The transformation of historical cleavages and the rise of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe by Bornschier, Simon








The transformation of historical cleavages and the rise of right-wing populist
parties in Western Europe
Bornschier, Simon





Bornschier, Simon. The transformation of historical cleavages and the rise of right-wing populist parties













The Transformation of Historical 
Cleavages and the Rise of  













Thesis to be presented to the 
Philosphische Fakultät der Universität Zürich 

























Part I: Putting Right-Wing Populist Parties in Context 
 
 
1.  The New Cultural Conflict and the Rise of the Populist Right 21 
 in Western Europe 
 
2.  The Extreme Right-Wing Populist Party Family 41 
 
 
Part II: New Political Divides and the  
Transformation of Historical Cleavages 
 
 
3.  Social Structure and Collective Identities: An Individual-Level Reading 67 
  of the Preconditions of Cleavage-Formation 
 
4.  From Structure to Culture and Back: The Perpetuation and Transformation  93 
 of Cleavages 
 
 
Part III: The New Cultural Cleavage and the Populist Right  
in France, Switzerland, and Germany 
 
 
5.  Methods and Research Design 123 
 
6.  France: The Reshaping of Cultural Conflicts and the Rise  149 
 of the Front National 
ii 
 
7.  Switzerland: The Role of Traditionalist-Communitarian Values and  197 
 National Autonomy in the Transformation of the Swiss People’s Party  
 
8.  Germany: A Constricted Ideological Space and the Failure  
 of the Extreme Right  247 
 
 
Part IV: Conclusions 
 
 
9.  The Redefinition of Cultural Conflicts and the Transformation of  299 










Appendix A:  Issue Positions and Issue Salience in the Campaign Data 315 
Appendix B:  Datasets Used for the Demand Side Analyses 329 
Appendix C:  Indicators Used for the Operationalization of Issue-Categories 331 














Table 3.1:  Political mobilization at the individual and collective levels  77 
Table 6.1:  Vote share of the Front National in parliamentary and  
 presidential elections in France, 1970s to 2000s 156 
Table 6.2:  Relevant issue-categories per election and those operationalized  
 on the demand side in France 164 
Table 6.3:  Political dimensions as determinants of voting choices in France,  
 1978-2002: Results from logistic regressions 183 
Table 6.4:  The social structural basis of support for the Front National 187 
Table 6.2:  Relevant issue-categories per election and those operationalized  
 on the demand side in Switzerland 214 
Table 7.2:  Results of a rotated factor analysis of old and new cultural issues  
 in the Swiss 1975 survey 218 
Table 7.3:  Political dimensions as determinants of voting choices in  
 Switzerland, 1975-1999: Results from logistic regressions 231 
Table 7.4:  The social structural basis of support for the SVP 236 
Table 7.5:  Interaction effects between social classes and ideological  
 positions as predictors for the SVP-vote, 1995 238 
Table 8.1: Newspaper coverage of extreme right-wing (populist) parties’  
 programmatic stances in six countries, late 1980s to early 2000s 263 
Table 8.2:  Perception of German voters that extreme right parties represent  
 their interests, by electorate, 1998 265 
Table 8.3: Relevant issue-categories and available data on the demand  
 side in Germany 274 
Table 8.4:  Political dimensions as determinants of voting choices in  
 Germany, 1976-2002: Results from logistic regressions 288 
Table A.1:  Issue positions of French parties in the four campaigns 316 
Table A.2:  Issue salience for French parties in the four campaigns 317 
Table A.3:  Issue positions of Austrian parties in the four campaigns 318 
Table A.4:  Issue salience for Austrian parties in the four campaigns 319 
Table A.5:  Issue positions of Swiss parties in the four campaigns 320 
iv 
Table A.6:  Issue salience for Swiss parties in the four campaigns 321 
Table A.7:  Issue positions of Dutch parties in the four campaigns 322 
Table A.8:  Issue salience for Dutch parties in the four campaigns 323 
Table A.9:  Issue positions of British parties in the four campaigns 324 
Table A.10: Issue salience for British parties in the four campaigns 325 
Table A.11: Issue positions of German parties in the four campaigns 326 




Figure 2.1:  The Political Space in Austria, 1994-2002 52 
Figure 2.2:  The Political Space in France, 1988-2002 53 
Figure 2.3:  The Political Space in Switzerland, 1991-1999 54 
Figure 2.4:  The Political Space in the Netherlands, 1998-2003 56 
Figure 2.5:  The Political Space in Germany, 1994-2002 58 
Figure 2.6:  The Political Space in Britain, 1992-2001 60 
Figure 4.1:  Social structure, collective identities and their reinforcement by  
 parties’ differing policy propositions 108 
Figure 4.2: Types of divide as a function of polarization, responsiveness,  
 and social closure 114 
Figure 5.1:  MDS-Solution for the 1988 French elections 129 
Figure 5.2:  Positions of parties and voters on the cultural dimension,  
 France 1988 132 
Figure 5.3:  Ideological blocks along the cultural dimension, France 1988 138 
Figure 6.1: Political Space in France, 1978-2002. Positions of parties and  
 issue-categories 162 
Figure 6.2:  Parties and voters on the cultural divide in France, 1978-2002.  
 Position, match, and polarization 166 
Figure 6.3:  Stability of alignments to the left-libertarian block, the centre-right  
 and the Front National in France, 1978-2002 170 
Figure 6.4:  Parties and voters on the economic divide in France,  
 1978-2002. Position, match, and polarization 173 
Figure 6.5:  Stability of alignments to the left and right blocks in France,  
 1978-2002 175 
Figure 6.6: Parties and voters on the EU-dimension in France, 1988-2002.  
 Position, match, and polarization 178 
Figure 6.7:  Voters’ positions on the economic and cultural dimensions of  
 European integration in France, 2002 181 
 
v 
Figure 6.8: Positions of social classes within the Front National’s electorate  
 in political space, 1988-2002 190 
Figure 7.1: Voter shares of the major parties and party blocks in Switzerland,  
 1975-2003 202 
Figure 7.2: Political space in Switzerland, 1975-1999. Positions of parties  
 and issue-categories 211 
Figure 7.3: Parties and voters on the cultural divide in Switzerland,  
 1975-1999. Position, match, and polarization 215 
Figure 7.4: Party electorates along the old and new cultural divides in  
 Switzerland, 1975 219 
Figure 7.5: Stability of alignments to the left-libertarian, centre-right and  
 extreme right ideological blocks in Switzerland, 1978-2002 221 
Figure 7.6: Parties and voters on the European integration dimension in  
 Switzerland, 1975-1999. Position, match, and polarization 224 
Figure 7.7: Parties and voters on the economic divide in Switzerland,  
 1975-1999. Position, match, and polarization 227 
Figure 7.8: Stability of preferences for the left, right, and Christian Democrat  
 party blocks in Switzerland, 1991-1999 229 
Figure 7.9: Economic and cultural positions within the SVP’s electorate,  
 broken down by class, 1995 and 1999 241 
Figure 8.1: Political space in Germany, 1976-2002. Positions of parties and  
 issue categories 271 
Figure 8.2: Parties and voters on the cultural divide in Germany,  
 1976-2002. Position, match, and polarization 276 
Figure 8.3: Stability of alignments to the left-libertarian, centre-left and  
 centre-right ideological blocks in Germany, 1994-2002 280 
Figure 8.4: Parties and voters on the economic divide in Germany,  
 1976-2002. Position, match, and polarization 284 
Figure 8.5: Stability of alignments to the left and right ideological  
 blocks in Germany, 1976-2002 286 
Figure 9.1: Patterns of opposition along the state-market cleavage in France, 
Switzerland, and Germany 303 
Figure 9.2: Patterns of opposition along the cultural divide and the  













Value Divides and the Transformation of Western European  
Party Systems 
 
The continuing presence of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe’s political 
landscape since the 1990s is a phenomenon escaping explanations centred on the level 
of individual countries. In spite of the recent split of the Front National, Jean-Marie 
Le Pen came in second in the French 2002 presidential elections, receiving more votes 
than the Socialist candidate. In Austria, Jörg Haider and a handful of faithful 
followers left the Freedom Party (FPÖ) after internal disputes, the party they had led 
to unprecedented electoral successes in the 1990s. Nonetheless, the FPÖ and the new 
party they formed together received no less than 15% of the vote in the 2006 election. 
In Switzerland, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) has become the strongest party and 
has recently gained a second seat in the country’s federal executive council. Strong 
right-wing populist parties also exist in Flemish Belgium and in Denmark. The 
populist right has become firmly entrenched in countries that differ markedly in terms 
of their institutions, their party systems, and their political cultures.  
Right-wing populist parties should be seen, I suggest in this book, in the larger 
context of changing societal structures that have affected party systems since the late 
1960s. While European party systems continue to carry the stamp of the historical 
class and religious cleavages, the dimensions underlying party interactions have been 
transformed. A first restructuring of political space occurred as a consequence of the 
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mobilization of the New Social Movements of the left in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Kitschelt 1994). This process has led to a transformation of Social Democratic 
parties as well as to the emergence of Ecologist parties, which have come to constitute 
the left-libertarian pole of a new cultural dimension of conflict that has succeeded the 
value divisions characteristic of the religious cleavage. Spurred by the educational 
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, the diffusion of universalistic values has thus led 
actors to call for the political enforcement of the principle of individual autonomy and 
the free choice of lifestyles. In a longer perspective, these developments can be seen 
as part of a long-term trend of secularization, as Flanagan and Lee (2003) have 
argued. 
Already in the 1980s, however, the contours of an opposing conception of commu-
nity, and of a different justification of moral principles has emerged in the form of the 
neo-conservative movement. Intellectuals and conservative political parties placed a 
renewed emphasis on tradition as a necessary binding force for society, and 
propagated solidarity in established communities such as the family as an antidote to 
the perils of individualization. While neo-conservatism remained an elitist ideology, 
the conservative counter-movement to the libertarian left gained momentum when the 
populist right, a new party type, succeeded in framing the question of identity and 
community in terms of “us” and “the other”. By putting the issues of immigration and 
the alleged inability of the integration of people with different cultural backgrounds 
onto the political agenda, the populist right has driven a second transformation of the 
dimensions of political conflict in the 1990s (Kriesi et al. 2006). Contrary to classical 
extreme right parties, the populist right does not adhere to racism and does not reject 
other cultures as such, but advocates an “ethnopluralist” ideal of preserving the 
distinctive traditions of national cultures.  
As a consequence, a new cultural conflict has gained centre stage in Western 
European party systems in the 1990s. The one side holds universalistic conceptions of 
community and advocates individual autonomy, the other emphasizes the right to 
preserve traditional communities in which common moral understandings have 
developed, and which are seen as threatened by multicultural society. These opposing 
positions mirror contemporary debates between liberals and communitarians in 
political philosophy, and in their extreme form constitute the poles of a political 
dimension of conflict that runs from libertarian-universalistic to traditionalist-
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communitarian values. While liberal philosophers such as Rawls (1971) emphasise 
universally binding norms, even moderate communitarians like Walzer (1983) are 
more reluctant to grant abstract principles primacy over shared moral understandings 
within an “organic” community. New Right intellectuals such as Alain de Benoist 
have popularized and radicalized the latter view, and have provided a blueprint for the 
populist right’s “differentialist nativist” discourse, as Betz (2002, 2004) has termed it.  
The factors determining the success of extreme right parties in the 1980s have been 
quite diverse, leading Kitschelt (1995) to differentiate several types of such parties, 
that differ in their programmatic orientation. While some of them, such as the French 
Front National or the Swiss SVP, allegedly have an authoritarian free-market appeal, 
others, such as the Austrian Freedom Party, are assumed to thrive more on populist 
anti-state pleas. These differences are conceived as a the product of country-specific 
opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1995, McGann and Kitschelt 2005). In this first 
mobilization phase, anti-immigrant stances have played a minor role. And even today, 
they clearly capitalize on more than just opposition to immigration, even if the issue 
has catalyzed their success (Mudde 1999). 
If the differences were ever that stark, the “identitarian turn” of the 1990s in the 
discourse of right-wing populist parties, to use Betz’s (2004) expression, has resulted 
in a programmatic convergence across countries. Rather than mobilizing country-
specific potentials, these parties thrive on an ideologically homogeneous group of 
voters that are located at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the new cultural 
dimension of conflict. As a consequence, extreme right-wing populist parties, or right-
wing populist for short, can be considered a common party family within the broader 
category of extreme right parties. Apart from their location at the extreme of the 
ideological dimension running from libertarian-universalistic to traditionalist-
communitarian positions, two further attributes distinguish them from other parties. 
The first is their populist anti-establishment discourse, in which they draw a dividing 
line between themselves and the established parties both of the left and right. 
Secondly, they exhibit a hierarchical internal structure, which sets them apart from 
pluralist mainstream parties, and which allows a charismatic leader to quickly revert 
the party’s positions in reaction to the changing moods of the populace. This 
organizational feature has enabled right-wing populist parties to rapidly cater the 
immigration theme, as well as to exploit new issues such as European integration. 
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Within the wider extreme right party family, the extreme populist right represents an 
ideologically more moderate sub-group, both by virtue of its “differentialist nativist” 
discourse, as well as its explicit adherence to democratic rule. This allows right-wing 
populist parties to portray themselves as the ignored mainstream of society.  
According to my argument, these parties mobilize political potentials that oppose 
societal evolutions that began in the 1960s as a consequence of an enlarged structural 
basis for universalistic values – indeed, an outcome of the critical juncture of the 
educational revolution. This of course raises the question why it took the 
traditionalist-communitarian potential so long to manifest itself in partisan politics, 
after the libertarian-universalistic movement had early on led to the formation of 
Ecologist parties and the transformation of Social Democratic or Socialist parties. 
Indeed, Sacchi (1998) has shown that both the universalistic potential, as well as the 
reaction to it, were already present at the attitudinal level in Western mass publics in 
the 1970s. The emergence and subsequent cross-national diffusion of the 
“differentalist nativist” political frame has certainly played a role here, and can be 
considered a necessary condition for the success of right-wing populist parties, as 
Rydgren (2005) has suggested. This echoes the older distinction between “old” 
extreme right parties of a fascist imprint, and a “new”, post-industrial type of extreme 
right party that Ignazi (1992, 2003) has put forward.  
 
 
Historical Cleavages and the Rise of Right-Wing Populist Parties  
 
Notwithstanding the increasing similarities of right-wing populist parties in terms of 
their discourse, however, their far from uniform success across Western Europe begs 
an explanation. While a first major theme of this book is to demonstrate the back-
ground of right-wing populist parties’ mobilization in terms of ideology and societal 
potentials, the second objective is to place the emergence of this new party family in 
the wider context of stability and change of party systems. More specifically, I 
suggest that we should pay attention to the interplay between the traditional conflicts 
that underlie European party systems, and new political conflicts that may or may not 
alter the dominant patterns of oppositions. New divides will only materialize if the 
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established cleavage structure no longer “organizes” issues cutting across existing 
lines of division “out of politics”, in Schattschneider’s (1975 [1960]: Ch. 4) famous 
words. In a similar vein, Kriesi and Duyvendak (1995) have argued that a zero-sum 
relationship exists between the strength of the existing cleavages and the political 
potentials for the manifestation of new conflicts.  
Before this insight can be translated into an empirically applicable analytical 
model, however, a conceptual re-assessment of the cleavage concept itself is 
necessary. There is a basic contradiction between those strands of research that 
understand cleavages as (historically rooted) alliances between certain social 
structural groups and political parties (e.g., Franklin et al. 1992) and those who 
conceive cleavages as dimensions of conflict that underlie interactions in party system 
(e.g., Bartolini, Mair 1990, Mair 1997). A third strand (e.g., Evans 1999a) is 
concerned with new structural divisions that shape voting behaviour, but has 
difficulties in showing how newly found antagonisms relate to the historical cleavages 
of the Lipset-Rokkan account. The cleavage concept’s major strength lies in its 
potential capacity to bridge the macro- and micro-levels of analysis by bringing to 
bear macro-historical processes on individual political behaviour. However, 
contradictions in the understanding of the concept itself, as well as a lack of 
conceptual tools appropriate for applying it, limit its analytical usefulness.  
Depending on the approach one takes, different implications emerge regarding the 
space that the historical cleavages leave for the mobilization of new conflicts. The 
social structural determinants of alignments along the traditional class and religious 
cleavages have lost in strength, and we could therefore conclude that the potential for 
new conflicts to emerge is large. On the other hand, new linkages between social 
groups and political parties have crystallized, and voting behaviour therefore 
continues to have a structural basis (Kriesi 1998, Müller 1999, Evans 1999b, Oesch 
2006). The remarkable stability of European party systems can therefore be accounted 
for by the durability of the basic divisions underlying these party systems. Conflicts 
associated with the historical cleavages continue to bind large parts of the electorate, 
but at the same time, the meaning and content of these basic divisions have been 
modified. It is therefore debatable whether it can be said that the cleavages themselves 
have remained stable. Thus, contradictions and a lack of consensus are inherent in 
existing approaches to the study of cleavages, which limit the usefulness of the 
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concept. To take into account the evolving nature of cleavages, I propose to link the 
concept to the patterns of programmatic conflict that structure party competition.  
In developing this argument, the first step is to take a fresh look at how cleavages 
are formed and subsequently perpetuated. Drawing on social movement research that 
has most extensively addressed the conditions that allow the mobilization of new 
conflicts, I argue that the neglect of the central role that collective identities play in 
the mobilization as well as in the “freezing” of cleavages leads to inadequate 
understandings of the cleavage concept itself. Cleavages will emerge only under very 
specific circumstances that are conductive to the formation of collective identities of 
the groups involved. Taking Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) influential definition of a 
cleavage further, I show that social structural commonalities and shared interests 
alone are insufficient to account for the formation of cleavages. Even if based on 
common interests, collective action requires the existence of a sense of community 
within a group, as well as a clear demarcation from others. While political actors can 
to a certain degree form and reinforce collective identities, such efforts take place 
within the boundaries of the structural and cultural similarities of the groups in 
question. To explain the translation of structural divides into political oppositions it is 
therefore necessary to move beyond conceptions of political behaviour as motivated 
by narrow self-interest, and include the ideas, ideologies, and specific historical 
sequences of mobilization that lead to the formation of cleavages. The classical 
exponents of the cleavage approach such as Lipset and Rokkan (1967), as well as 
Bartolini and Mair (1990), if not explicitly, then at least by implication adhere to such 
a “culturalist structuralism”. In empirical applications of the cleavage approach, 
however, the collective identity element is almost invariably neglected. 
A focus on collective identity also allows us to make sense of the famous “freezing 
into place” of European party systems that Lipset and Rokkan (1967b) observed, a 
process that has remained poorly understood to this day, as Mair (2001) has stated. 
Cleavages remain stable and “organize out” new issues to the degree that the basic 
oppositions they represent continue to shape voters’ understandings and interpre-
tations of politics. New voters are socialized into the existing structure of cleavages, 
and develop cognitive schemas that allow them to interpret new issues in terms of 
basic ideological divisions. They also acquire political identities that help them to 
locate themselves within their schematic representation of politics, and allows them to 
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take political decisions with little information at hand. The room the established 
cleavages leave for new conflicts therefore depends on the persistence of the 
collective social and political identities they entail. 
Consequently, a durable pattern of political behaviour of structurally (or 
politically) defined groups – a cleavage – has its origin in the conflicts resulting from 
a macro-historical critical juncture, but its continued saliency depends on its being 
kept alive by contemporary political conflict. Conflict has group-binding functions 
(Coser 1956), and collective political identities will therefore gradually become 
weaker if they are not reinforced by political conflict. By the same token, cleavages 
will no longer be transmitted over generations if the conflict they stand for has lost its 
relevance, and a window of opportunity for new conflicts will emerge on the political 
stage. Determining the space for new conflicts therefore requires the inclusion of the 
divergence of parties’ policy positions into the study of cleavages.  
Given the role of conflict in stabilizing and perpetuating cleavages, then, the 
analytical model I develop in this book focuses on the lines of conflict that actually 
structure party interactions in election campaigns. The empirical evidence presented 
in this study suggests that party oppositions evolve around two conflicts in the six 
countries studied, namely, France, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, 
and Britain. The first is the political manifestation of the traditional class cleavage, 
whose social structural underpinnings suggest that it has evolved into a broader state-
market cleavage. The second dimension is a cultural divide that is reminiscent of the 
religious cleavage, but has been enriched by new issues. As survey research has 
shown, the social basis of the religious cleavage had already shifted from religious 
denomination to religiosity some time ago (Lachat 2004, Elff 2002a, 2002b), and had 
thus lost some of its foundation in social structure. As a consequence of the dual 
mobilization efforts of the New Left and of the counter-mobilization of the New 
Right, it is now characterized by a value-based opposition between libertarian-
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Programmatic Lines of Conflict and Opportunities for Right-Wing 
Populist Mobilization 
 
A central argument developed in this book is that the rise of the populist right is a 
consequence of the growing salience of this new cultural dimension of conflict at the 
expense of the economic state-market cleavage. Differing from Kitschelt’s (1995) 
idea of a right-wing populist “winning formula” that combines authoritarian ethno-
centrism and free-market economics, I show that these parties almost exclusively 
mobilize on the cultural dimension. In fact, they rally an electoral coalition that is 
united by relatively homogeneous cultural preferences, but that diverges much more 
in terms of their orientations regarding the desired degree of state intervention in the 
economy. As the example of the French Front National most clearly demonstrates, the 
continued success of right-wing populist parties crucially depends on the prevalence 
of culturally, as opposed to culturally defined group identifications among its voters. 
Consequently, right-wing populist parties thrive only if cultural conflicts appear more 
salient to voters than antagonisms along the economic divide. It is therefore essential 
to move beyond one-dimensional left-right conceptions of political space and to 
distinguish clearly between the parties’ positions on both dimensions that are found to 
underlie party oppositions in Western Europe.  
Previous studies have addressed the question to which degree support for the 
populist right depends on the strategies employed by mainstream parties, and on the 
political space they leave to the populist right. However, their predictions are either 
weakened by assumption that party positions can be represented on a single left-right 
dimension, which meshes positions on the cultural and economic divides (e.g., Abedi 
2002, Carter 2005), or by the conviction that voters will only support parties that 
adequately represent them on both relevant dimensions (Kitschelt 1995). Both 
assumptions are problematic and do not hold up against empirical evidence. For 
scholars working within the cleavage approach, the idea that voters may experience 
conflicts of interest as a result of cross-cutting cleavages is in fact far from new. As a 
result of the recent transformation of the cultural dimension of conflict in European 
party systems, this problem is posed anew and has resulted in dealignment and 
realignment of various groups of voters. Two important predictors emerge that 
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structure the opportunities for the populist right. One is the relative importance of the 
economic and cultural dimensions of conflict to its potential voters, and the other is 
the relative saliency of the various group identifications that these voters hold. It is 
only the veining of collective identities based on social class that has made possible 
mobilization efforts based on national identity and tradition, because the former have 
typically cut across such broad ascriptive categories. 
The analytical model developed in this book focuses separately on each dimension 
of conflict and its contribution in structuring political alignments. It combines a focus 
on parties’ programmatic offer with an analysis of the preferences or the political 
demand of voters. Beyond addressing the question of the relative importance of the 
two dimensions of conflict for the mobilization of the various party families, it 
focuses on two factors that impinge on the chances for challenging parties to gain 
success. The first factor, in the tradition of Bartolini and Mair (1990), as well as 
Kriesi and Duyvendak (1995), is the degree of closure of the social groups divided by 
a cleavage. The closure of social groups is essential because where existing group 
identifications are strong, mobilization efforts along new lines of social division are 
difficult. While I discuss at length the interplay between social structure and 
collective identities in the theoretical chapters, an empirical study of this relationship 
at the individual level faces formidable problems of measurement.  
To a large degree, however, these problems are due to a lack of appropriate 
analytical tools. I therefore suggest concepts that make such measurement possible in 
principle, but limitations in the data available in standard electoral surveys make their 
empirical implementation difficult. As a consequence, and for additional reasons that 
will become more apparent later on, I shift attention from social or group identities to 
political identities. Political identities are the combined result of common locations in 
social structure, and of the politicization of the interests associated with those 
locations by political parties. While are obviously more remote from social structure 
than social identities, they have the advantage of empirical measurability. In practice, 
I therefore follow Bartolini and Mair (1990) in focusing on the loyalties of voters to 
ideologically defined blocks of parties. However, in attempting to bridge the micro 
and macro levels of analysis, I employ survey data to determine the loyalty of voters. 
This allows an inclusion of the political orientations underlying voters’ political 
identities in the analysis.  
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The second factor impinging on the chances for right-wing populist parties is the 
opportunity structure resulting from the programmatic positions and the strategies of 
the established parties. Where the established parties absorb the traditionalist-
communitarian potentials that gain room as a result of the veining of the traditional 
cleavages, the populist right will have difficulties in entrenching itself. In other words, 
the responsiveness of the party system to the preferences of the electorate is of crucial 
importance here. Likewise, if the established parties keep polarization around the new 
cultural conflicts low, they may be able to contain the manifestation of the 
traditionalist-communitarian potential, while at the same time remaining responsive to 
their constituencies. To determine the responsiveness of a party system in a particular 
election, I reconstruct the lines of conflict structuring the campaign on the voter side 
and measure the positions of party electorates using survey data. Combining the 
responsiveness of the party system and voter loyalties to ideological party blocks 
results in a typology that distinguishes several types of divide that leave varying room 
for the manifestation of new conflicts and parties. To the degree that the party system 
adequately reflects the preferences of voters, more polarized positions will reinforce 
the underlying group identifications and political identities. If polarization is weak, on 
the other hand, then alignments may be stabilized in the short run by the prevalence of 
strong social and political identities. But in the longer run, they are likely to give way 
to new alignments if sufficiently polarizing new conflicts emerge.  
 
 
Applying the Model: The Countries Studied 
 
While the theoretical approach developed in this book is not geared at a specific party 
family, it will be applied to explain the success of right-wing populist parties in 
Western Europe. In a first analysis of the right-wing populist party family, I focus on 
France, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain. These countries 
vary in important respects, such as their size, the degree to which they experienced an 
economic crisis in the 1990s, and regarding their political institutions, which range 
from clearly majoritarian to highly consensual. Furthermore, their party systems 
differ, ranging from a two-party system in Britain to multi-party formats with 6 to 7 
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effective parties in certain Swiss and Dutch legislatures in the 1990s. The results 
reveal that for all the differences between these countries, the same dimensions of 
opposition have come to characterize party interactions from the 1990s on, namely, 
the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian and a state-market line 
of conflict. While the transformation of political space has thus been remarkably 
similar in spite of important contextual variation, right-wing populist parties have not 
profited to the same degree from this dynamic. Whereas they have not only 
experienced considerable electoral breakthroughs in the French, Swiss, Austrian, and 
Dutch party systems, they have failed to establish themselves at the national level in 
Germany and Britain. In a second step, I therefore apply the analytical model 
described above to three exemplary cases. Two of these exemplify different routes to 
the establishment of a strong right-wing populist party, while one shows how the 
established parties can under certain circumstances inhibit the emergence of a new 
party of this type.  
France is the first country studied, and represents a case where a new right-wing 
populist party was able to establish itself early on. The Front National was the first 
party to adopt a modern culturalist discourse some 25 years ago, and still represents 
something like the “avant garde” of this party type. A poster from the 2007 
presidential campaign, and reproduced here (see picture on page 12), shows a young 
woman of African descent despising the established left and right for having ruined 
the country, while supporting Le Pen’s plea for assimilation, social mobility, and 
laicism – indeed, some of France’s fundamental republican values.  
The second case is that of Switzerland, where an established actor of the right, the 
Swiss People’s Party (SVP), underwent a transformation from a conservative to a 
right-wing populist party. This route is similar to that of the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in 
Austria. While the FPÖ is generally considered a party of new extreme right (e.g. 
Ignazi 2002, 2003), the SVP’s status as a member of this party family is more 
disputed, in particular because of the role that opposition against European integration 
has played in its success. While the country’s troubled relationship to the European 
Union has certainly played a role in catalyzing the SVP’s rise, the analysis seeks to 
establish that Switzerland faces a transformation of its party system that is closely 
comparable to what is occurring elsewhere in Europe.  
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Advert from the Front National’s 2007 presidential election campaign 
Source: http://lepen2007.fr/blog/index.php?Photos [retrieved 27.2.2007] 
 
Finally, I analyse Germany as one case where the populist right did not experience an 
electoral breakthrough, and represents a crucial test for the theoretical framework 
developed. Both in Germany and in Britain it could be and has in fact been argued 
that political institutions, most prominently the electoral systems, or in the German 
case the National Socialist past, explain the absence of a successful right-wing 
populist party (e.g., Ignazi 2003). While the National Socialist past does seem to play 
a role in the case of Germany, I will argue that there is little evidence to support the 
claim put forward by Givens (2005) that the electoral system has played a decisive 
role in containing the extreme right’s success in that country. In fact, Carter (2005) 
shows in a large-scale quantitative comparison that the electoral system loses its 
explanatory power once features of the political context and of extreme right parties 
themselves are taken into account. My own analysis suggests that the strength of 
established political identities and the patterns of opposition in the party system are at 
least as important as the other factors mentioned, and that the patterns of opposition in 
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the party system are likely to play a decisive role in Britain as well. In particular, the 
German case suggests that the way in which the left is transformed by the left-
libertarian movements impinges on the traditionalist-communitarian potential.  
The Dutch trajectory cannot easily be accommodated in any of the routes sketched 
out. It may be argued that the liberal VVD has pre-empted the populist right’s success 
by virtue of its pronounced traditionalist-communitarian position. At the same time, 
this did not prevent the spectacular eruption of the List Pim Fortuyn in the 2002 
elections. As will be shown, Pim Portuyn’s discourse was not really traditionalist-
communitarian, making him fit uneasily into the right-wing populist party family. For 
these reasons, the Netherlands merit a more in-depth treatment that will, however, 
have to await a later analysis. It will be all the more interesting because it is not yet 
clear at the moment whether Geert Wilders’s newly founded “Partij voor de vrijheid” 




Measuring the Programmatic Content of Party Oppositions 
 
In order to locate parties in the resulting issue space, I rely on data based on a coding 
of the media coverage of election campaigns that has been collected within a larger 
project (Kriesi et al. 2006), and covers one election in the 1970s, and three elections 
in the 1990s and 2000s. The choice of this data has advantages as well as 
disadvantages. Its advantages over expert survey data are clear. Because small 
political formations such as right-wing populist parties may not have marked profiles 
concerning all issue dimensions, expert surveys risk to produce data that is biased by 
theoretical expectations regarding parties’ positions. An obvious disadvantage of the 
campaign data over that collected by the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative 
Manifestos Project (Budge et al. 2001, Klingemann et al. 2006) is that is covers only a 
relatively limited time-span. Given the focus on the long-term transformation of 
cleavages, it would have been promising to be able to extend the analysis to the 1950s 
and 1960s, where it is generally assumed that cleavages were still “frozen”. An 
important advantage of the campaign data over party manifestos and especially over 
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expert surveys is that the positions derived from the newspaper coverage of election 
campaigns more closely reflects what voters actually learn of the parties’ positions, 
which is heavily determined by what the dominant themes of the campaign are. The 
data is therefore more situational, which is advantageous for the present problem for a 
number of reasons. Because the populist right has succeeded in setting the media 
agenda in recent years, it has forced even those parties to take positions regarding 
immigration and traditionalist-communitarian values that were more occupied with 
economic than with cultural issues in their election programs, for example. 
Furthermore, because I assume that voters’ preferences and political identities can be 
reinforced by conflict between parties, it is useful to focus on those conflicts that were 
actually fought out during the campaign. Furthermore, the media data offer 
information both on the position of parties regarding the issues of the campaign, as 
well as on their relative salience. Using Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling, 
both position and salience can be taken into account to create graphical 
representations of political space.  
Although the lack of information on election campaigns preceding the 
transformation of the traditional cleavages is regrettable, the later elections covered by 
the media data are ideal for the research question at hand. In the one election analyzed 
in the mid-1970s, we expect a situation in which the political space has undergone a 
first transformation under the impact of the mobilization of the New Left and the new 
issues it has brought on the political agenda. Three campaigns in the 1990s and early 
2000s then cover the years in which the right-wing populist counter-mobilization 
gained momentum, resulting in a second transformation of the political space and of 
Western European party systems. Three time-points in each country allow a study of 
the strategies employed by the established parties as well as of the their consequences 
for right-wing populist parties. On the political demand side, national post-election 
surveys are used to measure voters’ positions along the dimensions of party 
opposition and their loyalties to ideologically defined party blocks. 
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Plan of the Book 
 
The first part of this book addresses the defining characteristics of right-wing populist 
parties and the potentials underlying their rise. In Chapter 1, I discuss the emergence 
of the new cultural divide that opposes libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-
communitarian values and justify the claim that these are polar normative ideals. 
Chapter 2 argues that right-wing populist parties can be considered a common party 
family by virtue of their specific position regarding the new cultural dimension of 
oppositions, as well as two further criteria. This hypothesis is verified in an empirical 
analysis of the programmatic content of party oppositions of three election campaigns 
in the 1990s in France, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain. 
The results reveal that the political spaces of these countries have come to be 
structured by the same dimensions – namely, the state-market dimension and the new 
cultural divide – and confirms the claim that there has been a convergence of the 
programmatic profile of right-wing populist parties in this decade. The analysis also 
shows, however, that the List Pim Fortuyn is at best a highly untypical member of this 
party family. Furthermore, Chapter 2 suggests that the established parties of the right 
in Germany and Britain may have absorbed the traditionalist-communitarian potential 
that right-wing populist parties thrive on. 
Part 2 then puts the mobilization of the populist right into the context of the 
transformation of historical cleavages that has occurred since the 1960s. Chapter 3 
introduces the cleavage concept and discusses the conditions necessary for the 
mobilization of cleavages. By drawing on social psychological theories, it seeks to 
develop tools that bridge the micro and macro levels of analysis by showing how 
collective identities can be grasped and measured at the individual-level. While these 
conceptual tools require more specific information on individuals’ group attachments 
and social networks than the surveys used in this study contain, this chapter also 
serves to clear the ground for the following one, which is concerned with the way 
cleavages are perpetuated. In Chapter 4, I first discuss the various understandings of 
what accounts for the “freezing” of Western European party systems after the full 
mobilization of electorates in the 1920s. In discussing the paradox of a remarkable 
overall stability of party systems in the midst of massive societal changes, I again 
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highlight the central role of collective identities in the perpetuation of cleavages. As 
time goes by, however, cleavages appear less structured by social identities – such as 
class or religious denomination – but more and more become politically defined 
collective identities. The chapter ends with an analytical model that distinguishes 
various types of cleavages and political divides that impinge on the mobilization 
space of political actors seeking to politicize new conflicts. This model is the basis for 
the country studies in Part III. 
In order to avoid all too technical considerations in the country chapters, Part III 
begins with a chapter that discusses the data used as well as the methodological 
choices involved in the empirical implementation of the analytical model set out. 
Chapter 5 also explains in detail the collection and characteristics of the media data 
used throughout the book. It also explains the procedures used to analyse the demand 
side data. Here, the shift from social to political collective identities has the advantage 
of making them more amenable to measurement using survey data. Because the 
application of the analytical model is rather complex, it is illustrated in that chapter 
using concrete examples.  
The analysis of the role the reshaping of cultural conflicts has played in the rise of 
the French Front National in Chapter 6 then sets the stage for the country studies. All 
the country chapters begin by outlining of the country-specific context. This includes 
consideration of the traditional cleavages that underlie the party system, as well as 
how firmly the party system remains anchored in social structure. It also discusses 
how the issues evolving around a traditionalist-communitarian defence of community 
have been dealt with by the established parties and what the resulting potentials for a 
right-wing populist mobilization are. The chapters then go on to the analysis of the 
patterns of opposition in the respective party systems. The results generated by the 
analytical model set out in Chapter 4 are thereby confronted with and validated by 
prior qualitative and quantitative findings. Beyond the common analysis, each of the 
country chapters fleshes out country-specific ways in which the traditionalist-
communitarian potential is mobilized and identifies additional determinants of the 
success of the populist right. Thus, the analysis of the French case sheds light on the 
role of European integration in the Front National’s mobilization, and underlines the 
importance of the strategies both of the established right and of the left in shaping the 
potential for the populist right.  
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The analysis of the rise of the Swiss People’s Party in Chapter 7 underlines the 
similarities in the political potentials that right-wing populist parties thrive upon, 
despite the varying role played by conflicts over European integration. What is 
frequently referred to as an “openness to the world vs. demarcation divide” in 
Switzerland is in fact only a variant of the more general antagonism between 
libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. Finally, the German 
case treated in Chapter 8 shows once more that political potentials are not only shaped 
by societal factors, but also by the strategies of political actors. Contrary to the French 
case, the established parties in Germany were able to contain the mobilization of the 
traditionalist-communitarian potential by new political actors. Far from being 
idiosyncratic, it thus suggests ways in which the emergence of a party of the populist 
right can be averted.  
The conclusion summarized the patterns of opposition found in the three countries 
as well as the similarities and differences in the politicization of the libertarian-
universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian line of conflict in the three countries 
studied. It also suggests that features of the party systems may have impinged on the 
strategies chosen by the established parties, and which have led to the emergence of 
right-wing populist parties in some cases, and to their failure in others. Finally, it 
assesses the prospects for the future success of the populist right and for the 
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In the course of the last two decades, right-wing populist parties have gained sizable 
vote shares in France, Switzerland, and Austria. In the Netherlands, Pim Fortuyn has 
succeeded in breaking into a party system whose segmentation and “pillarization” 
once made it an example of stability. Throughout much of the post-war period, 
Switzerland and Austria had also been marked by a high stability of the party 
alternatives. In these countries, as well as in Denmark, Norway, Italy, and Belgium, 
the success of new parties of the right has largely surpassed that of older parties of the 
extreme right, which seemed to have represented a “normal pathology” resulting from 
tensions created by rapid change in industrial societies (Scheuch, Klingemann 1967). 
Certainly, the optimism of the “golden age” of growth after World War II has given 
way to a more gloomy feelings of malaise in the era of unemployment and austerity 
politics. The enduring success of right-wing populist parties, however, as well as the 
increasing similarity of their discourse suggest that they are more than a populist 
outbreak of disenchantment with electoral politics. Rather, it has become apparent that 
a common potential must underlie their rise.  
Right-wing populist parties should be seen, I suggest in this chapter, in the larger 
context of changing societal structures that have affected party systems since the late 
1960s. More specifically, the populist right rides the tide of a broader societal 
movement that represents a counter-offensive to the universalistic values advocated 
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by the New Social Movements that have come up in the 1960s. The subsequent 
emergence of Ecologist parties and the New Left transformation of Social Democracy 
have caused a first restructuring of political space in the 1970s and 1980s (Kitschelt 
1994). In contrast, the populist right has driven a second re-definition of the 
dimensions of political conflict in the 1990s (Kriesi et al. 2006). A new cultural line 
of conflict has thereby taken shape across Europe that opposes libertarian-
universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. As a result, the various types 
of extreme right parties that Kitschelt (1995) has distinguished have largely vanished 
since their turn to identity politics. Consequently, I argue and show empirically in 
later chapters that right-wing populist parties mobilize more or less exclusively on the 
cultural dimension of conflict. What remains of their market-liberal credentials, which 
play an important role in Kitschelt’s (1995) “winning formula” of the New Radical 
Right, are therefore largely irrelevant to their success.  
As a result of their programmatic convergence, right-wing populist parties’ 
discourse now centres on three convictions. They claim, first, that traditional norms 
based on common understanding stand over abstract universalistic principles, and 
second, that multicultural society destroys the “organically grown” national 
community, and thus dilutes those traditional norms. Thirdly, they insist on the 
primacy of politics, in that majority decisions taken within a political community 
stand above universalistic normative principles and decisions taken by supra-national 
political authorities such as the European Union. This chapter demonstrates that the 
populist right’s traditionalist-communitarian discourse represents a polar normative 
ideal to the libertarian-universalistic conviction of the New Left. Chapter 2 then 
verifies this claim empirically, besides offering the criteria necessary to define the 
right-wing populist party family. 
Although I argue that the potential underlying right-wing populist parties’ appeal is 
cultural, economic factors have shaped the prospects for the mobilization of this 
potential in one specific respect. The processes of globalization and European 
integration have resulted in a diminished autonomy of economic and social policy 
making at the national level, and have thereby contributed to a weakening of the 
saliency of economic as opposed to cultural conflicts. Because the mobilization of the 
populist right hinges crucially on the saliency of cultural, as opposed to economically 
defined group divisions within its electorate, globalization and Europeanization have 
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catalyzed the (belated) manifestation of the conservative pole of the universalistic-
traditionalist axis of political conflict.  
 
 
The New Cultural Conflict 
 
The advent of value-based conflicts in the late 1960s 
 
Around 1968, new political issues came up that had more to do with values and life-
styles than with traditional, distributional conflicts. As Inglehart (1977) has put it, a 
“silent revolution” took place that led segments of society to question traditional 
societal values and forms of politics. Differing somewhat from this initial emphasis 
on political styles (e.g., Offe 1985), the resulting disputes are now more often 
described as cultural and value-based in character. A “postmodern political conflict” 
has developed, which was characterized by Inglehart as an opposition between 
materialist and post-materialist values. As Flanagan and Lee (2003) have recently 
shown, an opposition between “libertarian” and “authoritarian” values continues to 
polarize the inhabitants of advanced industrial countries. The two authors conceive 
the shift from authoritarian to libertarian values as part of a long-term process of 
secularization, which leads from theism over modernism to postmodernism. In theism, 
the localization of authority is external and transcendental, and truth and morality are 
based on absolute principles. In modernism, it is still external, and universal, but 
based in and constructed by society. Finally, in postmodernism, the location of 
authority “has become internal and individual” (Flanagan, Lee 2003: 237). The 
mobilization and the counter-mobilization around the antagonisms between authority 
and autonomy, and between conformism and non-conformism, according to Flanagan 
and Lee, are expressions of this shift. 
Consequently, after distributive issues had structured the left-right divide for a long 
time, the movements of the New Left brought value and identity issues on the political 
agenda. Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck (1984), together with Inglehart (1984), claimed 
early on that identity- and lifestyle-politics were transforming the traditional left-right 
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dimension, leading to the political realignment of social groups that blurred the socio-
structural basis of voting choice. In a similar vein, Kitschelt (1994) has then shown 
that in the 1980s, the value divide has created a two-dimensional political space in 
European party systems. Cutting across the “old” distributional axis, a line of conflict 
opposing libertarian and authoritarian values had come to structure the attitudes of 
voters. At the heart of this conflict, in Kitschelt’s account, are different conceptions of 
community, where the values of equality and liberty in a self-organized community 
form the one pole, while values centring on paternalism and corporatism form the 
opposite pole (Kitschelt 1994: 9-12). 
This conception is quite similar to the somewhat broader pattern that Flanagan and 
Lee (2003) have detected. As a variety of sources of the policy positions of political 
parties show, political space in advanced western democracies is at least two, if not 
three-dimensional (Warwick 2002). However, it is not clear to which degree these 
dimensions are really new or if they have simply been rendered more salient in the 
past decades. Most probably, this is due to the fact that the new value opposition so 
far has only been discussed in relation to the traditional class cleavage. But even if 
most European party systems do not carry the stamp of all four cleavages that resulted 
from the national and industrial revolutions (Rokkan 2000), many European countries 
are characterized by more than just one cleavage. With the religious cleavage 
representing the second common structuring element of European party systems 
(Kriesi 1994: 211-234), political space in multiparty systems is likely to have been 
two-dimensional already before the New Social Movements of the 1960s and 1970s 
transformed the meaning of „left“ and „right“. Indeed, Flanagan and Lee’s (2003) 
explicitly relate today’s libertarian-authoritarian value divide to an opposition 
between religious and secular worldviews. 
On the political left, the prominence of libertarian political issues has given rise to 
the establishment of Ecologist parties and a transformation of Social Democratic 
parties early on in the 1980s, as Kitschelt (1994) has shown. As a result of this 
change, they have attracted an increasing number of votes from the middle class, 
especially in certain constituencies of it such as among the so-called social-cultural 
professionals (Kriesi 1993a, 1998, Müller 1999). On the political right, however, the 
impact of this new dimension of conflict has had less of a uniform impact, although 
Kitschelt (1995) has argued that radical right parties constituted the opposite pole on 
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the new libertarian-authoritarian axis of conflict. Similarly, in Ignazi’s (1992, 1996, 
2003) interpretation, radical right parties are a “by-product of a Silent Counter-
revolution”, in other words an equivalent on the right to Inglehart’s “Silent 
Revolution”. However, the process these authors sketch out for the rise of the radical 
right is much more country-specific than the process on the left, where countries 
primarily diverge in the extent to which older parties of the left or newly founded 
Ecologist parties absorbed the New Left issue agenda (see Hug 2001). Furthermore, 
the political orientations of right-wing extremist supporters seem to have varied 
between countries as well (Gabriel 1996).  
Kitschelt’s (1995: Ch. 1) explicit differentiation of European radical right-wing 
parties exemplifies the heterogeneity of this category. According to the author, the 
combination of authoritarian and free-market appeals constitutes the “winning 
formula” characteristic of “New Radical Right”. This programmatic profile may seem 
somewhat contradictory, but allegedly it allows parties such as the Front National to 
appeal to losers of modernization, as well as to disenchanted segments of the middle 
class. In other cases, the model is specified in that party systems and political 
economies characterized by patronage make a populist anti-statist strategy most 
successful, as in the case of the Austrian FPÖ or the Italian Lega Nord. In still other 
cases, a “welfare chauvinist” strategy is most promising. Due to these differences in 
the programmatic profile of the radical right, it is debatable if its rise can be 
considered an equivalent transformation of the political right to that of the left in its 
move towards libertarian positions. 
I would argue that in the 1980s, the “winning formula” of right-wing populist 
parties consisted not so much in a specific programmatic profile, as Kitschelt argued, 
but in a strategic flexibility, which allowed them to capture issues that other parties 
had neglected. Right-wing populist parties’ main commonality in their first 
mobilization phase in the 1980s was, therefore, primarily their anti-establishment 
discourse (Betz 1998 and the country chapters in Betz and Immerfall 1998, Schedler 
1996). This was combinable with advocating issues which the established parties did 
not take up, in the 1980s for example neo-liberal demands (in the domestic realm), 
and allowed right-wing populist parties to present themselves as “anti-cartel-parties” 
in Katz and Mair’s (1995) terminology. Their prime advantage in seizing such 
changing programmatic opportunity structures was their hierarchical internal 
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structure. Setting them apart from the pluralist character of the established parties, this 
permitted them to repeatedly revert their policy-positions in response to sentiments in 
the populace. Immigration policies, on the other hand, did not play a prominent role 
until the early 1990s (see Betz [2004: Ch. 2] for a review and Swyngedouw [2000] on 
late adoption of the immigration issue by the Vlaams Blok).  
Hence, to the degree that oppositions along the cultural axis of political 
competition are likely to result in a reconfiguration of existing cleavages, this process 
has probably only started in the late 1980s or early 1990s. While empirical studies 
have shown that an authoritarian potential arose at approximately the same time as the 
libertarian potential (Sacchi 1998), this has not immediately resulted in strong support 
for traditionalist stances. For this traditionalist or authoritarian potential to be 
politicized in a way that mobilizes broad segments of society, it probably has to be 
connected with more concrete political conflicts that are conductive to collective 
identity formation. Both social movement theory, as well as Cleavage-theory teaches 
us that a durable organization of collective interests requires the prior construction of 
a collective identity, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
Right-wing populist parties can be seen as part of a broader movement of the 
right, which has its origin in broad societal transformations that oppose social groups 
for structural and cultural reasons, similarly to the New Left (Kriesi 1999). 
Accordingly, and as is not so often noted, the movements of the right – such as 
religious, fundamentalist and nationalist movements – are equally manifestations of 
identity politics, and are just as much concerned with recognition, as Calhoun (1994: 
22f.) points out (see also Honneth 2003). Nineteenth century European nationalism, 
for example, represents a rather “old” form of identity politics according to Calhoun. 
The fact that movements of the right are also manifestations of identity politics is 
perhaps not so evident. Whereas the libertarian movements demanded the recognition 
of difference, the traditionalist-authoritarian pattern is essentially conservative, rather 
than liberating. As a conservative movement, the underlying values and goals appear 
more diffuse, and their political manifestation therefore depends more heavily on 
political leadership. For this reason, I assume the formation of a collective identity to 
be more a matter of deliberate moulding of political elites than the grass-roots 
mobilization of the movements of the libertarian left.  
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I would argue that in the 1990s, right-wing populist parties in a number of 
European countries have found a political message that is conductive to collective 
identity formation. I postulate the programmatic profile right-wing populist parties to 
have converged regarding two elements that make this party family represent the 
counter-pole to the libertarian left. The first centres on the new issues or discourses 
embodied in their anti-immigration stance, which does not involve ethnic racism, but 
rather what Betz (2002, 2004) has called “differentialist nativism” or “cultural 
racism”. A second group of issues brought up by the populist right represents a 
reaction against the societal changes brought about by the libertarian left, and includes 
the rejection of the multicultural model of society as well as universalistic values in 
general. Both groups of issues are theoretically as well as empirically situated at one 
pole of a new line of conflict that may be labelled libertarian-universalistic vs. 
traditionalist-communitarian. The next section will briefly substantiate the claim that 
the issues advocated by the libertarian left and the populist right are indeed polar 
normative ideas. 
 
The conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian 
values 
 
From a theoretical perspective, Rokeach (1973) has suggested early on that the space 
of possible ideological positions is two-dimensional. While Rokeach finds a number 
of values to structure people’s belief systems, there are severe limits to the number of 
combinations that are effectively viable when it comes to politically relevant values. 
For one thing, Rokeach (1973: 23) claims that there is a limited number of common 
human problems for which peoples must find a solution. And the range of possibilities 
is limited, for one thing, because not all combinations of values are possible, and for 
the other, because most combinations devoid of “human activity”, as Wildavsky 
(1987: 6) puts it. That is, they are not viable because they have no cultural or 
historical material to draw upon, no relevant paradigms or blueprints. In Moscovici’s 
(1988) terms, one could say that they lack corresponding social representations. 
As a consequence, Rokeach proposes a model where politically relevant ideologies 
are ultimately combinations of two values: freedom and equality. The model is 
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validated by a quantitative content analysis of Socialist, Communist, Fascist and 
Capitalist texts, which each represent a different combination of the emphasis of 
freedom and equality, respectively. Similar dimensions are found in the accounts of 
Wildavsky and his colleagues (Wildavsky 1987, 1994, Thompson et al. 1990), and 
while there is disagreement concerning the labelling of the two dimensions, they 
essentially correspond to those propagated by Kitschelt (1994): Conflicts over the 
value of equality structure the state-market axis, while differing emphases on freedom 
structure the universalistic vs. communitarian or libertarian vs. authoritarian axis of 
conflict. In other words, these issues are not new as such; only their rising salience is 
intrinsic to post-industrial societies, a point I shall return to later on. 
A synthesis of normative models of democracy provided by Fuchs (2002: 40-43) 
suggests that our conception of viable value-combinations indeed draws on existing 
blueprints or normative substantiations. In Fuchs’ mapping, a first dimension that is 
observable within political thought represents the responsibility of citizens’ life, 
opposing self-responsibility and a stronger responsibility of the state, corresponding 
to the established state-market line of conflict. The second dimension concerns the 
nature of the relationship between individuals. It is exemplified by libertarian or 
liberal conceptions of democracy on the one hand and republican conceptions on the 
other. This latter dimension is at the centre of the ongoing philosophical debate 
between liberals and communitarians, opposing individualist and communitarian 
conceptions of the person (see Honneth 1993). Implicit in this discussion is an 
opposition between universalistic and traditionalistic values. Although communitarian 
thinkers such as Walzer (1983) and Taylor (1992) only propose a (modest) 
communitarian corrective to liberal universalism, this debate has provided theoretical 
grounds for a more far-reaching critique of the universalistic principles established by 
Rawls (1971). As an example of the liberal account, Dahl (1989) denies any 
substantive values as constituting the common good. In his conception, the common 
good consists in the conditions of equal participation – in the universalistic 
democratic process itself, in other words. 
Even moderate communitarians such as Michael Walzer (1983, 1990) and Charles 
Taylor (1992) have argued that universalistic principles may violate cultural traditions 
within an established community and therefore engender the danger of being 
oppressive. If humans are inherently social beings, the application of universalistic 
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principles may lead to political solutions that clash with established and widely shared 
cultural practices. And since the liberal-universalistic theory no less than other 
accounts ultimately depend on the plausibility of this conception of the individual, this 
view cannot be considered as more objective than a communitarian approach, as 
Taylor (1992) convincingly argues. Communitarians urge us to acknowledging the 
fact that our identities are grounded in cultural traditions, and that an individualistic 
conception of the self is misconceived. 
Philosophical currents of the European New Right have borrowed from 
communitarian conceptions of community and justice in their propagation of the 
concept of “cultural differentialism”, claiming not the superiority of any nationality or 
race, but instead stressing the right of peoples to preserve their distinctive traditions. 
In turn, this discourse has proved highly influential for the discourse of right-wing 
populist parties (Antonio 2000, Minkenberg 2000). As Antonio (2000: 57-8) 
summarizes: 
“[…] New Right opposition to African, Middle Eastern, or Asian immigration 
stresses the evils of capitalist globalization, resistance to cultural 
homogenization, and defence of cultural identity and difference. Their pleas 
for »ethnopluralism« transmute plans to repatriate immigrants into a left-
sounding anti-imperialist strategy championing the autonomy of all cultural 
groups and their right to exert sovereignty in their living space. […] They 
contended that modern democracy’s melding of diverse ethnic groups into a 
mass »society« destroys their distinctive cultural identities. In their view, it 
dissolves cultural community into atomized, selfish, impersonal economic 
relations.” 
Although Birnbaum (1996) has claimed that there is a substantial affinity between 
communitarian philosophers and the New Right, it should be stressed that the 
sympathies of leading New Right thinkers such as Alain de Benoist towards North 
American communitarians are rather one-sided, as Antonio (2000: 63) has underlined. 
However, it seems that communitarian arguments have provided a “blueprint” (in the 
above-mentioned sense) or a broader justification for the right-wing populist parties’ 
differentialist discourse, which is much harder to attack intellectually than biological 
racism.  
From a theoretical point of view, then, the defence of cultural tradition and a 
rejection of the multicultural model of society represent a counter-pole to 
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individualistic and universalistic conceptions of community. Immigration is directly 
linked to this conflict since the inflow of people from other cultural backgrounds 
endangers the cultural homogeneity that thinkers of the New Right as well as 
exponents of right-wing populist parties deem necessary to preserve. Equally present 
in communitarian thinking is an emphasis of the primacy of politics over abstract 
normative principles. In Walzer’s (1983: Ch. 2) account, the right to self-
determination within a political community includes the right to limit immigration in 
order to preserve established ways of life.1  
In this context, the populist right’s conception of democracy also deserves 
mention. At first glance, its strong commitment to popular rule and calls for the 
introduction of direct democratic instruments by parties such as the Front National 
appear in strange accord with similar demands of the New Left. However, building on 
the distinction between protective and transformative conceptions of democracy put 
forward by Warren (1992) and Held (1996), the difference is that right-wing populist 
parties see direct democracy as a means to preserve popular sovereignty and to protect 
citizens against the state and its rulers. Democratic involvement is not seen, however, 
as a way to foster compromise by modifying participants’ pre-political preferences, as 
participatory democratic theory would suggest (e.g., Pateman 1970, Barber 1984). 
Coupled with the populist right’s disdain for the liberal component of liberal 
democracy (see Swyngedouw, Ivaldi 2001), direct democracy thus risks to establish 
the tyranny of the majority. It thus serves quite a different function than in the 
participatory model of the New Left, where citizen participation in decision-making is 
thought to foster individual autonomy as well as compromise (the transformative 
vision). Arguably, the principle of justice libertarians adhere to is not an unconditional 
application of universalistic norms, but rather Habermas’ (1998) discourse model that 
attempts to bridge liberal and communitarian conceptions. An open discourse, in this 
approach, establishes universalistic principles that are nonetheless bound by the 
cultural traditions of those participating in the deliberation. 
                                                
1 It has to be emphasized that Walzer merely conceives universalistic principles (everyone is allowed 
to move where he/she wants to) and the preservation of established traditions as conflicting goals. 
Hence, he does not deny the legitimacy of refugees – political or economic – migrating to more 
secure or more prosperous countries in principle.  
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Potentials and Mechanisms Underlying the Rise of the Populist Right 
 
The mobilization of the traditionalist-communitarian potential 
 
The main innovation of right-wing populist parties, as opposed to older overtly racist 
parties, was the adoption of a discourse based on “differentialist nativism” (Betz 
2002, 2004), and an advocacy of the introduction of direct democratic institutions. 
These are important changes for the following reasons: On the one hand, social 
psychological studies have shown that “blatent” prejudice is relatively rare among 
European citizens, while more subtle forms of prejudice are much more common 
(Pettigrew, Meertens 1995). On the other hand, democracy represents an almost 
universal value in advanced industrial nations (Fuchs et al. 1995). Hence, by avoiding 
overtly racist statements and in advocating more instead of less democracy, the new 
populist right can mobilize beyond the more narrow radical right constituency. 
Rather than rallying a diverse group of voters whose main characteristic is a 
diffuse resentment vis-à-vis the established parties, my claim is that right-wing 
populist parties mobilize a relatively well-defined group of citizens located at the 
traditionalist-communitarian pole of the new cultural line of conflict. If these voters 
are distrustful of the established parties, then this does not imply that their vote for the 
populist right is primarily a protest vote. Rather, their distrust results from the 
perception that none of the established parties have forcefully opposed the political 
enforcement of universalistic values, and therefore fail to represent their views.  
Differing from Kitschelt’s (1995) claim that the most successful right-wing 
populist parties mobilize by means of a combination of authoritarian and free-market 
issues, my argument implies that these parties almost exclusively mobilize along the 
cultural divide. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that right-wing populist 
parties are increasingly elected by citizens who would not be expected to have very 
market-liberal preferences. These parties’ social basis of support has shifted from an 
over-representation of the petty bourgeoisie to include sizable proportions of voters 
that can be considered the losers of modernization due to their lack of education and 
their low or obsolete skills. In Betz’ (2004) words, there has been a “proletariani-
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zation” of the populist right’s support base. The working class has become the core 
clientele of parties such as the French Front National, the Austrian FPÖ, the Progress 
Party in Norway, the Danish People’s Party, and the Belgian Flaams Blok, now 
renamed to Flaams Belang (Perrineau 1997, Mayer 2002, Plasser, Ulram 2000, 
McGann, Kitschelt 2005, Bjørklund, Andersen 2002, Swyngedouw 1998, Betz 2001, 
Oesch 2006, Minkenberg, Perrineau 2007).  
Studies of the ideological profile of the Front National’s electorate by Perrineau 
(1997) and Mayer (2002), as well as the analysis presented in Chapter 6 suggest that 
its lower-class component has strongly “leftist” or state-interventionist preferences 
concerning economic policy, contradicting Kitschelt’s proposition. Similarly, 
Ivarsflaten (2005) presents evidence that those voting for the populist right in France 
and Denmark are fundamentally divided on the economic axis. To the degree that 
right-wing populist parties still take a market-liberal stance as they did in the 1980s, I 
assume lower-class citizens to vote for them despite the parties’ economic profile, 
rather than because of it. And what is even more plausible is that the changes in their 
electorates have engendered a shift away from neo-liberal demands on the part of 
right-wing populist parties in the 1990s, as Betz (2001, 2004) has suggested. In 
Chapter 2, this hypothesis will be tested empirically. 
To be able to mobilize an electorate that is characterized by diverse economic 
preferences, cultural, as opposed to economic conflicts must constitute and remain the 
primary concern for the voters of the populist right. By implication, the enduring 
success of these parties crucially depends on the prevalence of culturally, as opposed 
to economically defined group identifications among its rows. Economically defined 
collective identities such as social class must therefore give way to broader identities 
based on similar interpretations of “what it means” to share a national culture whose 
traditional norms and values seem threatened. The challenge to tradition may appear 
as an inevitable consequence of modernization and cultural globalization, but right-
wing populist parties have framed the threat to national culture in terms of an 
opposition to libertarian-universalistic conceptions of community. Universalistic 
values, which manifest themselves in positive attitudes towards cultural liberalism and 
multicultural society, are in fact strongly fostered by higher education (Kriesi et al. 
2007), and such values have thus become more diffused as result from the massive 
expansion of tertiary education in the last decades. In terms of their political 
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mobilization, the New Social Movements of the left have seen what Snow and 
McAdam (2001) refer to as a “general diffusion” of movement identities in the 
broader population. As a consequence, the potentials for a counter-mobilization have 
increased as well. By way of their defence of traditionalist-communitarian values, in 
which the demarcation from foreigners plays a central role, right-wing populist parties 
have found a discourse that is conductive to collective identity formation. Their 
mobilization has then completed the establishment of the new cultural divide.  
The significance of collective identities in political mobilization processes will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. While the cross-national diffusion and adoption 
of the differentialist nativist mobilization frame after its “invention” by the French 
Front National has constituted a necessary condition for the success of the populist 
right, as Rydgren (2005) has suggested, it is not a sufficient condition. While there 
seems to be something like a natural propensity of humans to group-formation and to 
the demarcation from others, as Social identity theory suggests (Tajfel 1982), existing 
collective identities may cut across new categories, an therefore inhibit their political 
manifestation. Thus, students of ethnic conflicts stress that “Ethnicity competes with 
other large-scale bases of organization, notably class mobilization, for the loyalty, 
time, and resources of potential members” (Olzac 1992: 18). In a similar vein, 
Schattschneider (1975: Ch. 4) has argued that every form of political organization has 
a bias to the mobilization of some conflicts while not being receptive to others. New 
issues and lines of conflict can only emerge if the established cleavage structure no 
longer “organizes” issues cutting across established lines of division “out of politics”, 
in Schattschneider’s famous words. Later chapters therefore address the question how 
patterns of party competition prevalent in a particular party system can either trigger 
or retard the emergence of the new libertarian-communitarian vs. traditionalist-
communitarian line of conflict. First of all, however, the role played by the processes 
of globalization and European integration in diminishing the salience of distributional 
conflicts, as well as in catalyzing the political manifestation of the traditionalist-
communitarian potential merit discussion.  
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Denationalization as a catalyst for the manifestation of the new cultural potential 
 
Broadly defined, globalization can be understood as a spatial widening and an 
intensification of regional or global economic and cultural interactions (Goldblatt et 
al. 1997: 271, Held et al. 1999). In the economic domain, the lowering of boundaries 
between nation-states nourishes and accelerates the process of economic 
modernization. By exposing certain sectors to increasing competition, it is likely to 
engender new social divisions (Kriesi et al. 2006, Esping-Andersen 1999). The 
“losers” of modernization are lower-skilled individuals who either have increasing 
difficulty in competing on the labor market, or who face a relative decline in real 
income, depending on a country’s politico-economic system (Scharpf 2000a: 68-124). 
Income distribution trends show that the share of households at the lowest end of the 
post-redistribution income scale has risen in countries such as Great Britain, Austria, 
the Netherlands and slightly in Switzerland since the 1970s or 1980s, while Germany 
and France do not display such a clear trend (Alderson, Beckfield, Nielsen 2005). 
At the same time, the policy repertoire available to national governments is 
constrained as a consequence of agreements to liberalize international capital flows 
and trade, some of which are formally enforced by institutions such as the European 
Union and the World Trade Organization. As a consequence, a real problem of 
legitimacy arises, since “Governments must increasingly avoid policy choices that 
would be both domestically popular and economically feasible out of respect for 
GATT rules and European law or as a result of decisions made by the WTO, the 
European Commission, or the European Court of Justice” (Scharpf 2000b: 116; 
similarly Mény and Surel 2000, Offe 1996). As Huber and Stephens show, partisan 
effects on a whole array of welfare state indicators have vanished in the 1980s, when 
“(…) governments found themselves with dramatically fewer options” (Huber, 
Stephens 2001: 221).  
Many governments have explicitly justified unpopular measures in economic and 
social policy making with the structural imperatives of globalization and EU-
integration, an example being the obligation to fulfill the Maastricht requirements in 
order to participate in the European Monetary Union. As a consequence, a potential 
arises for political actors that insist on the primacy of autonomous national politics as 
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against these obligations. Right-wing populist parties, in this sense, can be understood 
as “anti-cartel parties”, which mobilize resentment because the established parties are 
no longer responsive to the preferences of voters (Katz, Mair 1995, Blyth, Katz 2005). 
Kitschelt (2000) has vividly criticized this view, arguing that parties always have an 
interest in exiting the cartel in order to attract votes.2 However, and this is a further 
implication, the possibilities of appealing to specific social groups are much more 
limited in the context of austerity politics and budgetary restraint than in the high 
times of Keynesianism in the post-war decades. In the contemporary context, as Blyth 
and Katz (2005) argue, where parties are unable to constantly expand the provision of 
public goods to secure their support, cartelization represents a rational response. The 
solution parties have opted for is a collective discourse of “downsizing expectations”, 
“externalizing policy commitments” to independent central banks, the EU or other 
supra-national organizations, and distancing themselves even further than the catch-all 
party type from any defined social constituency that could hold them accountable 
(Blyth, Katz 2005: 42). 
This is not to say that parties have converged in their rhetoric. In fact, evidence 
from the programmatic statements that parties put forward in election campaigns 
suggests that the major parties of the left and right have converged regarding 
economic policy only in Germany and Britain, but not in France, Switzerland, Austria 
or the Netherlands since the 1970s (Kriesi et al. 2006). No more can we expect the left 
and right to pursue the same policies once in office. Even if the general thrust of the 
economic policy making in France, for example, has been a liberalizing one in the 
past two decades, the reforms of left-wing and right-wing governments continue to 
differ in the way they affect specific social groups (Levy 2000, 2005). However, in 
conjuncture with Social Democracy’s increasingly middle class support base and an 
emphasis on the constraints of globalization, the left no longer issues very class-
specific appeals.3 Furthermore, their new core constituency of socio-cultural 
professionals has political preferences that differ from those of their old core 
                                                
2 However, Kitschelt’s argument is somehow inconsistent since a few pages on, he traces 
dissatisfaction with parties to the very non-responsiveness that Katz and Mair (1995) can be 
assumed to have in mind: „Dissatisfaction with parties does not originate in their new capacity to 
form cartels and dissociate themselves from their voters, but [...] in the political-economic agenda 
of policy-making, confronting parties with inevitable trade-offs among objectives voters would like 
to maximize jointly [...]“ (Kitschelt 2000: 160). As I will argue in Chapter 4, it is useful to 
distinguish between policy-specific and organizational cartellization. 
3  For a similar argument, see Goldthorpe (2002: 15-20). 
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constituency, the manual working class (Kitschelt, Rehm 2005). In appealing to 
social-cultural specialists, the New Left has increasingly framed its social policy in 
terms of universalistic values, for instance by uncoupling entitlements from labor 
market participation (Häusermann 2007). The left has thus further eroded its support 
in the working classes by advocating policies that are diametrically opposed to the 
preferences of their old core constituency, which holds rather traditionalist values, as 
Kriesi et al. (2007) show.  
Even if programmatic stances continue to diverge, the left has thereby adopted a 
cross-class rhetoric that has traditionally been a characteristic of the political right. 
Voters are therefore increasingly unlikely to interpret the differences in parties’ 
programmatic offer in class terms, with the effect of weakening the collective 
identities underlying the traditional (worker vs. non-worker) state-market opposition. 
Along the “new” state-market cleavage that opposes citizens with different views 
concerning economic policy, the middle class is at least as divided internally as the 
working class is distant from the middle and upper classes.4 Furthermore, concerning 
those segments most affected by economic modernization, persistently high levels of 
unemployment or declining standards of living have led to a loss of credibility of 
parties’ promises to solve such problems. No matter how pressing economic 
grievances are, these social groups’ class-based collective identities might have been 
weakened to the extent that they become receptive for culturally framed mobilization 
efforts. Voting for right-wing populist parties may therefore become a viable option, 
even if these parties do not generally advocate state interventionist economic policies. 
Right-wing populist parties have seized the opportunities associated with an 
insistence on the primacy of national politics in two ways. In what may be called the 
political logic of their mobilization, they have denounced the “cartelization” and of 
the established parties of the left and right, which allegedly no longer differ in their 
policies. In this sense, the populist right has profited from the processes of 
globalization and European integration in an indirect way. But it has also more 
directly exploited them by attacking the gradual process of denationalization. Betz 
(2002, 2004) has provided evidence that right-wing populist parties increasingly take 
an anti-globalist stance in their programs. In election campaigns, on the other hand, an 
explicit pro- vs. anti-globalization conflict is so far not very prominent (Kriesi et al. 
                                                
4  The country studies in Kriesi et al. (2007) provide empirical evidence concerning this point. 
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2006). A similar conflict is embodied in disputes over European integration, however. 
Because the delegation of competences to the EU to a certain extent undermines an 
autonomous economic and social policy at the national level, there is both a cultural 
or political, as well as an economic rationale for opposing European integration.  
Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) have provided evidence that the libertarian-
authoritarian axis is an important determinant of parties’ positions towards the EU, 
with the populist right appearing as the prime opponent of the process of European 
integration. Left-right-positions, on the other hand, are unable to explain stances 
toward the EU, indicating that the process of supra-national integration is primarily 
interpreted in cultural, rather than in economic terms. On the other hand, it has 
become apparent in the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in France that 
opposition to the integration project can comes both from the extreme left and from 
the extreme right (Brouard, Sauger 2005). However, I expect opposition against 
European integration from the left and right to be closely related to the respective 
ideological core of these parties. Thus, given the market-liberalizing thrust of policies 
pursued at the European level, opposition from the left should follow an economic 
logic, and be associated with extreme positions concerning the state-market divide. 
Supporters of the populist right, on the other hand, are more likely to reject the 
integration project because it clashes with their emphasis on national sovereignty and 
the preservation of cultural differences between nations.  
Opposition to the European Union thus fits the ideological package of the populist 
right, because it can readily be interpreted in terms of the libertarian-universalistic vs. 
traditionalist-communitarian line of conflict. While the role of European integration in 
the mobilization of the populist right will therefore be studied in the country analyses, 
most electoral surveys unfortunately do not contain information that allows a clear 
distinction between economic and cultural motives for the rejection of European 
integration. However, the French data used in Chapter 6 does make such an analysis 
possible, and the claim that the populist right’s mobilization against the EU is driven 
by culture, and not by economics will be verified in that chapter.  
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Right-wing Populist Parties Within their Party Systems 
 
If a sizable proportion of the electorate hold preferences that are located at the 
traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural axis structuring the belief systems of 
citizens in advanced industrial countries, it is of course not evident why it should be 
(exclusively) right-wing populist parties that mobilize this potential. Indeed, I assume 
that where the established parties take a clear position on the cultural axis and do not 
leave the related issues to marginal political actors, right-wing populist parties are 
presumably less successful in mobilizing the potential described above.  
At the same time, it is plausible that right-wing populist parties have advantages 
over the established right in mobilizing this potential. For one thing, voters may prefer 
the original (right-wing populist party) to the copy, as Jean-Marie Le Pen has 
frequently stated. For another, the populist right’s discourse itself contributes to 
moulding the attitudes that are supportive to its success. As I have argued, the 
traditionalist-communitarian bundle of values represents a rather diffuse conservative 
potential, which is less tied to concrete issues than the fight for recognition of 
difference on the part of the New Social Movements of the left. Hence, the 
movements of the right’s struggle for recognition has so far often manifested itself not 
in genuinely new issues but in the “resurfacing” of older identity categories such as 
national identity and culture – even if they appear in new disguise as in the case of the 
“differentialist nativist” discourse. The reaction to the societal transformations since 
the 1960s could in principle take various forms, and there have been earlier variants 
such as neo-conservatism (see Habermas 1985). My contention is that a traditionalist-
communitarian discourse and an opposition to immigration are the most promising 
issues because they are highly conductive to collective identity formation. It thus 
fosters a much broader following and a stronger appeal among the more 
disadvantaged sectors of society than was the case for the neo-conservative 
movement. 
Quite often, however, conservative parties actually launched the debate around 
immigration in the early 1980s, but then lost the ownership of the issue to the extreme 
right (Ignazi 1992, 2003). A central factor mediating right-wing populist parties’ 
success therefore appears to be whether or not the established parties of the right 
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(continue to) take a clear position along the cultural divide. As Kitschelt (1994) has 
shown, Socialist parties have positioned themselves near the libertarian-universalistic 
pole of the cultural dimension of conflict, which has resulted in a realignment of 
voters on the political left (Kriesi 1993a, 1998, Müller 1999). The parties of the 
established right have found it more difficult to take a clear position on the new axis, 
because the electoral coalition supporting them is often divided over the new cultural 
issues. In most cases, it has therefore been the populist right that drove a process of 
realignment triggered by cultural issues. As a consequence, a differentiation into Old 
Right and New Right similar to that between Old Left and New Left has occurred. 
However, there have been cases such as Britain and Germany where the populist right 
did not achieve a breakthrough. To the degree that the political space similarly 
structured across Western Europe, it thus appears that right-wing populist parties are 
only successful in mobilizing the traditionalist-communitarian potential if no 
established party exists that adopts a similar discourse. 
If established right-wing parties and new populist right may at times advocate 
similar issues, then the question arises how these two groups of parties can be 
analytically distinguished. In the following chapter, I suggest criteria to demarcate the 
right-wing populist party family from its mainstream competitors. It is then 
empirically verified to which degree right-wing populist parties have actually 
converged on a profile corresponding to the discourse of the New Right, and are 
located at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the new cultural divide. 
Furthermore, I verify the claim that the political space in Germany and Britain is 
structured by the same dimensions as in France, Switzerland, Austria and the 
Netherlands, and that established parties of the right therefore seem able to absorb the 

















Two propositions are tested in this chapter by way of an empirical analysis of the 
dimensions structuring political space around the 1990s in six Western European 
countries. The first is that right-wing populist parties are located in a distinct position 
in political space. Together with two further criteria, namely, their anti-establishment 
discourse and their hierarchical internal structure, they can thus be considered a 
common party family. The populist right’s distinct organizational structure results in a 
strategic flexibility, allowing these parties to rapidly take up new issues that can be 
interpreted in terms of the universalism-traditionalism conflict, such as opposition to 
European integration. Among the countries studied in this chapter, the “candidates” 
for inclusion in the extreme right-wing populist party family are the French Front 
National, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Swiss People’s Party, and the Dutch List 
Pim Fortuyn. The empirical analysis will also provide an opportunity to test the 
hypothesis that right-wing populist parties have de-emphasized neo-liberal demands 
and now most commonly advocate what has been termed a “welfare chauvinist” 
position. That is, the populist right may advocate exempting the non-native population 
from welfare benefits, but as a result of its increasingly lower-class support base, it no 
longer calls for cutbacks on the general provision of public welfare.  
The second proposition is that the political space is structured by the same two 
dimensions in those countries where right-wing populist parties have not found great 
resonance at the national level, namely, Britain and Germany. Consequently, the 
populist right’s lack of success in these two countries may partly be due to the fact 
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that established right-wing parties have adopted similar positions in debates centring 
around national tradition and are equally reluctant to endorse universalistic values. 
These propositions are tested by means of an analysis of parties’ issue positions 
deriving from a coding of the media coverage of election campaigns. This data has 
been collected within a larger research project (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, 
Bornschier, and Frey 2006), and is based on a sentence-by-sentence coding of the 
newspaper coverage of parties’ programmatic statements in election campaigns. This 
method has been developed by Kleinnijenhuis and his collaborators (see 
Kleinnijenhuis and De Ridder 1998, and Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001). 
A crucial step in the analysis of the dimensions structuring political space is the 
assignment of the programmatic statements put forward by parties in election 
campaigns to more general political goals. Twelve overarching issue categories are 
presented in this chapter that allow an analysis of parties’ positions between countries 
and over time. This system of categories has been developed jointly within the project 
mentioned. The dimensionality of political space is then determined using 
Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). The technical aspects of the analysis are presented 
only briefly in this chapter, and the reader is referred to Chapter 5 for a more detailed 
description both of the data and the procedures used to analyse it.  
 
 
An Extreme Right-wing Populist Party Family? 
 
The term (extreme) right-wing populist is used in this book to denote political parties 
that, despite having distinct historical origins, can be distinguished from others on the 
basis of a number of commonalities. However, even if it may seem straightforward to 
identify the presumable members of such a party family, naming clear analytical 
criteria is a much more difficult task. Consequently, consensus regarding a definition 
of the extreme right is slim, posing a problem for comparative research (Mudde 
1996). A first useful definition is offered by Ignazi (2003), who defines extreme right-
wing parties as situated at the extreme of the left-right spectrum. This is a relative 
criterion, and should not be confused with usages in Germany, for example, according 
to which extreme right parties, in contrast to the radical right, oppose the democratic 
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constitution, and therefore represent anti-system parties in a narrow sense. Ignazi 
(2002, 2003) further distinguishes between “old” and “new” extreme right parties. 
While the old type has its roots in historical fascism and is a product of materialist 
conflicts, “new” extreme right parties are the product of post-materialist conflicts 
characteristic of the post-industrial period. 
Building on Ignazi’s (2003) criterion of extremeness, I specify the extreme right-
wing populist party family as a sub-group of the broader category of extreme right 
parties. The distinctiveness of the populist right has a programmatic and a contextual 
component. In programmatic terms, it represents a more moderate sub-group of the 
broader extreme right category by virtue of its “differentialist nativist” or culturalist 
discourse and its renunciation of biological racism. The criterion of relative 
extremeness has the advantage of making the definition inclusive towards parties that 
declare supporting democracy or even call for the introduction of direct democratic 
means of citizen participation. While their pro-democratic discourse makes it difficult 
to call them anti-system parties, extreme right-wing populist parties are certainly 
polarizing parties, drawing on Capoccia’s (2002) framework. It is therefore only for 
the sake of brevity that I at times drop the term “extreme” from their label. While 
Ignazi (2003) pays little attention to the specific discourses that extreme right parties 
may employ, the work of Betz (2004) has drawn scholarly attention to the discursive 
innovations in the populist right’s discourse. As van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 
(2005) show, the framing of the populist right issue agenda seems to matter, since 
their success depends on their being perceived and evaluated as normal parties by 
voters. 
In contextual terms, it matters whether or not extreme right parties are conceived 
as a product of a new cultural conflict in advanced industrial societies. If this is the 
case, then they must represent a phenomenon different from extreme right parties 
outside advanced industrial countries both in terms of their raison d’être, as well as in 
terms of the mechanisms underlying their rise. Thus, while Australia’s One Nation 
Party is a potential candidate for inclusion in the right-wing populist party family (see 
Mughan, Bean, McAllister 2003), the parties of the extreme right in Eastern Europe 
are almost certainly not. Consequently, the potential benefit of analyzing the 
determinants of the success of all these parties jointly is small, as Norris’ (2005) 
analysis puts in evidence. Even an elementary distinction between “old” and “new” 
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extreme right parties shows that their electoral fortunes depend on different factors, as 
Goulder (2003) empirically demonstrates. 
The term “populist” in the extreme right-wing populist party label refers to a 
specific style of discourse and to characteristics of the internal structure of these 
parties. These elements have been important in the mobilization of this party family, 
but are not necessarily specific to it. For a new party to break into an existing party 
system with a fully mobilized electorate, it must succeed in displacing the existing 
structure of conflict by a new one, as Schattschneider (1975: Ch. 4) has pointed out. A 
promising way to do this is to denounce the established parties of being unresponsive 
to what really cleaves the electorate, and to accuse them of deliberately forming a 
“cartel” to protect their privileges. Thus, the populist right’s anti-establishment 
discourse has been part and parcel of its role in drawing up a new conflict between 
libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. In addition, these 
parties are characterized by a hierarchical internal structure that differs from the 
pluralist organization of mass parties. This allows them to adapt quickly to new 
circumstances and to seize programmatic opportunity structures more quickly than the 
established parties, which interpret new issues in terms of the existing structure of 
conflicts, and thereby seek to reinforce existing cleavages.  
A strategic flexibility has already been a key to right-wing populist parties’ success 
in the 1980s, as I have argued, when they still propagated quite diverse issues, for 
example neo-liberal demands in the case of the Front National and the FPÖ (e.g., 
Ignazi 2003). Their internal party structure has remained a prime advantage thereafter, 
allowing them to thrive on new potentials, such as those stemming from diffuse 
resentments against Muslims after September 11, 2001 (see Betz 2005), or from 
widespread feelings of insecurity that have fuelled the law and order issue. The 
populist right has catered the associated issues by pointing out that they belong to a 
more salient line of conflict than those represented by the established parties. A case 
in point is the reversal of its originally favourable stance regarding European 
unification, framing opposition to the project in terms of its traditionalist-
communitarian convictions, as we shall see. While the established parties are divided 
regarding European integration and therefore avoid taking clear positions (Kriesi et al. 
2006, Bartolini 2005), the populist right can successfully combine a critique of the 
integration project with the political anti-establishment logic of their mobilization. 
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To distinguish the extreme right-wing populist party family, I use three empirically 
applicable criteria that sum up this discussion. One is related to these parties’ extreme 
position in political space, while two are related to their populist style of mobilization:  
(1) A location at the extreme on the ideological axis ranging from libertarian-
universalistic to traditionalist-communitarian positions. The criterion of 
extremeness is similar to one used by Ignazi (2003). However, my focus is 
exclusively on parties’ position regarding the cultural axis of conflict. 
Contrary to Kitschelt (1995), I argue that a specific stance on distributive 
issues is not a defining feature of this party family. On the contrary, right-wing 
populist parties’ attitude regarding distributive conflicts is likely to vary as a 
function of the social-structural characteristics and preferences of their 
electorate. Ignazi (2003), on the other hand, uses a single left-right dimension, 
and therefore cannot distinguish between positions on the economic and the 
cultural axes. This is a problem because left-right positions are correlated both 
with economic and cultural issues, as van Spanje and van der Brug (2005) 
have shown. 
(2) A populist anti-establishment discourse, in which right-wing populist parties 
draw a political line of conflict between themselves and the established 
parties. This is the “political logic” of their mobilization, which they use to 
portray themselves as anti-cartel-parties and defenders of real democracy. 
Drawing up a politically defined antagonism, in addition to the divide based 
on interests or values, also helps them to bridge the internal divisions within 
their heterogeneous electorate, and to mould a new collective identity. 
(3) A hierarchical internal structure, setting them apart from the pluralist 
organization of the established parties. This allows them to repeatedly revert 
their policy-positions in response to sentiments in the populace, as the vast 
country-specific literature on their programmatic stances testifies.  
 
Parties have to conform to all three criteria to be included in the group of extreme 
right-wing populist parties. For example, Mudde (1996: 231ff, 2000) criticizes the 
concept of populism, employed on its own, as primarily describing a political style 
and not a specific ideology. While agreeing on this point, I consider the combination 
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of a traditionalist-communitarian stance with a populist anti-establishment discourse 
as a central element in distinguishing right-wing populist parties from the established 
right, which may at times advocate similar policy positions for tactical reasons. Since 
the empirical analysis in the next section primarily focuses on parties’ positions in 
political space, I will provide some support concerning the other two criteria in a brief 
manner now. 
Strong evidence for the importance of the internal party structure is provided by 
the two cases where a pre-existing, established party underwent a transformation to an 
exponent of the populist right. The rise of the Austrian FPÖ or the Swiss SVP was 
accompanied by an abandonment of their former pluralist party organizations in 
favour of a hierarchical machinery allowing a charismatic leader to dominate the 
apparatus. This is supported by Ignazi’s (2003: 111-116) description of Jörg Haider’s 
ascension to the leadership of the FPÖ, as well as by the Swiss experience, which will 
be presented in Chapter 7. The remaining two candidates for inclusion in the extreme 
right-wing populist family, namely, the Front National and the List Pim Fortuyn, also 
fulfil the second and third criterion. The Front National’s anti-establishment discourse 
is well known, Jean-Marie Le Pen regularly referring to the established parties as the 
“gang of four” and denouncing the lies of the “candidates of the system” (Le Monde, 
25.4.1995, p. 5). At the same time, the party’s structure is extremely centralized and 
hierarchical (Venner 2002). The Pim Fortuyn movement is also a obvious case, the 
LPF essentially having consisted of Fortuyn, and the candidates for parliament having 
been personally selected by him (Pennings, Keman 2003). 
Of course, an anti-establishment strategy is more feasible as long as right-wing 
populist parties are not in government. If they cannot adopt their propositions when 
participating in government, it becomes more difficult to convince voters that they are 
actually different from the other parties. At least the fate of the FPÖ in Austria 
suggests such an interpretation (Heinisch 2003). In Switzerland, on the other hand, 
government participation has been less detrimental to the continuing success of the 
Swiss People’s Party (SVP). Christoph Blocher, an exponent of the right-wing 
populist wing of the party, who has entered the federal government in 2003, has in 
fact contributed to adopting policies consistent with the parties’ line, such as the 
recent restriction of the law to asylum. It thus remains an unsettled question to which 
degree government participation poses a problem for right-wing populist parties’ 
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ongoing success. To a certain degree, both the SVP and the FPÖ have managed to 




Right-wing Populist Parties and Their Competitors in the Political Space  




The following analysis will track the positions of the List Pim Fortuyn, the Front 
National, the FPÖ and the SVP in the political space constituted by the programmatic 
positions advocated within their respective party systems. The structure of political 
space in these countries can then be compared with the cases of Germany and Britain, 
where no strong extreme right-wing populist parties are present at the national level. 
To be able to identify the lines of conflict structuring political competition, a media 
analysis of parties’ “political offer” in the elections for the respective country’s first 
parliamentary chamber was conducted (except for France, where the analysis focuses 
on presidential contests). In each country, all articles related to the electoral contest or 
politics in general were selected from a quality newspaper and a tabloid, covering the 
last two months before Election day for three elections in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
The articles were then coded sentence by sentence, as is spelled out in more detail in 
Chapter 5.1 For the present purposes, only relationships between political actors and 
political issues are taken into account. Political actors were coded according to their 
party membership. Small parties were grouped; for example, in France, the UDF 
category comprises several small centre parties as well. To insure reliability, some of 
the smaller parties had to be excluded from the analysis, when there was not enough 
information on their issue positions.  
To code political issues, a detailed schema was used, distinguishing between 200 
or more categories. For the statistical analysis, they were regrouped into 12 broader 
categories. In the following, the content of these categories is specified. All categories 
                                                
1  Because of their importance in the campaign, party ads were also coded in Switzerland. 
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have a clear direction, and actor’s stance towards them can be either positive or 
negative. The abbreviations in brackets refer to the ones used in the figures later on: 
 
Economic issues 
- Welfare: Expansion of the welfare state and defence against welfare state 
retrenchment. Tax reforms that have redistributive effects, employment programs, 
health care programs. Valence issues such as statements “against unemployment” 
or “against recession” were dropped if there was no specification whether the goal 
was to be achieved by state intervention or by deregulation. 
- Budget: Budgetary rigor, reduction of the state deficit, cut on expenditures, 
reduction of taxes that have no effects on redistribution. 
- Economic liberalism (ecolib): Support for deregulation, for more competition, and 
for privatisation. Opposition to market regulation, provided that the proposed 
measures do not have an impact on state expenditure – this is the distinguishing 
criterion from the Welfare-category. Opposition to economic protectionism in 
agriculture and other sectors. 
 
Cultural issues 
- Cultural liberalism (cultlib): Support for the goals of the New Social Movements: 
Peace, solidarity with the third world, gender equality, human rights. Support for 
cultural diversity, international cooperation (except for the European Union and 
Nato), support for the United Nations. Opposition to racism, support for the right 
to abortion and euthanasia and for a liberal drug policy. Cultural protectionism, 
coded negative: Patriotism, calls for national solidarity, defence of tradition and 
national sovereignty, traditional moral values. 
- Europe: Support for European integration – including enlargement – or for EU-
membership in the cases of Switzerland and Austria. 
- Culture: Support for education, culture, and scientific research. 
- Immigration: Support for a tough immigration and integration policy, and for the 
restriction of the number of foreigners. 
- Army: Support for the army (including Nato), for a strong national defence and for 
nuclear weapons. 
- Security: Support for more law and order, fight against criminality and political 
corruption. 
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Residual categories 
- Environment (eco): Calls for environmental protection, opposition to atomic 
energy. 
- Institutional reform (iref): Support for various institutional reforms such as the 
extension of direct democratic rights, calls for the efficiency of the public 
administration. 
- Infrastructure (infra): Support for the improvement of the infrastructure. 
 
 
The data are now analysed using Multidimensional Scaling (MDS), which results in a 
graphical representation of parties and issues in a low-dimensional space in every 
country. The grouping of the issues into economic, cultural, and residual categories is 
provided for illustrative purposes and does not determine the analysis. To give salient 
relationships between political actors and issues more weight than less salient ones, a 
Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling is used. There are always distortions 
between the “real” distances and their graphical representation in the low-dimensional 
space resulting from the MDS, but the weighting procedure ensures that the distances 
corresponding to salient relationships between parties and issues will be more 
accurate than less salient ones. The results thus take into account both position and 
saliency. 
In all six countries, political space proves to be clearly two-dimensional, since the 
move from a one-dimensional to a two-dimensional representation results in the 
clearest improvement in the goodness-of-fit of the solution.2 The results of the 
analysis are presented in Figures 2.1 to 2.6. The dimensions resulting from the MDS 
analysis are not substantially meaningful. The solution can therefore be freely rotated 
and it is possible to lay theoretically meaningful axes into the distribution. It is also 
important to keep in mind that the distances in the solutions are only interpretable in 
relation to each other, and not in absolute terms. For example, right-wing populist 
parties may not be just next to the subject of immigration in absolute terms, because 
their proximity to other issues also “pulls” them in another direction. A fuller 
                                                
2 The values for the Stress I statistic, which is an estimation of goodness-of-fit of the final 
configuration, is 0,32 for Austria, 0,29 for France, 0,25 for the Netherlands, 0,32 for Switzerland, 
0,34 for Germany and 0,25 for Britain.  
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description of methodological procedures and a guide to the interpretation of the 
MDS-analyses can be found in Chapter 5. 
In the solutions, a first line has been drawn between “welfare” and “economic 
liberalism” as a representation of the distributional political conflict. All the 
configurations have been rotated to make this antagonism lie horizontally in political 
space. Arguably, it represents the political content of the traditional state-market 
cleavage. The cultural line of conflict has been drawn by connecting “immigration” 
and “cultural liberalism”, the two categories that embody the libertarian-universalistic 
vs. traditionalist-communitarian line of conflict. Cultural liberalism conveys both 
support for universalistic values, as well as the repudiation of the opposing normative 
ideals, namely, the defence of tradition, national sovereignty, and traditional moral 
values. Opposition to immigration and calls for a tough integration policy (denoted in 
the figures as “immigration”), on the other hand, captures stances regarding the theme 
the populist right has used for its construction of a collective identity based on the 
demarcation from people with cultural backgrounds different from that of the majority 
population. 
 
Right-wing populist parties in the political space of Western European party systems 
 
The first thing we notice when looking at the general patterns is that the configuration 
of political alternatives presented in the six party systems is strikingly similar. 
Political competition everywhere is structured by an economic and by a cultural line 
of conflict, although to varying degrees. In France and Switzerland, there are signs of 
an integration of the two dimensions, cultural liberalism being associated with a pro-
welfare position and anti-immigration stances lying closer to the economic liberalism 
pole of the state-market divide. Britain is an exception in that immigration played a 
minor role in the elections under investigation, and the category therefore does not 
appear in the figure. However, as in the other countries, cultural liberalism, along with 
support for the EU, is a polarizing issue in Britain. I start by discussing the countries 
displaying a strong presence of parties that are presumed to belong to the right-wing 
populist party group, testing the hypothesis that this can be considered a party family. 
I then analyze the proposition that established right-wing parties are situated in a 
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similar position in Britain and Germany’s political space, thereby weakening the 
chances of an electoral breakthrough of more extreme parties.  
The French Front National, the Austrian FPÖ, and the Swiss SVP are clearly 
situated at the extreme of the political spectrum in their respective countries, as 
Figures 2.1 to 2.3 show. All of them are furthest away from cultural liberalism, and 
also the most fervent opponents of immigration, making them form the lower pole of 
the cultural line of conflict. By contrast, the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn, while also 
located at the limits of the political spectrum (see Figure 2.4), stands out for not being 
particularly opposed to immigration, raising doubts concerning its inclusion in the 
category of right-wing populist parties. In France, Austria, and Switzerland, however, 
right-wing populist parties are clearly located at the opposite pole of the Social 
Democrat and Ecologist parties with regard to all the issues associated with the 
cultural dimension. In Switzerland, support for European integration is also located in 
the libertarian-universalistic domain, and appears even more polarizing than cultural 
liberalism. This supports the hypothesis that attitudes towards the EU are becoming 
“embedded” in the cultural axis of conflict (Kriesi et al. 2006). Finally, right-wing 
populist parties are also near to law and order stances (“security”) and institutional 
reforms, where calls for direct democracy are included. However, this is not 
necessarily what distinguishes them from other parties. Having presented the general 
picture, I now discuss the most important differences between the cases. A brief 
interpretation focused on the individual countries addresses, among other points, 
right-wing populist parties’ varying positions regarding the economic axis of conflict. 
In Austria (Figure 2.1), the cultural line of conflict cuts across the distributional 
dimension very clearly. The FPÖ is located on the cultural line of conflict and rather 
remote from the distributional axis, near to anti-immigration and furthest away from 
cultural liberalism. At the same time, the FPÖ has moved away from neo-liberalism, 
which was an issue it propagated in the 1980s (e.g., Ignazi 2003), and is now located 
nearer to “welfare” than to economic liberalism. This is less visible in the figure, 
where other issues also condition its position, but the similarity measures show that 
between 1999 and 2002, the FPÖ has completely reversed its position and has 
switched to a pro-welfare and anti-economic liberalism position (see Appendix A). 
This move is in line with a strategy aiming to mobilize the losers of economic 
modernization and globalization. Indeed, the FPÖ represents something like the 
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“master case” of a modernization loser party, combining exclusionary community 
construction with leftist economic stances. This is not by implication equivalent to 
success, of course, since the party has faced the difficulties of becoming a government 
party and of being struck by internal disputes. What is also apparent in Austria is that 
established parties may seek to attract the same potential a right-wing populist party 
has been mobilizing, even if this is more difficult for them due to their pluralist 
internal structure, as I have argued. It is quite striking how close the conservative 
ÖVP has moved to the FPÖ’s position, especially in the 1999 election campaign.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Austria 
Legend: fpo: Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (Austrian Freedom Party); ovp: Österreichische 
Volkspartei (conservatives); lif: Liberales Forum; spo: Social Democrats; ecolo: Greens. 
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In France, we find a situation similar in some respects to Austria. The cultural line 
of conflict also clearly cuts across the distributional dimension, and here too, cultural 
liberalism and anti-immigration stances are located at the extreme points of this axis 
(Figure 2.2). The Front National takes a distinct position and is consistently located in 
the traditionalist-communitarian political space over the years, far away from cultural 
liberalism. While the parties of the left are always located in the left-libertarian 
domain, the parties of the established right have shifted their strategy. In 1995 they 
are located between the left and the Front National, although at a safe distance from 




Figure 2.2: France 
Legend: front: Front National, Mouvement National Républicain (MNR); rpr: Rassemblement pour la 
République; udf: Union pour la Démocratie Française, small center parties; mrg: Mouvement des 
Radicaux de Gauche; psf: Parti Socialiste Français; pcf: Parti Communiste Français; ecolo: Verts, 
ecological parties; exl: extreme left. 
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similar to that in 1988. As a consequence, the political space drawn up by the parties 
becomes triangular, with the parties of the left situated on the upper left, the moderate 
right-wing parties to their right and the Front National at the lower end of the cultural 
divide. At the same time, the Front National’s position regarding distributional issues 
is not clear-cut. In 2002, it has moved nearer to economic liberalism and away from 
the more pro-welfare stance it had taken in 1988 and 1995. 
In Switzerland, the cultural dimension appears highly polarizing, and the SVP is 
clearly situated at the one pole of this opposition, advocating cultural protectionism as 




Figure 2.3: Switzerland 
Legend: svp: Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People’s Party); exr: older extreme right parties, lib: 
Liberal Democrats (FDP and other liberal parties), cvp: Christian Democrat group; sp: Social 
Democrats; ecolo: Greens. 
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SVP’s fervent opposition to joining the European Union is also evident in the location 
of this issue, whose position is much less centred than in most of the other countries. 
At the same time, we can see that the cultural divide does not cut across the 
distributional one very clearly. Anti-immigrant positions are located much nearer to 
economic liberalism than to welfare state support. In other words, there are signs of an 
integration of the economic and cultural divides in a single left-right dimension. Thus, 
the SVP is located at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural divide, but 
also close to economic liberalism. Its position in the economic domain does not seem 
suitable to mobilize the losers of economic modernization.  
As a non-member of the European Union, however, the SVP’s refusal to join the 
Union can be considered an expression of economic protectionism as well as part of a 
defence of national community and its distinct traditions. The importance of the issue 
of European integration also explains the unexpected position of the Ecologists, which 
is due to their rejection of a rapprochement. As the analysis in Chapter 7 will show, 
the Ecologists do represent the counter-pole to the SVP along the libertarian-
universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian line of conflict. What is most striking 
about the SVP is the fact that it has moved into a political space originally occupied 
by extreme right parties such as the Freedom Party, the Swiss Democrats and Swiss 
Democratic Union. As can be seen in Figure 2.3, the SVP’s position is identical to 
that of the older parties of the extreme right. In the course of the SVP’s programmatic 
shift, the older extreme right parties have almost vanished – due to the diminished 
attention they have gained in the media, we can no longer estimate their position in 
1999. 
In the Netherlands, the data covers the span from 1994 to 2003, but it makes little 
sense to analyze the four election jointly that took place in this period of time, because 
the Dutch political space has been profoundly restructured, and we find the largest 
shifts in party positions in this country. I therefore restrict the analysis to three 
contests, namely, the 1998 election, before Pim Fortuyn appeared on the political 
stage, and the 2002 and 2003 elections. In 2002, the List Pim Fortuyn reaped a 
sweeping success, receiving 17% of the vote. In the elections in 2003, the LPF – 
without Fortuyn – gained 5.7% of the vote. In the political space of the late 1990s to 
early 2000s, the line connecting cultural liberalism and immigration cuts across the 
distributional dimension very clearly (Figure 2.4). The LPF is manifestly located quite 
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far away from cultural liberalism. This reflects its opposition to the multicultural 
model of social integration, demanding instead that foreigners adapt to the Dutch 
culture. At the same time, the conservative VVD issues a clearer anti-immigration 
stances than the Pim Fortuyn movement.3 
The LPF’s position reflects the fact that Pim Fortuyn very much advocated an 
innovative ideological cluster of his own, which does not fully conform to the 




Figure 2.4: The Netherlands 
Legend: lpf: List Pim Fortuyn, Leefbar Nederland; vvd: Liberals; cd: Christian Democrat group; d66: 
Democrats ’66; pvda: Worker’s Party; gl: Green Left (Groenlinks, PSP, PPR). 
                                                
3  Unfortunately, the Centrumsdemokraten and other extreme right parties, which we would expect to 
be positioned similarly, could not be included in the analysis because there are too few observations 
regarding their positioning. 
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Hence, while he was opposed to multicultural society (which forms part of the 
cultural liberalism category), he held libertarian values concerning homosexuality and 
related societal values. He expressed neither tough stances against immigration, nor a 
strong law and order position, as our data show (see the tables in Appendix A). 
However, he did criticize the individualization and fragmentation of society 
(Pennings, Keman 2003: 62), thus aiming at the communitarian potential I have 
sketched out, yet in a different way than right-wing populist parties do. Consequently, 
the LPF should not be classified as an extreme right-wing populist party similar to the 
Front National, the FPÖ or the SVP. Pennings and Keman (2003), come to a similar 
conclusion in an analysis based on party manifesto data from the MRG-project, noting 
that the LPF bears more resemblance with established right-wing parties in other 
European countries than with parties of the extreme right. As far as the LPF’s 
programmatic profile regarding the welfare state and economic liberalism is 
concerned, it is clearly nearer to a liberal position. 
What is also striking is how all the established parties have moved away from 
cultural liberalism in the Netherlands, though not necessarily towards anti-
immigration stances. Indeed, the differences in the parties’ positions in the different 
elections are the largest of all countries studied here. The success of Pim Fortuyn’s 
programmatic stance thus has to be seen in the light of (i) an established party already 
taking a clear position at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural divide 
before the appearance of the LPF, namely, the liberal VVD, and (ii) strong 
competition from other parties, imitating the ideological mix developed by Pim 
Fortuyn, and collectively challenging what had appeared a multicultural consensus. 
 
No space for the populist right in Britain and Germany? 
 
Starting with Germany (Figure 2.5), we can see that the basic structure of political 
space is quite similar to the one found in the four countries already discussed. The 
cultural line of opposition runs from cultural liberalism to anti-immigration stances, 
cutting across the economic axis very clearly. In 1994, both the Ecologists as well as 
the Social Democrats take a left-libertarian position, and are located close to the 
universalistic pole of the cultural divide, and according to general expectations. The 
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FDP in this election is very liberal both in economic, as well as in societal matters. 
The Union, on the other hand, representing the two Christian Democratic sister parties 
CDU and CSU, is located in a rather centrist position with regard to both dimensions. 
Thus, while the resulting configuration is triangular, the space at the traditionalist-




Figure 2.5: Germany 
Legend: ecolo: Greens, pds: Democratic Socialists, spd: Social Democrats, Union: Christian Democrats 
(CDU, CSU), fdp: Liberals 
 
 
Between 1994 and 2002, we witness a quite astonishing general move of the major 
parties towards the traditionalist-communitarian pole, with the (partial) exception of 
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the Ecologists, which primarily move to the right. While the SPD in 1998 takes a 
centrist position on both dimensions – similar to the Union’s location in the first 
election – the latter has moved further to the anti-immigration pole of the cultural 
divide. Thus, while the configuration remains triangular, the two main parties have 
both moved away from a libertarian-universalistic position. Without having seen the 
emergence of a strong challenging party of the populist right, German political space 
is thus characterized by a configuration resembling that found in the countries 
previously analyzed. The Union’s location is similar to the one exhibited by the 
populist right in other countries, and appears to leave little room for the latter, except 
for the small parties of the extreme right that represent a rather marginal phenomenon 
and hardly appear in the media.  
Although political space is also two-dimensional in Britain (Figure 2.6), the situation 
in this country is somewhat different compared to those discussed so far. While a 
cultural dimension structures the positions of the major parties, it is characterized only 
by a libertarian-universalistic pole (marked black), lacking the ideological counterpart 
of a culturally homogeneous community. Budgetary rigor is located at the opposite 
extreme in political space. This is not entirely surprising because cutting back the 
state is associated with a neo-conservative political position, which is liberal in 
economic terms, but traditionalist in cultural matters (Habermas 1985, Eatwell 1989). 
Right-wing populist parties such as the Front National and the FPÖ have advocated 
similar positions in the 1980s (Ignazi 2003). Even in the 1990s, budgetary rigor is 
generally associated with a traditionalist-communitarian stance in Austria, France, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland, although not in Germany (see Figures 2.1-2.5). 
However, support for or opposition against universalistic values clearly play a role 
in parties’ appeals in Britain. This dimension also includes attitudes towards the 
European Union, similarly to Switzerland. While Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
switch their positions regarding the cultural conflict between 1997 and 2001, the 
Conservatives are furthest away from cultural liberalism and Europe. However, the 
Labour party in 1997 and the Liberal Democrats in 2001 come rather near to their 
position, making it less extreme in relative terms. Still, the Conservatives’ most 
consistently show a neo-conservative profile, characterized by an acceptance of 
economic, but a rejection of cultural modernity, which Habermas (1985) identifies as 
the core traits of neo-conservatism. Under Margaret Thatcher, the Conservatives have
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Figure 2.6: Britain 
Legend: labour: Labour Party, cons: Conservative Party, libdem: Liberal Democrats. 
 
 
explicitly emphasised the need to defend national tradition (Eatwell 2004: 64). 
Nonetheless, a potential for communitarian-traditionalist mobilizations beyond the 
Conservatives seems to exist, given the success of the UK Independence Party in the 
last European elections, for example. Furthermore, the historical weakness of the 
British extreme right, according to Eatwell (2004), is not due to structural factors, 
political culture, or even institutions, a frequently quoted explanation (e.g. Ignazi 
2003), but rather to the nature of the extremist parties themselves, internally divided 
and far too radical. In this sense, the British Nationalist Party’s “modernization” 
strategy of the past years, consisting of its adoption of a differentialist cultural 
discourse and the targeting disadvantaged social groups (Eatwell 2004), may prove 
successful in the long run.  




The evidence from the analysis of political space shows that political conflicts in the 
six countries examined are structured by an economic state-market and by a cultural 
line of conflict. Drawing on various theoretical perspectives, I have argued that the 
issues associated with this axis – the libertarian goals brought up by the New Social 
Movements of the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the conservative counter-reaction 
represented by movements of the right – can be interpreted in terms of an opposition 
between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values or concep-
tions of justice. The more recently established pole of this line of conflict is 
characterized by an opposition to the universalistic conceptions of the New Left – the 
latter including the right to difference, societal permissiveness, and in some countries 
also support for supranational integration in the European Union – as well as by an 
anti-immigration stance. I have further argued that the latter represents an attempt at 
community construction based on the exclusion of culturally different citizens. With 
the exception of Britain, where the immigration issue has been almost absent from the 
political debate until recently, the cultural liberalism of the New Left and the anti-
immigration stances advocated by right-wing populist parties indeed lie at opposing 
poles of a new cultural line of opposition. 
The French Front National, the Austrian Freedom Party and the Swiss People’s 
Party are clearly positioned at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of this opposition. 
Clearly, these are not single-issue parties, but express a coherent ideological vision. 
Together with the two other criteria proposed – a populist anti-establishment-
discourse and a hierarchical internal party organization, centred on a charismatic 
leader – they can be considered members of a common party family. While the 
populist-organizational criteria also apply for the Dutch Pim Fortuyn movement, its 
position regarding the cultural line of conflict differs from that of the other populist 
parties. Hence, while Pim Fortuyn opposed the multicultural model of society 
associated with the libertarian left, he did not put forward any tough anti-immigration 
stances. Consequently, he does not satisfy the criteria I have put forward to identify 
members of the extreme right party family, namely, an extreme position on the 
cultural axis of conflict. 
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By contrast, I have proposed the label those parties that satisfy the criteria of 
extremeness on the new cultural dimension of conflict “extreme right-wing populist”. 
Like most labels applied to these parties, the term “right” is actually misleading, 
because the populist right does not represent an extreme form of right-wing thinking, 
as Mudde (2000: 179) argues convincingly. However, with the term “New Right” 
comprising too diverse strands (Eatwell 1989), we are by convention stuck with terms 
identifying these parties as part of the “right”. Indeed, right-wing populist parties 
stand out for their extreme position on the cultural axis of conflict and not for a 
specific stance regarding the state-market conflict. Contrary to Kitschelt’s (1995) 
prediction, not all successful right-wing populist parties are pro-market, as the 
Austrian case demonstrates most clearly. Other parties, such as the French Front 
National, change their position regarding distributional conflict frequently, reflecting 
an unease in satisfying the diverging economic preferences of their voters, as Chapter 
6 will demonstrate. Of the three parties included in the extreme populist right group, 
only the Swiss SVP is consistently pro-market. 
A final note regarding the proper definition of the extreme right-wing populist 
party family is in order here. The empirical application of my criteria to delineate the 
right-wing populist party family has primarily sought to distinguish this group from 
the pluralist parties of the established right. On the other hand, an analysis the focuses 
on parties’ position in political space is rather insensitive towards internal differentia-
tions within the extreme right. Because all these parties share an ideological core, 
drawing borders inside the extreme right group is no easy task (Mudde 2000). As I 
have argued, what distinguishes right-wing populist parties from the wider extreme 
right party family is their culturalist discourse, which the Front National, the FPÖ, and 
the SVP practice alike. The distinction between the older parties of the extreme right 
and the new right-wing populist sub-type will be addressed once more in the 
discussion of German extreme right parties in Chapter 8. More important for the topic 
of this chapter has been a clear distinction between extreme right-wing populist 
parties and those of the established right. Although this may seem a trivial problem at 
first sight, it is in fact essential, as this analysis shows. For example, the Dutch VVD’s 
ideological position in political space corresponds closely to the profile exhibited by 
the three members of the extreme right-wing populist group. Given these similarities, 
a distinction based on origin, which would classify the Swiss SVP as an established 
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conservative party and the Austrian FPÖ as a national conservative party, makes little 
sense. A major difference then lies in the anti-political-establishment rhetoric and the 
hierarchical internal structure of right-wing populist parties.  
The rhetorical element corresponds to a type of mobilization specific to this party 
group, linking popular discontent with the propagation of a political division between 
them and the “cartel” represented by the political establishment. A hierarchical 
internal structure, on the other hand, enables populist parties to quickly respond to 
changing moods in the populace. This opportunism allows them to interpret new 
issues in terms on the cultural axis of conflict they mobilize on. An example is the 
Front National and its changing stance regarding the EU, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. Such flexibility in strategic positioning is quite difficult to achieve for 
parties with a pluralist internal structure, despite the fact that these parties are 
becoming more centralized as well (Katz, Mair 1995, Blyth, Katz 2005). 
Finally, the analysis has shown that the lack of success of right-wing populist 
parties in Germany and Britain can at least partially be explained by the fact that 
established parties in these countries exhibit a programmatic profile similar to the one 
characteristic of the populist right. However, Britain stands out for not having seen 
the immigration issue ascend to the central role it played in the other countries. At the 
same time, libertarian-universalistic issues are highly polarizing, indicating that the 
universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian divide can structure the party system 
even in the absence of the immigration-issue. The British Conservatives take a clear-
cut position regarding this conflict, combining it, as the Swiss SVP does, with an 
opposition to the European Union. Thus, from this perspective, the chances for new 
parties seem rather limited in Britain. At the same time, the recent success of the UK 
Independence Party as well as the rising appeal of the British Nationalist Party (see 
Eatwell 2004) urge to temper all too clear-cut predictions. 
In Germany, the Union parties appear to occupy the political space in which right-
wing populist parties thrive in elsewhere. Political conflicts in Germany closely 
resemble those found in the other countries, and contrary to Britain, the immigration 
issue has played a role in the election campaigns of the 1990s. For this reason, the 
German case merits a more in-depth analysis, taking into account the role of political 
identities shaped by the historical cleavages in stabilizing political alignments, as well 
as the established parties’ way of dealing with the immigration issue, both of which 
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are possible factors inhibiting the appearance of a right-wing populist party. Such an 
approach is the subject of Chapter 8, which will also discuss the German extreme 
right’s failure to modernize and to distance itself from fascism. The following two 
theoretical chapters lay the conceptual ground for the analysis of the role of historical 
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In cleavage theory, as well as in explanations of political mobilization in general, a 
central importance of the prior establishment of a collective identity is generally 
acknowledged. However, under which circumstances collective identities emerge and 
how they relate both to social structure and to individual identities has so far not been 
explicitly laid out. Thus, while one of the merits of the cleavage concept is to link 
macro-historical processes with individual-level analyses, the question how the 
individual and the macro levels are to be linked – one of the central problems in the 
social sciences, as Coleman (1986) has pointed out – is far from clear. Quite 
obviously, the formation of cleavages and their subsequent long life-span suggest that 
people develop relatively stable political identities that cannot be explained by their 
acting as interest-based actors alone. My argument is that existing research is deficient 
for not giving enough weight to the role of identity processes both in the initial 
mobilization of political oppositions, as well as in the formation of long-term bonds 
between social groups and political parties.  
The main aim is then to bridge the micro and macro levels by drawing on social 
psychological accounts of identity formation, which provide promising tools to link 
the two levels. Applications of these concepts in political science are scarce (for 
overviews, see Monroe et al. 2000, Brewer 2001, and Huddy 2001), with few 
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exceptions in the field of social movement research (Klandermans 1997, Stryker et al. 
2000). More specifically, to the best of my knowledge, none of these concepts have so 
far been employed to account for one of the prototypical questions when cleavage 
theory is brought to bear on individual-level mobilization: Within a category of 
people sharing some social structural characteristic such as working class 
membership, why are some individuals mobilized in terms of this characteristic, while 
others feel close, say, to a denominational party? And once preferences for a specific 
party have developed, what is it that stabilizes the resulting alignments over time? To 
address these questions, I will take advantage of calls put forward recently for an 
integration of “social identity theory”, developed by Tajfel (1982) and “identity 
theory”, developed by Stryker (1980). The combination of these approaches seems 
promising in order to link social structure and collective identity formation.  
I start by providing a short overview of the cleavage approach of the historical 
formation of party systems in Europe. I then emphasize the importance of the 
collective identities of social groups for the mobilization of cleavages. A brief 
excursus on the formation of Latin American party systems shows that the relative 
homogeneity of the European historical experience of cleavage formation tends to 
conceal this important fact. The main part of the chapter then introduces and links the 
concepts of social identity, personal identity, and values, which makes it possible to 
grasp collective identity at the individual, as well as the group level. While this results 
in concepts that are applicable in empirical research, survey data frequently lacks the 
kind of information necessary to implement them. Nonetheless, by providing an 
account of how cleavages are initially mobilized, this chapter clears the ground for 
Chapter 4, where I focus on the factors accounting for the stabilization and the 
“freezing” of party systems after the initial mobilization of political conflicts. The 
insights from the discussion in this chapter thereby feed into the analytical model that 
seeks to gauge the impact of historical cleavages on the mobilization of the populist 
right. The chapter concludes by addressing the role of identity processes in the 
mobilization of the libertarian New Social Movements on the one hand, and the 
forging of a traditionalist-communitarian collective identity by right-wing populist 
parties on the other.  
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The Cleavage Concept and the Historical Experience of Europe 
 
Across Europe, the twin processes of the national and the industrial revolutions have 
constituted “critical junctures” determining subsequent political development, and 
have led to long-term alignments between social groups and political parties. In Lipset 
and Rokkan’s model (Lipset, Rokkan 1967, Rokkan 2000), the national and the 
industrial revolutions have each resulted in the establishment of two cleavages. The 
national revolution refers to the process of nation-building, and to the resulting 
conflicts between the state and the church. The antagonisms to emerge from this 
revolution have been territorial on the one hand and cultural on the other. The centre-
periphery cleavage was triggered by “the conflict between the central nation-building 
culture and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously 
distinct subject populations in the provinces and the peripheries”, while the religious 
cleavage developed from “the conflict between the centralizing, standardizing, and 
mobilizing Nation-State and the historically established corporate privileges of the 
Church” (Lipset, Rokkan 1990 [1967]: 101, emphasis in original).  
As opposed to these cultural conflicts, functional oppositions have arisen only after 
a certain degree of internal consolidation of the national territory and a certain level of 
cultural standardization. The processes of external boundary building have been a 
crucial precondition for the internal political structuring of the polity along functional 
lines (Bartolini 2005: Ch. 2). Accordingly, cross-local oppositions first resulted from 
the industrial revolution, which in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries produced two 
cleavages: A sectoral cleavage between the first and the secondary sectors of the 
economy, opposing agricultural and industrial interests, and, as the historically 
youngest divide, the class cleavage. While this last cleavage has not necessarily been 
the strongest one, it has probably received most attention in comparative politics 
because it has come to structure politics in every European country. These historical 
cleavages, in processes lasting to the end of the 19
th
 and the beginning of the 20
th
 
centuries have given birth to the modern party systems in Europe. Subsequently, as 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have famously noted, the full mobilization of European 
electorates by the 1920s led to a “freezing” of the major party alternatives. The basic 
structure of European party systems has thus proved remarkably stable throughout 
much of the 20
th
 century. 
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In their further elaboration of the concept, Bartolini and Mair (1990: 213-220) have 
offered a definition of a cleavage which has become widely accepted. According to 
this conceptualisation, a political divide must comprise three elements to constitute a 
cleavage: (1) A social-structural element, such as class, religious denomination, 
status, or education, (2) an element of collective identity of this social group, and (3) 
an organizational manifestation in the form of collective action or a durable 
organization of the social groups concerned. Going beyond the three constituting 
elements of a cleavage in the definition quoted above, the term cleavage is usually 
reserved for relationships which exhibit a certain stability. A cleavage constitutes a 
durable pattern of political behavior linking social groups and political organizations. 
This pattern is reproduced over generations of voters, and possibly beyond the 
conflicts which originally brought the respective parties into being.  
A cleavage therefore constitutes a political structure in David Easton’s terms, who 
states that “structure is a property of behavior” (1990: 43). Cleavages entail collective 
political identities and organizational loyalties that determine individual political 
behavior, and which are not easily broken down or diluted by new political 
movements. The space for new political conflicts is thus conditioned by the existing 
cleavage structure. The relationship between the last of the four historical cleavages 
and the three historically older ones illustrates this nicely. The class divide, contrary 
to the other cleavages, has proven to be universally polarizing across Europe. But 
despite representing the main commonality of European party systems, its impact has 
been far from uniform in the different countries. On the one hand, this is due to the 
country-specific opportunities for alliances with other political movements. More 
directly relevant for the present discussion is the fact that the class cleavage’s strength 
as well as the make-up of its social basis have been heavily determined by the older 
cleavages and the loyalties and identities that they entailed (Rokkan 2000: 277-412, 
Bartolini 2000: Ch. 8). Workers’ parties thus found their mobilization space 
constrained by prior mobilization efforts of the religious, nationalist and agrarian 
political movements. As a consequence, the share of the working class voting for left 
parties varies heavily across countries, and so does the social structural homogeneity 
of the electorate mobilized by the left (Bartolini 2000: 497). 
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The Role of Collective Identity in the Mobilization of Cleavages 
 
The prerequisites of collective action 
 
As the definition by Bartolini and Mair (1990) noted above makes clear, the collective 
identities of the social groups divided by a conflict are a constituting element of a 
cleavage. As far as the initial mobilization of a cleavage is concerned, the reasons for 
this are straightforward. Tarrow (1992: 177) states that “If the social movement 
research of the last two decades has shown anything, it is that grievances are not 
sufficient to trigger collective action, that this requires someone who can take 
advantage of political opportunities, develop organizations of some kind, and 
interpret grievances and mobilize consensus around them” (emphasis added). There 
are differing usages of the term collective identity, but I propose here to understand it 
as the shared beliefs, values and ideologies, as well as the shared definition of the 
membership criteria and of the boundaries of a group. This understanding draws upon 
conceptions of collective identity in the literature on social movements (see, for 
example, Gamson 1992, Kriesi et al. 1995, Melucci 1996: 70-1, Klandermans 1997, 
Snow, McAdam 2000, Brewer 2001: 119).  
However, contrary to some usages in the literature, such as Melucci’s (1996), I 
prefer to view a collective identity as something the individuals in question are 
conscious of sharing, and which binds them together. In a similar vein, Eisenstadt and 
Giesen (1995: 74) conceive collective identity as “produced by the social construction 
of boundaries“. These divisions, according to the authors, might be related to control 
over resources and social differentiation, but they are nonetheless dependent upon 
symbolic codes of distinction. For reasons which will become apparent later on, I 
propose to keep analytically distinct the second and the third elements of a cleavage 
mentioned above, namely, the element of collective identity and that of political 
organization. As Gamson (1992: 61) argues, “A person may embrace the collective 
identity offered by a movement and feel alienated from its major organizational 
carriers. Conversely, there may be organizational loyalists whose personal lives are 
thoroughly intertwined with the fate of the carrier but feel little identification with any 
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broader »we« that includes movement constituents”. Thus, the collective identities of 
social groups are independent of their more specific political articulation. 
The element of collective identity is central for the mobilization of cleavages 
because in the absence of a shared self-definition, the classical collective action 
problem arises for the mobilization of a certain cause, where free-riding is the rational 
option for each individual (Olson 1965). Pizzorno (1986, 1991) has demonstrated that 
from a strictly logical perspective, theories expecting people to act collectively on the 
basis of their shared interests alone are deficient. Without something beyond self-
interest, the Hobbesian problem of order, i.e. how people come to agree to act 
together and establish a state, cannot be solved. Pizzorno then goes on to claim that a 
collective identity as a shared standard is a necessary precondition for members of a 
group to be able to engage in cost-benefit-calculations regarding their actions. There 
is abundant evidence for the fact that much political behaviour cannot be explained by 
the pursuit of individual self-interest. People in many instances choose courses of 
action which do not reflect their material self-interest (for an overview over the 
literature, see Mansbridge 1990a, 1990b). Pizzorno (1986, 1991), similarly to Melucci 
(1996), also argues that some forms of collective action are valued in themselves and 
therefore do not depend on shared interests at all.  
If the collective action problem is correctly stated, objectively shared interests are 
insufficient to explain the formation of a cleavage. An individual will only consider 
grievances and deprivations as typical for the social category it belongs to if it 
somehow identifies with the group constituting this category. Only if the category has 
a meaning for the individual is an interpretation of discontent possible in collective as 
opposed to individual terms. Concerning mobilization along political cleavages, 
Sartori (1968) has early on criticized Lipset’s (1960: Ch. 7) dictum of party 
oppositions being the “democratic translation of the class struggle”. At the centre of 
his critique was the often implicit notion that objective class positions manifest 
themselves as a matter of course. According to Sartori (1968), we have to distinguish 
clearly between objective class membership and subjective class consciousness. The 
historical mobilization of the class cleavage illustrates that political organization and 
mobilization is possible only under conditions favourable to the development of a 
subjective attachment to a collective group. While I will provide a reading of the 
formation of the historical class cleavage that emphasizes the role of collective 
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identity later on, a look at party system formation outside Europe illustrates the 
preconditions of cleavage-formation most clearly.  
 
European exceptionalism: How cleavages did not materialize in Latin America 
 
Looking at the European experience, the importance of the conditions favorable to the 
formation of a collective political identity are easily overlooked. For all the 
differences that exist between cleavage structures in Europe, we simply do not find 
any countries where cleavages did not materialize at all. This is due to one of the 
specificities of the democratization process in Europe, namely, the timing and gradual 
character of the extension of political rights to new social groups claiming their 
political incorporation. This struggle for political participation had strong identity-
forming effects since it provided the groups in question with clearly defined the 
boundaries of the group as well as with an overarching goal. The relevance of this fact 
can easily be seen by extending the geographical scope of the countries considered, 
which brings in considerably more between-country variance regarding the strength of 
cleavage identities.  
The Latin American experience underlines that without a favorable timing of 
suffrage extensions, and in the absence of a political struggle of social groups for 
political participation, cleavages might never develop, independently of the level of 
modernization.
1
 Accordingly, in a country like Brazil, where the suffrage was 
extended to large parts of the population preemptively, long before the working class 
had effectively organized and actually called for the vote, a class cleavage never 
materialized despite high levels of socio-economic inequality. In the absence of the 
critical junctures characteristic of the European path to cleavage formation, Brazil 
remains an enigma in that the party system is not anchored in social structural 
divisions, in spite of a large potential for class-based political action, given the 
extremely high levels of inequality (see Samuels 2006). Chile, on the other hand, one 
of the few countries in Latin America which has a cleavage structure similar to 
                                                
1  This section draws on my Diploma-thesis (Bornschier 2002) where I analyzed the conditions which 
made for non-existing connections between social structure and party system in Brazil and 
compared them with the historical trajectory of countries where such links exist, chiefly in 
Uruguay and Chile. 
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European countries, also shares important other characteristics of the European cases: 
The sequential struggle of social groups for their political inclusion resulted in a 
gradual extension of the suffrage and led to the emergence of religious and socio-
economic cleavages very much like in Europe.  
Somewhat different but following the same logic is the Uruguayan experience. As 
a result of prolonged civil wars in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, large parts of the 
population took sides for one of the opposing camps. Together with the early 
extension of the suffrage, when the opposition from the civil war was still fresh, this 
resulted in strong and durable loyalties of the population to one of the two parties 
associated with the two camps (Coppedge 1998: 177-180). The Colorados and the 
Blancos are catch-all parties, which do not have clear-cut links to social structure, and 
bear more similarities to the pluralist parties of Northern America than to their 
European counterparts.
2
 Nonetheless, the strong collective identities deriving from the 
period of civil war froze the party system into place. A relevant workers’ party 
emerged only much later, following a very gradual process of mobilization. Until 
today, Uruguay is characterized by the most stable party system in the Southern Cone 
of Latin America (Mainwaring, Scully 1995).  
These examples underline the fact that the collective identity element of a cleavage 
is far from negligible, and too often taken for granted. First of all, the Brazilian case 
illustrates that the development of functional oppositions is impossible without a prior 
process of collective identity formation of the social groups in question. The example 
of Uruguay then shows how strong collective identities can lead to the emergence and 
the freezing of political divides even in the absence of a clear-cut socio-structural 
basis. Nonetheless, this cleavage fostered regularities in behavior that retarded the 
development of a state-market opposition for decades. We can thus learn a lot from 
looking at countries outside Europe in determining the prospects for new cleavages to 
develop. The importance of the prior existence of a collective identity for a cleavage 
to emerge is more clearly visible in Latin America, where some party systems have 
been structured by cleavages, while others do not relate to social structure in any 
meaningful way. In Europe, by contrast, the variation is more in the degree to which 
the various structural conflicts have manifested themselves politically, determined by 
the differing alliances between social sectors. It is important to recognize that the 
                                                
2  The distinction between American and European parties is developed by Epstein (1980). 
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European cleavages developed not only as a consequence of very far-reaching critical 
junctures – the national and the industrial revolutions – but also under specific 
historical conditions and a timing of the democratization process that favored the 
formation of collective identities of various social groups. Overall, then, the threshold 
movements have to overcome to mobilize a cleavage seems quite high from the start, 
and even higher where existing cleavages constrain the mobilization space for new 
political conflicts, which will be the subject of Chapter 4. 
 
Collective identities and collective action potentials 
 
In social psychological terms, the political mobilization of a social group requires its 
members to interpret conflicts of interest or of ideological outlook in intergroup as 
opposed to interpersonal terms. According to social identity theory, this is achieved 
by the cognitive process of depersonalisation (Stets and Burke 2000: 231-2, Tajfel 
1982). Tajfel (1982: Ch. 4) has provided an outline of the conditions for interpersonal 
to become intergroup behaviour: In contexts allowing for individual social mobility 
from one social position to another, behaviour is most likely to remain interpersonal, 
since individual action in order to change one’s situation is possible. Intergroup 
behaviour, on the other hand, requires what Tajfel calls social change beliefs, which 
emerge only when group boundaries are not easily transgressed, or when the existing 
social stratification system does not enjoy legitimacy. This mechanism is in many 
ways similar to Hirschman’s (1970) concepts of  “exit” and “voice”, which play a 
central role in Bartolini’s (2005) analysis of the preconditions of internal cleavage 
structuring, namely, the drawing up of the outside borders of the polity in the process 
of nation-building. In Tajfel’s account, social mobility and social change beliefs form 
a continuum. The further beliefs are away from the “social change” end of the 
continuum, the more “creativity” is necessary for the fostering of ideologies that make 
individuals act not as individuals but as group members. In other words, conflicts are 
only interpreted in group terms if intergroup mobility is low, because these conditions 
make probable the identification of individuals with the group they belong to. On the 
other hand, if social mobility is perceived to be high, the symbolic construction of 
boundaries will be much more difficult. 
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Lipset (1960) has employed a similar reasoning to explain why class-based 
political action has been common in European countries, while no socialist party 
emerged in the United States, arguing that differences in interclass social mobility 
between the United States and Europe go a long way in explaining this fact. Thus, in 
general terms, if the group boundaries based on functional characteristics are not 
particularly strong, the collective identity potential they entail is correspondingly 
weak. At the other end of the continuum are ascribed characteristics such as ethnicity, 
which cannot be overcome at all. If individuals define themselves in terms of their 
ethnic group, grievances that overlap with this group are likely to be interpreted in 
group terms and action is likely to be collective rather than individual. On the other 
hand, collective identity formation in terms of stratification or class categories, which 
are characterized by social mobility, is much more difficult, as the historical 
experience of Latin America has shown. In between, we find group distinctions based 
for example on religion. These are personal characteristics that are not ascribed, but 
nonetheless difficult to overcome, since they are often at the core of individuals’ 
personal identity, a point I will return to later on. Consequently, they also have a 
strong potential for fostering “political change beliefs”. 
At the individual level, identification with a social group or category is the 
individual-level equivalent to a collective identity, as Klandermans and de Weerd 
(2000) have suggested. Because a political mobilization of group interests is 
dependent upon the prior existence of individuals’ identification with the group, the 
potential for collective identity formation of a social group or category is crucial in 
determining the chances for the political mobilization of structurally rooted 
grievances. Such collective identities or group identifications are pre-political and do 
not necessarily include definitions of political action necessary to achieve a group’s 
interests. In a similar vein, Klandermans and de Weerd (2000: 70) point out that 
collective identities remain “neutral” unless they are politicised. 
In this respect, the concept of the “mobilization potential” of a social movement in 
fruitful. Klandermans (1997: 16) defines it as consisting of the citizens who could 
theoretically be mobilized by a movement, who share certain values and beliefs, and 
who are sympathetic to a certain collective action frame (see also Kriesi and 
Duyvendak 1995: 5-10). Combining this with the definition of a cleavage employed 
above, the mobilization potential of any political opposition – be it a new conflict or 
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one already represented by the party system – consists of two elements: (1) Groups of 
individuals defined by objective social conditions or cultural oppositions, and (2) 
sharing a collective identity, meaning that members identify with the group in 
question. While the first of these element identifies structural potentials, based on 
social structural or cultural distinctiveness, it is only the second element which 
involves the shift to collective action potentials, which can be mobilized by political 
actors. 
The relationships between the basic concepts laid out so far are summarized in 
Table 3.1. Orientations towards political action, which I have not discussed so far, are 
only relevant for the third stage of a cleavage, namely the element of political 
organization. It is here that political actors come into play which can mobilize 
political potentials in various ways and in different political arenas. As a result, 
individuals develop loyalties to political organizations such as parties, and the conflict 
the party represents becomes part of their ideological schema, as will be argued in 
Chapter 4. The significance of individual-level role designations and value patterns at 
the collective level will be discussed later on in the course of this chapter.  
 
Table 3.1: Political mobilization at the individual and collective levels 
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Collective Identity and the Individual:  
The Problem of Multiple Group Membership 
 
The problem stated: Political potentials at the individual level 
 
Evidently, even if the members of a structural category share a collective 
consciousness – implying that a collective action potential is present – not all of them 
are likely to be mobilized in terms of the grievances, interests, or ways of life 
characteristic of this group. This is, of course, partly due to the fact that they have to 
be reached by mobilization efforts. A more crucial factor accounting for differences 
between collective action potentials and political action, however, is that individuals 
are rarely members of one social category or structural potential alone. Hence, even 
people similarly located in employment terms may variably think of themselves for 
example as working-class, as catholic, or as belonging to a certain ethnic community, 
to name just a few possibilities. If it were not for this fact, the assertion that interest-
based mobilization always requires the prior construction of a collective identity may 
seem too starkly put. If only one group membership were relevant for an individual, 
its preferences might be clear-cut enough to take a political decision based on 
individual interest. But in most real-world political situations, decisions are not that 
simple, and whenever more than one group membership is salient, political behaviour 
will be more difficult to predict. 
From a historical macro perspective, scholars working within the cleavage-
perspective have of course been sensitive to the effects of cross-cutting cleavages and 
the cross-pressures resulting from them, as mentioned (Rokkan 2000, Bartolini 2000: 
Ch. 8). But at the individual level, there are very few accounts that provide tools to 
explain why some members of a social category are mobilized on the basis of that 
category while others are not. Early on, Sartori (1968) had ironically stated that 
studies on class-voting in many countries actually found more non-class voting than 
anything else, ending with the apparent paradox that many people seem to vote 
against their material class interests. 
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Even accounts of political mobilization which emphasize the role of collective 
identity, such as Melucci’s (1995, 1996), rarely address the question why some people 
are mobilized in terms of a certain social characteristic, while others are not. Diani 
(1996), for example, provides an interesting model to explain the rise of the Italian 
Northern League by employing concepts from social movement research. Stressing 
the political opportunities deriving from the veining of traditional cleavages and 
alignments, he shows how the Lega Nord successfully recast mobilization frames to 
gain support along a northern Italian identity. Yet, we are left with the problem that 
apparently not all northern Italians are responsive to this frame. While we can often 
intuitively point to explanations for this fact, we lack the conceptual tools to properly 
address this question at the conceptual and empirical levels. Again, social psychology 
offers more satisfactory answers to these questions. Here, we find theories that show, 
first, how individual identities are shaped by attachments to various groups, and 
secondly, offer theoretical links between individual-level identities on the one hand, 
and collective identities on the other. 
 
Competition among identities: Linking social identity theory and identity theory 
 
In social identity theory, a distinction is made between those aspects of a person’s 
identity that are individual, and those that are social. Originally developed by Henri 
Tajfel (1982: Ch. 5), this distinction is captured concisely by Monroe et al. (2000: 
421) as follows: “Broadly defined, social identity refers to the social categories, 
attributes, or components of the self-concept that are shared with others and therefore 
define individuals as being similar to others. In contrast, personal identity is made up 
of those attributes that mark an individual as distinct from all others.” Social identity, 
in other words, refers to those parts of an individual’s identity that are derived from 
their identification with various social groups. While collective identity is a socially 
constructed collective belief, group identification is situated at the individual level, 
and refers to the appropriation of collective beliefs (Klandermans, de Weerd 2000: 75, 
Klandermans 1997). Potentially, individuals can have a wide variety of social 
identities or groups they identify with: citizens sharing their religious affiliation, their 
professional group or their social class, their nationality, or the circle of all Europeans, 
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to note just a few examples which are potentially relevant for politics. To the extent 
that the members feel attached to these groups or categories, they form collective 
action potentials, as argued earlier.  
If all of the group identifications referred to above were of the same strength, 
equivalent political potentials would result. Which identification would prevail in 
political action would merely be determined by the stimuli of a given situation that 
activates a specific identification. This is in fact what social identity theory would 
suggest (Thoits, Virshup 1997: 120-1).
3
 But in practice, it is quite likely that people 
will show different intensities in their identification with various groups. Hence, what 
is lacking in the described link between collective identity and individual identity is 
(a) an understanding of which factors make a particular identity salient in a specific 
situation and (b) what happens if several identities appear to be simultaneously 
relevant in a given moment. 
Stryker (2000), in one of the rare applications of social psychological concepts to 
political mobilization, criticizes social identity theory for not being able to account for 
differentials in social movement participation by individuals who are similarly located 
in structural terms and ideologically like-minded. With its focus on how intergroup 
conflict emerges, and rarely focusing on real-world situations, social identity theory 
has been less concerned with the question why some people participate in collective 
action while others do not. Stryker’s (1980, 2000) identity theory, on the other hand, 
offers conceptual tools to address the question. Although differences between identity 
theory and social identity theory exist, I will follow recent claims underlining the 
potential in linking the two theories,
4
 and offer an account that integrates them. A 
generic difference is that identity theory comes from a sociological tradition, and 
stresses interpersonal processes, while social identity theory comes from a social 
psychological tradition, and emphasizes cognitive processes (Thoits, Virshup 1997: 
120-1). 
Identity theory builds on sociological role theory and posits that “Persons 
potentially have as many [social] identities as sets of role relations in which they 
                                                
3  However, there are differences in emphasis within the theory as to how context-dependent 
identities are (see Brewer 2001: 121-2). 
4  See especially Stets and Burke (2000). Hogg and Ridgeway (2003) provide an overview of the 
literature. Accounts integrating the two theories can be found in Brewer (2001) and Burke (2004). 
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participate” (Stryker 2000: 28).
5
 Roles are behavioural expectations tied to positions 
in the social structure. A position, on the other hand, is any socially recognized 
category of actors. These can be defined by occupation, by status, or simply by 
characteristics such as “rich man”, “poor man”, “intellectual”, and so on, in the 
examples that Stryker gives.
6
 The expectations attached to positions are of course 
social per se, but another important feature clearly making them social is that they 
relate to counter-roles – employer vs. employee being an example (Stryker 1980: 57-
59). Identities are internalised role designations whose salience can vary: Contrary to 
social identity theory, which posits that they are either activated or not activated due 
to the features of a specific situation, identity theory holds that identities have 
different probabilities of being activated (Stets and Burke 2000: 229-30). Identities 
can be conceived as being ordered into a salience hierarchy, “such that the higher the 
identity in that hierarchy, the more likely that the identity will be invoked in a given 
situation or in many situations” (Stryker 1980: 60-1). Contrary to social identity 
theory’s conception, then, identity salience is transsituational.  
In Stryker’s identity theory, social behaviour consists in role-related choices. 
Action and interaction are shaped by shared meanings, which are, in turn, the product 
of prior interaction. Underlying the theory is a symbolic interactionalist framework 
whose premise is that people’s actions are determined by the way they interpret 
situations. This basic assumption is captured in the phrase by Thomas and Thomas 
from 1928, quoted by Stryker (1980: 2): “If men define situations as real, they are real 
in their consequences”. In his version of the theory, however, Stryker gives more 
weight to social structure than to interpretive processes in accounting for an 
individual’s social behaviour, though sticking to the premises of symbolic 
interactionalism: “Thus, if the social person is shaped by interaction, it is social 
structure that shapes the possibilities for interaction and so, ultimately, the person” 
(Stryker 1980: 66). In other words, the salience hierarchy of identities is influenced by 
                                                
5  Stryker does not always explicitly differentiate between personal and social identity, primarily 
because he views humans are inherently social beings, and personal identity as socially patterned. 
It is clear that when he speaks of identities here, the term is meant to refer to social identities. 
6  Thoits and Virshup (1997: 124-5) argue that roles based on personal interaction, such as in the 
family, should be kept distinct from identifications with large-scale social categories. In doing so, 
they emphasize differences between social identity theory and role theory because the two theories 
focus on qualitatively distinct psychological phenomena. However, since I am primarily concerned 
with identifications with large-scale social categories, I follow Stryker (2000) in playing down 
these differences. 
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an individual’s networks of relationships and commitments to social groups. This is 
how society and social structure are reflected in an individual’s self-concept.  
In accounting for political action and mobilization, identities can be conceived as 
competing with one another for expression. Identity salience thus affects behaviour 
through role choice (Stryker 2000: 26-8). As mentioned, identities are transsituational 
on the one hand, and organized in a hierarchy of salience on the other. Hence, if there 
is little difference in the salience of two identities an individual holds, mobilization 
efforts or situational stimuli will play a dominant role in determining action (Stryker 
2000: 35). However, if differences in the intensity of identities exist, this does not 
seem to be the case. Huddy (2001: 146-7) quotes a range of empirical evidence 
supporting the view that less salient identities are more affected by the situational 
context. Stryker even holds that less salient identities can win competition with more 
salient identities under certain conditions. Very salient identities, on the other hand, 
are found to be hardly affected by specific situations, supporting the view that they are 
transsituational. 
Although social identity theory and identity theory differ in their conception of 
social groups,
7
 the two theories appear reconcilable, especially if social identities and 
role identities are viewed as different, yet integrated elements of a person’s identity, 
as Burke (2004) does. The relevance of these theories for political mobilization can 
readily be seen. According to Stryker (2000), differences in political mobilization 
within social categories can be accounted for not simply by emphasizing recruitment 
                                                
7  Since I have been integrating identity theory and social identity theory, I want to make obvious 
where the two theories differ, and justify my approach. While identity theory is very illuminating 
in that it introduces the notion of role choice, the resulting conception of groups differs from the 
one I use, which is derived from social identity theory. As Stets and Burke (2000: 227-8) note, 
“Social identity theorists regard the group as a collective of similar persons all of whom identify 
with one another, see themselves and each other in similar ways, and hold similar views, all in 
contrast to members of outgroups”. The central cognitive process in social identity theory is 
therefore depersonalisation (Stets, Burke 2000: 231-2), which results in individuals’ playing down 
of within-group differences that inevitably exist in the real world. Conceiving group attachment in 
this way is useful because it makes it compatible with the concept of collective identity, which is 
also based on the belief that commonalities within the group are more important than differences.  
Identity theory, on the other hand, puts much more emphasis on within-group interaction and role 
differentiation (Brewer 2001: 117). Here, the central cognitive process is self-verification, i.e. 
seeing oneself in terms of a certain role, which can vary among members of a group (see Burke 
2004). For the study of political mobilization, this group concept is less promising than that of 
social identity theory. However, Stets and Burke (2000: 232) suggest that the two understandings 
can be linked, since membership in a social group or role involves both aspects, namely, “[…] 
one’s identification with a category (emphasized more strongly in the depersonalisation process), 
and the behaviours that we associate with the category (underscored more strongly in self-
verification). Both identification with a social category and role behaviour refer to and reaffirm 
social structural arrangements.” 
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processes or campaigning effects, but also by individuals’ linkages to various social 
networks – read: other group identifications – which pull them away from being 
mobilized in terms of a specific group membership. One of the prototypical historical 
examples for this process in cleavage theory is the catholic worker who has to chose 
between class solidarity and his belonging to a religious community – both 
constituting possibly salient social identities. From a cleavage perspective, then, social 
psychological accounts linking identity and social structure are interesting because 
they allow us to study differences in identity-conceptions within social categories 
without ending in a purely social constructionist account. 
 
An illustration: The mobilization and the decline of the class cleavage 
 
The perspective just developed allows an interpretation of the crucial role which 
industrialization and urbanization played as preconditions for the mobilization of the 
industrial working class. As I mentioned earlier on, these processes are considered 
crucial for an explanation of the emergence of working class political organizations. 
From an individual-level perspective, industrial manufacturing at the end of the 19
th
 
century made for similarities in work routines of workers, providing more 
homogeneous role identities than was mostly the case in pre-industrial employment. 
Equally important, spatial concentration increased the connectedness of workers 
sharing similar employment conditions. In the village context, relationships had been 
more varied and less restricted to individuals of the same class. Now, industrial 
employment and spatial concentration both worked together to increase the salience of 
role identities. Consequently, in defining themselves according to their place in the 
production process, workers’ class identification became part one of their social 
identities. Surely, this process was not automatic, but supported or triggered by 
Marxist ideology, which emphasized the centrality of individuals’ place in the 
production process and the lack of political inclusion as a defining feature of working 
class members. At the same time, ideology only gained momentum due to the 
structural and political potentials which were catalysed by the similarities in working 
conditions that large-scale manufacturing introduced. 
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Furthermore, the development of a collective identity would not have been possible 
had not other group identifications lost part of their power as a consequence of the 
same macro-processes that had aided the development of a working class political 
identity. Hence, industrialization led people to migrate to the new industrial centres, 
weakening the more diverse role and social identities linked to their established 
cultural context. Collective identities tied to the older cleavages, such as religious 
identifications, were thereby weakened. How much force religious identities retained, 
and if working-class identification would have the chance to win identity competition 
with them, was of course open to individual variation. This depended on individual’s 
identity hierarchy, which was, in turn, influenced by their other social networks. 
Where factory employment brought together workers from the same region and with 
established social relations, religious and regional identities can be hypothesized to 
have retained more strength due these networks. Overall, then, spatial concentration 
was of course a precondition for the mobilization of the working class because it 
provided an environment more favourable to left-wing political mobilization than the 
countryside, as Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens (1992) have argued. At 
the same time, it is doubtful whether Marxist ideology would have taken hold had not 
older collective identities lost and the new working class identification gained in 
salience within individuals’ salience hierarchy. 
Research at the macro level has shown that differences in the timing and degree of 
industrialization and urbanization are important factors in accounting for the timing of 
the mobilization of the political left in Europe (Bartolini 2000: 122-130). The above 
are meant to be sketchy examples to illustrate how the concepts introduced in this 
section allow us to move back and forth between the macro processes I started out 
with, and the level of the individual. We can employ the same logic to explain how 
the advent of a post-industrial economy at the end of the 20
th
 century has led to the 
decline of working-class identities as a consequence of (1) the declining role of large-
scale industrial manufacturing, (2) processes of gentrification of city centres and sub-
urbanization, which reversed the trend to special concentration of similar employment 
categories, resulting in a weakening of role identities. Pappi (2001) has shown that the 
vote for the German Social Democrats among voters is no longer dependent on the 
social homogeneity of their circles of friends, and concludes that the basis for the 
maintenance of the traditional class conflict is thereby fading. 
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Finally, auxiliary class organizations such as unions and left-wing parties play a 
declining role in reinforcing role identities. In response to their more heterogeneous 
support base, these organizations have broadened their profile in order to appeal to 
other classes and social segments. Regarding the parties of the left, this evolution is a 
consequence of their New Left transformation, and their taking up of many of the 
goals advocated by the libertarian New Social Movements. How political appeals 
impinge on the maintenance of collective identities is the subject of Chapter 4. To be 
able to shed light on the identity processes underlying the mobilization of the New 
Left and the right-wing populist counter-offensive, it is necessary to discuss the role 
of values in collective identity formation.  
 
 
Linking the Personal and the Social: Values and Social Structure in  
the Mobilization of the Movements of the Left and Right  
Since the Late 1960s 
 
The Role of Values in Collective Identity Formation and Political Action 
 
Little has been said so far about the relationship between social identity and personal 
identity. Indeed, Hitlin (2003) points out that both identity theory and social identity 
theory mention, but rarely address the level of personal identity. Hitlin proposes to see 
values as a cohesive force within personal identity. As political philosopher Charles 
Taylor puts it, when we seek to answer the basic question of our identity – “Who am 
I?” – we usually do this with reference to what is of crucial importance to us. And 
this, in turn, is closely related to our fundamental orientations and goals (Taylor 1992: 
Ch. 2). The fact that people define themselves in these terms is fairly modern. Taylor 
shows how identity has turned from something ascribed and unchangeable in pre-
modern times to a self-concept which is to some degree constructed and defined by 
each individual. But since it can only be defined by reference to surrounding people, 
and using ideas that are somehow articulated in our culture, such a self-description is 
inherently social (see also Jenkins 1996: Ch. 1).  
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To describe people’s fundamental orientations and goals, and to pull attention to 
their social patterning, it is common to use the concept of values. Rokeach (1973: 5), 
defines values follows: 
“A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of 
existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode 
of conduct or end-state of existence. A value system is an enduring 
organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states 
of existence along a continuum of relative importance.” 
 
Values, according to the Hitlin and Piliavin (2004: 362), are mental structures much 
like schemata, and hence more abstract that attitudes. If personal identity is defined by 
individual value priorities, it is personal in the sense of not being primarily structured 
by group membership. Hitlin (2003: 121) noted that “Values develop in social 
contexts, draw on culturally significant symbolic material, and are experienced as a 
necessary and fundamental, but noncoerced, aspect of self. Understood as conceptions 
of the desirable, values are not experienced as externally binding but rather as ideals 
worth striving for” (Hitlin 2003: 121). Although value-identities are less strongly 
related to social structure, and more strongly shaped by culture than social and role 
identities, values are of course subject to social patterning. They link individuals to 
cultural systems and social groups (Gecas 2000: 94-5). Individual value priorities vary 
due to differences in socialization, similarities and dissimilarities in personal 
experience and individual needs (Rokeach 1973: 23-4). 
Adding personal or value identities to the role and social identities discussed so far 
identifies conditions facilitating political action on the one hand, as well as new 
sources of mobilization on the other. Patterns of individual value priorities anchored 
in social structure are relevant for political mobilization in that common values 
facilitate the construction of a collective identity by providing an ideological 
interpretation of group membership. Huddy (2001: 144) mentions that meaning and 
group attachment can be fostered by group members’ basic value orientations. At the 
same time, values motivate action. According to Rokeach (1973), values both 
represent standards that guide decisions and have motivational functions because they 
represent the relatively stable “supergoals” that people strive for. Thus, values can 
provide what Honneth (2003: Ch. 8) calls the necessary “semantic bridge” linking the 
individual experience of non-recognition – in terms of life chances or in terms of 
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identity – to a collective cause. Consequently, a group identification can develop, and 
enable collective action.  
 
Values and the mobilization of the new cultural divide 
 
By virtue of its collective identity element, every cleavage by definition has a value 
component, and it therefore does not make sense to contrast the class cleavage from 
cultural cleavages on these grounds, as Bartolini (2000: 16) points out. As Rokeach 
(1973) and Wildavsky (1987, 1994) have suggested, there are essentially two 
politically relevant value dimensions: freedom and equality. Whereas the value of 
equality underlies the mobilization of the class cleavage, the rising salience of the 
libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian divide is associated with 
differing emphases of the value of freedom. Just as the state-market cleavage has a 
cultural component, so does the new value divide have a structural component, even if 
it has so far remained difficult to delineate precisely. Consequently, I label the new 
cultural divide with reference to the cultural and moral character of the issues it 
evolves around – the free choice of life-styles, as well as differing conceptions of 
justice and community. In contrast, the state-market cleavage, while also reflecting a 
value divide, but in political terms involves a struggle over resources. 
Using more complex class schemas than the blue collar-white collar division 
underlying the traditional class cleavage, it can be shown that the libertarian-
authoritarian value divide does have a structural basis, as shown by Kriesi (1998). 
However, while a more precise conceptualization of employment structures explains a 
lot, the value divide has an impact on voting behaviour that goes beyond class. This 
indicates, as Kriesi (1998: 177) concedes, that it has so far not been possible to detect 
the new conflict’s structural component. In the terms introduced in this chapter, is has 
remained difficult to pin-point the social structural underpinning of the new cultural 
divide in terms of role identities. So far, there is merely evidence to suggest that 
social-cultural specialists, who are involved in interpersonal work logics in the tertiary 
sector, support parties that advocate universalistic values, while what remains of the 
working class seems to have become an important support base of parties mobilizing 
traditionalist-communitarian values, as discussed in Chapter 1.  
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Over and above these polar cases, however, our instruments for the description of 
social structural role identities still seem inadequate to detect the basis of the new 
cultural divide. Moving beyond social class, and taking into account the dynamics of 
the relative rise and decline of the social standing and prestige of social groups, as 
suggested by milieu theory (Vester 2001, Vester at al. 2001), appears promising. 
Theoretically, a whole range of social categories may potentially constitute the basis 
of a cleavage, as Bartolini (2004) has argued, pointing out that the term social-
structural “[…] does not point to mere »economic« or »demographic« criteria, but to 
the whole range of differentiation criteria of social groups such as lineage, property, 
class, education, credentials, power, status.” One of the difficulties in studying social 
identities other than those defined by class and religion, however, lies in the 
limitations of the available survey data. 
However, we have a clearer understanding of the origins of the values underlying 
the new antagonism. Early on, Allardt (1968) has argued that the educational 
revolution of the 1960s constituted a critical juncture, which had the potential to 
develop into a new cleavage. Because tertiary education fosters the adoption of 
universalistic values, it has resulted in growing differences between citizens along a 
value conflict that has variably been described as evolving around freedom (Rokeach 
1973), materialism and postmaterialism or postmodernism (Inglehart 1977, 1997), 
libertarian vs. authoritarian values (Flanagan, Lee 2003), or, in this book, around 
libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. The libertarian-
authoritarian divide characteristic of cultural conflicts in the 1970s was still closely 
related to religion. Individual positions along the cultural divide of the 1990s, 
however, which has become enriched with the immigration issue, have come to be 
determined by differences in education more than anything else in the six European 
countries studied by Kriesi et al. (2007). Most probably, this is the result of a 
combined effect of early socialization, stressed by Inglehart (1977, 1997), and the 
advancement of universalistic values by the expansion of higher education. As Marks’ 
(1997) analysis of the formation of materialist and postmaterialist values shows, early 
socialization is indeed central, but education also promotes postmaterialist values, 
over and above individuals’ social environment in their childhood years. 
On the libertarian side of the value divide, the mobilization of the New Social 
Movements of the left was facilitated by the close association between participants’ 
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individual identities, the collective identities of the movements, and their political 
agenda, namely, the recognition of difference in terms of lifestyle, gender, sexuality, 
and so forth. Furthermore, the very constitution of a movement striving for certain 
goals entails a process of collective identity formation and maintenance (Melucci 
1996, Habermas 1998: 8). In a process Snow and McAdam (2001) refer to as a 
“general diffusion” of movement identities, these movements in alliance with parties 
of the New Left, which took over their agenda, appear to have succeeded in forming 
political identities in larger segments of society that identified with their cause.  
To the degree that the movements of the right, and right-wing populist parties in 
particular, represent a counter-offensive to the universalistic values promoted by the 
libertarian movement, we expect their mobilization to be supported by the opposing 
value cluster, namely, by a traditionalist-communitarian collective identity. Because 
the links between the goals of right-wing populist parties and the identities of its 
supporters are less direct, it can be assumed that their mobilization depends more on 
the deliberate molding of a collective political identity by political elites. Such 
attempts are potentially successful because there is something like a natural 
propensity of humans to group-formation and to the demarcation from others, as 
social identity theory (Tajfel 1982: Ch. 5), as well as other social psychological 
theories suggest. This is because social groups provide members with social identities, 
whose maintenance is important for individual’s positive self-esteem.
8
  
The preceding chapters have highlighted the importance of the mobilization 
frames employed by actors of the populist right. Political campaigns can play an 
important role in the mobilization, since they “(…) not only draw on existing groups 
and group bias but also construct new coalitions from latent identity categories” 
(Monroe et al. 2000: 441). In conjuncture with the decline of collective identities 
formed by the class and religious cleavages, caused by the advent of a post-industrial 
economy, and the long-term trend of secularization, which have led to a withering of 
working-class and religious identities, other identities – old or newly salient ones – 
can gain room. In the case of the populist right, mobilization efforts have contributed 
to the “resurfacing” and rising salience of national identity, which has already played 
an important role in the older nationalist movements. This identity thereby seems to 
                                                
8
 Similarly, Burke (2004: 10) argues that social identities have a bearing on feelings of self-worth. 
This mechanism is central in various, otherwise competing social psychological theories linking 
identity to group formation and intergroup conflict. See the overview in Monroe et al. (2000). 
90 Chapter 3 
have ascended in the individual salience hierarchy of identities of certain segments of 
the population.  
While acknowledging the possibilities of political elites to reinforce collective 
identities, the crucial point this chapter has sought to emphasize is that such efforts 
take place within the boundaries of the structural and cultural similarities of the 
groups in question. To the degree that right-wing populist parties depend on an 
ideological, rather than a protest vote, they potentially share common social or role 
identities. Because of our insufficient understanding of the social structural basis of 
the populist right vote, and due to the lack of data to measuring potentially salient 
social identities, the further analyses will focus on the commonalities of right-wing 
populist voters’ values and their more strictly political identities. At least these 
elements of the collective identity underlying traditionalist-communitarian 
mobilization processes are amenable to empirical examination. Accordingly, I expect 
the right-wing populist electorate to be characterized by a homogeneity of 
traditionalist-communitarian value positions along the new cultural divide. However, 
even if this is correct, the success of right-wing populist parties within the group of 
citizens holding traditionalist-communitarian values is likely to be conditioned by the 
salience of collective identities tied to the older cleavages. For this reason, the 
following chapter develops an analytical model to gauge the degree to which these 





The purpose of this chapter has been to develop a conceptual framework for the 
analysis of cleavage-formation at the individual level. I have intended to show that 
using concepts from social psychology, these processes can be fruitfully studied at 
that level. The distinction put forward between structural and collective action 
potentials allows an assessment of the chances of structural conflicts being politically 
mobilized. Thus, my aim was both to challenge reductionist views that consider it 
sufficient to define political potentials in social structural terms, as well as to offer 
analytical tools to incorporate the element of collective identity into the study of 
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political cleavages. While collective identity is a constituting element of Bartolini and 
Mair’s (1990) widely accepted definition of a cleavage, it is all too often left aside in 
empirical analysis due to the difficulties of measurement, a notable exception being 
Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995). Bartolini (2000), despite insisting on the importance 
of taking it into account, finds himself unable to measure it in a meaningful way. 
While this is on the one hand due to a lack of appropriate data, a problem that is not 
easily resolved, shortcomings can on the other hand be traced to a lack of appropriate 
analytical tools. For this reason, I have attempted to grasp collective identities at the 
individual level in this chapter, hoping to contribute to a more adequate integration of 
the collective identity dimension into the study of cleavage mobilization. 
Both the traditional class and religious cleavages, as well as the more recent divide 
based on the conflict between citizens holding libertarian-universalistic and those 
defending traditionalist-communitarian values, emerged due to the interplay of 
common value priorities, integration into social networks, and the deliberate moulding 
of collective identities by political elites. Social structure and individual identities 
have to interact to enable the formation of collective identities that result in collective 
action potentials. However, to assess the strength of a collective action potential, we 
also have to take into account how firmly group members are still rooted in social 
identities related to older oppositions. To be able to develop a model that takes into 
account the interplay of old and new conflicts, we first need a proper understanding of  
how exactly European party systems have “frozen” into place in the 1920s. The 
processes accounting for the perpetuation and transformation of cleavages lies at the 






From Structure to Culture and Back:  





„Despite more or less thirty years of close reading by countless scholars in a 
variety of different fields, and despite what is now a genuinely voluminous 
literature seeking to explore and often test the ramifications of the so-called 
»freezing hypothesis«, there still remains a marked degree of confusion about 
what precisely was believed by Lipset and Rokkan to have settled into place by 





The mobilization of the historical cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), 
in processes lasting to the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, have 
given birth to the modern party systems in Europe. Subsequently, the full mobilization 
of European electorates led to a “freezing” of the major party alternatives. A crucial 
characteristic of Western European competitive politics, according to Lipset and 
Rokkan (1990 [1967]: 134), is that “the party alternatives, and in remarkably many 
cases the party organizations, are older than the majorities of national electorates”. As 
the historical record shows, existing cleavages condition the room for the emergence 
of new conflicts. However, interpretations of the sources of the stability of European 
party systems differ, and so do notions of what promotes the stability of the basic 
lines of division underlying European party systems. This discord is mirrored in the 
discussion on whether or not the classical class and religious cleavages have 
maintained their structuring power, or if their force is waning. 
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If cleavages are formed by the interplay between structural or cultural similarities 
and the formation of a collective consciousness of social groups, as I have suggested 
in the previous chapter, then their continued salience must result from the stability of 
these collective identities. In the following, I suggest that an important mechanism 
perpetuating collective identities and individual-level group attachments is political 
conflict. As Coser (1956) has argued, conflict with out-groups has group-binding 
functions and increases the internal cohesion of groups. In order to gauge the chances 
for new conflicts to manifest themselves politically, we should therefore focus on the 
degree to which older lines of conflict have remained politically relevant, and thereby 
contribute to keeping the underlying group identifications alive. Consequently, the 
aim of this chapter is to develop an analytical model that, by incorporating the policy 
oppositions around which party competition evolves, allows an assessment of how 
established conflicts limit the room for parties mobilizing on new issue dimensions. 
This model will then be employed in later chapters to explain the rise of right-wing 
populist parties in various European countries.  
This chapter is organized as follows. I start with the diverging findings concerning 
the enduring strength of the classical cleavages. While contrasting results of research 
addressing this question are partly due to the respective methodological choices, 
differences in approaching the question also tend to reflect diverse understandings of 
the cleavage concept itself, and in particular of the famous „freezing“-metaphor. The 
mayor opposition lies in an interpretation of the freezing hypothesis in terms of the 
immutability of social structural basis of cleavages on the one hand, and in terms of 
the stability of party systems on the other. In following the second line of 
interpretation, I propose a reading that centres on the lines of conflict structuring party 
interactions. In contrast to other approaches, this allows political change to be 
accommodated with the long-term stability of party systems emphasized in the 
cleavage account. I then suggest an analytical framework that links cleavages to the 
political conflicts that actually manifest themselves in politics. The model 
incorporates the positions of the parties and of their voters along the central lines of 
conflict, as well as the strength of political identities underlying them. By 
differentiating between different types of alignment between parties and voters, 
hypotheses can be derived concerning the mobilization potential of new conflicts that 
result in the realignment between social groups and political parties. 
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“Bottom-up” and “Top-down” Approaches to the Study of Cleavage 
Transformation 
 
The question to which degree historical cleavages still determine political behaviour 
today has been approached from two perspectives. One approach centres on the social 
structural basis of cleavages, while the other focuses on the way new political issues 
have transformed the meaning of the historical antagonisms. While both have their 
merits, they have so far not been systematically linked in political analysis. “Bottom-
up” approaches. Studies examining the social structural basis of cleavages are often 
inexplicit as to whether or not they are examining the traditional cleavages or possible 
new structural oppositions. Those of them who do find politics to have a structural 
basis today (e.g. Evans 1999a) seem primarily concerned with this fact as such, and 
pay less attention to the question how these oppositions relate to the historical 
cleavages. Consequently, they have little to say concerning the question what the 
policy antagonisms are about that have resulted in the new alignments they discover. 
As Peter Mair (Mair et al. 1999: 309) and Franklin (2002) have put it, Evans’ “The 
End of Class Politics?” (1999a) is not really a book about politics. More than offering 
a test of the strength of the historical cleavages, then, this is an analysis of the 
cleavage concept as such. On the other hand, Franklin et al. (1992) explicitly test the 
structuring power of the traditional class cleavage, by focusing on the historical 
antagonists in this conflict. Their conclusion is that, in terms of the manual vs. non-
manual employment divide, the force of this cleavage has veined. This, on the other 
hand, leaves unexplored the continuing existence of a modified state-market cleavage 
as a consequence of the transformation of its social structural referent. Both 
approaches, then, suffer from the same deficiency: Proceeding “bottom-up”, from the 
social structural characteristics of voters to their party choices, they have difficulties 
relating the structural bases of politics to the policy-oppositions structuring interaction 
in party system. 
„Top-down“ approaches. Kitschelt’s (1994) analysis, which takes new political 
issues as a starting point, can be considered a „top-down“-approach. As the author 
reveals, the opposition between left and right has been profoundly transformed since 
the 1970s as a result of a value conflict between libertarian and authoritarian 
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conceptions of community. As a consequence, it is quite doubtful if it is legitimate to 
speak of the traditional class cleavage when referring to the left-libertarian vs. right-
authoritarian divide, even if this conflict is rooted in new class divisions. If we take 
Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) three-fold definition of a cleavage literally, and apply it 
not only to the initial mobilization of conflicts, but also as a tool to analyse partisan 
alignments in later stages of political development, then the class cleavage has – in 
part, at least – given way to a new opposition. Hence, while Bartolini and Mair’s 
(1990) own empirical analysis reveals a remarkable stability of party systems along 
the left-right opposition, it is left open if this stability is due to a persistence of the 
underlying cleavages, or, what is in fact more plausible, to their profound 
transformation.  
While Kitschelt (1994) has pointed to the forces that have driven the transforma-
tion of the historical class cleavage, his approach does not reveal to which degree 
contemporary alignments are determined by the new value opposition on the one 
hand, and how strongly they are still related to the state-market cleavage on the other. 
For this reason, it is necessary to relax Kitschelt’s assumption that left-libertarian and 
right-authoritarian positions form one single dimension of conflict in Western 
European party systems. For example, there are very few parties that combine a 
libertarian-universalistic cultural position with a market-liberal economic stance. 
Voters with this set of preferences will therefore often have to choose between a New 
Left party that adequately represents them on the cultural dimension and a liberal 
party that reflects their economic preferences. To properly distinguish the impact of 
the two divides underlying the new left-right antagonism, each divide structuring 
party competition should therefore be studied separately. Furthermore, I come back to 
the concepts introduced in Chapter 3 in order to develop a more adequate 
understanding of how the historical cleavages of the Lipset-Rokkan account have 
survived over the decades. An understanding of this process is essential in order to 
develop expectations as to how these cleavages are likely to impinge on the 
mobilization potential related to new conflicts and on parties that seek to put together 
new electoral coalitions.  
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The Perpetuation and Transformation of Cleavages and  
Political Alignments 
 
Differing interpretations of the “freezing-hypothesis” 
 
Contrary to the analysis of the genesis of European party systems, the mechanisms 
accounting for their ensuing long-term stability have not been analyzed in detail in the 
original Lipset-Rokkan article, and not in Rokkan’s later work either, now collected in 
a single volume (Rokkan 2000). Although a careful reading does reveal some insights 
regarding this question, it did not represent the authors’ primary interest. As Mair 
(2001) argues, the “freezing-hypothesis” is not really a hypothesis, but rather an 
empirical observation: The basic structure of party systems had remained remarkably 
stable between the 1920s and the 1960s, and even thereafter, as we know today. The 
parties that have historically emerged in the early phases of competitive politics have 
thereby survived profound societal transformations.  
Empirical tests of the continuing validity of the freezing-hypothesis have 
proceeded along two main lines, as Mair (2001: 28-33) points out. As we will see, 
they are based on differing interpretations of what exactly “froze” into place in the 
1920s: (1) A first possibility is to track the evolution of social-structural basis of a 
cleavage, the strategy pursued by scholars studying the social structural determinants 
of voting behaviour. In Bartolini’s (2000: 24) words, the focus here is on the social 
homogeneity of the structural basis of cleavages. Mair (2001: 30) criticizes this 
approach on the grounds that it starts from the unrealistic assumption that the 
hypothesis could only be correct if society itself is “frozen”. Since social structure has 
evidently changed a great deal since the 1920s, the long-term stability of party 
systems, as revealed by Bartolini and Mair’ (1990) analysis, must be due to something 
else than stable patterns of linkage between social strata and political parties. If party 
systems retain their basic shape in the midst of an evolving society, then this can only 
be accounted for by the forming of new links between social groups and parties, 
which compensate the natural process of structural dealignment due to the declining 
number of religious and working class voters. This is in fact the reasoning put forward 
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by Evans and his colleagues (Evans 1999a). But if the cleavages have been 
profoundly transformed, then it hardly makes sense to apply the freezing-metaphor to 
the cleavages themselves. 
(2) The second strategy is to focus on the stability of party systems formed by the 
historical cleavages. Most of the work focusing on aggregate levels of electoral 
volatility falls into this category, such as Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) study. This 
perspective seeks to explain the persistence of parties beyond the conflicts that 
originally brought them into being. The fact that the links between social groups and 
parties are subject to change is at least implicitly taken as a given. They are not 
problematic, quite to the contrary: As Mair (2001) argues, for example, a long-term 
transformation of cleavages is actually the only possible explanation for the stability 
of European party systems evidenced in Bartolini and Mair (1990). Their constant 
adaptation helped parties survive in a profoundly changing environment.  
A partial explanation for the confusion as to the exact meaning of the freezing 
metaphor may actually lie in the influential definition of a cleavage put forward by 
Bartolini and Mair, which can only be read as putting great emphasis on the social 
structural homogeneity of parties’ electorates. However, in other instances, the 
authors themselves are much less strict in their understanding of cleavages. This 
applies to Mair’s (1997) later work as well as to Bartolini (2000), who accepts a long-
term decline in the social structural homogeneity of a party’s electorate as quite 
natural. Hence, Bartolini and Mair’s definition, emphasizing the social structure-
collective identity-organization linkage, seems much more adequate to analyze the 
conditions for the initial mobilization of cleavages than for answering the question to 
which degree historical cleavages structure politics today. Since studying the 
contemporary political relevance of cleavages is my aim, I will argue that it does not 
suffice to focus on social structure and on the stability of partisan alignments, but that 
we also have to identify the concrete political conflicts carried out in party systems 
and how they are interpreted and processed along the lines of historical antagonisms 
reflected in cleavages. 
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Party systems and the perpetuation of cleavages 
 
Upon closer reading, Lipset and Rokkan’s original formulation of the freezing 
hypothesis seems to conform more to the second interpretation just discussed than to 
the first. The passage most frequently quoted from their article in this context is the 
following:  
 
„The narrowing of the »support market« brought about through the growth of mass parties 
during the final thrust towards full-suffrage democracy clearly left few openings for new 
movements. Where the challenge of the emerging working-class parties had been met by 
concerted efforts of countermobilization through nationwide mass organizations on the liberal 
and conservative fronts, the leeway for new party formations was particularly small; this was 
the case whether the threshold of representation was low, as in Scandinavia, or quite high, as in 
Britain” (Lipset, Rokkan 1990: 135). 
 
This passage conforms to the interpretation that the freezing-metaphor does not refer 
to the conflicts themselves, but to the party systems. Lipset und Rokkan (1990: 134) 
actually refer to the „freezing of the major party alternatives“, and not the cleavages 
themselves. They explicitly state, „[…] the party systems of the 1960s reflect, with 
few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s“ (ibid, emphasis 
mine). A frozen party system is thus equivalent to a structurally consolidated or 
institutionalized party system, in Sartori’s (1976, 1994) terms. The stronger a party 
system structures the expectations of actors over time – at the elite as well as at the 
mass level – the more it contributes to channelling old and new conflicts into 
established structures of competition. Mair also suggests such a nexus between 
expectations and structuration: 
 
„Predictability then becomes a surrogate of structuration: the more predictable a party system 
is, the more it is a system as such, and hence the more institutionalized it has become. This is 
also what freezing is about“ (Mair 2001: 38). 
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With the full mobilization of electorates in the 1920s, the mayor social groups had 
developed links to political parties that represented them in the national centre of 
decision-making. Large parts of the population had developed political identities and 
group attachments to one of the forces which had led the way in the establishment of 
political organization: Those in the periphery joining in the resistance against the 
central nation-building culture on the basis of their ethnical, linguistic or religious 
identities; those who saw their religious identity endangered by the centralizing and 
standardizing nation state; those who opposed industrial interests because they saw 
their interests as members of the agricultural sector threatened; and, finally, the 
organization of the working class fighting for political incorporation and material 
equality, leading to the counter-mobilization of those with opposed class interests 
(Rokkan 2000). 
These established loyalties to the parties mobilizing on behalf of social groups 
formed of citizens’ political identities, understood here as those social identities that 
are politically relevant. If individuals perceive themselves as belonging to a group, 
they downplay within-group differences and start to emphasize differences between 
themselves and other groups (Tajfel 1982). In other words, they symbolically 
construct boundaries between themselves and their political competitors. The 
struggles around the mobilization and counter-mobilization of the interests that had 
brought the party systems into place rendered highly salient these political identities, 
and thus left little room for subsequent political mobilization.  
To the degree that conflicts evolve around the political questions directly linked to 
the original cleavages, politics is likely to reinforce and sustain the underlying 
collective identities. Ongoing political conflict serves to highlight the boundaries of 
the group and to keep group identification salient at the level of the individual 
member. The structure of conflict represented by the party system thereby perpetuates 
the collective identifications underlying the cleavage structure. Sartori (1968) has 
argued, for example, that objective class positions are not automatically transposed 
into politics. In the terms introduced in Chapter 3, this requires a class collective 
identity at the group level, and the development of a group attachment at the 
individual level. After the initial mobilization of this opposition, the conflicts carried 
out within the party system between working-class parties and those defending the 
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interests of the upper classes served to reproduce these group identifications at the 
voter level. 
However, it needs to be emphasized that it is not the working class party alone that 
keeps alive the subjective class-consciousness of the social constituency that once led 
to the mobilization of that party. Without an antagonist, this identification would lose 
much of its political relevance, and not being refreshed, would open the way to 
identifications on the basis of some other group membership. It is thus not parties 
themselves that reproduce collective identities, but the conflicts they carry out with 
other parties. In other words, it is the party system, defined as a „[...] system of 
interactions resulting from inter-party competition“ (Sartori 1976: 44) that reproduces 
collective identities. 
Political space can thus be imagined as structured by parties taking certain 
positions along the historical dividing lines. Cleavages being reflected in the party 
system, it is the interaction of the parties that reproduces the identities tied to 
cleavages. Contrary to the argument put forward by Campbell et al. (1960: Ch. 7) and 
Converse (1969), then, it is not necessarily the long-term identification of social 
groups with a specific party that accounts for the stability of a party system over time, 
but rather the stability of the patterns of interaction between parties that perpetuates 
political alignments. Accordingly, party identification appears as the product of a 
genuinely political socialization process.  
Party systems then reproduce themselves over time as new generations of voters 
are socialized into the existing structure of interaction, and come to interpret politics 
in terms of the prevailing pattern of oppositions. Thus, the configuration of the lines 
of conflict in a party system represents something like a cognitive schema that helps 
individuals to make sense of politics. A schema can be conceived as a „cognitive 
structure of organized prior knowledge, abstracted from experience with specific 
instances that guides the processing of new information and the retrieval of stored 
information“ (Conover, Feldman 1984: 96). According to the authors, one of the roles 
of schemas is to generate expectations against which reality is compared (ibid, p. 97), 
much like the notion of a frozen or an institutionalized party system developed in the 
preceding section.  
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In the absence of patterned interactions, the party system provides no cognitive 
schema for the interpretation of politics. Sartori (1976: 244-248) has argued that 
parties that do not exhibit this regularity in interaction – “fluid polities and quasi-
parties”, as he calls them – do not constitute a system at all. Accordingly, no stable 
links between social constituencies and parties exist, and levels of volatility from one 
election to the next can be very high, indicating the absence of any form of 
structuring. Examples for such constellations are absent in Western Europe, but the 
experience outside Europe – looking at the contrasts between party systems in Latin 
America, which were discussed in the preceding chapter, for example – demonstrates 
that veritable party systems are the product of cleavages, and do not develop in other 
historical contexts. 
The notion that the socialization within a party system entails the development of a 
cognitive schema then helps to explain why cleavages, once formed, are so resistant to 
change, and how they can persist beyond the immediate conflicts that have brought 
the system into being in the first place. As Bartolini and Mair (1990: 218) put it, they 
offer individuals already existing alternatives for their social identities and political 
integration. At the same time, this does not mean that there is no change in the content 
of the conflicts carried out between parties. On the contrary, as Mair (1997) has 
insisted, the historical party organization’s remarkable resilience over time is 
precisely due to their ability to adapt to structural and cultural changes. Thus, while 
new political issues are for the most part interpreted and processed in terms of the 
established structure of conflict, there is by no means stability in the political content 
of conflict. Structures of oppositions may resemble those produced by the historical 
cleavages, but it is not the cleavages or the original conflicts as such that are 
perpetuated, but the shape of the party system. 
At this point, it is obviously necessary to move from identities anchored in social 
structure and tightly bound to the social groups – whose mobilization initially 
produced a cleavage structure – to more genuinely political identities, which are 
partly a product of politics itself. This interpretation is in line with Sartori’s (1968) 
dictum that we have to conceive of the party system as an independent variable 
between the domains of social structure and politics. At a fine level of analysis, then, 
the partisan camps divided by a cleavage consist of social groups that have been 
mobilized into this opposition by virtue of the homogeneity of their life chances, their 
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religious world-view or their sectoral interests. Represented in the party system, 
however, are broader patterns of opposition, which are the result of multiple alliances 
between social groups in opposition to those with opposing interests or ideologies.  
At this higher level of abstraction, where we move from the political organization 
of social groups to political articulation and interaction within a party system, the 
more particularistic identities based on attachments to social groups are meshed into 
broader political orientations. These can be termed „political cultures“, as generalized 
orientations towards politics (Almond and Verba 1963: 13, Eckstein 1996). It has 
repeatedly been pointed out that such very basic clusters of values and ensuing value 
identities are antagonistically related to one another. Wildavsky (1987: 7) refers to 
this as a „necessity theorem“, according to which „conflict among cultures is a 
precondition of cultural identity“ (Wildavsky 1987: 7). Similarly, Coser (1956) has 
emphasized the group-binding functions of conflict. Hence, the established patterns of 
interaction within a party system serve to stabilize the collective identities underlying 
the dividing lines in the party system. Upon closer inspection, Bartolini and Mair’s 
(1990) study provides evidence exactly for this concerning the class divide: Studying 
the volatility between the blocs of the left and the right, their focus is not on the 
stability of alignments of specific social groups, but on the stability of one specific 
opposition within the party system, which is the fruit of the historical class cleavage. 
Ideological schemas also help voters take decisions on new issues consistent with 
their basic political beliefs, as Wildavsky’s (1987) culturalist theory of preference 
formation suggests. Because ideological schemas are likely to relate to fundamental 
value dimensions and are subject to social patterning, there is neither a different 
schema to be invoked by each individual and for every situation, nor is there just one 
universal schema, as simple cost-benefit explanations of political choice suggest 
(Wildavsky 1994). If voters locate themselves ideologically with reference to the 
divisions represented in the party system, a limited number of individual-level 
ideological schemas exists. Taking up the concept of identity salience from Chapter 3, 
the most salient group attachments are transsituational, and therefore likely to be 
invoked in almost every situation of political choice. For some, the most salient social 
identity may be class, and for others religion. Consequently, the two dimensions 
structuring political space will not be of equal importance for the individual voter. 
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The transformation of cleavages: Collective identities and realignments 
 
If new conflicts are usually somehow absorbed into the established structure of 
conflict without altering it, this does not mean that a party system will be capable of 
channelling all conflicts around new political issues. Whether this is the case depends 
on how easily new issues are reconcilable with the predominating antagonisms, or if 
they cut across them. If new issues divide the same social groups as the conflicts that 
have been prevailing so far, they will simply be taken up by parties and will result in a 
somewhat altered meaning or political content of the dominant lines of conflict within 
a party system. Just like voters, parties rely on ideologies to position themselves with 
respect to new issues (Budge 1994). However, if parties’ established electorates are 
divided concerning an issue that is new or was of minor salience hitherto, parties will 
try to avoid positioning themselves regarding this question. The obvious temptation to 
attract new voters by positioning themselves regarding controversial issues is 
tempered by the risks inherent of such a strategy. Parties are historical beings and 
“stand for something”, in Klingemann et al.’s (1994: 24) words, and this keeps them 
from abandoning those political positions that are closely associated with them. I take 
this to be the background of Schattschneider’s (1975) dictum of organization being 
the “mobilization of bias”, every form of organization being receptive to some 
conflicts but not to others. In times of “normal politics”, the party system is not 
particularly responsive to new issues, because the established cleavage structure tends 
to “organize” issues cutting across established lines of division “out of politics”.  
This situation can change, however, in phases of realignment. If new issues cannot 
be integrated into the existing structure of conflict, and if one of the parties within the 
system – or a new party – takes them up, the other parties will have to take sides as 
well, and chances are that linkages between social groups and political parties are 
reconfigured. While old connections are weakened in a process of dealignment, new 
and salient issues may lead to the formation of new linkages. The latter processes are 
at the heart of the theory of political realignments (Dalton, Flanagan, Beck 1984, 
Martin 2000, Mayhew 2000). Small realignments may occur continuously, but 
according to Martin’s (2000) reformulation of the theory, when party systems adapt to 
new structures of conflict, this is usually a rather eruptive process, and can be traced 
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to a number of “critical elections” characterized by higher levels of volatility 
accompanying the modification in party constituencies. This eruptiveness is precisely 
due to the inherent inertia of party systems as a consequence of their freezing along 
historical antagonisms, and the fact that they are not very responsive to new demands 
of the populace in times of “normal politics”. The latter in the theory of realignment 
denotes phases where the system is stable and where the prevailing alignments are not 
altered, despite events such as corruption scandals and economic crises affecting the 
relative strength of parties in the short run.  
Following Martin (2000: 84-86, 422-427), we can distinguish three levels of 
analysis regarding the evolution of patterns of party competition, each of them being 
related to a theory that lays primary emphasis on them:  
(1) The long-term evolution of social structure, which is the primary focus of 
cleavage-theory. Here, the focus is on those critical junctures, such as the 
national and industrial revolutions, which heavily influenced political 
development in a path-dependent function. Following Allardt (1968), I have 
claimed that the educational revolution of the 1960s and 1970s has constituted 
a new critical juncture. Higher education fosters universalistic values, and the 
societal dynamics resulting from the stronger diffusion of such values has led 
to the emergence of a traditionalist-communitarian counter-mobilization. 
Claims have been made that an additional critical juncture has been witnessed 
in the form of the processes of globalization and Europeanization that have 
intensified since the 1980s and 1990s (Kriesi et al. 2006). In a somewhat 
different reading, Bartolini (2005) has argued that the lowering of national 
boundaries in Europe does not necessarily lead to a new line of opposition, but 
leads to a de-structuring of the functional cleavages at the national level. As I 
have argued earlier on, European integration in both ways either directly or 
indirectly feeds into the new cultural conflict between libertarian-universalistic 
and traditionalist-communitarian values. 
(2) These developments do not translate directly into new antagonisms within the 
party system due to the force of existing alignments and the freezing of party 
systems along historical divides. The established parties will seek to avert the 
entry of new parties by responding to new potentials within the electorate, 
within the limits set by their historical position. The adaptation of the existing 
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structure of conflicts to new political potentials is the central focus of the 
theory of political realignments. The weakening of prevailing alignments and 
the emergence of conflicts cutting across a prevailing cleavage makes the 
electoral coalitions united by virtue of that cleavage break apart and opens the 
way for the establishment of new links between social groups and political 
parties. 
(3) The lowest level is that of everyday politics. Here, cyclical issues of minor 
importance, corruption scandals and the popularity or unpopularity of 
politicians and governments affect results of elections. Even if they dominate 
everyday politics, such events rarely affect the two higher levels of political 
development. 
 
In a restructuring of oppositions in a party system, levels one and two interact and 
therefore have to be analyzed jointly. A weakening of the grip of the established 
structure of conflict on voters is a precondition for a process of realignment to occur. 
As already pointed out earlier on, a dealignment can either be structural and 
behavioural (Martin 2000, Lachat 2004). In the case of structural dealignment, 
modernization leads to a long-term change in the strength of those social groups in 
which the old structure of conflict is anchored. Here, the long-term evolution of social 
structure situated at the first level impinge upon the second level, that of realignment-
theory. For example, the advent of a post-industrial economy has led to a shrinking of 
the traditional working class, while secularization has led to a decline in the share of 
regular churchgoers in Western European countries. As a consequence, the traditional 
strongholds of Social Democrat and Christian Democrat parties have lost in electoral 
importance. A party system reflecting primarily these conflicts will therefore be less 
rooted in social structure than a few decades ago, opening a window of opportunity 
for the mobilization of new conflicts. 
Processes of behavioural dealignment, on the other hand, are not necessarily 
connected to a gradual shift in the strength of social groups. Here, the links to political 
parties or to ideological blocks formed by cleavages undergo change as a consequence 
of the rising importance of new political issues, the advent of a new dimension of 
political conflict, or because a party abandons its customary position. If the policy or 
 The Perpetuation and Transformation of Cleavages 107 
 
value positions of an ideological block of parties and its voters no longer match, or if 
the electorate considers the political offer to be out-dated, the established links 
between parties and voters become fragile. A miss-match between the positions of 
parties and voters means that alignments may remain stable for some time due to 
habit, as long as voters do not redefine their political identity, but most likely, a 
realignment will occur. A process of realignment in this case requires a redrawing of 
individual’s personal group attachments. Drawing on Chapter 3, new identifications 
stand in direct competition with established group attachments, and much therefore 
depends on the latter’s salience. Behavioural realignments are therefore possible only 
as a consequence of a gradual transformation in individuals’ salience hierarchy of 
identities.  
Behavioural dealignment can, however, also be a consequence of politics itself. If 
political identities depend upon conflict with opposing identities, as stated above, the 
decline of conflict between parties along any one cleavage will lead to a gradual 
weakening of the group identities underlying it. As a consequence, other identities can 
ascend in the salience hierarchy of identities. These can be existing identities, which 
were supplanted by the salience of new group attachments. Or they can be older group 
attachments, suppressed by the mobilization of the cleavages outlined by Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967), which now re-emerge. On the other hand, the fading of the identities 
linked to the traditional cleavages opens space for the emergence of new collective 
identities, crafted by political entrepreneurs. However, as the preceding chapter has 
emphasized, the possibilities of deliberate forging of new identities are subject to the 
limits of objective social or political similarities characteristic of the new 
constituency. 
 
Summary: Policies and political conflict in the stabilization of alignments 
 
Summing up the discussion so far, the programmatic content of party oppositions is 
relevant in two respects. First of all, conflict along the broad dimensions of opposition 
reflected in the party system activates voters’ ideological schema (or cognitive 
representation of political space), and reinforces the established interpretation of what 
politics is about in the specific country. To the degree that parties adequately voice the 
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preferences of their constituencies, the conflict around policy also keeps alive the 
antagonistically related collective (political) identities underlying divisions. This can 
be presumed to be the case irrespective of parties’ government or opposition status. At 
the individual level, conflict therefore renders salient voters’ political identities, by 
which they can locate themselves in the ideological political space. Inversely, if a 
conflict is pacified, this leads to the dilution of the group identifications underlying it, 
and voters become receptive for new mobilization efforts, as Kriesi and Duyvendak 
(1995) have suggested, who postulate a zero-sum relationship between old and new 
divides. These mechanisms are displayed graphically in Figure 4.1, where the three 
levels correspond to the constituting elements of a cleavage as defined by Bartolini 
and Mair (1990). At the third level, however, I include the policy propositions issued 
by parties.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Social structure, collective identities and their reinforcement by  
parties’ differing policy propositions 
 
The programmatic content of party competition can be the source of change of 
partisan alignments in still a different way, however. In the medium term, alignments 
can only be expected to remain stable to the degree that parties adequately represent 
the preferences of voters. From the point of view of one theoretical tradition, we 
would not expect this to be the case. The Michigan School (Campbell et al. 1960) 
postulates that voters’ issue positions are antecedent to, and therefore result from their 
group loyalties and their party identification in the “funnel of causality” explaining 
voting behaviour. Realignment theory, on the other hand, while acknowledging that 
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this may be the case for phases of “normal politics”, suggests that the causality runs 
inversely in times of realignment (Martin 2000: 65-7). In a dynamic interpretation of 
the Michigan School’s “funnel of causality” (Bornschier, Helbling 2005: 27-32), a 
mismatch in the positions of parties and voters can lead to a reconfiguration of 
partisan preferences. This is a second way how the programmatic conflicts in the 
party system impinge on the perpetuation of cleavages. In terms of the three levels 
discussed earlier on, realignments then lead to a reconfiguration of the long-term 
alignments between social groups and political organization that are at the heart of 
cleavage-theory. 
In the short or even in the medium term, the absence of conflict between 
antagonistic ideological party blocks, or a mismatch in the positions of parties and 
voters should not lead to dramatic transformations in the of party system. This is 
because collective identities fade only eventually, and ideological schemas are not 
reconfigured in a day either. Understandings of politics therefore tend to reproduce 
themselves in a path-dependent manner (see Pierson 2000: 259-262). To the degree 
that the adoption of ideological schemas takes place in a political socialization 
process, as I have suggested, there is an element of inertia in them. This is because 
early socialization conditions later learning, and change is likely to be at least partially 
driven by generational replacement (see Eckstein 1988). We should thus expect 
significant differences in the make-up of ideological schemas between cohorts, 
patterned by the structure of conflict individuals were socialized into when they 
entered the electorate.1 Furthermore, voters have developed long-term loyalties to 
political parties, and continuity in voting behaviour may also occur as a habit.  
In all these cases, where the established conflicts have either been pacified, or 
parties no longer adequately represent their voters along the established or a new 
dimension of conflict, processes of dealignment and realignment are likely to occur. 
The established structure of conflict will fade eventually, especially if new parties 
represent the preferences of certain segments of the electorate more adequately. Based 
on these insights, we are now in a position to develop a typology of different types of 
divide that have varying consequences for the likelihood of new conflicts to emerge.  
                                                
1  Franklin’s (2004) finding that the evolution of electoral turnout can best be explained in terms of 
stable cohort patterns of political participation, which are shaped by a the level of activism when a 
cohort enters the electorate, supports such a view. 
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Cleavages and Lines of Conflict: A Typology of Alignments and Their 
Implications for the Mobilization Potential of New Conflicts 
 
Cleavages and lines of conflict 
 
Starting from the assumption that existing alignments condition the room for new 
conflicts to emerge, different types of cleavage are likely to have variable 
consequences for the mobilization capacity of new conflicts. While some cleavages 
may be at the centre of political disputes, others presumably have a more identitarian 
role, and stabilize alignments because the social groups divided by them (still) share a 
collective identity. Drawing on the work of Bartolini and Mair (1990: 19-52, 68-95), 
as well as Kriesi and Duyvendak (1995), we can differentiate cleavages along two 
dimensions, namely, salience and closure. Salience denotes the importance of a 
cleavage relative to other divides in a party system, while closure refers to the stability 
of the social relationship represented by the cleavage. Together, these elements 
condition the stability of political alignments. A cleavage, according to these authors’ 
conceptualization, is important if it structures party preferences to a high degree 
(relative to other cleavages) and if voters do not change allegiances for a party on one 
side of the cleavage to one belonging to the opposite camp.  
From Bartolini and Mair (1990), I retain the notion that the closure of social groups 
opposing one another along a line of cleavage can be analytically grasped by means of 
the stability of partisan alignments. Note that this implies a focus on politically 
defined collective identities, which are situated at a higher level of generality than the 
various group attachments and role identities underlying these political identities. 
The limitations inherent in cross-nationally comparable data preclude a focus on more 
specific social identities that are more intimately tied to social structure, and are 
central in the initial mobilization of cleavages, as argued in Chapter 3. In determining 
the saliency of a divide, I depart from Bartolini and Mair in focusing on the 
polarization regarding the issues around which it evolves, using the differences 
between parties’ programmatic statements (instead of cross-cleavage volatility, where 
low levels can either be a function of virulent conflict, or of social closure, which 
have differing implications). If parties’ positions are far apart along a line of 
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opposition, it represents a salient dimension within the party system. This follows 
from the central role attributed to political conflict in this chapter in perpetuating 
cleavage structures.  
In order to analyse political conflicts, I use the term line of opposition to denote an 
over-arching issue-dimension that structures party competition in a given election. 
Through its tight conjunction with the policy level of party competition, it denotes 
something distinct from a cleavage. Such a dividing line can, but does not necessarily 
reflect a cleavage. First of all, the number of lines of opposition does not necessarily 
coincide with that of the cleavages underlying the party system. However, they are 
likely to reflect the most salient cleavages. As we have seen in the analysis presented 
in Chapter 2, the economic and cultural dimensions characterizing party oppositions 
in the six Western European countries studied correspond rather closely to the 
divisions originally engendered by the class and religious cleavages. At the same 
time, a cleavage, as a (durable) pattern of political behaviour of social groups, linking 
them to specific political organizations (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 213-220), is 
something we do not necessarily encounter in everyday politics. For example, the 
centre-periphery cleavage, where it exists, may not find expression in a separate 
dimension of conflict, but is likely to be integrated in the main dividing lines that 
structure party interaction. 
As I have argued, the contemporary impact of the historical cleavages lies 
primarily in having shaped party systems in the crucial phase of mass 
enfranchisement and mobilization, which led to their subsequently “freezing”, and not 
so much in the immutability of a cleavage’s social structural basis. I therefore propose 
to lay primary emphasis on the stability of the links between social groups and parties, 
and pay less attention to the social structural homogeneity of the groups divided by a 
cleavage. A cleavage structure then denotes a durable pattern of political behaviour of 
socially or politically defined groups. In the model presented here, I regard the 
stability of alignments over time as the crucial factor distinguishing short-term 
alignments from cleavages. To the degree that we find the same lines of opposition in 
a number of consecutive elections, and if these divisions engender durable alignments, 
it is highly probable that they represent a cleavage. Unstable alignments, on the other 
hand, be they founded in social-structural divisions or not, are either short-term 
deviations from the established patterns of cleavage politics, or a herald of an 
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unfreezing party system. If the proposition is correct that collective identities are 
reproduced by conflict, however, then cleavages that not even occasionally manifest 
themselves in politics are bound to fade.  
The next step is to relate oppositions in the party system to the attitudes of voters. 
In determining the chances for a realignment to occur as a consequence of a new 
dimension of conflict, the match between the positions of parties and that of their 
respective electorates is crucial: It allows an estimation of the degree to which the 
party system is responsive to voters. Because the term cleavage has usually been 
reserved for relationships where political parties represent durable divides in the 
preferences of social groups, I consider a rough match in the positions of parties and 
their voters as a defining feature of a cleavage. Over the long run, a miss-match 
between the two will presumably lead to an erosion of the link between parties and 
their social constituencies. This leads to a waning of the cleavage and opens space for 
new alignments based on other group attachments.  
 
Different types of divide and resulting mobilization potentials for new conflicts 
 
This results in an analytical schema combining three elements: (1) The polarization of 
parties’ positions along a line of opposition, indicating the salience of a divide. (2) 
The match between the positions of parties and their voters along this line of 
opposition, allowing an estimation of the responsiveness of the party system to the 
preferences of the electorate. (3) The degree of closure a division entails in terms of 
the organizational loyalties of social groups. Like Bartolini and Mair (1990), I am not 
interested in partisan loyalties to individual parties, but in the stability of preferences 
for ideological blocks of parties along a divide, which represent the broad divisions 
reflected in voters’ ideological schemas. Stable preferences indicate closure and 
strongly rooted political identities, while instable preferences are an indication of a 
fluid line of opposition or cleavage. Closure gives an indication of the collective 
identity component of an alignment. If this component is strong, it will delay the 
manifestation of a new opposition even if parties have converged in their positions 
and if the conflict is pacified.  
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Figure 4.2 shows the possible combinations of these three elements. The starting 
point for analysis is a single dimension structuring political competition in a particular 
election in a country. The analysis of a number of elections can then reveal either 
dominant patterns or evolutions in the types of divide. I now explain the content of the 
cells in the schema and briefly state what the implications of the various types of 
alignment are for the mobilization capacity of new political oppositions. 
 
Starting at the top left of Figure 4.2, we find a situation combining high party 
polarization and a match in positions of parties’ and voters, indicating that voter 
preferences are also polarized. With parties and voters being durably aligned along a 
line of opposition, this corresponds to a highly segmented cleavage. The term 
segmentation comes from depictions of consociational democracy and there denotes 
deeply rooted identities such as language or religion. However, following Mair (1997: 
162-171), it can fruitfully be used for any deep political opposition entailing strong 
loyalties and party preferences of certain social groups. As a consequence, the 
electoral market is tightly restrained and leaves little room for the emergence of new 
lines of opposition or new political parties. At the extreme, such a structure of 
opposition rules out any real competition between parties. Political systems 
characterized by pillarization, where the Netherlands at least used to be a prominent 
example, each party has its own constituency, and they do not really compete at all. 
Presumably, therefore, this is the structure of conflict that most strongly inhibits the 
emergence of a new conflict at the centre of the party system. In this category we find 
on the one hand established cleavages that have either preserved their salience or have 
been reinvigorated by new issues, or, on the other hand, highly salient new divides 
that have come to structure politics. 
A corresponding case where preferences are volatile, exemplified by the field to 
the right, points to an emerging line of opposition. Competing with other, crosscutting 
divides, it lacks strong partisan loyalties. Voting choices are therefore dependent on 
the relative salience of this line of opposition as opposed to other divides in a given 
election. Should the division prove to be temporary, patterns of party competition will 
not change much. If, however, the conflict remains salient on the side of the voters, it 
is likely to lead to realignments resulting in a political structuring and then 
stabilization of alignments along this divide. The driving force of such realignments is 
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either an outsider-party or an established party reorienting itself in order to attract new 
voters beyond its traditional constituency. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Types of divide as a function of polarization, responsiveness, and 
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Moving to the right, we find two situations of a mismatch between the positions of 
parties and voters. In both cases, parties’ positions are far apart on the dimension, but 
the party system is unresponsive to the positions of voters. Supposedly, these 
constellations are related to Katz and Mair’s (1995) thesis of party system 
cartellization. Cartellization can either refer to the established parties keeping specific 
issues off the agenda, a situation that will be dealt with in a moment, or to their ability 
to inhibit the entry of new competitors, partly due to their privileged access to state 
resources. The latter case, which may be termed organizational cartellization, is 
relevant for cases of polarized, but unresponsive party systems, where the established 
parties manage to restrict competition. At the same time, grass root party members or 
parties’ clinging to their old core constituencies make impossible an ideological 
moderation. If alignments are stable, this indicates that parties either represent (i) an 
out-dated cleavage, which is pacified on the voter side, but still engenders loyalties, 
or (ii) that the dimension is of secondary relevance for voters who are more 
concerned with the stances parties take regarding a different dimension. As a 
consequence, the mismatch between voters’ preferences and the positions of parties 
does not lead to realignments. If, on the other hand, party preferences are not stable, 
the same situation has already led to a waning of partisan attachments. In this case, the 
hypothesis of a different political dimension stabilizing alignments can be ruled out – 
the party system does not reflect voters’ preferences and is unanchored in the 
electorate. Hence, the emergence of a new line of opposition is possible either due to 
the reorientation of an established party, or to the entry of a new competitor de-
emphasizing the established line of opposition for the benefit of a new one. 
 
I now turn to the two cases in the bottom-right corner, where the party system is 
feebly polarized and at the same time fails to represent voters, implying that party 
electorates are characterized by more diverging policy preferences. This can be the 
case in two contrasting situations: Either the established parties have converged along 
a line of opposition and are thus unresponsive to their voters, for whom the dimension 
remains salient, as some would argue concerning the state-market dimension. The 
other possibility is that the established parties have not (yet) taken clear positions 
along a new dimension of political conflict. Parties can try to avoid doing so for 
various reasons, for example because they are internally divided concerning new 
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issues, as it appears to be the case regarding parties’ stances towards European 
integration (Bartolini 2005). In these cases, where parties converge, while their 
electorates remain polarized, we have evidence for what I propose to call issue-
specific cartellization. This is probably the most advantageous situation for anti-
establishment parties to emerge, since they can on the one hand advocate 
programmatic positions that are not represented within the party system, and on the 
other hand denounce the other parties for not being responsive to the preferences of 
voters. In fact, this corresponds to a prominent explanation for the rise of right-wing 
populist parties in the 1980s (Katz, Mair 1995, Kitschelt 1995, Ignazi 1992, 2003, 
Abedi 2002). If party alignments are stable, and social closure is high, existing 
political identities will retard processes of realignment. But since the positions of the 
established parties are similar, and because no visible policy oppositions or conflicts 
reinforce group attachments, existing party preferences can be expected to decline, 
opening the way for new conflicts to gain room. 
 
Finally, in those situations represented by the two bottom-left cells, the distances 
between parties are low. Congruence with their electorates’ preferences being given, 
this means that electorates are not far apart either. The first case is that of an 
identitarian cleavage, where party preferences are stable due to strong collective 
identities of social groups, constituting political sub-cultures. In either case, closure 
remains high due to enduring group attachments that carry the imprint of historical 
conflicts. But since the underlying collective identities are not reinforced by 
contrasting programmatic stances of parties, preferences are likely to remain stable 
only as long as new oppositions do not gain in importance relative to the old ones. 
However, even if this happens, and if the new oppositions crosscut existing 
constituencies, the rise of a new line of opposition will at least be tempered or delayed 
by the force of existing loyalties.  
A competitive political dimension, on the other hand, denotes a kind of competition 
that is close to Schumpeter’s (1942) characterization of party competition: Elections 
serve to elect competing teams of politicians that try to convince voters in the 
electoral market. In theory, as Downs (1957) has argued, this results in their targeting 
the median voter (but see Barry 1978 and Powell 2000). In a situation conforming to 
these criteria, voters can choose among parties by virtue of their performance in 
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office. If new potentials were to arise, newcomers could in principle find fertile 
ground, because there is little in political identity to check the emergence of new 
conflicts. However, since the established parties do not have any strong links to 
specific constituencies that keep them accountable, they are relatively free to re-orient 
themselves and to absorb new issues, limiting the chances for challengers to gain 
success. An exception to this scenario would be if the established parties agreed not to 
address issues evolving around new oppositions, which would open space for anti-
cartel parties. 
 
While the primary aim of this typology is to study patterns of opposition in the party 
system as a whole in a given election, it is applicable at various levels of specificity. 
On the one hand, one can move up to a more general level and identify dominant 
patterns over a number of elections within a country. On the other hand, it is possible 
to move down and to characterize the more specific nature of oppositions for certain 
parties or groups of voters. For example, in cases of pillarization, a cleavage may 
continue to exist, but it is not necessarily relevant to the same degree for all voters. 
Thus, in cases of segmented political oppositions there is a certain danger of the party 
system not being responsive to those who are not integrated into the prevalent 
networks of societal and political opposition. Thus, such a structure of opposition will 
only inhibit the emergence of new conflicts if the party system also integrates citizens 
lacking strong political identities. The schema developed can also be applied to 
analyse the political behaviour of sub-groups of a party’s electorate, whose links to a 
specific party may be of different kinds. 
One of the problems involved in an analysis centring on parties and their respective 
electorates is that a non-responsive party system can generate both support for new or 
anti-establishment parties, as well as abstention from voting. For example, right-wing 
populist parties quite often seem to recruit their voters from previous non-voters, as 
the example of the French Front National shows (Mayer 2002). More generally, 
Goldthorpe (2002) has for instance argued that while class voting may be in decline, 
the relationship between class and non-voting may fortify as a result of the processes 
of modernization and globalization. Thus, any analysis seeking to gauge the chances 
of the emergence of new lines of opposition should keep an eye on non-voters. I will 
therefore take abstention into account when measuring the stability of alignments. 
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Conclusion 
 
Beyond shedding light on the way old cleavages are perpetuated in transformed form, 
the central task of this chapter has been to develop a typology of divides with varying 
consequences for the emergence of new lines of opposition. To the degree that 
established cleavages entail collective identities and provide cognitive schemata for to 
interpretation of politics, they condition the room available for the articulation of new 
conflicts that cut across the old divisions. Extending the argument from Chapter 3, I 
have argued that collective identities and ideological schemas are shaped and 
reinforced by political conflict. It is therefore essential to link historical cleavages to 
the policy level of oppositions in party systems, over and above the three constituting 
elements of a cleavage suggested by Bartolini and Mair (1990). 
In the country studies, the resulting model will be applied to study the patterns of 
opposition in three countries, focusing on one election in the 1970s, before the new 
cultural conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian 
values emerged, as well as three recent elections. In two of these countries, namely, in 
France and in Switzerland, the rise of the new cultural divide has resulted in the 
emergence of a right-wing populist party in the party system. Chapters 6 and 7 will 
investigate how the prevailing patters of opposition allowed the populist right to 
establish itself. Using the typology developed in this chapter, it will also assess which 
type of divide the new cultural conflict has turned into, and whether it is likely to 
remain durable. Despite the similarities of the Swiss People’s Party and the French 
Front National with respect to their position in political space, the two cases represent 
different starting points for the populist right. In France, the Front National broke into 
the existing party system, while the Swiss SVP was an established party that 
underwent a transformation to a right-wing populist party. In both cases, this resulted 
in a reconfiguration of the party system.  
If the premises underlying the model are correct, the differentiation of various types 
of divide should also be able to account for the fact that no right-wing populist party 
has emerged in Germany. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the basic structure of the 
German political space is remarkably similar to that of those countries where new 
parties of the right have been successful, and it must either be the strategies of the 
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established parties that have precluded a development similar to that in the other 
countries, or the force of political identities tied to the older cleavages. Both 
hypotheses can be verified using the analytical schema developed in this chapter. 
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, however, various methodological choices 
require discussion. Chapter 5 lays out how the model is implemented in the country 
chapters to come, and how the positions of parties and voters and the stability of 
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This chapter lays out and illustrates the methods and measurements used in the 
subsequent country chapters. On the one hand, this involves the operationalization of 
the analytical model set out in the preceding chapter. On the other hand, the strategy 
to empirically verify the hypotheses developed in earlier chapters will be outlined. 
Adopting the structure of the country analyses to come, this discussion has three main 
parts. In the first section, I start out by describing in more detail than was possible in 
Chapter 2 the campaign data used in this study. I also discuss at some length the 
interpretation of the configurations resulting from the Multidimensional Scaling 
(MDS) analysis. Investigating the dimensionality of political space, and determining 
the positions parties take within it, are also the first step in the research strategy 
pursued in the country studies.  
The second section illustrates step by step the measurement of the elements 
necessary to deploy the analytical schema set out in Chapter 4, and summarized in 
Figure 4.2. This analysis relies on the campaign data on the one hand, and on 4 post-
election surveys in each country on the other. Since the methods I use differ from 
those employed in prior research, I spend some time discussing the theoretical 
rationale for proceeding this way. Using examples from the analysis of the French 
case, I explain the measurement (i) of the positions of parties and voters along the 
dimensions found to structure oppositions within the party system, (ii) of the internal 
heterogeneity of the stances of parties and their voters, (iii) of the match between the 
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positions of parties and voters, and (iv) of the overall degree of polarization of the 
party system along the two dimensions.  
The third section presents the procedure used in the additional analyses performed 
in each chapter, which refer to hypotheses developed in Chapters 1 and 3. First of all, 
I use individuals’ positions along the two dimensions as determinants of voting for the 
various parties in the party system. Here, the aim is to determine which parties 
mobilize on which dimension, and who right-wing populist parties’ main antagonists 
on these dimensions are. In other words, I probe further into the structure of 
oppositions from the perspective of voters. This is intended to refine and corroborate 
the foregoing analysis by linking political supply and political demand according to a 
more strictly causal logic. In a next step, I will investigate the role played by social 
class in the vote for the populist right. Introducing a class schema that distinguishes 
between nine occupational classes, I substantiate the general expectations regarding 
the populist right’s support base discussed in Chapter 1. As a final step in the analyses 
to come, I verify to which degree the heterogeneity of the right-wing populist voters 
economic preferences are related to social class. My hypothesis, derived from the 
theoretical discussion in Chapter 3, is that social class does continue to matter for 
economic preference formation, but that these preferences are manifestly irrelevant 
for electoral choices as long as cultural orientations appear more central to the voters 
of the populist right. 
 
 
Determining the Dimensionality of Political Space in the Parties’ 
Programmatic Offer 
 
The campaign data 
 
To be able to identify the lines of conflict structuring political competition in demo-
cratic elections, I rely on data based on the media coverage of election campaigns in 
six European countries. This data has been collected within the research project 
“National political change in a denationalizing world” (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, 
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Dolezal, Bornschier, Frey 2006). The data covers one election in the 1970s and three 
more recent elections that took place between the late 1980s and early 2000s in 
France, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Britain. Parties’ 
programmatic offer is coded in the two months preceding each election. The election 
in the 1970s serves as a point of reference before the most recent restructuring of 
conflicts in Western European party systems took place. More specifically, in the 
1970s we expect a situation in which the first transformation of the traditional 
political space has taken place under the mobilization of the New Left. The second 
transformation, driven by the rise of the New Right, will be traced in the three more 
recent contests.  
In all countries except France, the focus of the analysis is on parliamentary 
elections. France is the exception because presidential elections are more important 
than legislative elections because of its semi-presidential regime, which makes the 
study of presidential contests more promising. The exception in France is the 1978 
parliamentary campaign, which was chosen because no suitable surveys were 
available for the presidential elections of the 1970s. For each election, we selected all 
articles related to the electoral contest or politics in general during the last two months 
before Election Day in a quality newspaper and a tabloid. These were Die Presse and 
Kronenzeitung in Austria, Le Monde and le Parisien for France, NRC Handelsblad 
and Algemeen Dagblad in the Netherlands, Neue Zürcher Zeitung and Blick for 
Switzerland, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Bild in Germany, and The Times and The Sun 
in Britain. Because the number of relevant articles varies a great deal between 
countries, we did not code every daily issue in all cases. Switzerland and France are 
two strongly contrasting examples, with the number of articles ranging from an 
average of six per day in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung to about 18 in the Le Monde. To 
arrive at a roughly similar number of sentences, between two and six days were coded 
per week, depending on the number of daily articles. A system of alternation was used 
to choose the weekdays to be coded. However, special reports on parties’ programs, 
or interviews with party leaders or presidential candidates were coded, regardless of 
the weekday on which they appeared. In Switzerland, party adverts in the same two 
newspapers were also coded due to their importance in Swiss election campaign. 
The articles (and adverts in Switzerland) were then coded sentence by sentence 
using the method developed by Jan Kleinnijenhuis and his collaborators (see 
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Kleinnijenhuis and De Ridder 1998 and Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001). This 
method allows a coding of the relationship between political actors on the one hand, 
and between political actors and political issues on the other. For the present purposes, 
only relationships between political actors and political issues are considered. The 
direction of the relationship indicates whether the actor is in favour or opposed to the 
issue and is coded either as –1 or as +1. There are three intermediary positions, but 
these were rarely used (only if the statement is explicitly contradictory, for example). 
Political actors were coded according to party membership. Small parties were later 
grouped to form larger categories, such as the parties of the extreme left competing in 
various countries. Another example is a number of small centre parties in France that 
are regrouped into the UDF category.  
Political actors’ programmatic statements were coded into 200 to 400 detailed 
categories, the number depending on the country. The statements concerning these 
detailed issues were then recoded into the 12 broader categories presented in Chapter 
2. There are two reasons for this. First of all, issues have been grouped to correspond 
to the central concepts used in this research. For example, the categories “Welfare” 
and “Economic liberalism” together allow an operationalization of the state-market 
conflict, while “Cultural liberalism” and “Anti-immigration stances” correspond to 
the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian line of opposition. The 
second reason is that the importance of the more specific issue categories varies from 
one election to the next depending on the political agenda, making it difficult to 
compare them over time.  
Each of the twelve broad categories used to cover the political agenda has a clear 
direction, and actors’ stances towards it can be either positive or negative. The 
assignment of the detailed, country-specific issue categories to the broader categories 
used for the comparative analysis is of course a crucial step in the analysis. A great 
deal of effort was devoted to defining clear rules concerning the assignment, which 
are laid out in Chapter 2, and to implementing them coherently across countries. Lists 
with the detailed issues and their assignment to the larger categories for each country 
are available from the author upon request.  
 




The first step in Chapter 2 as well as in the research strategy for the chapters to come 
is to determine the dimensionality of political space and to identify the issue 
categories that structure oppositions in the party system in a given election. The 
campaign data is analysed using the unfolding variant of Multidimensional Scaling 
(MDS). This allows a representation of parties and issues in a low-dimensional space 
according to measures of similarity or dissimilarity between them (Coxon 1982, 
Rabinowitz 1975). In the preliminary analysis presented in Chapter 2, three elections 
since the late 1980s were analyzed jointly in every country. In the country chapters, a 
more detailed analysis will follow, focusing on one election at a time, and also 
including an electoral contest in the 1970s. In all these analyses, the mean distance 
between the individual parties and each of the twelve issue categories is used as a 
measure of similarity between parties and issues.  
To give those relationships more weight that were prominent in a given election, 
Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling (WMMDS) is used,1 employing the 
number of observations in each category as a weight. Note that weighting by the 
overall salience of categories implies a focus on the general structures of opposition in 
the party system, and not on the salience of issues for individual parties. While there 
are always distortions between the “real” distances and their graphical representation 
in the low-dimensional space resulting from the MDS, the weighting procedure 
ensures that the distances corresponding to salient relationships between parties and 
issues will be more accurate than less salient ones. The proximities resulting from the 
analysis have then been rescaled to make them correspond to the original distances in 
the data.2 Furthermore, categories with less than 3% of the sentences per election were 
excluded from the analysis, as well as parties for which less than 20 sentences are 
available. 
The number of dimensions appropriate to represent the configuration can be 
determined by looking at the Scree Plot. In all six countries, political space proves to 
                                                
1  WMMDS can be carried out using the algorithm Proxscal, which is implemented in SPSS. 
2  The rescaling was performed by setting the weighted average distance between parties and issues in 
the final configuration equal to the same average in the original data (with distances being weighted 
by their corresponding salience). The procedure is developed in Kriesi et al. (2006). 
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be clearly two-dimensional, since the move from a one-dimensional to a two-
dimensional representation results in the clearest reduction in the Raw Stress statistic, 
which is a measure for goodness-of-fit. This is visible in an “elbow” in the Scree Plot. 
The values for Stress I, which are more appropriate to estimate the goodness-of-fit of 
the final configuration (see Coxon 1982), are indicated together with the Figures in 
the country chapters.  
It has to be emphasized that the dimensions resulting from the MDS analysis are 
not substantially meaningful. The only relevant information provided is the distance 
between the parties and the issue categories. This means that the solution can be freely 
rotated. Nonetheless, it is possible to lay theoretically meaningful axes into the 
distribution to facilitate the interpretation. In determining these axes, I apply two 
criteria. First of all, the opposition constituted by the poles must make sense 
theoretically. Hence, I expect an opposition between “welfare” and “economic 
liberalism” on the one hand, and between “cultural liberalism” and “immigration” on 
the other. Secondly, the categories constituting the poles should lie at the extremes of 
the distribution, since this is an indication of polarization. In all cases, the opposition 
between “welfare” and “economic liberalism”, representing the distributional political 
conflict, constitutes one of the emerging dimensions, and all configurations have been 
rotated to make this axis lie horizontally in political space. The second dimension is 
then formed by connecting a competing pair of polar issues. In the example in Figure 
5.1, which shows the result for the 1988 campaign in France, we see that the second 
dimension indeed opposes support for cultural liberalism and anti-immigration 
stances.  
Because of its theoretical relevance, the conflict around European integration is 
also taken into account if it proves to be polarizing. Looking at Figure 5.1, Europe 
appears as a rather consensual issue due to its central location. However, this 
conclusion is misleading due to certain specificities of MDS-analyses that I want to 
point out in the following. For purposes of illustration, the standard deviation of 
parties’ positions are therefore indicated next to the issue categories in Figure 5.1. In 
the present case, the central location of the European issue is due to the fact that 
positions regarding the EU cut across both of the two main dimensions structuring the 
space: All the main parties endorse European integration rather strongly in this 
election, with the exception of the Communist PCF, which fervently opposes it. Note 
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Stress I: 0.30 
Figure 5.1: MDS-solution for the 1988 French elections 
 
that this situation does not necessarily result in a three-dimensional solution for two 
reasons. First of all, the distances are more or less adequate in the two-dimensional 
solution: The major parties are all much nearer to Europe than is the PCF, and as 
pointed out, the distances in the solution are only interpretable relative to one another. 
Secondly, the EU-issue was not very prominent in this election, and as a result of 
weighting by salience, the distances between parties and this issue are potentially 
more distorted than more salient relationships. The immigration issue, for example, 
was more salient than Europe in present contest, and the Front National’s position 
regarding the immigration issue is therefore much more adequate than it’s distance to 
Europe, which it endorsed strongly in that election (something that has changed 
markedly in later years, however, as the analysis will show).3 Because parties may 
                                                
3  In fact, the decomposition of Raw Stress, a measure of badness-of-fit indicates to which degree 
certain points contribute to Raw Stress, and corroborates this hypothesis (results not shown here). 
Of all the political issues, Europe contributes most heavily to the misfit of the solution expressed by 
Stress.  
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seek not to address issues that cut across established lines of conflict, a strategy 
discussed as issue-specific cartellization in Chapter 4, highly polarizing issues that do 
not fit the general pattern of oppositions are quite interesting for the present purposes, 
regardless of their saliency. Consequently, if Europe constitutes a polarizing issue in 
one campaign, it is analyzed as an additional dimension in all the elections, provided 
that there is sufficient information to do so. 
Having identified the relevant dimensions and additional issues of interest, the next 
step is now to measure parties’ positions along these dimensions. This information 
cannot be inferred from the MDS solution, because the axes laid into the 
configurations are only meant to facilitate interpretation. Because parties’ positions 
are a function of their proximity to all twelve issues, and not just to the two that form 
the poles of a dimension, they have to be measured differently. 
 
 
Parties and Voters Along the Dimensions and Resulting  
Structures of Opposition 
 
Turning to the elements necessary to apply the analytical model summarized in Figure 
4.2, I start out with determining the position of parties and voters along the detected 
dimensions, also taking into account the heterogeneity of these positions. I then go on 
to explain how the match between the positions of parties and voters is measured. The 




To determine the position of parties, I calculate the mean of their positions regarding 
the two categories forming the dimension (or a single category as in the case of 
European integration). However, just as in the weighted MDS analysis, the relative 
saliency of the issues must be taken into account here. I therefore compute a weighted 
mean, using the two categories’ respective share of sentences as a weighting variable. 
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In the example of the 1988 French election above, welfare was more important than 
economic liberalism. Consequently, the weighting procedure will give greater weight 
to welfare in determining parties’ positions along this dimension. To make the results 
reliable, I exclude parties with less than ten observations. 
The dimensions are now reconstructed on the voter side using survey data. Using 
factor analysis to determine dimensionality on the voter side would allow an empirical 
test of the structure of political space, a strategy pursued by Kriesi et al. (2007). 
However, this may have the drawback of not allowing a positioning of electorates on 
the economic and cultural dimensions independently from one another. If attitudes 
towards economic and cultural issues are correlated in the aggregate, this will yield a 
first factor that represents a mixture of economic and cultural preferences. This is the 
case in Kitschelt’s (1994) first, left-libertarian vs. right-authoritarian factor, while the 
interpretation of his second factor is much less straightforward, and essentially 
represents what cannot be explained by the first dimension. One of the mayor 
problems with mixed dimensions is that the resulting positions may not be adequate to 
the same degree for all electorates. Because I expect right-wing populist voters to 
combine economic and cultural preferences in rather distinct ways, this problem is 
especially acute for my analysis. For example, one may have legitimate doubts 
concerning Kitschelt’s (1995: 106-108) positioning of the Front National’s voters at 
the far right on the economic dimension, because it is also related to a number of 
cultural issues in the factor analysis. The analysis presented in Chapter 6, which 
focuses only on economic preferences, reveals that Kitschelt’s results cannot be 
confirmed if we dissociate economic and cultural preferences. 
The first step in the procedure I follow is to assign the issue-specific questions in 
the surveys to the broader categories used in the media analysis. With a few 
exceptions, there are enough issue-questions in the surveys to allow an 
operationalization of the four categories pertaining to the economic and the cultural 
divides. In fact, quite often we find several items that are related to the same category. 
In these cases, an index was formed using principle component factor analysis. Saving 
the factor scores results in a new variable that measures individuals’ attitudes 
regarding the category. With very few exceptions, the theoretically grounded 
classification results in a single factor, indicating that the variables measure the same 
underlying dimension. Where there are many single items, however, it is difficult to 
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obtain one-dimensional solutions. In these cases, it usually makes sense to form sub-
categories. To the degree that a single factor emerges in the subsequent aggregation to 
one dimension, this does not damage the validity of the measurement. A listing of the 
indicators used and the assignment to the relevant issue-categories can be found in 
Appendix C, while Appendix B lists the datasets used for the analysis. 
The next step in the French example used above is to combine welfare and 
economic liberalism to form the state-market dimension. Only a single item is 
available to measure support for the welfare state, asking respondent to which degree 
inequality should be reduced by the state (for the classification, see Chapter 2). The 
item is thus standardized and an index is formed using this measure and that of 
economic liberalism, again using factor analysis. The mean position of each party’s 
electorate is then determined using respondents’ factor scores. Note that all the factor 
analyses are carried out using the attitudes of all respondents, and not only those who 
voted in the particular election. Because citizens with more clearly structured belief 
systems or ideological schemas are more likely to turn out to vote than others 
(Klingemann 1979), including non-voters in the construction of the indexes amounts 
to a tougher test of my hypotheses. 
The respective location of parties and voters on each dimension are presented as in 
Figure 5.2. Parties are situated on the upper line and their voters below. A strong 
methodological word of caution is in order here: Because the positions of parties and 
voters are measured on different scales, the positions cannot be directly compared, 
and the correspondence between the two can only be judged in relative terms. The 




match (5 parties): 0.98 
polarization parties: 0.73 | without FN: 0.54 
Figure 5.2: Positions of parties and voters on the cultural dimension, France 1988 
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the media, have a possible range of –1 to +1. These positions are interpretable in 
absolute terms. Hence, if the UDF is situated in the middle of the spectrum in the 
example shown in Figure 5.2, then its position is really in the middle of the road 
between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. On the 
other hand, the positions of parties’ voters have been standardized as a result of the 
factor analysis, and can only to be interpreted in relative terms. Here, the voters of the 
UDF are also centrally located, but this only tells us that they are situated in the 
middle of the voter distribution, which is not necessarily halfway between libertarian-
universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. Because respondents’ answers 
may also vary according to the question wording in the survey, it is not possible to 
derive voters’ absolute positions. Consequently, there is no way to make the two 
scales strictly comparable. 
 
Heterogeneity of parties’ and electorates’ positions 
 
Informative as they are, the mean positions of parties and voters say little about the 
homogeneity or heterogeneity of the statements issued by parties and of the 
preferences within an electorate. Different political actors belonging to the same party 
may issue diverging policy stances, while the preferences of voters making up a 
party’s electorate may be spread out along the ideological spectrum to quite varying 
degrees. On the voter side, considerable heterogeneity is in fact the rule, because it is 
not ideology alone that influences voting decisions. To compare and visualize the 
ideological spread within parties’ electorates, and in parties’ positions, we can 
calculate the standard deviations of positions. In Figure 5.2, bars indicate the spread 
around average positions. In this election, we can see that the Front National’s 
statements concerning the cultural line of conflict are much more homogeneous than 
those of the Gaullist RPR, for example. The Front National also has a more 
homogeneous electorate than the other parties. By giving an idea of the overlap of the 
positions of two neighbouring electorates or parties, the standard deviations of the 
positions allow us to assess how strongly parties compete with one another for 
ideologically similar electorates. This, in turn, is crucial aspect for determining how 
segmented political competition is, which will be relevant for the classification of 
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elections. Note that if political actors issued very few statements concerning an issue, 




Even if the mean positions of parties and voters cannot be compared directly, it is 
possible to measure the congruence of representation by calculating correlations. 
Because the correlation taps only the covariance between positions, the differing 
scales do not affect it. The results from the correlations are displayed below the 
figures for each election. In the example shown in Figure 5.2, match is very high, 
indicating an almost perfect correspondence between parties’ and electorates’ 
positions, which is plausible when looking at their respective locations. Because the 
match can only be calculated for those parties for which we have both supply-side, as 
well as demand-side data, I indicate on how many pairs the measure for match is 
based. In the example shown, for example, the Ecologists are not taken into account 
because they were not sufficiently present in the campaign to be positioned on the 
economic dimension. 
As a rule of thumb to classify elections according to the schema in Figure 4.2, I 
take correlations below 0.8 as an indication of mismatch and correlations above this 
value to characterize a responsive party system. A correlation of 0.8 means that two 
thirds of the variance in the parties’ positions can be explained by voters’ preferences, 
or vice versa. Obviously, the choice of the cut-off point is debatable, and I will not 
rely exclusively on this criterion in the country chapters. However, while values over 
0.8 or even 0.9 are in fact quite common, unresponsive party systems are usually 
characterized by a match between parties and voters way below 0.8. Consequently, 
the cases of responsiveness and unresponsiveness are rather clear in the concrete 
cases.  
 




The graphical representation of the positions of parties and voters allows a substantial 
interpretation of positions and patterns of opposition. To classify elections according 
to the degree of polarization they entailed, however, it is useful to have an overall 
measure of polarization along a dimension. Here, the standard deviations of parties’ 
positions along a dimension is a straightforward solution. If we were interested in the 
overall ideological polarization of a divide, it would make sense to take into account 
the relative strength of parties in this measure (see Klingemann 2004). However, what 
is required for the implementation of the model in Figure 4.2 is an assessment of the 
ideological spread of a party system’s political offer to voters, and whether or not this 
offer satisfies voter preferences. For this reason, using standard deviations is not 
problematic, but it should be kept in mind that all parties contribute to this measure 
independently of their importance. By performing the calculations with and without 
the populist right challenger (if there is one), we can also assess how strongly the 
latter contributes to the polarization of the party system. 
To classify an election according to my model, the polarization of parties’ 
positions in combination with degree to which parties match the positions of their 
voters is sufficient to assess the pattern of opposition. Again, as a rule of thumb, 
standard deviations below 0.5 will be taken as evidence that the system is weakly 
polarized along this dimension, while values of 0.5 and beyond indicate relatively 
high levels of polarization. If we want to estimate how much space there is for a right-
wing populist challenger, the polarization measure excluding the challenger is 
obviously most instructive. If, on the other hand, such a party is already established 
and forms part of a pattern of segmented oppositions, as in the French example used 
above, the characterization of the party system should rely on the values including all 
parties. 
So far, then, we have a measure for two of the three elements necessary for a 
classification of party systems according to the different types of divide outlined in 
the previous chapter. The degree of polarization of the party system is estimated using 
the standard deviations of the parties’ positions, while the correlation of parties’ and 
voters’ positions indicates the degree to which the system is responsive to voters. The 
missing element is the stability of alignments, to which I now turn. 
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Stability of alignments 
 
In analyzing the stability of alignments between voters and parties, I am interested in 
the degree to which a line of opposition engenders loyalties, which indicate social 
closure of the groups divided by an opposition. Loyal voters are those who vote for a 
party belonging to the same ideological block in a number of consecutive elections. 
As urged in Chapter 4, it is crucial also to take into account non-voting, since 
abstention may be an antecedent to the reconfiguration of preferences. Loyalty in my 
conception then implies that a voter regularly turns out to vote for his/her ideological 
party block. The alternative measure, volatility, would only take into account those 
voters who actually swifted from one block to the other in two consecutive elections, 
while all those who did not vote in one of them would be excluded from the analysis. 
By focusing only on wholesale shifts in party preferences, volatility disregards 
possible erosions of loyalties that are more gradual but nonetheless result in new 
political potentials. As Schmitt-Beck et al. (2006) have shown, a shift in partisan 
loyalties usually involves a prior move into independence.  
To determine the stability of alignments, I use recall questions from the surveys.
 
Asking people which party they voted for in a prior election is non unproblematic, 
since declared choices are known to be inaccurate at times (Himmelweit et al. 1978), 
and I am conscious of the limitations of this approach. However, the alternative, using 
aggregate measures of volatility, as for example employed by Bartolini and Mair 
(1990), is equally problematic. The problem there is that shifts between the blocks 
that run in opposing directions can cancel each other. Consequently, an apparent 
stability in aggregate volatility may conceal varying degrees of fluctuation between 
the blocks. A limitation of the use of recall questions, on the other hand, is that we 
only obtain information regarding stability in two consecutive elections. However, 
comparing the level of short-time stability over time and across parties should 
nonetheless provide adequate information regarding (i) the relative loyalties exhibited 
by the voters of the various ideological blocks, and (ii) the evolution of these loyalties 
over time. Two additional points can be made for the use of recall questions for my 
purposes. First of all, errors in recall are not random, but tend to produce consistency 
with behaviour at the time of recall (Himmelweit et al. 1978: 369). Thus, this measure 
is conservative, and, if anything, will tend to underestimate change. Secondly, the fact 
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that I am only interested in loyalties to ideological blocks, and not to individual 
parties, also makes the use of recall questions less problematic. Even if respondents 
may err in naming the party they voted for in the preceding election, it is less likely 
that they will also misname the ideological block they voted for – at least if the 
division between the blocks is substantially meaningful. 
As noted in the preceding chapter, my classification approach is inspired by the 
work of Bartolini and Mair (1990). However, while their empirical focus is on the 
volatility between the left and the right blocks, they draw conclusions not only 
regarding the class cleavage, but also pertaining to the entire cleavage structure of the 
country. This is obviously a limitation. For example, we cannot be sure that a low 
degree of salience of the class cleavage, in conjunction with a lack of closure, really 
points to other important competitive dimensions, as Bartolini and Mair (1990: 45) 
contend. The same pattern could also indicate an overall low degree of cleavage 
structuring. Looking at only one line of opposition at a time avoids this problem. 
However, this also means that the ideological blocks have to be defined separately for 
the economic and the cultural divides. While this is quite straightforward in the case 
of the economic divide, which can be interpreted as the political expression of the 
class cleavage, it is somewhat more tricky concerning the cultural divide.  
For the economic divide, two blocks can be defined based on the sides they take 
with regard to the traditional class cleavage. The classification of most parties is 
relatively easy using what Bartolini (2000: 10-11) calls a “genetic approach”, namely, 
identifying those parties as belonging to the left that have their roots in the process of 
lower-class enfranchisement and the rise of the class cleavage, characteristic of the 
structure of industrial conflicts. Bartolini’s classification thus provides a good starting 
point. The more difficult question concerns newer parties, and in particular the so-
called New Left parties and the populist New Right, which emerged since the late 
1960s and are not the product of the conflicts of the industrial age, as argued in 
Chapter 1. In most countries, Ecologist and New Left parties clearly have their origins 
in movements that are considered “movements of the left” (Kriesi 1999), but apart 
from this genetic criterion, I will also use parties’ empirically determined positions in 
political space for the classification. 
The identification of the relevant blocks along the cultural dimension is more 
difficult, because we do not have established criteria such as those relating to the class 
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cleavage and the economic dimension as a starting point. From the theoretical 
discussion in Chapter 1, however, we can expect up to four blocks along the cultural 
divide: (1) New Left parties, (2) the classical parties of the left, (3) those of the 
established right, and (4) New Right parties, represented by the populist right. 
However, not all of these blocks may be discernible in every country. Furthermore, 
the distinction between Old Left and New Left is not necessarily an easy one, since 
New Left parties can either be newly founded parties such as the Ecologists, or result 
from the transformation of an older Socialist party. To define the blocks, I therefore 
use the empirically discerned distances between parties’ and voters’ positions along 
the cultural dimension. Large gaps between mean positions and low levels of overlap 
in the spread around these positions indicate a segmentation of competition. If such a 
pattern is manifest over at least two elections, it seems reasonable to consider the 
parties separated in this way as belonging to different ideological blocks.  
Figure 5.3 shows the example of positions along the cultural divide in the 1988 
election in France. Assuming the pattern found is reproduced in later elections, three 
blocks can be identified. First of all, because neither the positions of parties, nor those 
of their electorates reveal a divide between old left and the New Left, and because the 
overlap is especially large on this side of the spectrum, the left as a whole constitutes 
the first block (PCF, PSF, extreme left and Ecologists in the example). The second 
block is made up of the established right, the RPR and UDF. Finally, because both the 
Front National as a party, as well as its voters lie far away from the established right, 
the populist right forms a New Right block of its own. Based on this classification, the  
 
Figure 5.3: Ideological blocks along the cultural dimension, France 1988 
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share of voters can be calculated that chose the same party in the preceding election 
and in the one under study, resulting in the measure for the stability of alignments. We 
now have the three elements necessary to classify election according to the analytical 
model developed in Chapter 4: Position, match, and stability. This analysis rests on a 
comparison of the aggregate positions of parties and voters. In the ensuing steps, the 
country chapters will probe further into the causal logic of voting choices. First of all, 
individuals’ ideological positions will be used to predict their vote. Secondly, the 
social class base of right-wing populist party support will be explored. 
 
 
Voting Determinants and the Impact of Social Class on Economic and 
Cultural Preference Formation 
 
Voters’ positions on the dimensions of conflict as voting determinants 
 
Having located voters on the policy dimensions that structure conflict in the party 
system, we can explore the role these positions play in individual voting decisions. 
The first aim of this analysis is to verify the claim that right-wing populist parties 
mobilize more or less exclusively on the cultural dimension of conflict. Secondly, I 
probe further into the structures of opposition in the party system by determining 
which dimensions the other parties mainly mobilize on. If my broad assumptions are 
correct, there should be parties who gain votes by virtue of their followers’ economic 
preferences, while others attract votes because of their cultural orientations. More 
specifically, if the rise of the populist right results from a reaction to the rise of the 
universalistic values advocated by the New Left, the latter’s supporters should be 
mobilized by the same dimension of conflict. The old left, on the other hand, should 
turn out to be the antagonist of the established right on the economic dimension. 
While the analysis so far can show us to which degree the positions of parties and 
voters match, the analysis of voting determinants will show which dimension is 
relevant for which parties. 
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In this analysis, voters’ positions on the economic, the cultural, and where present  
the EU-dimension are used to explain voting behaviour. I run binary logistic 
regressions for each party, using dummies as dependent variables. Certainly, 
multinominal logistic regression analysis would have the advantage of discriminating 
better between the choices of ideologically similar parties. On the other hand, running 
separate regressions for each party has the advantage of not requiring the arbitrary 
definition of a reference category, this choice always influencing the results. The 
tables presented report odds-ratios, z-values, significance levels, as well as the 
variance explained for each party. The odds ratios indicate the ratio between the 
probability of an individual voting for a party as opposed to the probability of not 
voting for it when its attitudes are more traditionalist-communitarian, for example.  
The explained variance allows us to assess to mobilization logic of parties. Some 
will mobilize a distinct electorate in ideological terms, while others may gain votes 
due to a wide range of other motives, such as the personal traits of leaders and protest 
voting. Contrary to assertions that at least some right-wing populist parties gain a 
large number of protest votes (e.g., van der Brug und Fennema 2003, Luebbers et al. 
2002), my hypothesis is that, if anything, there is a connection between political 
dissatisfaction and certain issue positions. Put differently, right-wing populist parties 
do not mobilize a moody bunch of voters that are driven by little more than the 
rejection of the established political class. Much rather, the electorate of the populist 
right is made up of a group of voters with a distinct position on the cultural dimension 
of conflict. I therefore suspect these voters to reject mainstream politics because the 
established parties fail to represent their views, rather than being motivated by protest 
as such. This may then be termed “rational protest voting” (Bornschier and Helbling 
2005). 
 
The social structural basis of right-wing populist party support 
 
To the degree that the rise of right-wing populist parties is indeed the product of a 
cultural conflict that has its origin in the expansion of higher education, then these 
parties’ social structural mobilization pattern should be related to education. If higher 
education fosters the adoption of universalistic values, voters with tertiary education 
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should be under-represented in the electorate of the populist right. I use a distinction 
between low levels of education (elementary school and lower vocational training), 
medium levels (secondary education, vocational training) and higher education 
(undergraduate and graduate levels) to discern the impact of education on the 
propensity to support the populist right. I expect the strongest negative effect from 
higher education, but in addition, voters with low levels of education may be 
especially likely to support a traditionalist-communitarian stance because this group 
can be considered to represent the losers of the economic and cultural modernization 
processes of the past decades, as argued in Chapter 1.  
The next step in the analysis focuses on the losers of economic and cultural 
modernization in terms of social class membership. In the following, I first present the 
class schema used in the subsequent analyses and then develop some expectations 
regarding the propensity of various social classes to support the populist right, 
building both on economic, as well as on cultural preferences that are deemed 
characteristic of these classes. To measure social class, I draw on a modified version 
of the Erickson-Goldthorpe class schema proposed by Lachat (2004). Departing from 
Erickson and Goldthorpe, who distinguish only two groups within the middle class (or 
service class), and following Kriesi (1993a, 1998) and Müller (1999), this schema 
distinguishes three segments within the new middle class. Moving beyond vertical 
accounts of stratification, this approach introduces horizontal differentiations that help 
to capture the origins of diverging political orientations that are due to work logics 
and degrees of autonomy exerted in the workplace (see Kriesi 1998). While the 
resulting occupational categories are certainly not classes in a narrow sense (Oesch 
2005, 2006a), they do identify groups that can be expected to share certain economic 
interests and cultural world-views. 
Following Oesch (2003: 6, 2006a), three different work logics can be distinguished 
that correspond to the horizontal divisions in this schema: An organizational, a 
technical, and an interpersonal work logic. Managers are situated in an environment 
dominated by an organizational work logic, characterized by the exercise of delegated 
authority. Examples would be financial managers, bookkeepers or public service 
administrative professionals, here and in the following using examples provided by 
Oesch (2003, 2005, 2006a). They are employed in administrative hierarchies with a 
bureaucratic division of labour, which can be expected to engender strong loyalties to 
142 Chapter 5 
their organization. Technical specialists, on the other hand, are less oriented towards 
their organization and more towards their professional community, which represents 
an additional point of reference for them (for example architects or computing 
professionals). Their work logic is technical, because the processes they work in are 
determined by technical parameters. Finally, an interpersonal work logic is 
characteristic of the so-called social and cultural specialists. Less bound into lines of 
command, teachers, journalists, or social workers have a strong orientation towards 
their clients, patients, and so on. Even more so than the technical specialists, they will 
put a heavy emphasis on individual autonomy. 
Together with the more conventional categories that correspond to the Erickson-
Goldthorpe schema, this class schema is composed of eight classes, to which the 
category of non labour force participants is added. The terms in italics indicate the 
abbreviations used later on: 
1. self-employed farmers 
2. other self-employed in non-professional occupations 
3. semiskilled and unskilled workers, including agricultural workers 
4. skilled workers and foremen 
5. routine non-manual workers in white-collar occupations 
6. managers and other professionals in social-administrative occupations 
7. professionals with technical expertise 
8. social-cultural specialists 
9. non labour force participants 
My operationalization of these categories for the six countries under study relies on 
Lachat (2004) and Kriesi et al. (2007). Not all post-electoral surveys permit a full 
operationalization of the schema, and the country chapters will draw attention to 
differing implementations. In a first analysis, logistic regressions will be run to assess 
the impact of the class categories on the vote for the populist right, using dummy 
variables for the social classes. Managers are chosen as the reference category 
because they constitute a relatively large group and at the same time are not expected 
to represent the core support base of right-wing populist parties.  
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Some more specific predictions can now be made concerning the propensity of the 
various social groups to support the populist right. Starting with hypotheses 
concerning the new middle class, we can then go on to develop expectations regarding 
the other categories. According to Kriesi (1998) and Müller (1999), the new middle 
class is characterized by diverging value orientations that derive from, or are 
reinforced by, individuals’ position in the production process. The interpersonal work 
logic characteristic of social-cultural specialists, together with their shielded position 
from the market, can be expected to generate support for universalistic values on the 
one hand, and economic preferences favouring material equality on the other hand. 
And it is in fact recognized that social-cultural specialists represent the core support 
base of the New Left (Kriesi 1998, Müller 1999, Oesch 2006b). For these reasons, I 
expect the populist right’s support to be weakest in this group. Managers, on the other 
hand, are conceived as the most right-authoritarian segment of the new middle class 
(Kriesi 1998, Müller 1999). In other words, they are probably less supportive of 
universalistic values and on average situated nearer to the traditionalist-
communitarian pole of the cultural dimension, combining this cultural ideology with 
more market-liberal stances. Technical experts can be expected to lie in between these 
two groups. Within the middle class, then, managers are most susceptible to be 
mobilized by the populist right in terms of a traditionalist-exclusionist conception of 
community. However, as a whole, the middle classes do not necessarily belong to the 
groups most strongly affected by the process of economic and cultural modernization, 
and consequently, we cannot expect right-wing populist parties to draw over-
proportional support from these segments. 
As far as the other classes are concerned, the petty bourgeoisie segment within the 
self-employed has long been considered a potential for right-wing extremist parties 
(Lipset 1960: Ch. 5, Kitschelt 1995). Low levels of education make the members of 
this category receptive for the particularistic and traditionalist stances of the populist 
right. Furthermore, applying Sacchi’s (1998) argument, which draws on Habermas’ 
theory of modernization (Habermas 1995), this segment’s early integration into 
market processes makes it more likely that its members develop anti-state attitudes, 
rather than hostility towards the market. At the same time, the petty bourgeoisie 
belongs to the segments that are particularly touched by economic modernization. 
However, while Kitschelt (1995) had postulated that this segment is also attracted by 
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the neo-liberal profile of the “new radical right”, I have demonstrated in Chapter 2 
that the populist right’s programmatic stance regarding the distributional conflict is no 
longer decisively market-liberal in the 1990s. It thus seems more plausible to assume 
that this segment, too, is overwhelmingly mobilized by virtue of its position on the 
cultural dimension. The petty bourgeoisie would thus be a constituting part of the 
anti-modernist cultural potential that Sacchi (1998) has empirically identified in 
western societies. 
In principle, similar factors such as low levels of education would also make 
farmers appear predisposed to support the populist right. While the origin of the Swiss 
People’s Party as a agricultural party and its continuing support in this segment would 
underscore such a hypothesis (see Kriesi et al. 2005), parties rooted in the urban 
milieu, such as the French Front National, have not been successful among farmers 
until quite recently (Mayer 2002). If the origin of right-wing populist parties matters 
for their success in this segment, we can expect the Swiss case to represent an 
exception. Looking at Austria, the Freedom Party’s spiritual home in Pan-German 
nationalist circles does not make the party appear predisposed to mobilize peasants 
either. Finally, the position of routine non-manual workers is somewhat ambiguous, 
as Müller (1999: 147) states, its position in the class structure being too undetermined 
to allow the formulation of clear hypotheses regarding its party political preferences. 
However, in terms of pay, they are often worse off than the manual working class, as 
Oesch (2006a) shows. Furthermore, certain segments of this group are under pressure 
due to economic modernization and the automation. In other words, routine non-
manual workers do appear to constitute a potential for the populist right. 
Finally, segments of the working class can in fact be expected to represent a core 
support base of the populist right. For one thing, relatively low levels of formal 
education characterize the unskilled as well as large parts of the skilled workers. 
Because higher education fosters support for libertarian or universalistic values 
(Sacchi 1998, Kriesi et al. 2007), this makes the working class relatively receptive to 
the traditionalist-communitarian ideology of the populist right. Furthermore, they 
belong to the social groups most strongly affected by economic modernization and 
structural change, as outlined in Chapter 1 (see Kriesi et al. 2006 for a more detailed 
discussion). In principle, workers would appear to constitute an economically leftist, 
rather than a culturally traditionalist potential. However, given the presumed 
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weakening of the collective identities related to the traditional state-market cleavage, 
these groups’ bonds to the parties of the left have also weakened, and they 
consequently become a more promising target for identity-based appeals. Similarly to 
the petty bourgeoisie, workers’ early insertion into the production process, according 
to the Habermasian logic explained above, makes it plausible that they come to see 
themselves as modernization losers more in cultural, rather than in economic terms.  
Summing up, to the extent that (a) the traditional institutions of left-wing working 
class socialization, such as unions, lose their influence due to the decline of the 
employment structures characteristic of the Fordist production regime, and (b) a shift 
in emphasis takes place from economic to cultural issues in the political arena, parts 
of the working class may defect the left and vote for parties advocating traditionalist-
communitarian stances. Note that this necessitates neither a shift in political 
preferences, nor in party preference at the individual level. In terms of political 
preferences, the individual-level saliency of the economic and cultural dimensions is 
central if voters do not find a party that adequately represents them on both 
dimensions. Regarding party preferences, the perpetuation of cleavages, as discussed 
in Chapter 4, suggests that such a change takes place above all through generational 
replacement. Accordingly, support for the populist right should be strongest among 
those generations that have been socialized into a new pattern of conflict in their 
formative years. 
Because my model attributes central importance to the force of established political 
identities, the analysis of the social bases of support for the populist right is also 
exploratory. Here, I have developed general predictions for the susceptibility of 
certain employment categories to vote for right-wing populist parties. However, the 
crucial point determining to which extent these social groups actually vote for the 
populist right is strongly individual voters within the group are anchored in 
dimensions of conflict other than the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-
communitarian divide, according to the logic discussed in Chapter 4. Thus, more 
important than the direct relationship between class position and voting patterns is the 
question to which degree class continues to matter for preference formation, which 
represents the final step in the analyses to come. 
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Social class and economic and cultural preference formation 
 
The most important hypothesis in relation to social class concerns the determinants of 
the heterogeneity of the populist right’s electorate in terms of economic policy 
preferences. If right-wing populist parties rally behind themselves different social 
classes that can be expected to have diverging interests regarding the state-market 
divide, then two explanations can serve to explain this fact. The first one is the 
contention that social class quite generally is no longer relevant for political 
preference formation, as boldly put forward by Kingston (2000). The other 
explanation, which is at the heart of this book, is that class continues to matter for 
economic preference formation. At the same time, voters belonging to social classes 
characterized by left-wing economic preferences vote for the populist right despite the 
fact that these parties do not represent their economic interests. Economic preferences 
are simply irrelevant because cultural orientations prevail. Again, if a segment is 
actually mobilized on behalf of its members’ common preferences regarding 
economic or cultural issues depends on the relative ranking of individuals’ group 
attachments in their salience hierarchy of identities, as outlined in Chapter 3. 
In order to flesh out this hypothesis, the country chapters will present the location 
of the different classes within the populist right’s electorate in political space, whose 
dimensions are constituted by the economic and the cultural dimension used in the 
previous analyses. Classes are located using their average factor scores on these 
dimensions. If my reasoning is correct, then the social classes within the populist 
right’s electorate differ markedly in their economic preferences, but share a common 





The ensuing chapters will follow the structure of analysis outlined in this chapter. 
They start with the analysis of the dimensions underlying parties’ programmatic offer, 
and then go on to analyze the correspondence of the positions of parties and voters. 
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Together with the stability of alignments along the respective dimensions, this 
provides the necessary elements to classify elections according to the analytical model 
developed in Chapter 4. In a second step, the impact of the two dimensions of conflict 
will be studied for all parties. A final focus is on the social structural support base and 






France: The Reshaping of Cultural Conflicts  







In much of the 20
th
 century, France hardly qualified as an example of a stable party 
system, and it has not been uncommon to see new parties rise and old parties fall. At 
the same time, the enduring presence of the Front National appears to be more than 
the most recent episode of a challenge to the established parties, as the Poujadist 
movement had been in the 1950s. In fact, the institutions of the Fifth Republic – the 
two-round majoritarian formula used in national parliamentary elections and in 
presidential contests – did progressively bring about a more stable pattern of “bipolar 
multipartism” after 1958 (Parodi 1989, Knapp 2002). Since the early 1980s, however, 
cultural conflicts related to the different conceptions of norms that should be binding 
in society, of the way community is conceived, and of the balance of power between 
the nation state and the European Union have emerged. The appearance of these 
issues on the political agenda marked the rising prominence of a libertarian-
universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian line of conflict that lies at the heart of 
the transformation of the French party system in the 1980s and 1990s. 
As a driving force of this transformation, and as one of the most successful right-
wing populist parties, the French Front National has received a great amount of 
scholarly attention. And indeed, in many ways, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s formation still 
represents something like the “prototype” or the “avant-garde” of right-wing populist 
parties. Taking up concepts of the French Nouvelle Droite, it was among the first to 
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adopt a “differentialist nativist discourse”, as Betz (2004) has termed it, staunchly 
defending national culture and the established traditions it embodies. Earlier than in 
other countries, the extreme populist right in France achieved its electoral break-
through in a number of second-order elections in the early 1980s. The rise of the 
political formation founded in 1972 by Le Pen owes a lot to the rather sudden decline 
in salience of the traditional cleavages and to a subsequent realignment in the 
country’s party system that took place in the early 1980s (Martin 2000, Perrineau 
1997). 
France thus appears as a promising case for the application of the theoretical 
framework set out in Chapter 4. As I shall argue, the rise of the Front National does 
appear to be related to the structural changes in the French economy since the 1970s. 
But at the same time, and contrary to Kitschelt’s (1995) contention, economic issues 
have hardly played a role in the party’s success story. Much rather, the evolution of 
the French party system brought about by the Front National is the result of, first, the 
transformation of the religious cleavage and, second, the rising prominence of 
cultural, as opposed to class divisions for certain social groups. In fact, there is very 
little evidence for Kitschelt’s (1995) thesis that the Front National mobilizes some 
voters by virtue of its free-market stances, while others are more attracted by its 
authoritarian-exclusionist appeal. Much rather, the populist right in France manages to 
rally behind itself a group of voters whose main characteristic is a strong homogeneity 
in terms of cultural preferences, but that has quite diverging position regarding the 
traditional state-market cleavage. This the hypothesis this chapter seeks to sub-
stantiate. As I will show, social class does continue to matter for economic preference 
formation, but these preferences are manifestly irrelevant for the support of the 
populist right. In the terms introduced in Chapter 3, the Front National’s ability to 
unite this diverse coalition depends centrally upon the predominance of culturally, as 
opposed to economically defined group identifications within its rows.  
The following section will give a brief overview of the French party system and its 
evolution in the past decades. In particular, it is important to note that the Gaullist 
movement has introduced a strong tradition of sovereignist discourses into French 
politics that played no small role in paving the way for the Front National. 
Consequently, when the Gaullist RPR (now UMP) abandoned its position at the 
traditionalist pole of the cultural dimension, it left vacant a position in political space 
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that the Front National later thrived in. The preceding sections then follow the 
research strategy outlined in the previous chapter, implementing the analytical model 
set out in Chapter 4. In general, presidential elections are analysed, due to their 
superior importance over parliamentary elections in France’s semi-presidential 
system. However, because no appropriate post-election survey was available for a 
presidential election in the 1970s, the analysis begins with the parliamentary election 
in 1978, and then proceeds to the presidential contests of 1988, 1995 and 2002. The 
long time span covered by the data is appropriate for an analysis of the French case, 
where the populist right firmly entrenched itself in the party system already in the late 
1980s. In the third section, when I turn to voting determinants, the role played by the 
economic and the cultural dimensions of conflict in determining voting decisions 
within the French party system is investigated. Finally, I analyse the class basis of the 
Front National’s support and empirically demonstrate the continuing influence of 
social class for the economic preference formation even among Front National voters. 
Furthermore, the influence of education on the vote for the populist right is verified. 
Following the Front National’s split in 1998, the extreme populist right was present 
with two candidates in the 2002 presidential election: Le Pen, who ran for the 
remaining Front National, and Bruno Mégret, who abandoned the party to form the 
Mouvement National Républicain (MNR). It would have been interesting to analyse 
the two formations separately, but the limited presence of Mégret in the media, as 
well as the insufficient number of respondents who declare having voted for MNR in 
the 2002 survey precludes such a strategy. And contrary to expectations, Mégret 
received only 2.3% of the vote, despite being the more moderate of the two populist 
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Political Potentials and the Transformation of the French  
Party System Since the 1970s 
 
Traditional cleavages, new issues, and the rise of the Front National 
 
Despite the organizational instability of its parties, the basic political divisions in 
French political society have remained rather stable until fairly recently. As many 
other European countries, political divisions in France carried the imprint of the class 
and religious cleavages. Even if there were no strong clerical parties, France 
represents a case where the parties of the right implicitly defended the prerogatives of 
the church (Rokkan 2000: 376). Consequently, it is important to keep in mind that the 
dominating left-right divide was by no means solely the expression of the class 
cleavage, but was also marked by a strong cultural or value component. In fact, 
religious voting has always been much stronger than class voting in France (Bartolini 
2000: 494, Knutsen 2004: 228). In this sense, the early manifestation of the new 
libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian divide is perhaps less 
surprising, because it does not depend that much on the pacification of the socio-
economic cleavage, which remains relatively strong in social-structural terms 
(Knutsen 2004). 
At the same time, the two traditional cleavages overlap to a large degree, and as a 
result of the new electoral rules introduced in the Fifth Republic, a bipolar Communist 
vs. anti-Communist/catholic opposition emerged (Parodi 1989, Martin 2000, 
Grunberg 2006). Within each of the two blocks, the two major parties joined together 
to support a candidate of the left or the right, respectively, in the second round of the 
Presidential elections. However, both on the right, as well as on the left, there have 
been early signs of a break-up of the bipolar pattern, which then manifested itself 
rather suddenly in the 1980s. Within the right, Charles de Gaulle’s presidency 
introduced a tradition of heavy emphasis on national sovereignty and the defence of a 
prominent place for France in world politics, which led to a Gaullist vs. non-Gaullist 
divide within the right. In the 1970s, Jacques Chirac’s newly founded Gaullist RPR 
progressively gained weight at the expense of the centrist UDF federation, which had 
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its traditional strongholds among religious voters. On the political left, and during a 
similar time period, François Mitterrand’s re-launched Socialist party gained support 
at the expense of the Communists. This evolution can on the one hand be attributed to 
the PCF following an orthodox Stalinist ideology, in spite of the growing disillusion-
ment with the communist regimes in the east (Courtois and Peschanski 1988). On the 
other hand, the Communist party had drawn over-proportional support from the 
disengaged segment of the population, and the demise of the religious cleavage 
weakened both the Catholic, as well as the Communist subcultures (see Knutsen 
2004: 108-9). 
In other words, the decline of the religious cleavage seems to have paved the way 
for a new opposition centring on the antagonism between universalistic values and 
principles and traditionalist-communitarian norms and conceptions of community. On 
the one hand, the Socialists, more strongly adhering to a New Left course, gained 
votes at the expense of the Communists, who retained a more orthodox leftist profile 
in the 1970s and 1980s. A similar process, bringing to the fore the question of 
community, took place on the right, where the Gaullist RPR can be considered a 
forerunner of the New Right. While the Gaullists laid great emphasis on national 
sovereignty and patriotism, the UDF was more liberal in cultural terms, with Minister 
of Health Simone Veil for example liberalizing contraception and in 1975 introducing 
the right to abortion. 
In fact, France is one of the prime examples that corroborates Ignazi’s (1992, 
2003) influential claim that the established parties of the right pushed a radicalization 
of political discourse which right-wing populist parties later thrived on. This occurred 
first in 1977, when the right-wing government announced plans to repatriate 
immigrants, countering first successes of the left in the wake of their ascendance to 
power, and confronted with rising levels of unemployment. This provoked a counter-
mobilization of the unions and the non-communist left, as well as by parts of the right, 
leading the government to abandon the plan (Martin 2000: 256ff.). And the 
established right played with ideological polarization again after it found itself in 
opposition after 1981. When the Socialist government under Mitterrand decided to 
regularize illicit immigrants and abandon the death penalty, the right reacted promptly 
and radicalized its discourse to oppose these measures. 
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On the other hand, the Socialist left, confronted with the early successes of the 
Front National, promoted anti-racism as a central issue to fill its ideological void, as 
Perrineau (1997: 49-50) states, defending a multiculturalist “recognition of 
difference”. This strategy is likely to have contributed to the rising salience of the 
cultural as opposed to the economic dimension of conflict. Furthermore, it reinforced 
the Front National’s ownership of the immigration issue (see also Meguid 2005). 
After the RPR performed a change on ideological profile and rallied behind cultural 
liberalism, a new structure of opposition emerged, where the Socialists represent the 
counterpart of the established right in economic terms and the antagonists of the 
populist right in cultural terms. Grunberg and Schweisgut (2003) have termed this a 
“tripartition” of political space. 
At the same time, this chapter qualifies this claim by drawing attention to the 
cross-cutting nature of the European integration dimension. First of all, the role of 
European integration in the mobilization of the French populist right should not be 
neglected. While the Gaullists had traditionally been sceptical of the integration 
project, they changed their stance quite radically in the European elections of 1984, 
and rallied behind a list led by Simone Veil, member of the UDF and former president 
of the European parliament. With the decline of the Communist party and the 
Socialists adopting a more clearly pro-European line, virtually the entire political 
spectrum had turned pro-European. Only the narrow margin of approval of the 
Maastricht treaty in 1992 and failure of the European Constitutional treaty to gain 
majority support that brought to the fore the truth that voters are strongly divided in 
their attitudes towards the integration project. Presumably, Euro-scepticism on the 
political right is related to the rise of the new cultural line of conflict. Because 
political integration at the European level implies the establishment of a supra-
national political centre and of a new political community, the European project 
clashes with the traditionalist-communitarian conception of community that the 
populist right advocates (see also Chapter 1). 
Secondly, by introducing a fissure within the left, the European integration process 
may gradually lead to the emergence of a pattern of oppositions involving four blocks. 
While the Socialists are favourable to European integration, the lack of support on the 
part of the Communist and extreme left, put in evidence in analyses of the referendum 
on the Constitutional treaty (Boy and Chiche 2005), is presumably related to a 
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different logic of rejection from that on the right. Given that EU policies have paved 
the way for deregulation and more liberal economic policies, while there has been 
little re-regulation in the realms of economic and social policy making at the 
European level, the euro-scepticism of the non-socialist left is more tightly related to 
the traditional state-market cleavage. Conceptions of social justice and of the relative 
emphasis put on the state or the market in allocating resources can be expected to be 
decisive in forming attitudes towards the EU, whose policies are, after all, heavily 
oriented towards the economic domain. Because the voters of the left in general hold 
quite libertarian-universalistic attitudes, I do not expect voters on this side of the 
political spectrum to be particularly concerned with the loss of identity, but rather 
with what they see as a neo-liberal thrust in European integration, a hypothesis 
supported by Evans (2000). Quite exceptionally, the 2002 post-election survey 
permits a separate operationalization of cultural and the economic preferences 
concerning European integration, and the analysis in this chapter will therefore probe 
further into the dual logic of rejection of the EU. It will be particularly interesting to 
investigate (i) to which degree attitudes towards the EU are related to positions on the 
domestic dimensions of conflict, (ii) how homogeneous or heterogeneous electorates 
are regarding this dimension, and (iii) whether the conflicts resulting from the inte-
gration question cult across established alignments. Even if the European integration 
issue has not been very prominent in the presidential contests studied in this chapter, 
there is ample evidence that Europe has been “invisible, but omnipresent” in 
structuring alignments in the 1990s, as Belot and Cautrès (2004) put it. 
The Front National’s stance towards the European integration process is one of the 
prime examples of its strategic flexibility that is a defining feature of the populist 
right, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. The Front National, originally strongly 
favourable to the integration process (see Mayer 1998), has not been slow to respond 
to the opportunities provided by a euro-sceptic discourse. Once more putting in 
evidence its ability to quickly reverse its positions, it launched a new election 
programme shortly after the Maastricht referendum of 1992, in which it devoted 
considerable attention to the issue. Taking a staunchly anti-European stance, this was 
also a reaction to the emergence of new euro-sceptic competitors resulting from 
secessions from the established right (Perrineau 1997: 74-5, 78-9). 
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Quite generally, the Front National’s centralized internal organization and its 
ensuing capacity to quickly take stances regarding new issues have been crucial in its 
rise, as well as in its later ability to stabilize its support (see Table 6.1). Due to Le 
Pen’s leadership qualities, the Front National in 1972 succeeded in integrating the 
rather diverse streams of the French extreme right and established a powerful 
organization. The party’s structure is extremely centralized and hierarchical, giving 
Le Pen a lot of leeway to define the programmatic line over the party’s militants 
(Venner 2002). Another prominent example of the Front National’s flexibility has 
been the reversal of its stances in economic policy. In the late 1970s and the early 
1980s, the party was resolutely market-liberal, which prompted Kitschelt (1995) to 
highlight this as the party’s defining feature, setting it apart from the old radical right. 
However, when the party saw a first “proletarianization” of its electoral basis in the 
1986 elections, this neo-liberal thrust was progressively abandoned. While the party 
programme launched in 1985 had been very neo-liberal, the 1992 programme was 
protectionist and included rather welfare statist stances (Perrineau 1997). In a 1996 
défilé, the Front National even called for the defence of the public sector, for a higher 
minimal wage, culminating in the slogan “le social, c’est le Front National” (ibid.). 
 
Table 6.1:  Vote share of the Front National in parliamentary and presidential 
elections in France, 1970s to 2000s 
 
 1973 1974 1978 1981 1986 1988 1993 1995 1997 2002 
Parliament –  0.3 1.8 10 9.7 12.7  14.9 11.3 
Presidency   0.7  –  14.4  15  16.9 
Sources: Daniele Caramani, 2000, Elections in Western Europe since 1815. Electoral Results by 
Constituencies, Basingstoke: Macmillan; www.assemblee-nationale.fr; various other internet-data 
bases.  
 
Presidential Election 2002, second round 
RPR/UMP Chirac 82,2% 
Front National Le Pen 17,8% 
Source: Mayer (2002: 363) 
 
The downside of Le Pen’s control over the party apparatus and the consequent lack of 
pluralism has been a series of splits. When Le Pen set up a list of candidates including 
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many defectors of the traditional right in 1986, which probably helped the party’s 
appeal a great deal, many militants in turn left the party. Personal rivalries between Le 
Pen and Bruno Mégret, himself a renegade from the Gaullist RPR, have persisted, and 
even provoked the party’s split in 1998. While the Front National had progressively 
gained vote shares in national parliamentary elections similar to those achieved by Le 
Pen in presidential contests (see Table 6.1), making plausible the hypothesis that the 
party was increasingly attracting an electorate convinced of the party’s programmatic 
stances and less driven by Le Pen’s personal charisma (Mayer 1997), the 2002 
presidential elections underscored the role played by his personality. Although 
Mégret, as a representative of the moderate party wing, appeared much more suited to 
mobilize the bourgeois elements of the Front National’s electorate, his disappointing 
performance in direct competition to Le Pen underlined the party’s dependence on its 
icon (Mayer 2002). Statistically, sympathy for Le Pen played the most decisive role in 
explaining the Front National vote in the 1995 presidential elections, but at the same 
time, 80% of these voters declare having done so because of their candidate’s ideas, 
his personality only coming second (Mayer 2002: 209-10). 
All this said about strategic flexibility and personal charisma, the role of the Front 
National’s strong and far-reaching organization should not be downplayed. Although 
Le Pen centralized the party’s internal structure in the early 1980s, the party also has a 
rich array of affiliated organizations. Youth and women’s organizations, a number of 
sector-specific unions both in the public, as well as in the private sector, affiliated 
traditionalist catholic movements and newspapers aim at creating and nourishing a 
tightly knitted nationalist counter-culture, in Perrineau’s (1997: 46-7) words, 
reminiscent of the Communist party in its early years. 
 
New structural potentials and their political manifestation: Xenophobia and the 
politics of economic adjustment 
 
While a full analysis of the context conditions relevant for the rise of the Front 
National is beyond the scope of this short overview, two more political potentials 
merit discussion in the party’s rise: First, the political manifestation of xenophobia, 
and second, the crisis of France’s the state-directed economic model of moderni-
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zation. Starting with xenophobia, and in order to make sense of the rise of the 
immigration issue since the early 1980s, it is important to acknowledge that it is 
neither linked to an increase in immigration, which has remained very limited since 
the mid-1970s, nor to a surge in xenophobia. According to survey data presented by 
Martin (2000: 256) the share of citizens who believe that there are too many 
immigrant workers in France has not risen significantly between 1966 and 1993 – 
they were a majority already back then. In other words, the political potential linked 
to immigration has not grown. In line with the line of analysis proposed in this book, 
this chapter therefore focuses on political factors to explain the timing of the rise of 
the Front National and the subsequent transformation of political space. At the 
individual level, and adopting the framework developed in Chapter 3, a political 
mobilization of ethnic categories must be related to a waning of other group 
attachments. In the French case, this concerns not only attachments based on social 
class, and related to the class cleavage, but also religious identities, whose political 
relevance has declined, as the preceding discussion has shown. While the latter 
process can be seen as deriving from a long-term process of secularization 
characteristic of European societies (see Flanagan and Lee 2003 and Chapter 1), the 
diminished significance of group identities linked to the class cleavage seems to be 
more intimately related to politics itself, and more specifically to the politics of 
economic reform since the early 1980s.  
Indeed, France’s path to economic modernization since the 1970s has had quite 
far-reaching consequences. As Levy (2000, 2005) shows, the economic policy 
changes of the 1980s and 1990s imply a shift from a state-directed to a market-
directed economy, resulting in a radical break with the past. According to Hall, the 
efforts made at liberalizing the economy have been “the most substantial of any nation 
in continental Europe” (2006: 7). While these reforms greatly enhanced competitive-
ness, making France one of the most attractive destinations for foreign direct 
investment in Western Europe throughout the 1990s, the process has not been without 
losers. The relatively large segments of the workforce disposing of low levels of skills 
and education were hit especially hard by the de-industrialization triggered by the 
increased international economic competition. As Levy (2005: 119-122) has 
forcefully argued, French governments reacted to this challenge by redeploying state 
activism from industrial to social policy making. Levy calls the latter a “social 
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anaesthesia” program, designed to “pacify and demobilize the victims and opponents 
of market-led adjustment” (Levy 2005: 119). When social exclusion increasingly 
became a problem in the 1980s, targeted minimum benefits were introduced, for 
example a state-financed minimum income (Palier 2005). 
On the one hand, the level of inequality, though always exceptionally high within 
the OECD-world, has not risen since the 1970s (Alderson et al. 2005: 422). But some 
of the legacies of France’s “variety of capitalism” have remained. As in all regimes of 
coordinated capitalism and continental welfare states, individuals with few or obsolete 
skills find it increasingly difficult to compete on the labour market (Scharpf 2000, 
Hall and Soskice 2001). One of the major problems in France, in other words, is 
ensuring employment, especially for the young and even more so for those among 
them with low levels of education. According to Eurostat, the unemployment rate for 
under 25 year-olds in France in 2005 was more than twice as high as the overall rate 
of 9.9%. Two related dualisms therefore emerge within the French population. On the 
one hand, there is a divide between those covered by the rather generous Bismarckian 
social insurance schemes and those 10-15% of the population only relying on targeted 
minimum benefits (Palier 2005: 141). Levy points out that the “anesthetic” provided 
by welfare policies paying people not to work appears to be waning in force (2005: 
121). While the benefits may prevent poverty, they do not override the emergence of a 
labour market insider vs. outsider divide. And this antagonism, as Chauvel (2006) 
shows, is in fact a generational one, producing an “insiderization” of previous 
generations and an “outsiderization” of new ones.  
In terms of the political potentials resulting from these divides, it is important to 
note that the basic thrust of economic reforms has been quite similar under the left-
wing governments under Mitterrand’s presidency after 1983 and under the right-wing 
governments between 1986 and 1993 (Hall 2006, Levy 2005). As a consequence, little 
difference was visible between the positions of the established parties. And it is also 
important to note that the social groups most affected by the new social divisions are 
over-represented in the Front National’s electorate. It is quite telling that the Front 
National’s electorate is young, and that the party is weakest among the over 65 year-
olds. On the one hand, the latter are likely to be more firmly rooted in the traditional 
structure of conflict, according to the logic of political socialization set out in Chapter 
4. On the other hand, the young are more likely to be labour market outsiders. In fact, 
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a combination of attributes such as being aged under forty and not having a bac 
degree (equivalent to high school) made the probability of voting for the Front 
National climb to about 27% in 1997 (Perrineau 1997: 103, Mayer 2002: 81).  
Structural potentials due to the process of economic modernization and liberali-
zation therefore exist, and the segments of the workforce most touched by these 
structural changes are also over-represented in the Front National’s electorate, as we 
will see. But we are left with a paradox: The potentials resulting from structural 
economic change are mobilized not in economic, but in cultural or ethnic terms. 
Indeed, after an initial propagation of neo-liberal economic stances, the Front National 
found the political space restricted along the state-market axis of conflict after the U-
turn performed by the left in 1981 and the subsequent propagation of neo-liberalism 
by established right in the 1980s (of which not much was left in the 1990s, as we will 
see). But what is equally important is that the electoral coalition mobilized by the 
Front National could hardly be more heterogeneous as far as economic preferences 
are concerned, and that the party is well aware of this. 
An anti-establishment strategy denouncing the cartel of the established parties that 
appeared to have rallied behind the libertarian-universalistic zeitgeist of the 1980s 
therefore appeared more promising. Le Pen has actively sought to weaken the impact 
of economic issues by declaring that the socio-economic cleavage has lost any 
relevance, and had been replaced by the opposition between the proponents of a 
cosmopolitan and those of a national identity (Perrineau 1997: 64). Furthermore, the 
central role played by resentment vis-à-vis the political class in the mobilization of the 
populist right should not be understated, and has been strongly confirmed by all 
studies of the French case. The Front National capitalizes on a well-known anti-
establishment discourse, where Le Pen regularly refers to the established parties as the 
“gang of four” and denounces the lies of the “candidates of the system” (interview in 
Le Monde, 25.4.1995, p. 5). While this is a mobilization logic typical of all right-wing 
populist parties, the detachment of the French political system from society, and the 
frequent corruption scandals make it especially powerful in this case.  
However, a task left to investigate in this chapter is the degree to which the Front 
National capitalizes on changing coalitions of protest voters, or if it in fact mobilizes 
an ideologically extreme minority of the electorate that is unlikely to return to the 
established parties. Having provided the wider context of the transformation of the 
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French party system, the analysis will now focus on the patterns of opposition that 
result from party’s policy stances on the one hand, and voters’ orientations and long-
term alignments on the other hand.  
 
 
The Dimensionality of Political Space 
 
The first step in the analysis is to identify the dimensions that structure oppositions in 
the four elections under study. Differing from Chapter 2, the analysis starts in the late 
seventies and proceeds with a separate analysis of each election. The methods used to 
implement my analytical strategy having been explained in detail in the preceding 
chapter, the following discussion focuses on the results of the analysis. For all 
technical matters, the reader is referred to Chapter 5.  
The political space resulting from the MDS analysis, and constituted by the parties’ 
positions concerning the twelve issue categories in each election, is presented in 
Figure 6.1. In all four cases, the solution is clearly two-dimensional.
1
 As expected, the 
opposition between “welfare” and “economic liberalism” emerges as one dimension, 
and can be interpreted as the political content of the traditional state-market cleavage. 
The second axis visible is a cultural opposition. In the late seventies, the libertarian-
universalistic pole of the new divide has already emerged. This is visible in the 
extreme position of cultural liberalism, which regroups the issues relating to the goals 
of the New Social Movements. It can also be seen that of all parties, the Socialist PSF 
is located nearest to this category. The counter-pole of the cultural dimension is 
formed by budgetary rigor. This can be interpreted as a neo-conservative position, 
which is liberal in economic terms, but traditionalist in cultural matters (see Habermas 
1985, Eatwell 1989). The Gaullist RPR is situated at the traditionalist pole of this 
divide, close to budgetary rigor and furthest away from cultural liberalism. However, 
it is interesting to note that the two dimensions are partially integrated, as all parties 
but the Socialists are situated on a single dimension running from support for the 
                                                
1  The values for the Stress-I statistic are 0.13 for 1978, 0.3 for 1988, 0.19 for 1995, and 0.26 for 





















































Figure 6.1: Political Space in France, 1978-2002. Positions of parties and issue-categories
Legend: front: Front National; rpr: Rassemblement pour la République (later UMP, Union pour und mouvement populaire); udf: Union pour la Démocratie Française, 
small center parties; mrg: Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche; psf: Parti Socialiste Français; pcf: Parti Communiste Français; ecolo: Greens, ecological parties; 
exl: various extreme left parties.
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welfare state to budgetary rigor. This conforms to the established wisdom that 
economic and cultural conflicts overlapped to a large degree in France. At the same 
time, we can see that the PSF’s more strongly libertarian-universalistic stance as 
compared to the Communist PCF is largely responsible for the two-dimensionality of 
the solution.  
While the economic divide remains stable over time, the analysis reveals a 
transformation of the cultural divide. In 1988, a traditionalist-communitarian counter-
pole to the universalistic principles embodied in cultural liberalism emerges, 
represented by exclusionist anti-immigration stances. This accords with the 
hypothesis of a second transformation of the cultural divide in the late 1980s and 
1990s (see Chapter 1), resulting in a conflict centring on a libertarian-universalistic 
position opposed to a traditionalist-communitarian world-view. While the positions of 
parties evolve somewhat, the basic structure of conflict is reproduced in 1995 and 
2002.
2
 Like in 1978, there is a tendency for the two dimensions to be integrated, as 
cultural liberalism is associated with a left-wing position on the state-market 
dimension and anti-immigration stances are closer to economic liberalism.  
But nonetheless, with the partial exception of the 1995 election, the tripartition of 
political space is clearly visible in the solutions, and it is now the Front National’s 
position that escapes the one-dimensionality of the established parties’ positions. All 
the parties of the left combine the support the welfare state with an endorsement of 
universalistic values, annihilating the differentiation between Old Left and New Left 
that was visible in 1978. The UDF and RPR have largely converged in their position 
as well and are generally situated closer to the market pole of the state-market divide. 
However, looking at the cultural divide, we observe a change in strategy of the 
established right vis-à-vis the populist challenge: Whereas the UDF and RPR had 
been situated halfway between the left and the Front National on the cultural divide in 
1988 and 1995, they have converged with the parties of the left on a relatively 
universalistic position in the most recent contest. As a consequence, the structure of 
opposition turns more clearly two-dimensional: The established left and right diverge 
primarily in their economic, and not in their cultural positions, with the consequence 
                                                
2  In 1995, we can see that support for the army is very strongly associated with anti-immigration 
stances, and both categories could be interpreted to represent the traditionalist cultural pole. 
However, because army is only relevant in this one election, cultural liberalism and immigration are 
taken to represent the cultural divide in the three more recent contests. 
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of leaving the entire traditionalist-communitarian political space to the populist right. 
In how far these stances correspond to the orientations of voters is an open question 
that will be addressed on the analysis of the demand side of competition.  
European integration does not take an extreme position in the French political 
space, but this is partially due to the fact that the division over Europe cuts across both 
other dimensions. European integration is sufficiently present in the media to emerge 
as a polarizing issue in 1988 and 1995, while it no longer plays a role in the 2002 
contest. Being a relevant issue dimension both theoretically and empirically, it will be 
studied in the subsequent analysis alongside the state-market cleavage and the 
evolving cultural divide. 
The next step is now to calculate the position of the parties along the three 
dimensions identified and then to position voters in the parties’ political space. Table 
6.2 shows which of the relevant categories can be operationalized on the voter side 
with survey data. In a second step, the issue categories constituting the axis are 
integrated into a single measure of the position on each axis, both for the supply, as 
well as for the demand side (see Chapter 5). Concerning the economic dimension, we 
lack items for voters’ orientations regarding support for the welfare state in 1995 and 
2002. Consequently, this dimension is calculated only using voters’ positions 
 
Table 6.2:  Relevant issue-categories per election and those operationalized on  
 the demand side 
 Economic dimension Cultural dimension  EU dimension 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Budget  
1978 X X X – 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Immigr   Europe  
1988 X X 2 dim. X  – 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Immigr   Europe 
1995 – 2 dim. X X  X 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Immigr   Europe 
2002 – X X X  X 
 
Note: X denotes that one dimension emerges from the factor analysis. In two cases, the solution is two-
dimensional (“2 dim.”), and both underlying variables are used for the construction of the axis. See 
Chapter 5 for an explanation of this procedure and Appendix C for a list of the items used for each 
category. 
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regarding economic liberalism. However, this lack of information is not such a 
problem: From a theoretical point of view, these categories can be expected to form 
one dimension, and empirically, attitudes regarding the welfare state and economic 
liberalism are highly correlated at the individual level in 1978 and 1988.
3
 Regarding 
the cultural dimension, only cultural liberalism is available in 1978 and attitudes 
regarding the European Union can only be measured in 1995 and 2002 on the demand 




Parties and Voters on the Cultural Divide 
 
Position, match, and polarization 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the positions of parties and their electorates along the cultural 
dimension. A position on the left indicates a libertarian-universalistic position, while a 
position on the right denotes a defence of tradition as against these universalistic 
principles. The latter ideological syndrome from 1988 on is coupled with exclusionist 
stances regarding foreigners, as we have seen. In the 1978 election, the positions of 
the parties of the left and of the centrist UDF do not differ very much, while the RPR 
pursues a polarizing strategy by issuing more traditionalist stances. In fact, the 
Gaullists are the only party that is nearer to the traditionalist pole of the divide. It is 
also quite evident that a number of parties fail to represent their voters adequately. 
While the UDF takes the most libertarian-universalistic position after the PSF, its 
voters are situated at the opposing end of the distribution, virtually at no distance to 
those who voted for the Gaullist RPR. In this sense, the RPR’s rise at the expense of 
the UDF is not that surprising. The Communists and the MRG are similarly out of 
touch with their voters, resulting in a very low overall match in positions on the 
supply side and on the demand side, as indicated beneath each of the graphs. In other 
                                                
3  In 1978 and 1988, welfare and economic liberalism display factor loadings of at least 0.8 on the 
state-market dimension. 




1978: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (5 parties): 0.29 






1988: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (5 parties): 0.98 





1995: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (4 parties): 0.99 





2002: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (6 parties): 0.80 
polarization parties: 0.59 | without FN: 0.06 
 
Figure 6.2: Parties and voters on the cultural divide in France, 1978-2002. 
Position, match, and polarization 
Legend: see Figure 6.1. 
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words, the party system is clearly unresponsive to the electorate. The Front National’s 
position cannot be determined in 1978 due to an insufficient number of statements. 
The position of its voters, on the other hand, is very dispersed along the cultural 
dimension, resulting in a centrist average position. It thus seems as if the party did not 
primarily mobilize on this dimension at the beginning of its rise. 
Between 1978 and 1988, polarization surges, and the parties are now much more 
spread out along the spectrum. This is attributable both to the more clearly libertarian-
universalistic discourse of the left, as well as to the emergence of the Front National at 
the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural divide, set far apart from the 
moderate right. While the RPR has not changed its position very much, the UDF now 
lies at quite a distance from the parties of the left, resulting in a programmatic 
convergence of the established right. In 1995, the UDF does not appear in the graphic 
because the party did not present a candidate of its own, but called to support 
Balladur, a second RPR-candidate who ran against Chirac. As in 1995, the location of 
the parties now closely resembles the relative positions of their electorates. The most 
important finding is that the Front National mobilizes an electorate whose location is 
similarly extreme to the party itself. From 1988 on, and also in the most recent 
contest, the populist right has an electorate of its own. Although there is some overlap 
between relatively traditionalist supporters of the RPR and the less traditionalist 
followers of the Front National, a large number of the latter’s voters are located at the 
extreme of the dimension. The relatively large spread of the RPR’s issue statements 
underlines the party’s difficulty in defining its position on the cultural dimension, and 
its voters are also more dispersed along the spectrum than those of the Front National. 
While the electorates have also become more polarized than in the 1970s, it is the 
strong increase in polarization of the party system that restores the responsiveness of 
the party system, resulting in a close match of the positions of parties and voters. 
Overall, we face a situation of deep segmentation of which the Front National is an 
integral part: The party system is responsive with or without the Front National and 
its voters. Both the party and its voters lie at the extremes on the cultural divide and 
strongly contribute to the segmented nature of opposition on this axis.  
On the party side, however, the 2002 election marks a change in strategy of the 
established right regarding the right-wing populist challenger: While the polarization 
of the party system is more or less maintained due to the presence of the Front 
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National, the parties of the established right have converged on a relatively 
libertarian-universalistic position, close to the parties of the left. Without the Front 
National, the polarization of the party system is minimal. This quite extraordinary 
result could be attributed to the last two weeks of the campaign, when it was clear that 
Le Pen would be one of the candidates in the second round. However, there is no 
change in this picture if we omit all articles that appeared in the two weeks between 
the first and the second round of the elections. And if the parties of the established 
right have moved towards the libertarian-universalistic pole, their voters have not 
followed suit. The electorates of the established parties are much more evenly spread 
out along the dimension than the parties, and the correlation of 0.8 marks a 
comparatively low match, indicating that the party system is not very responsive. The 
Gaullist RPR is especially detached from its electorate, and risks to loose those voters 
to the Front National who attach great importance to the issues associated with the 
cultural divide. To which degree this danger is real depends, in conjunction with the 
RPR’s future strategy, on the strength of the loyalties of the voters of the established 
right, to which I now turn. 
 
The stability of alignments along the cultural divide 
 
In analyzing the stability of alignments, I am interested in the degree to which ideolo-
gical divisions on the cultural dimension engender loyalties among voters, or, put 
differently, to which degree they entail collective political identities. Theoretically, we 
can expect up to four ideological blocks on the cultural dimension, corresponding to 
an Old Left vs. New Left division on the one hand, and an established right vs. 
extreme populist right divide on the other hand. With this expectation, the 1978 
election is rather difficult to interpret, the largest distance being the one between the 
RPR and the other parties. From 1988 on, however, the picture changes, and several 
common features can be identified in that election and in the following ones: First of 
all, a division between the established right and the populist right is observable, and 
the Front National’s electorate represents a first ideological block. Except for the 
extraordinary pattern in 2002, a division between the moderate right and the parties of 
the left is also visible. Within the left, however, no clear differentiation between Old 
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Left and New Left emerges, and the overlap both in parties’ programmatic stances, as 
well as in their voters’ preferences indicates that they compete for voters with similar 
ideological outlooks. The Ecologists are a partial exception, since their voters in 2002 
could be taken to represent a decisively New Left block. But this is less clear in the 
earlier years and the position of the party itself, which can only be determined in 
2002, is not distinct from that of the established parties. 
Consequently, I form three ideological blocks: a left-libertarian family, a centre-
right group and a block constituted solely by the Front National. The division between 
the left and the centre-right breaks down in 2002, but only on the party side, and I will 
therefore use the same blocks over the entire time-span. For the 1978 election, only 
two blocks can be formed because too few respondents declare having voted for the 
still marginal extreme right. The division between left-libertarian and centre-right 
parties corresponds to the classification that will be used for the class cleavage, but 
note that I exclude those who voted for the various independent candidates of the left 
and right here. These candidates, that we cannot place in political space due to an 
insufficient number of statements in the media, may offer combinations of economic 
and cultural stances that differ from those of the other parties. An example would be 
Jean-Pierre Chevènement in 2002, a dropout from the Socialist party who combined a 
leftist economic programme with a somewhat nationalist and Eurosceptic discourse. A 
second example is Philippe de Villiers, a former member of the UDF, who founded a 
new party called Mouvement pour la France and as a presidential candidate led a 
campaign in defence of tradition and national sovereignty in 1995. 
The first striking feature in Figure 6.3 is the high level of partisan loyalty exhibited 
by the electorate of the Front National. Around 80% of those who declare having 
voted for it in the preceding election have done so again directly before the survey 
was carried out.
4
 On the other hand, cross-tabulations of actual and previous votes 
(results not shown here) also demonstrate that in all elections, considerable parts of 
the Front National’s electorate come from voters who previously did not vote, who 
were non yet eligible to vote in the previous election, or voted for other parties, 
                                                
4  This result has to be taken with a grain of salt, since the number of respondents who declare having 
voted for the Front National in the preceding election is always lower than the number of those who 
declare having done so in the more recent election, the one actually under examination. However, 
the analysis by Swyngedouw et al. (2000), which uses more sophisticated methods such as iterative 
proportional fitting to correct for the effective voting shares of parties, supports the results 
presented here. 
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mostly for independent candidates and the established right. Voters coming from the 
left are the smallest category in all years. These results show that at least concerning 
the hard core of the Front National’s electors, the structure of opposition is indeed 
highly segmented. Looking at the left-libertarian block, we see a decline of loyalties 
between 1978 and 1995, but a stabilization at about 72% thereafter. In the first 
election, loyalties on the left were still stronger than those exhibited by Front National 
voters later on, but they are now somewhat weaker. The stability of alignments to the 
centre right, on the other hand, has always been the weakest. From 1988 on, 
alignments have declined further from the comparatively low levels. In 2002, loyalties 
have dropped to a low of 59%. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Stability of alignments to the left-libertarian block, the centre-right  
and the Front National in France, 1978-2002 (in percent) 
 
 
Summary: emerging types of cultural opposition 
 
The French party system was in the wake of the emergence of a new dimension of 
political conflict in 1978. Polarization was low, indicating that the parties’ positions 
were feebly structured by conflicts over libertarian-universalistic values and neo-
conservative calls for drawing back the state, exemplified by the cultural liberalism 
and budgetary rigor categories. The left-wing libertarian movements of the late 1960s 
and 1970s do not seem to have led to a strong opposition around questions of liber-
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tarianism vs. tradition moral values at the level of the party system in that election, 
even if the RPR emerges as the most traditionalist party. However, strong alignments 
related to traditional laicist-communist vs. Catholic-traditionalist divide still checked 
realignments along the transformed cultural dimension, corresponding to the situation 
in the second cell from the right at the bottom of the schema in Figure 4.2. 
By 1988, a new and more extreme pole has emerged in the shape of the Front 
National. An authoritarian cultural potential was not only present, it already formed a 
loyal constituency of the Front National. At the same time, the parties of the left 
adopted a more decisively libertarian-universalistic stance in the 1980s. While the 
centre-right did not move much, the rise of the immigration question marks the 
mobilization of a traditionalist-communitarian political potential in favour of the 
preservation of an (imagined) traditional community. Polarization growing both at the 
party and the voter level, the party system is responsive to the citizenry and 
oppositions have become highly segmented since 1988. This is especially true for the 
Front National’s traditionalist block, which maintains the highest levels of loyalty of 
the three blocks. And while the left-libertarian block, too, seems to have stabilized its 
alignments, the centre-right block displays declining levels of loyalty, pointing to 
ongoing processes of dealignment. 
Overall, the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian divide repre-
sents a segmented “emerging line of opposition”, according to my theoretical model 
(Figure 4.2). Positions are polarized both on the supply, as well as on the demand 
side. At the same time, the decline of partisan loyalties to the centre-right block 
indicates that the opposition still lacks closure and that, consequently, the divide is not 
yet settled. However, the 2002 election has changed this situation of congruent 
segmented representation: With all parties converging on a rather universalistic 
stance, and polarization declining starkly, the party system has become rather non-
responsive and party support rather volatile as far as the centre-right block is 
concerned, opening a wide potential for the Front National’s anti-cartel rhetoric (this 
corresponds to the bottom-right cell in Figure 4.2). This is crucial not only because 
the established right’s voters’ cultural preferences are not adequately represented, but 
also because parts of the RPR’s electorate have cultural preferences that overlap with 
those of the Front National’s clientele anyway. Consequently, much depends on the 
centrality of the economic vs. the cultural divide for the voters of the centre-right, and 
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what the nature of opposition is on the economic dimension. These are the questions I 
now turn to. 
 
 
Parties and Voters on the Economic Divide 
 
Position, match, and polarization 
 
Figure 6.4 shows the respective positions of parties and voters on the economic 
dimension. A position on the left corresponds to a programmatic stance or preferences 
in favour of the welfare state and against economic liberalism, while a position on the 
right represents the opposite set of preferences. Starting with the election of 1978, we 
find that the space of political competition is skewed to the left, with the RPR being 
positioned right in the middle of the spectrum and the UDF to the left of it. Without 
the Front National, polarization is below 0.5 and therefore rather modest. Including 
the populist right, on the other hand, makes polarization rise considerably. Contrary to 
the cultural dimension, there are enough statements to position the Front National on 
the economic dimension in this election, which is an interesting finding as such. And 
at the end of the 1970s, the party did in fact have the most clear-cut market-liberal 
profile of all. In other words, we do find some evidence for Kitschelt’s (1995) claim 
that the party at the beginning of its ascendancy mobilized many voters with neo-
liberal preferences. The party’s electorate does not differ much from the voters of the 
established right, but we have to keep in mind that extremely few people voted for the 
populist right and that the results are therefore less reliable. 
However, by 1988, both the Front National, as well as its voters are situated quite 
differently. In this election, the party lies halfway in between the Socialists and the 
established right, and the voters of the populist right lie to the left of those of the 
established right as well. Behind this average position lie quite divergent individual 
preferences, as the large spread of positions indicates. The heterogeneity of the 
economic positions of the voters of the Front National in this as well as in later 
elections contrasts with their relatively homogeneous positions on the cultural




1978: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (7 parties): 0.79 





1988: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (6 parties): 0.98 





1995: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (4 parties): 0.88 





2002: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (8 parties): 0.76 
polarization parties: 0.50 | without FN: 0.45 
 
Figure 6.4: Parties and voters on the economic divide in France, 1978-2002. 
Position, match, and polarization 
Legend: see Figure 6.1 
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dimension. The dispersion of the Front National’s voters is especially large in 2002, 
reaching far into the grounds of the left. This is already strong evidence for my 
hypothesis that the voters of the populist right are drawn together by their cultural 
orientations, while their divergent economic preferences make it difficult for the party 
to define its position on this dimension. After the centrist location in 1988, the Front 
National has returned to a more market-liberal position in 1995 and especially in 
2002. However, this position clearly does not correspond to the preferences of the 
majority of its voters. Neo-liberal appeals thus seem to play a less important role in 
the Front National’s success than Kitschelt (1995) has claimed. More plausibly, the 
Front National’s shifting positions reflect the party’s difficulty in satisfying the 
preferences of a heterogeneous electorate, where some segments are in favour of 
strong government intervention in the economy, while others have free-market 
preferences, as Perrineau (1997) and Mayer (2002) have shown. 
As far as the party system as a whole is concerned, polarization generally lies 
around 0.5, except for 1995, where it is considerably lower. At the same time, the 
relatively close match of positions between parties and voters indicates that the party 
system is by and large responsive to the electorate. There is a decline in match in the 
2002 election, however, in part caused by the two political formations that have 
resulted from the new value conflicts that emerged since the late 1960s: the Ecologists 
and the Front National, which both do not adequately represent their voters on the 
economic dimension. Both electorates are quite centrist on average, while their parties 
lie at the extremes. Contrary to other years, we also see a differentiation within the 
established right, the supporters of the UDF being more decisively market-liberal than 
those of the RPR. However, the respective parties do not mirror this difference. The 
following analysis of voter loyalties will allow us to estimate how large the potential 
for realignments is that results from this situation of incongruent representation. 
 
The stability of alignments along the economic divide and resulting types of 
opposition 
 
The distinction between the ideological party blocks divided by the class cleavage is 
quite straightforward in France. The only question left to settle, as discussed in 
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Chapter 5, is how to classify the parties of the New Left and of the New Right, which 
are the product of post-industrial conflicts. Even here, however, the case is quite 
simple for the French Ecologists, which are clearly situated at the interventionist pole 
of the state-market divide, and for the Front National, which leans more to the market 
pole of the cleavage, even if both of these parties inadequately represent their voters. 
Loyalties to the left and right blocks are presented in Figure 6.5. It is visible in the 
figure that the stability of alignments on the left is in decline since 1978, and is lower 
than that those to the right block since 1988. Between 1995 and 2002 however, 
alignments on the right have started to decline as well. Overall, levels of loyalty seem 




Figure 6.5: Stability of alignments to the left and right blocks  
in France, 1978-2002 (in percent) 
 
Putting together the three elements of the schema presented in Chapter 4, we can now 
draw some conclusions regarding the character of economic divisions within the 
French party system. In line with the introductory discussion of the politics of 
economic reform, party polarization is generally rather low. Much therefore depends 
on whether or not this is an adequate representation of their voters. In 1978, this is not 
the case, if we exclude the Front National, which hardly gained any votes in that 
election. With loyalties being very high in the late 1970s, we thus face a non-
responsive party system in which party identification checks realignments (see Figure 
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4.2). Here, realignments could in fact have favoured a party advocating more clearly 
market-liberal policies, as the Front National did in that election.  
However, in 1988 and 1995, match is restored, and the party system has regained 
responsiveness. In conjuncture with low levels of polarization and a high stability of 
alignments, this indicates that the class cleavage represents an identitarian political 
dimension, where alignments are more strongly structured by political identities than 
by real-world policy-differences between the left and the right blocks. This is mainly 
due to the fact that the right in France is quite far from endorsing market-liberalism. 
There is a difference between the voters of the left and the right, however: The former 
exhibit declining loyalties, indicating that at least for some segments of the electorate, 
the class cleavage is moving in the direction of a competitive political dimension, 
where the performance of governments is at least in part decisive for voting choices. 
This is plausible in the light of the similarity of the basic liberalizing thrust of the 
economic reforms pursued by governments of the right and the left in the 1980s and 
1990s (Levy 2000, 2005). 
The erosion in loyalties of the voters of the right is less marked. There is no decline 
until 2002, where the party system no longer mirrors voters’ positions very well. 
Since the loyalties of the Front National’s voters are constantly high, this appears to 
be a problem of the parties of the established right. As in 1978, the party system has 
become to a certain degree non-responsive to voters. At the same time, we should 
remember which parties were most clearly out of touch with their voters in that 
election: The Ecologists and the voters of the Front National, whose creation is linked 
to the emergence of post-industrial conflicts. To the degree that economic stances 
matter for these electorates, there would be a potential for realignments to take place. 
But much depends on the relative weight these citizens attribute to being congruently 
represented on the economic and the cultural dimensions, respectively. In particular 
concerning the Front National, constantly high levels of loyalty despite misrepresenta-
tion in the economic domain indicate that for this group of voters, the economic 
divide represents a secondary political dimension, again employing the analytical 
schema from Chapter 4. This hypothesis will be substantiated in the analysis of voting 
determinants. First, however, we should investigate to which degree the European 
integration issue acts as a dimension crosscutting alignments based on the economic 
and cultural divides.  
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Support and opposition for the European Union: A crosscutting dimension? 
 
The European integration dimension can be analyzed on the supply side in 1988, 1995 
and 2002. An analysis of voters’ attitudes towards European integration is possible in 
1995 and 2002. In this last election, the data permit a separate treatment the economic 
and cultural aspects of the integration process on the voter side. Right from the start, it 
should be kept in mind that European integration, while constituting a polarizing 
issue, only in 1988 played a prominent role in the election campaign (see the tables 
indicating the saliency of issues in Appendix A). Often we do not have ten sentences 
regarding the EU for a single party, and positions based on less than ten observations 
are set in brackets in Figure 6.6. Especially in the 2002 election campaign, European 
integration hardly played a role, and it is therefore only possible to represent the 
positions of three parties, namely the Front National, the Socialists and the RPR for 
that election. To the degree that parties misrepresent their voters, and to the extent that 
the integration process represents a salient issue for the electorate, this indicates an 
issue-specific cartellization of the party system, where parties avoid issues that cut 
across the dimensions of conflict they mobilize on. 
In 1988, we only have information regarding parties, but it is quite revealing to 
compare the changes in position that occur between 1988 and 1995. In the late 1980s, 
only the Communists had opposed European integration, while all the other parties, 
including the Front National, were quite strongly in favour of the EU. Between 1988 
and 1995, then, the Front National performed a dramatic reversal of its position, from 
a reticent, but clear support of the EU to a staunch opposition of the project. The 
European integration issue is therefore a striking example for the populist right’s 
strategic flexibility, whose importance was discussed in Chapter 1 and 2. In line with 
the new 1992 party program, which devoted considerable attention to it and 
denounced European integration (Perrineau 1997: 75), the Front National of all parties 
put most emphasis on the issue in the 1995 election campaign, where almost 9% of its 
statements concerned the EU (see Appendix A). The voters of the Front National are 
also the electorate most sceptical of the integration project, although we can see that 
its preferences are far from homogeneous in 1995, as put in evidence by the large 
standard deviation around their average position. However, a few years later, in 2002, 
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the supporters of the Front National already exhibit a more distinct profile, being 





1988: only parties 





1995: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (4 parties): 0.99 





2002: parties (above) and voters (below) 
– 
 
Figure 6.6: Parties and voters on the EU-dimension in France, 1988-2002. 
Position, match, and polarization 
Legend: see Figure 6.1 
 
This evolution is concomitant to a stronger structuring of attitudes towards the EU 
along partisan lines. Between 1995 and 2002, electorates’ positions become more 
polarized, either due to realignments that have taken place, or due to the mobilization 
efforts of parties. Although it played a very minor role in the most recent campaign, 
 France 179 
 
the analysis presented here supports Belot and Cautrès’s (2004) claim that Europe was 
“invisible, but omnipresent” in structuring alignments in the 2002 presidential election 
(see also Meunier 2004). Most importantly, the general pattern of opposition revealed 
in Figure 6.6 differs from that found on the economic and the cultural divides: While 
the Socialists, as well as the centre-right are in favour of European integration, the 
Communists and the Front National are rather sceptic, indicating a split within the left 
and the right (note that the voters of the various radical left candidates are not very 
pro-European either). The overall correspondence of the positions of parties and 
voters along the European divide can only be reliably estimated in 1995, but there we 
see that the party system is highly responsive to the preferences of voters, as indicated 
by the high match of 0.99. The Socialists and the Front National represent the poles of 
the distribution both on the party, as well as on the voter side, but the supporters of the 
Ecologists also consistently stand out for their pro-European attitudes.  
In other words, even if positions on the EU-dimension differ from those found on 
the other two dimensions, they are unlikely to trigger (further) realignments, since 
parties already represent their electorates in a congruent fashion. What is quite 
striking in 2002 is the fact that the voters of the Front National are by far the most 
Euro-sceptic and are situated at quite a distance from the RPR voters, which emerge 
as the second-most opposed group of voters, which does contrast with the reluctantly 
favourable position of the party itself. That said, the fact that representation is by and 
large congruent along the EU-dimension suggests that the issue indeed has played and 
continues to play a role in structuring alignments. Given the Communist-Socialist 
split regarding the EU, realignments may on the one hand have taken place between 
these two parties. On the other hand, with the RPR-voters having become more Euro-
sceptic between 1995 and 2002, there may be a further potential for the Front National 
with its decisively anti-EU stance. However, to which degree the party can mobilize 
this potential also depends on the competition in the nationalist political space. While 
the Front National faces decreasing competition in the realm of the ideological core of 
its positions, as the previous analyses have shown, this is not necessarily the case 
regarding the EU-issue, where various dropouts from the established right such as 
Charles Pasqua, Philippe Séguin and Philippe de Villiers compete for euro-sceptic 
votes. 
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The role played by the EU in structuring alignments will be tested when I turn to 
voting determinants. An open question I first want to pursue before that regards the 
nature of the different electorates’ attitudes towards the EU-project. As discussed, the 
pattern of opposition along the EU-dimension differs from the one found on the 
economic, as well as the cultural divides. This may be due to the fact that orientations 
towards the European integration process can have a cultural and as well as an 
economic basis. Given the libertarian-universalistic outlook of the electorate of the 
left, left-wing opponents of the EU can be expected to reject the project for economic 
reasons. Consequently, positions regarding the economic aspect of European 
integration should be related to orientations regarding the state-market dimension. On 
the other hand, as argued in Chapter 1, I expect the populist right’s opposition against 
the EU to be rooted in its distinctive position along the libertarian-universalistic vs. 
traditionalist-communitarian divide. In this case, the fear of loosing political 
sovereignty and a perceived danger of denationalization for what is conceived as a 
“natural” national community leads to a rejection of the integration process. 
At the party level, the question of European integration is unfortunately not 
sufficiently present in the election campaigns to allow an in-depth analysis of stances 
towards the economic and cultural aspects of integration. However, on the demand 
side, items in the 2002 post-electoral survey allow a differentiation of the economic 
and the cultural dimension of EU-integration. The economic dimension can be 
operationalized using the question if respondents fear that EU-integration endangers 
the achievements of the welfare state. For the cultural dimension, I use items 
pertaining to respondents’ fear of loosing their identity and the question whether they 
see France’s role in the world endangered by the EU. The positions of the electorates 
along these two dimensions are shown in Figure 6.7. To compare the European 
dimensions with the national dimensions of opposition, the figure also shows the 
electorates on the state-market and libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-
communitarian dimensions of conflict. The latter is a two-dimensional representation 
of the positions found in Figures 6.2 and 6.4. 






Figure 6.7: Voters’ positions on the economic and cultural dimensions  
of European integration in France, 2002 
Legend: see Figure 6.1 
 
The positions of party electorates in Figure 6.7 strongly support the hypothesis 
regarding the different logics of rejection on the left and the populist right. The voters 
of the Front National are extreme only as far as their culturally based orientations 
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regarding the EU are concerned. The Communists and the radical left, on the other 
hand, most clearly see an economic threat as a consequence of EU-integration. It is 
interesting to note that the voters of the largest parties of the established left and right, 
the PSF and the RPR/UMP, diverge more along the cultural than along the economic 
dimension. Most striking, however, is the similarity of the electorates’ positions along 
the two European political dimensions and those constituting the national political 
space. Although positions along the national dimensions appear more polarized and 
therefore more segmented, there is a strong resemblance of the two images. In both 
instances, the Ecologists and the Front National lie at the extremes of the cultural 
dimension, while parties of the established left and right, exemplified by the PCF and 
the UDF, are situated at the extremes of the economic dimension. If we keep in mind 
the minor role played by the European integration issue in presidential campaigns, 
oppositions regarding the EU are surprisingly segmented, especially along the cultural 
dimension, which emerges as more polarizing than the economic one. Beneath the 
surface, the integration question indeed seems to impinge on patterns of opposition in 
the party system. In the analysis of the factors structuring voting behaviour presented 
in the next section, it will be interesting to investigate the role played by the EU-issue 
for partisan alignments. 
 
 
Political Divides as Determinants of Voting Choices 
 
While the analysis so far was concerned with the congruence between the positions of 
parties and voters, the aim in this section is to determine which role the three political 
dimensions we have identified play in determining voting choices. More specifically, 
I am interested in the question which parties mobilize on which dimensions. 
Naturally, most attention is given to the Front National, but I am also concerned with 
the question who the populist right’s main antagonists and closest competitors are. 
The results of the analysis, following the procedures outlined in Chapter 5, are 
presented in Table 6.3. Looking at 1978, and with minor exceptions, a relatively 
simple pattern of oppositions can be seen, following left-libertarian vs. right-wing 
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Table 6.3:  Political dimensions as determinants of voting choices in France,  
 1978-2002: Results from logistic regressions run separately for each party 
 
 Parties 
Dimensions Ecolo MRG EXL PCF PSF UDF RPR Front 
 
1978 
Economic  odds 1.4** 1.3* 0.5*** 0.3*** 0.6*** 1.8*** 1.9*** 1.3 
 z 2.5 2.3 -3.3 -14.3 -8.6 10.4 11.5 1.3 
Cultural odds 0.5*** 1.2 0.8 0.8*** 0.9** 1.4*** 1.5*** 1.06 
 z -5.5 1.7 -1.2 -5.0 -2.8 5.0 6.4 0.26 
R
2
  5.6% 1.7% 4.6% 15.8% 4.5% 8.6% 10.6% 0.9% 
 
1988 
Economic odds 1.0 - 0.6** 0.3*** 0.5*** 2.4*** 2.2*** 1.2* 
 z 0.2 - -3.1 -10.5 -11.7 11.6 11.0 2.4 
Cultural odds 0.6*** - 0.8 0.6*** 0.7*** 1.0 1.6*** 2.9*** 
 z -4.8 - -1.7 -5.7 -6.3 -0.1 6.4 10.8 
R
2 
 3.5% - 4.4% 18.6% 9.5% 10.7% 12.2% 12.7% 
 
1995 
Economic odds 0.7* - 0.7** 0.4*** 0.5*** - 2.5*** 1.2* 
 z -2.4 - -2.9 -8.9 -11.5 - 15.8 2.5 
Cultural odds 0.7** - 0.5*** 0.8* 0.8*** - 1.3*** 2.0*** 
 z -3.0 - -5.1 -2.2 -4.9 - 4.8 8.1 
Europe odds 0.9 - 1.3** 1.4*** 0.6*** - 0.9* 1.7*** 
 z -0.6 - 2.6 3.8 -7.4 - -2.1 7.6 
R
2 
 3.8% - 6.5% 11.9% 12.5% - 14.0% 12.1% 
 
2002 
Economic odds 0.9 1.1 0.6*** 0.4*** 0.7*** 2.1*** 1.5*** 1.1 
 z -1.5 0.8 -8.4 -7.3 -6.1 9.7 8.2 1.4 
Cultural  odds 0.3*** 0.5*** 0.7*** 0.5*** 0.7*** 1.0 1.4*** 2.6*** 
 z -9.9 -4.7 -5.0 -5.4 -5.4 -0.1 6.6 12.5 
EU econ. odds 0.9 1.0 0.9* 0.9 0.9** 1.1* 1.1** 1.0 
 z -0.7 -0.2 -2.2 -1.4 -2.7 2.1 2.7 0.6 
EU cult. odds 0.8* 0.8 1.0 1.3* 0.8*** 0.9* 1.1 1.3*** 
 z -2.1 -1.6 -0.6 2.0 -4.0 -1.9 1.9 3.3 
R
2 
 11.8% 6.5% 5.3% 11.0% 3.9% 7.4% 4.8% 12.5% 
Significance levels: * 0.5 level ** 0.01 level *** 0.001 level 
Number of observations: 2199 (1978), 1712 (1988), 2047 (1995), 3312 (2002) 
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traditionalist antagonism:
5
 Those voting for the parties of the left are in favour of the 
welfare state and state intervention in the economy, and defend libertarian-universa-
listic values. The reverse is true for the UDF and RPR, which mobilize strongly on 
both dimensions. The voters of the Ecologists are those most strongly moved by 
cultural liberalism, but economically, they actually lean more to the right, and thus 
represent a first exception to the overall pattern. The other exceptions are the MRG, 
which I will not deal with in detail, and the Front National. In the latter case, no clear 
result emerges, as the results are insignificant due to the limited number of cases. 
This basic pattern remains stable in the later elections, but at the same time, the 
results lend support to our prior interpretation of a segmentation of the cultural 
dimension caused by the mobilization of the Front National. Both the RPR, as well as 
the Front National mobilize voters with traditionalist-communitarian attitudes along 
the cultural dimension. However, this effect is much stronger for the populist than for 
the established right. The reverse is true for the voters with market-liberal preferences. 
In 1988 and 1995, there is something of a tendency for market-liberal attitudes to 
favour the Front National. However, the effects are much weaker than for the 
established right, and in 2002, market liberalism ceases to have a significant influence 
on the Front National vote. Overall, then, the results strongly confirm the hypothesis 
that the populist right mobilizes almost exclusively on the cultural dimension.  
The analysis of voting determinants also clearly reveals who the Front National’s 
main competitors and antagonists are. Starting with the competitors, we can see that 
from 1988 on, the UDF no longer mobilizes citizens by virtue of their cultural 
preferences, but rather gains support from those with market-liberal preferences. This 
is a direct effect of the declining role of religion in politics and the transformation of 
the cultural divide, initiated by the Gaullist RPR and then radicalized by the Front 
National. Most of the parties of the left appear to gain votes by a dual logic of 
mobilization, receiving support from those with leftist economic preferences and from 
citizens with libertarian-universalistic attitudes. So far, then, the analysis supports the 
hypothesis that the rise of the Front National has established a tripartite structure of 
opposition, where the parties of the left represent the counterpart of the established 
right in economic terms and the antagonists of the populist right in cultural terms. 
                                                
5  In all cases, the direction of the variables is coded in such a way that the odds ratios indicate the 
probability of voting for a party when attitudes are more right-wing in economic terms or more 
traditionalist-communitarian in cultural terms.  
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Even if the parties of the left do not diverge very much in their logic of mobilization, 
the analysis also support the hypothesis that the Ecologist voters constitute the 
ideological counter-pole to the populist right on the cultural dimension. However, the 
Ecologist party is not alone to mobilize voters with a distinctly libertarian-
universalistic profile, in general competing with the Communists, and also with the 
extreme left in 1995, and the with the MRG in 2002. 
In an important respect, however, the tripartition argument is imprecise. The 
European integration dimension has introduced a rift within both the left and the right, 
as the analysis of voting determinants clearly confirms. In 1995, the first year where 
we have information on voters’ attitudes, the European issue reveals differing 
mobilization logics within the left and right blocks. On the political right, favourable 
attitudes towards the EU are a predictor for the vote for the RPR, while a sceptical 
view of the integration process makes the probability of voting for the Front National 
rise sharply. A similar contrast is visible on the left, where the Socialists gain support 
from voters with a distinctly pro-European profile, while the PCF and extreme left 
voters are sceptical of the EU.  
The separate measurement of the economic and cultural aspect of European 
integration in 2002 allows a more precise appraisal of these effects. Here, the analysis 
reveals that the Front National mobilizes those citizens who reject the integration 
process for a fear of losing their identity and rejecting the loss of national sovereignty 
implied by it. The culturally open or universalistic conceptions of community 
prevalent among the voters of the left make them insensitive to this threat. The 
exception, however, are the voters of the Communists. Contrary to expectations and to 
the prior analysis of the location of electorates in the European political space, these 
voters also appear to be moved by a fear of losing their identity. In general, however, 
the parties of the left gain votes from those who believe that European integration 
may undermine the achievements of the welfare state, while those who do not exhibit 
such a fear are more likely to vote for the established right. Economic considerations 
regarding the EU play no role for the Front National’s electorate, confirming our prior 
findings. The issue of European integration has thus led to a pattern of opposition 
characterized by four blocks, dividing both the established and the populist right, as 
well as the Socialist-Ecologist and the Communist-extreme left. These divisions are 
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difficult to observe in political life, as most parties do not emphasize the issue of 
European integration in national election campaigns.  
Comparing the overall predictive power of voters’ positions on the three political 
dimensions in explaining party choices, it is interesting to note that from 1988 on, it is 
the Front National whose support can best be predicted by means of ideology, 
followed by the Communists, and at some distance by the RPR. More so than the 
other parties, in other words, the populist right gains its votes from citizens with a 
distinct ideological profile. Consequently, relative to other parties, there is actually 
less, and not more room for explanations based on charisma and protest votes in 
explaining the success of the populist right in France. Such explanations appear more 
powerful for the followers of formations such as the extreme left, whose support is 
poorly explained by ideological variables. The vote for the Front National, on the 
other hand, is an ideological vote. 
 
 
The Impact of Social Class and Education on Support for the  
Front National 
 
The social structural support base of the populist right in France 
 
As the preceding section has shown, the Front National mobilizes an electorate that is 
clearly distinct in ideological terms. Is this also true in social structural terms or does 
the Front National mobilize a heterogeneous cross-class alliance? The high level of 
stability of alignments exhibited by the voters of the Front National makes this a 
particularly interesting question. I am primarily concerned here with the question 
whether support for the populist right is still related to the social-structural divisions 
typical of the industrial era of conflict. However, I also test the hypothesis that 
differences in education, which underlie the new cultural divide, have an impact on 
the propensity to vote for the Front National. Table 6.4 presents logistic regression 
results, explaining the vote for the Front National using dummy variables for social
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Table 6.4:  The social structural basis of support for the Front National  
 (logistic regression results) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 1988 1995 2002 1988 1995 2002 
 
Farmers odds 0.8 0.8 1.4 0.7 0.7 1.1 
 z -0.6 -0.9 1.2 -1.2 -1.4 0.3 
Self-employed odds 1.7* 1.8** 1.0 1.5# 1.6* 0.8 
 z 2.4 3.0 0.0 1.75 2.3 -0.7 
Unskilled workers odds 1.1 1.6* 1.3 0.9 1.4 1.0 
 z 0.2 2.1 1.1 -0.5 1.3 -0.1 
Skilled workers odds 1.3 1.9*** 1.5** 1.2 1.6** 1.2 
 z 1.5 4.1 2.5 0.8 3.0 1.0 
Routine non-man. workers odds 1.3 1.3 0.9 1.1 1.1 0.8 
 z 1.1 1.3 -0.3 0.4 0.7 -1.4 
Technical specialists odds - 1.1 0.7 - 1.1 0.6 
 z - 0.4 -1.1 - 0.2 -1.4 
Social-cultural specialist odds - 0.5** 0.4*** - 0.5* 0.5** 
 z - -2.7 -3.7 - -2.3 -2.9 
Non-labor-force part. odds 1.0 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.2 0.8 
 z 0.1 0.7 -0.3 0.1 0.6 -0.7 
 
Prof. intermediaries* odds 1.1 - - 1.0 - - 
 z 0.5 - - 0 - - 
 
Higher education odds    0.3** 0.3*** 0.3*** 
 z    -2.8 -3.4 -3.4 
Low education odds    2.0** 2.0** 1.8** 
 z    2.6 3.0 2.4 
 
Variance explained  0.5% 2.1% 1.8% 1% 2.7% 2.9% 
N  3289 4078 4017 3252 4055 4014 
Notes: For social class, managers are used as the reference category, except for 1988, where 
Managers/Professionals together form the reference category. Because a different class schema was 
used in 1988, the normal typology could not be constructed. I have included the French categories 
„professions libres“ and „cadres prof. intellectuelles“ in the Manager-category. For education, citizens 
with medium levels of education (secondary/vocational training) form the reference category. 
* Additional category only used in the 1988 survey. 
Significance levels: # p=0.1 * p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001 
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classes and for educational groups, as set out in Chapter 5.
6
 Because there are few 
Front National voters in the 1978 sample, and because none of the variables are 
significant, I do not report the results for this first election. 
The results for Model 1 show certain regularities in 1988 and 1995 on the one hand 
and between 1995 and 2002 on the other hand. In the first two elections, the self-
employed are over-represented among Front National voters and in 1995, we actually 
find support for Kitschelt’s (1995) thesis: Both the self-employed and members of the 
working class are over-represented in this electorate. The similarities between 1995 
and 2002, on the other hand, pertain to the over-representation of skilled workers – by 
far the largest group among Front National voters, as we shall see – and an under-
representation of social-cultural specialists. The latter finding conforms to expecta-
tions, because this group represents the core support base of the New Left in advanced 
post-industrial countries (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998, Müller 1999). The self-
employed, on the other hand, are no longer over-represented in 2002. 
Model 2 introduces education in the equation, and the results quite impressively 
underscore the importance of this variable in structuring the attitudes that nurture the 
right-wing populist mobilization. Citizens with tertiary education are very unlikely to 
vote for the Front National, compared to those with secondary education or vocational 
training, which form the reference category. On the other hand, those who have low 
levels of formal education (i.e. little more than elementary school) are much more 
likely to support the populist right. Both effects are strong and highly significant. By 
and large, the introduction of education does not affect the impact of the class 
variables, with the exception of the propensity of skilled workers to vote for the Front 
National in 2002. Overall, then, the party’s support base is most strongly 
distinguished by education in social structural terms, but a class pattern persists 
beyond this. What stands out in the results is the strong reluctance of the social-
cultural specialists to support the populist right, even when education is taken into 
account. Furthermore, the party’s entrenchment in the working class is partially, but 
not exclusively an effect of education. 
                                                
6  There is an additional category of “professions intermediaries” in 1988, and two categories are 
dropped in that year because the information provided in the survey does not permit the full 
operationalization of the schema. See also the note to the table. 
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To further test Kitschelt’s (1995) contention according to which the Front National, 
as the “master case” of the New Radical Right, attracts some social groups by way of 
its pro-market appeals, and others by its authoritarian-exclusionist stances, I tested 
interaction effects between the social classes used in Table 6.4 and positions on the 
economic divide (results not shown here). The findings do not support the thesis that 
some social classes vote for the populist right for economic reasons. For 1988 and 
1995, none of the interaction terms are anywhere near significance. In 2002, on the 
other hand, the interaction terms for economic preferences and skilled workers, 
routine non-manual workers and non labour-force participants are actually significant. 
But contrary to expectations and to Kitschelt’s hypothesis, these groups stand out for 
their left-wing economic preferences. In other words, many of those supporting the 
Front National do so not because of its pro-market stance, displayed for example in 
the 2002 campaign, but rather in spite of it. A last series of analyses further fleshes out 
this point. 
 
Social class and economic and cultural preference formation 
 
The analysis so far has suggested that the Front National manages to rally an 
electorate with quite heterogeneous economic preferences. However, this is not to say 
that occupational class plays no role in political preference formation. Quite to the 
contrary, my hypothesis is that the heterogeneity of economic preferences exhibited 
by the Front National’s electorate is related to diverging preferences anchored in class 
locations. But as long as cultural issues appear more salient to these voters, the Front 
National’s economic stances will be largely irrelevant for their choices. This 
hypothesis can be verified by locating sub-groups of the Front National’s electorate in 
the economic and cultural political space. Figure 6.8 shows the preferences of Front 
National voters broken down by social class. The figures in brackets refer to the share 
of respondents that belong to the respective social class within the Front National’s 
electorate. 
The results prove to be remarkably similar over the years and provide strong 
confirmation for my hypothesis. The positions of the social classes within the Front 
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Figure 6.8: Positions of social classes within the Front National’s electorate in political space, 1988-2002
Note: The figures in brackets report the respective share of members of these social classes in the Front National’s electorate
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This is especially true for the largest groups within the Front National’s electorate, 
namely, the skilled workers, which are rather leftist in economic terms, and the 
managers and self-employed, which have quite market-liberal preferences. What 
unites Front National voters from all these classes, however, is their position 
regarding the cultural dimension. This is especially true for those groups forming the 
core basis of the party’s support: Skilled workers, managers, routine non-manual 
workers, and the self employed up to 1995, all of which exhibit remarkably similar 
cultural preferences.  
We can conclude, then, that class does matter for economic preference formation. 
However, whether voters are actually mobilized on behalf of their common prefer-
ences regarding economic or cultural issues is quite a different question. The crucial 
variable here is the relative importance of group attachments in individuals’ salience 
hierarchy of identities. The analyses presented here show that Le Pen’s Front National 
has succeeded in constructing a collective identity based on the idea of a culturally 
homogeneous national community to which voters of the populist right adhere to. 
Functional differentiation is still visible in economic preference formation, but the 
identities linked to the traditional class cleavage have suffered a decline relative to 





As a result of the waning of the religious divide in French politics, which pitted a 
laicist-communist and a Catholic-traditionalist subculture against each other, French 
politics have been profoundly altered in the past two or three decades. Together with a 
(limited) convergence of left and right along the economic dimension of conflict, this 
has opened the way for a transformation of the cultural divide. In the late 1970s, 
cultural liberalism and the issues related to it, such as the free choice of life-styles, 
sexual liberation, and international solidarity were characteristic of oppositions along 
the cultural dimension. The mobilization around these issues has contributed to a 
general diffusion of universalistic principles. In the 1978 election, there was a simple 
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polarity between voters of the left and voters of the right. Even if the parties 
themselves failed to reflect this opposition adequately, the Gaullist RPR, with its 
strong emphasis on national sovereignty and in insisting on an important role for 
France on the international scene, represented the counter-pole to the libertarian left. 
The RPR’s rise in the 1970s at the expense of the UDF federation can on the one hand 
be attributed to the declining role of religion in politics and in the subsequent 
transformation of the cultural dimension of conflict. On the other hand, the RPR 
played an active part in redefining the nature of cultural oppositions. To some degree, 
then, the Gaullist right is now haunted by a ghost it has nourished in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. The established right introduced a new set of issues into French politics, 
which the Front National subsequently radicalized and thrived upon. 
While the French case thus conforms to Ignazi’s (1992, 2003) model, the dynamic 
of changes in the party system escapes Ignazi’s one-dimensional left-right interpreta-
tion of conflicts. Instead, it requires a separate treatment of the structure of opposi-
tions along the different lines of conflict mirrored by the party system. According to 
my thesis, which is strongly supported by the French analysis, the rise of right-wing 
populist parties is dependent upon the displacement of collective identities related to 
class by broad ascriptive categories such as ethnicity for its supporters. Here, the 
analysis of the patterns of opposition along the economic divide is revealing. Between 
the 1970s and the late 1980s, the character of economic divisions in France is 
transformed. While the party system failed to represent voters adequately in 1978, the 
match between the preferences of voters and the positions of parties is restored in 
1988 and 1995, and the party system has regained responsiveness. However, 
polarization along the economic divide was relatively low, conforming to the 
discussion of economic policy making under left and right governments in the 1980s 
and 1990s presented earlier on. Because alignments to the left and right blocks are 
quite stable, this indicates that the class cleavage is an identitarian political dimension, 
where loyalties are more strongly structured by political identities than by real-world 
policy-differences between the left and the right blocks. At the same time, declining 
attachments on the political left indicate that for some segments of the electorate, the 
class cleavage is moving in the direction of a competitive political dimension, where 
the performance of governments is at least in part decisive for voting choices. Even if 
the party system has become unresponsive and economic alignments more volatile 
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once more in the 2002 election, the changing character of the class cleavage has 
permitted the ascendancy of cultural conflicts to unprecedented prominence. 
Contrary to the low levels of polarization along the economic cleavage, oppositions 
are much more marked along the cultural divide. While the party system was feebly 
structured by this divide in the late 1970s, the structure of opposition has become 
highly segmented along a libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian 
dimension from 1988 on. For the most part, the party system responds to the 
preferences of the citizenry along this divide. With the Front National mobilizing an 
electorate whose preferences closely resemble the stances of the party itself, the 
populist right is an integral part of the segmented pattern of oppositions and rallies a 
segment of voters who clearly lie at the traditionalist pole of the cultural dimension. 
One of the most striking features of the Front National’s mobilization is the fact that 
its voters display the highest levels of loyalty of the three ideological blocks identified 
along the cultural dimension. While alignments to the left-libertarian block have 
stabilized, those to the centre-right show a continuous decline, and have dropped 
below 60% in 2002. This points to ongoing processes of dealignment from the centre-
right parties, which may profit the Front National.  
Aided by a number of favourable circumstances, the Front National has managed 
to unite the hard core of the traditionalist-communitarian segment of the electorate 
and to establish itself durably in the French party system. The analysis presented in 
this chapter thus supports Grunberg and Schweisgut’s (2003) contention that the 
mobilization of the Front National has driven the evolution from a bipolar to a 
tripartite structure of oppositions in the French party system, and disconfirms 
Andersen and Evans’ (2003) claim to the contrary. However, as plausible as the 
tripartition of political space may be both to the observer of French politics, as well as 
in the light of empirical analyses, it needs to be qualified. The inclusion of the 
European integration dimension in the present analysis suggests that a more complex 
pattern of oppositions is actually at play. The European integration project has 
introduced a rift within both the left and the right. The populist right, in contrast to the 
UDF and RPR (now UMP), gains votes from those who oppose the integration project 
by virtue of their traditionalist-communitarian preferences. A similar contrast is 
visible on the left, where the Socialists gain support from voters with a distinctly pro-
European profile, while the PCF and extreme left voters are sceptical of the EU. 
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However, contrary to that of populist right supporters, their scepticism is in fact 
related to their perception that the EU endangers the achievements of the welfare 
state. Despite the minor role played by European integration in the presidential 
campaigns studied in this chapter, oppositions concerning the issue are structured by 
partisanship to a surprising degree, warranting the conclusion that it would be 
legitimate to speak not of three, but of four ideological blocks in French politics. 
Once more, the analysis of orientations regarding the EU has underscored the 
irrelevance of economic preferences in explaining the vote for the Front National. 
Similarly to their overall economic orientations, these voters are neither particularly 
concerned with the impact the EU may have on the French welfare state, nor do they 
appraise economic liberalization. Much has been made of Kitschelt’s (1995) claim 
that the populist right mobilizes certain social groups by virtue of their allegedly 
economically liberal preferences. And in fact, we find that a market-liberal political 
potential existed in France at the end of the seventies, since the parties did not 
adequately represent voters on the economic divide. The Front National taking the 
most market-liberal stance, it may have attempted to mobilize this segment of the 
population. However, Le Pen’s formation failed to gain even a modest share of the 
vote in 1978, and the much larger share of voters it rallied in later elections was 
characterized by the most strongly diverging economic orientations of all electorates. 
As a result of the uneasy task of accommodating such diverging preferences, Le Pen 
moved uneasily towards more statist stances in 1988 and back to neo-liberalism in 
2002. Moreover, today, the market-liberal potential seems quite limited in the light of 
Alain Madelin’s meagre result in the 2002 presidential elections. 
Even if social class does not play the most decisive role in explaining the vote for 
the Front National, the social groups most strongly touched by the processes of 
economic modernization and structural change are over-represented in the populist 
right’s electorate. The paradox then is that these segments of the population are 
mobilized on behalf of their cultural, and not their economic preferences. The analysis 
has shown that the strongly diverging economic preferences of the Front National’s 
electorate continue to be related to social class. Among its core support groups, 
members of the working class have leftist economic preferences, while managers and 
the self-employed are quite liberal as far as their economic outlook is concerned. 
However, it appears that these economic preferences are largely irrelevant for an 
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electorate primarily concerned with the preservation or reestablishment of a homo-
geneous cultural community. More so than in the case of the other parties, the vote for 
the Front National can be explained with ideological variables, and more specifically 
using voters’ position on the cultural divide and on the European integration 
dimension. In social structural terms, the strong impact of education on the propensity 
to vote for the populist right strong supports the hypothesis that the new cultural 
conflict is an offspring of the critical juncture of the educational revolution. The Front 
National draws over-proportional support from citizens with low levels of education, 
while those with higher education by and large refuse to vote for it. 
All this suggests that as long as cultural conflicts remain predominant, the Front 
National is unlikely to vanish. Le Pen’s formation represents a group of voters that 
defend an exclusionist conception of community that no other party advocates. These 
voters loyally turn out and vote for the Front National election after election – much 
more consistently than the voters of the other parties. To which degree the populist 
right can still grow beyond the hard core of traditionalist-communitarian voters, 
however, is a more difficult question to answer. On the one hand, the dangers should 
not be overstated. As the 2002 presidential election has shown, there are clear limits 
to the Front National’s reach. After having announced after the first round that he 
would consider any result below 30% of the vote as a defeat for himself an for France, 
Le Pen’s vote share stagnated at 17,8% in the second round of the presidential 
elections. In no département did he gain more than 30% (see Mayer 2002: 363-384). 
Apparently, the dividing line between those ready to vote for the extreme right and 
those who are not runs deep. At the same time, the RPR/UMP’s relatively libertarian-
universalistic profile in the 2002 presidential contest seems quite inappropriate in 
containing the Front National’s rise. To a certain degree, the Front National and the 
Gaullists mobilize according to a similar cultural logic. The RPR/UMP’s position thus 
stands in sharp contrast to the comparatively traditionalist-communitarian position of 
the its followers, even if they are far less extreme than those voting for the populist 
right. If the established right maintains this profile, it thus risks leaving the entire 
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Within the countries studied in this book, Switzerland stands for a case in which an 
established party has mobilized and absorbed the political potentials related to the 
new cultural conflicts that have emerged since the 1960s. In the course of this process, 
the Swiss People’s Party has undergone a transformation from a conservative agrarian 
party to an extreme right-wing populist party. As already demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
both the party’s programmatic profile, as well as its position relative to the other 
parties closely correspond to those of other members of the right-wing populist party 
family. In fact, most studies of the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, 
SVP) converge in their assessment that the party has undergone a profound 
transformation as a result of the radicalization of its discourse, which centres on the 
preservation of Swiss traditions against the challenges of immigration and 
supranational integration in the European Union (Skenderovic 2005, Mazzoleni 2003, 
Kitschelt and McGann 2003, McGann and Kitschelt 2005). In this process, Christoph 
Blocher, the charismatic leader of the party’s section in the canton of Zurich, 
managed first to dominate his regional section and then the national party 
organization. Apart from curbing internal pluralism and adopting a hierarchical 
internal structure, the party also began practicing an aggressive style of campaigning 
that denounced the established parties of forming an elite cartel by disregarding the 
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will of the people regarding immigration policy and Switzerland’s involvement in 
international organizations. Consequently, and as this Chapter will document in more 
detail, the SVP fulfils the three criteria used to distinguish members of the right-wing 
populist party family presented in Chapter 2. 
At the same time, the question of Switzerland’s relationship to the European Union 
has played a central role in the SVP’s mobilization, and has catalyzed a polarization 
of positions along the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian line of 
conflict. In fact, the cultural line of conflict in the Swiss Party System is frequently 
characterized as an opposition between “openness” to the world and a traditionalist or 
nationalist “closure” (Hardmeier, Vatter 2003, Brunner, Sciarini 2002, Kriesi et al. 
2005). The centrality of the European integration issue put in evidence in models 
explaining the support for the SVP (Kriesi et al. 2005, Kitschelt, McGann 2003, 
McGann, Kitschelt 2005, Holzer, Linder 2003) of course raises the question whether 
its voters really hold the anti-universalistic and exclusionist conceptions of 
community that are characteristic of right-wing populist supporters. One of the main 
hypotheses I seek to substantiate in this chapter is that the SVP voters’ attitudinal 
pattern closely corresponds to that exhibited by other supporters of the populist right 
across Western Europe. However, tying the rather diffuse anti-universalistic potential 
to the important issue of how Switzerland should define its position regarding 
European integration has facilitated the mobilization of the traditionalist-communi-
tarian potential and is therefore central for explaining the SVP’s ascendancy.  
As a result of the mobilization of the libertarian and of the traditionalist-
exclusionist potentials by two major political actors, Switzerland represents a case in 
which the new cultural conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s have resulted first in a 
transformation of the Social Democratic party on the left and then of an established 
conservative party on the right. However, even if there was a delay in the 
manifestation of an ideological counter-pole to the New Left, the forces pushing 
towards the transformation of the SVP have already been present within the party in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s (Skenderovic 2005: 213-6). It is the Blocher wing’s 
“long march through the institutions” of the national party structure that explains the 
delayed emergence of a successful and united traditionalist-communitarian counter-
pole to the libertarian-universalistic conceptions of the New Left. Since the 1970s and 
especially in the 1980s, various newly founded extreme right parties had emerged in 
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the political space in which the SVP later thrived. However, marked by fragmentation 
and lacking charismatic leaders, their electoral support culminated and came to a halt 
in 1991. Having a more powerful organization and helped by a charismatic leader, the 
SVP succeeded in absorbing the more narrow extreme right potential into a broader 
movement of the New Right that relegated the various smaller parties to an ephemeral 
phenomenon. 
The analysis presented in this chapter reveals that while the political potentials 
related to the new cultural divide were present early on, the established parties were 
slow to respond to the transformation of the traditional cultural dimension in the 
1970s. New parties emerged both on the left and on the right, leading to a 
fragmentation of the traditionally stable Swiss party system. The SVP’s rise in the 
1990s then marks an adjustment process in the party system that has strongly affected 
the balance of power and its mechanics. In the course of this transformation, the 
parties situated at the poles of the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-
communitarian dimension of conflict, the Social Democrats and the SVP, have grown, 
mainly at the expense of the smaller parties of the extreme left and the extreme right, 
but also of the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Democrats. Switzerland then 
represents a case in which, despite a profound transformation of the patterns of 
opposition in the party system, the traditional parties have to a large degree absorbed 
the new cultural conflict.  
This chapter is organized as follows. I start by discussing the forces that have 
traditionally shaped the Swiss party system and elaborate on the recent changes 
touched upon in this introduction. The empirical analysis starts by determining the 
lines of opposition structuring party competition in the national elections of 1975, 
1991, 1995 and 1999. Applying the research strategy set out in Chapter 5, I then 
investigate the patterns of opposition and the interaction between parties’ 
programmatic stances and their voters’ preferences along the economic, cultural, and 
European integration dimensions. The technical procedures and their theoretical 
justification have been explained in Chapter 5, I only make reference to the 
peculiarities of the Swiss analysis in presenting the results. Due to a lack of 
appropriate survey data, only a partial analysis of the 1991 election is possible. In the 
fourth section, I turn to the role the three dimensions investigated play in structuring 
voting decisions. Finally, I analyse the class and educational basis of support for the 
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SVP. Having discussed some of the grievances resulting from the processes of 
economic modernization in the past, the first aim of this analysis is to determine 
whether there is a social-structural component to the party’s success. The second aim 
is to verify how diverging SVP voters’ preferences are regarding the traditional state-
market conflict. This has important consequences for the vulnerability of the populist 
right, should economic conflicts regain centre stage. 
 
 
From Stability to Instability and Back: The Evolution of the Swiss Party 
System and the Rise of the Swiss People’s Party 
 
Traditional cleavages and the rise of new parties in the 1970s and 1980s 
 
Contrary to the French case, the rise of the populist right in Switzerland took place 
within a party system that has been renown for its stability. Historically, the liberal-
religious, the agrarian-industrial and the state-market cleavages had all led to the 
formation of political parties and subsequently shaped the party system over decades. 
In the 1970s, the religious cleavage was still stronger than the class cleavage, as 
Lijphart’s (1979) analysis showed. At the same time, it is important to note that the 
conflict mirrored by this cleavage is not the same in all canton, which in turn is a 
prime factor in accounting for the existence of different cantonal party systems. The 
Christian Democrats (CVP) and their forerunners have traditionally represented two 
different antagonisms, depending on the context. In the predominantly protestant 
cantons it has gathered the support of the catholic minority, while it reflects a conflict 
between religious and laicist citizens in the catholic cantons. In these cantons, the left 
has remained unsuccessful until recently, and with the Liberal Democrats and the 
Christian Democrats being the predominant parties, the latter have also represented 
voters with leftist economic views. The patterns of party competition therefore vary 
markedly from canton to canton, and it is customary to speak of different cantonal 
party systems (Klöti 1998, Kriesi 1998, Ladner 2004). This will be relevant later on 
for the assignments of the parties to the ideological blocks formed by the class 
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cleavage. Historically, Switzerland was a country in which liberalism was hegemonic 
(Luebbert 1991), which resulted in a late and weak mobilization of the left and 
secured the Liberal Democrats – and the Liberal Party in the French-speaking cantons 
– a much stronger role than in most continental European countries. However, in the 
1990s, the Liberals were overtaken first by the Social Democrats (SP) and then by the 
SVP as a consequence of the growing prominence of the libertarian-universalistic vs. 
traditionalist-communitarian line of conflict. 
Apart from the class and religious cleavages that characterize all Western Euro-
pean countries, the existence of an agrarian party, the predecessor of the SVP, is a 
characteristic Switzerland shares with the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands 
(Rokkan 2000: 397-404). Founded in 1936 as the Farmers’, Artisans’ and Citizen’s 
party (Bauern-, Gewerbe- und Bürgerpartei, BGB), it was rooted in the protestant 
German-speaking cantons, and changed its name to Swiss People’s Party (Schweiz-
erische Volkspartei, SVP) in 1971. Represented in the national Executive Council, it 
has been a junior partner in the government coalition whose composition has 
remained unchanged between 1959 and 2003 (the so-called “magic formula”). The 
permanent representation of the four major parties in government – the Social 
Democrats, the Liberal Democrats, the Christian Democrats and the SVP – 
guaranteed the consensual style of politics of which Switzerland represents the model 
(Lijphart 1999). 
Since the late 1960s, however, new political parties have emerged both to the left 
of the social democrats and on the extreme right. Those of the extreme left have 
gradually been absorbed by the Social Democrats and the Ecologists, the latter 
integrating a diverse number of green parties that emerged in the 1970s and the 1980s 
(Ladner 1999). The oldest party on the extreme right is the National Action (NA), 
which rose to prominence in the 1970s by launching three popular initiatives against 
foreign “overpopulation”. Although they were all defeated, the popular support for the 
first initiative, which gained of 46% of the vote in 1970, early on brought to the fore a 
xenophobic political potential. Anti-immigrant mobilization in the 1970s was 
intimately tied to the name of James Schwarzenbach, a charismatic and disputatious 
politician who vindicated a traditional Christian and rural Swiss identity (Müller 
2005). However, support for the party, which changed its name to Swiss Democrats 
later on, peaked at 3.3% of the vote. Combining anti-immigrant, ecological and social 
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concerns, it can be taken to represent a classical extreme right tendency (Gentile, 
Kriesi 1998: 126). In 1985, the Swiss Automobilist Party was founded as a reaction 
against ecologist and socialist successes. Taking on a broader extreme right agenda, it 
combined anti-immigration with free market and anti-statist appeals and thus followed 
Kitschelt’s (1995) model of a New Radical Right party (see Skenderovic 2005: Ch. 
5). However, similar to the Swiss Democrats, it reached the height of its support in the 
1991 election, where it received around 5% of the vote, and has steadily declined 
since then. Support for other extreme right parties has generally been negligible, but it 
is noteworthy that the Lega dei Ticinesi immediately after its founding gained almost 
a quarter of the vote in the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland in 1991. Although a 
right-wing populist party in profile and style, the Lega is a special case because it is at 
the same time a regionalist party. Overall support for the extreme right peaked in 




Figure 7.1: Voter shares of the major parties and party blocks, 1975-2003 (in percent) 
Legend: svp: Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People’s Party); sp: Social Democrats; lib: Liberal 
Democrats and Liberal Party; cvp/ldu: various Christian Democrat parties, Landesring der 
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The transformation of the Swiss People’s Party and the rise of the new cultural divide 
 
In the 1970s, after the social groups constituting the SVP’s core support base – 
farmers and rural inhabitants – had diminished in strength, the party sought to attract 
new voters, pursuing a rather centrist political strategy (Ladner 1999: 231, 
Skenderovic 2005: 212-3). However, this moderate programmatic profile did not 
result in electoral gains. Furthermore, it clashed with the more conservative ethos of 
the party’s Zurich wing. As a reaction to this strategy, the Zurich section of the party, 
under the leadership of Christoph Blocher, started pushing for a more polarizing 
strategy already in the late 1970s, staunchly defending traditionalist values. Blocher’s 
anti-intellectualism as well as his earlier active opposition against the 1968 student 
movement underline the anti-libertarian or anti-universalistic thrust that nourishes 
right-wing populist mobilization in Switzerland. Anti-immigration stances, on the 
other hand, do not seem to have played a role within the SVP at this point.  
In the years that followed, Blocher’s Zurich section of the party underwent a 
process of transformation, taking on the characteristics that distinguish right-wing 
populist parties from mainstream parties in organizational and rhetorical terms, 
namely (i) a hierarchical internal organization and (ii) an aggressive anti-establish-
ment discourse (see Chapter 2). The party not only became more professionalized, but 
also more centralized and hierarchical or even authoritarian, according to Skenderovic 
(2005: 243). Programmatic decisions were taken by a small circle of high-ranking 
party officials. The Zurich section also “invented” the aggressive anti-establishment 
campaigning style that was later adopted by the national party organization and the 
other cantonal sections (see Kriesi et al. 2005 for illustrative examples).  
Apart from the SVP’s growing electoral support in the canton of Zurich, displacing 
the Bern section that had traditionally dominated the national party organization by 
virtue of its electoral strength, the growing influence of the Blocherite wing on the 
national party organization was achieved by the success of two campaigns that 
touched upon the virulent question of Switzerland’s relationship to Europe and the 
world. In 1986, it led the successful campaign against Switzerland’s adherence to the 
United Nations. Then, in 1992, Blocher was the leading proponent of the campaign 
against participation in the European Economic Area, which was also defeated in a 
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popular vote and set the course for Switzerland’s standing aloof of the European 
Union. Because the Bern wing, whose proponents traditionally represented the party 
in the federal government, had supported the rapprochement to Europe, the defeat of 
the proposal further strengthened Blocher’s position in the party and allowed him 
gradually to dominate the national party organization. Subsequently, there were 
numerous examples of politicians who did not agree with the new party line and either 
voluntarily left the party or were forced to leave. Since the late 1980s, the Zurich 
wing also succeeded in putting the asylum question on the national agenda, promoting 
tough stances against “fake” and criminal asylum seekers. 
Although some dissent remains concerning the proper labelling of the SVP, most 
recent studies of the party agree that its ideological profile corresponds to that of a 
right-wing populist party (McGann and Kitschelt 2005, Mazzoleni 2003, Skenderovic 
2005, Kriesi et al. 2005). However, it is important to note that establishing a 
hierarchical party structure is not conterminous to a weak organization. Similarly to 
the Front National in France, the SVP has a rich array of affiliated organizations, such 
as youth sections of the party and civil society organizations. Prominent among these 
is the Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland (Aktion für eine 
unabhängige und neutrale Schweiz, AUNS), co-founded by Blocher after the UN vote 
in 1986. As a consequence of the SVP’s transformation, and of its superior 
organizational strength, the smaller parties of the extreme right have found their 
mobilization space tightly constrained. Divided into rival parties, and competing with 
a better funded party with a charismatic leader, the electoral fate of the extreme right 
parties was dull. After their high in 1991, they virtually collapsed under the 
mobilization efforts of the SVP, as Figure 7.1 shows. The empirical analysis will 
therefore substantiate the double claim that (i) the SVP’s transformation resulted in a 
programmatic convergence with the parties of the extreme right, and (ii) that the 
voters of these parties and the followers of the SVP have similar orientations 
regarding the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian divide.  
The Social Democrats and the Environmentalists having absorbed the various 
splinter parties of the left, and the SVP having supplanted the parties of the extreme 
right, the established parties have reversed the trend towards party system 
fragmentation. But the organizational continuity of the parties should not mask the 
profound transformation in the patterns of interaction and in the balance of power in 
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the party system. In line with Kitschelt’s (1994) argument, the left, under the 
influence of the New Social Movements of the 1970s, has shifted its emphasis from 
economic to cultural issues. While remaining economically leftist, it has put heavy 
emphasis on enforcing culturally liberal or universalistic social values. On the other 
hand, the SVP has succeeded in mobilizing all those who oppose the challenge to 
traditional values and the forces that erode some of the distinctive traits of Swiss 
culture, such as the myth of national autonomy and neutrality. In the 1990s, the 
parties lying at the poles of this new cultural divide have grown steadily. While the 
SVP has become the strongest party in 1999, the Social Democrats have recovered 
from their losses in the 1980s, despite the competition they face from the Ecologists 
within their own camp. The losers of the transformation of the cultural divide, in other 
words, are the parties of the centrist block, namely, the Christian Democrats and the 
Liberals (see Figure 7.1). Certainly, the erosion of the formers’ support base must also 
be seen in the context of the waning of the traditional religious cleavage (Lachat 
2004: 71-3). As a consequence of these shifts in party strength, Christoph Blocher has 
gained a seat in the federal council at the expense of the Christian Democrats after the 
2003 parliamentary elections. In the seven-seat council, the SVP, the FDP, the SP 
now each hold two seats, while the CVP must content itself with one. But the Liberal 
Democrats are also under pressure, and their decline – albeit less pronounced – more 
intimately reflects their difficulties in finding a coherent strategy vis-à-vis their 
challenger.  
The mobilization of this conflict has also led to a homogenisation of the conflicts 
structuring party competition in the cantonal party systems, which have remained less 
nationalized than in other countries until recently (Armingeon 1998, Caramani 2004). 
By means of its modern style of campaigning, the SVP has drawn attention to its 
political agenda throughout the country and has expanded its reach to the catholic and 
French-speaking cantons in which it had no historical roots (Kriesi et al. 2005). 
Consequently, it has been the driving force of a “nationalization” of the national party 
system and a more confrontational political style in Swiss politics (Kriesi 2005: 6). 
An analysis of the SVP’s development between 1995 and 2003 shows that the party’s 
potential – the share of people considering the possibility of voting for it – has 
remained constant, and that its growth from a share of 14.9% of the vote in 1995 to 
26.7% in 2003 is largely due to its ability in actually mobilizing this potential (Kriesi 
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et al. 2005). The strategy of permanent campaigning, the party’s professional style, 
and the charisma of Christoph Blocher have, in other words, played a decisive role in 
the success of the populist right in Switzerland. 
 
Political potentials underlying the rise of the SVP 
 
As pointed out earlier on, the immigration question has been on the political agenda 
for a long time in Switzerland. In other words, just as we have seen in France, the rise 
of an anti-immigrant party cannot be attributed to rising levels of xenophobia. In fact, 
attitudes towards foreigners have in general become more favourable in Switzerland 
between the 1960s and the 1990s (Stolz 2001). The crucial point therefore is whether 
or not exclusionist attitudes are mobilized and politically articulated by political 
parties. Because of the openness of the Swiss political system due to its direct 
democratic institutions, the immigration question surfaced earlier than in other 
countries, but this did not yet lead to an immediate articulation of the issue at the 
party level. In fact, when the populace voted on three popular initiatives seeking to 
limit the number of foreigners and expelling part of those already living in 
Switzerland in the 1970s, the established parties unanimously rejected the proposals. 
As the empirical analysis will show, party oppositions at this time were still structured 
by an older cultural antagonism, but it can also be shown that the political potentials 
underlying the new cultural line of conflict were already present. 
Apart from the role of political agency in articulating latent political potentials, 
which I have discussed in Chapter 3, my framework suggests that established loyalties 
crosscutting latent identity categories condition the emergence of new group 
divisions. Hence, the saliency of the class and religious cleavages is likely to have 
limited the room for the mobilization of broad ethnicity-based identities in the post-
war years. However, the comparatively strong mobilization of the left-wing New 
Social Movements of the 1970s and 1980s in Switzerland (Koopmans, Kriesi 1995), 
and the subsequent shift from economic to cultural issues on the part of the parties of 
the left is likely to have weakened the group attachments underlying the traditional 
class cleavage. As Hug and Trechsel (2002) show, the influence of the religious 
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cleavage, and to a lesser degree also the traditional class cleavage in structuring 
electoral alignments have diminished, especially in the 1990s. 
Because conflict is a precondition to collective identity formation, as argued in 
Chapter 4, the wide diffusion of libertarian-universalistic values expressed by the 
strong mobilization of the New Social Movements also suggests a strong potential for 
a counter-mobilization by New Right actors. At the same time, the rise of the 
transformed SVP owes a lot to the salience of the conflict over the country’s 
relationship to the European Union. At a theoretical level, the question of European 
integration is of course tightly related to the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-
communitarian divide, as I have claimed in Chapter 1. To the degree that the question 
is framed in cultural, and not in economic terms, supranational integration clashes not 
only with the “traditional” national community that citizens holding traditionalist-
communitarian values deem necessary to preserve, but also with the postulate of the 
primacy of (national) politics. By tying up to the forceful Swiss myths of national 
independence, regional autonomy and the instruments of direct citizen participation, 
resistance to the EU provides a powerful frame for what I have called the political 
logic of right-wing populist parties’ mobilization in Chapters 1 and 2.  
At the empirical level, orientations towards the European Union and the emphasis 
laid on national autonomy have been shown to be strong components of a broader and 
highly salient cultural divide structuring belief systems in Switzerland (Brunner, 
Sciarini 2002). Indeed, this has led these and a number of other authors to characterize 
the cultural conflict as one between “integration” and “demarcation” (Kriesi 1993b, 
Hug, Trechsel 2002, Hug, Sciarini 2002, Hardmeier, Vatter 2003, Kriesi, Sciarini 
2004, Bornschier, Helbling 2005). While not questioning the plausibility of this label, 
one of the central aims of this chapter is to elucidate to which degree the integration-
demarcation divide represents a Swiss idiosyncrasy or is in fact a variant of the more 
general divide detectable also in other countries. My hypothesis is that the European 
integration issue has catalyzed the formation of a New Right collective identity, but 
that the underlying potentials and political orientations closely mirror those of citizens 
located at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural divide in other 
countries. 
At the political and rhetorical level, all the major parties’ approved the participa-
tion in the European Economic Area in the 1992 referendum. This made the European 
208 Chapter 7 
issue a highly promising vehicle for a right-wing populist anti-establishment 
discourse. The SVP could denounce the established parties not only of “selling out” 
Swiss identity, but also of forming a cartel based on an elitist consensus that was not 
backed by a majority of the population. At a more general level, the collusive 
arrangements typical of consensus democracies make an anti-establishment discourse 
appear promising for outsiders. If there is something as a cartel of established parties, 
then it must look similar to an informally institutionalized grand coalition encom-
passing all the major parties. Although the SVP has traditionally been represented in 
the Executive Council, the federalist party structure made it possible for the Zurich 
section to play the oppositional card while the more moderate Bern wing was in 
government. In this sense, territorially fragmented party systems seem to leave “room 
for experimentation with the mobilization of new issues”, as Kriesi (2007) argues, 
testified also by the case of the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria.  
Due to the cultural polarization brought about by the mobilization of libertarian-
universalistic issues, and by the prominent role played by European integration 
throughout the 1990s, we can expect the SVP’s rise to be primarily associated with 
cultural potentials as well as by the political potentials amenable to an anti-
establishment discourse. Economic grievances, on the other hand, have presumably 
played a more moderate role than elsewhere, among other reasons due to low levels of 
unemployment. Due to its tradition of world-market openness, Switzerland has been 
less pressed to adapt its economic model to the more competitive international 
environment than elsewhere in Europe, as Bonoli and Mach (2000) point out. 
However, meagre growth levels and rising levels of unemployment in the 1990s – 
albeit low in comparison with the neighbouring European countries – have contrib-
uted to a general perception that reform was needed (Bonoli, Mach 2000, Lachat 
2007). Because we know that perceptions of job insecurity can be more important 
than the immediate threats (Mughan et al. 2003), the gloomy mood of the 1990s, 
supported by important measures at liberalizing the economy, may well have caused 
economic grievances that a right-wing populist party might thrive upon. 
At the same time, a dualism exists in the Swiss economy of an internationally 
competitive and a sheltered sector, characteristic also of other small open economies 
(Katzenstein 1985). Certain sectors of the economy thus risk being exposed to 
competitive pressure if Switzerland were to join the EU and have already come under 
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pressure as a result of the WTO agreements and the bilateral agreements between 
Switzerland and the EU, which were negotiated after the defeat of the European 
Economic Area project (Mach, Häusermann, Papadopoulos 2003). Because certain 
segments of the workforce risk to loose from a closer integration with the European 
Union, opposition against the European Union in part may reflect not only cultural 
perceptions of threat, but also economic fears. Unfortunately, however, the survey 
data available in Switzerland does not permit a separate measurement of the cultural 
and economic components of citizens’ orientations towards the EU, which proved 
illuminating in the analysis of the French case. 
While the SVP clearly mobilizes all those who oppose European integration for 
whatever reasons, its programmatic stance concerning the state-market divide does 
not appear very suitable to mobilize the losers of economic modernization, namely, 
workers with low levels of skills, and more specifically in the Swiss case, those 
employed in hitherto sheltered sectors. The party’s harsh anti-state discourse and its 
appeal to self-responsibility generally make its position appear quite neo-liberal in the 
media, as the analysis will show, and it is rather implausible that modernization losers 
should endorse such policies. But the SVP’s strategy in the economic domain is much 
more ambiguous than it may seem. Once in parliament, the party’s elected 
representatives do not follow a very market-liberal ideology, but, quite to the 
contrary, often vote against market liberalizing reforms (Häusermann 2003). More 
specifically, while they support a feebly regulated labour market, they are 
protectionist as far as general market liberalization is concerned, and especially 
regarding agriculture policies (Bernhard 2004). Given that farmers are one of the 
party’s traditional core constituencies, this latter point is not very surprising. But even 
at a more general level, this evidence suggests that the SVP does in fact protect those 
branches of economic activity that have been sheltered both from international 
competition, as well as from inter-cantonal competition within the country. At a 
rhetorical level, however, this policy is framed less in terms of the state-market 
cleavage than by opposing EU membership as well as too far-reaching concessions in 
the negotiations over the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU. The 
ensuing analyses will probe further into these hypotheses, taking into account also 
how well the SVP represents its voters along central dimensions of conflict in the 
Swiss Party system.  
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The Configuration of Parties’ Political Space and Resulting  
Dimensions of Opposition 
 
The first step in the analysis is to determine which dimensions of opposition were 
relevant in the election campaigns under study. Figure 7.2 presents the results of the 
MDS-Analyses of the parties’ programmatic offer, using the procedures explained in 
Chapter 5. In the mid-1970s as well as in the 1990s, Swiss political space is two-
dimensional, although the two dimensions cross-cut one another to varying degrees.1 
One of these dimensions is characterized by an opposition between support for the 
welfare state and economic liberalism, corresponding to the traditional state-market 
cleavage. In 1975, polarization around the economic divide was not particularly high, 
and the parties diverge more along the vertical than the horizontal dimension. In the 
later years, however, the two issues constituting the state-market cleavage exhibit a 
very high degree of polarization. In other words, the traditional class cleavage remains 
salient in Swiss politics. 
The cultural dimension in 1975 reflects a libertarian-authoritarian divide. It evolves 
around the issues put on the agenda by the New Left and challenging traditional 
values on the one hand, and law and order statements on the other hand. The Social 
Democrats and the Christian Democrats lie fairly near to one another at the 
libertarian-universalistic pole of this divide, while the Liberals and the “old” SVP are 
situated far away from cultural liberalism and near to law and order stances. The 
small parties of the extreme right combine a rather leftist economic stance with an 
anti-universalistic position. A decade and a half later, in the 1991 election, two new 
polarizing issues have appeared: European integration and immigration, the latter 
being situated close to support for the army. In line with a New Left position, the 
Social Democrats combine a leftist economic stance with a strong advocacy of the 
universalistic values embodied in cultural liberalism, and also show the strongest 
support for European integration. At the other extreme, the SVP’s position is now 
closest to that of the smaller parties of the extreme right as a consequence of the 
party’s transformation. As in 1975, it strongly opposes cultural liberalism, but this 
                                                






























































Figure 7.2: Political Space in Switzerland, 1975-1999. Positions of parties and issue-categories
Legend: svp: Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People’s Party); exr: various extreme right parties; lib: Liberal Democrats, Liberal Party; cvp: christian democrat parties, 
Landesring der Unabhängigen (Alliance of Independents); sp: Social Democrats; ecolo: Greens, ecologist parties; exl: various extreme left parties 
212 Chapter 7 
profile is now coupled with a fervent opposition to European integration and to the 
immigration of foreigners. Between the poles lie the parties of the established right. 
Their position with regard to the cultural dimension is somewhat variable, testifying 
their difficulty in defining their stance regarding the new antagonism. Finally, the 
Ecologists in 1991 differ from the position these parties typically take in other 
countries. Although they are not far away from cultural liberalism, they oppose both 
European integration and tough stances against foreigners, and are located far away 
from the other parties. The Ecologists’ position is partially responsible for the shifting 
make-up of the dimension cross-cutting the economic divide.  
In the early 1990s, the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian 
divide has indeed materialized, but it runs parallel to the state-market cleavage, while 
the cross-cutting dimension evolves around European integration and traditionalist-
communitarian stances. In 1995, then, when the Ecologists have rallied behind 
rapprochement to the EU, support for supranational integration becomes clearly 
associated with cultural liberalism, while anti-immigrant and pro-army positions form 
the opposing pole. Finally, in 1999, Europe is closely associated with a welfare statist 
position. The libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian divide does 
form a second dimension, but it is strongly correlated with the state-market divide. In 
other words, in this last election, the configuration tends to become one-dimensional. 
This is partially due to the fact that the parties situated at the poles of the cultural 
antagonism also occupy the poles of the economic divide. This is an interesting 
finding for a multi-party system, and reflects the transformation of the cultural divide 
from an antagonism traditionally carrying the stamp of the religious cleavage, to a 
conflict evolving around different conceptions of community, where the New Left and 
the populist right now take the extreme positions.  
For the subsequent analyses, it is necessary to define the dimensions along which 
the positions of the parties and their voters are to be compared. Having found the 
familiar opposition between welfare and economic liberalism in all four elections, the 
case is straightforward regarding the economic divide. Turing to the cultural divide, 
the matter is again clear for the election of 1975, where an antagonism between 
cultural liberalism and security emerges quite clearly that makes sense theoretically. 
Choosing the relevant categories in the 1990s is not as unambiguous a task in the light 
of the shifting patterns of cultural opposition. Immigration and army both consistently 
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form one pole of the cultural line of opposition, but the varying degrees of association 
between cultural liberalism and European integration suggest that the latter two issues 
should be kept apart. Furthermore, since one of the central aims of this analysis is to 
establish to which degree cultural oppositions in Switzerland differ from those found 
in the other countries, I measure the cultural dimension of the 1990s using the same 
categories as in the other countries, namely cultural liberalism and immigration. From 
a theoretical point of view, this antagonism is closest to the libertarian-universalistic 
vs. traditionalist-communitarian divide. Because support for the army in 1991 and 
1995 empirically emerges as intimately related to anti-immigration stances and in 
1991 could even be considered to constitute the pole of the cultural divide, I use both 
issue army and immigration to establish positions in those years.
2
 Performing an 
additional analysis of the European integration issue, it will be possible to establish 
the congruence between positions along the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-
communitarian and the EU-divide.  
Table 7.1 shows which of these categories can be operationalized on the voter side 
using post-election surveys. Most surveys make possible the operationalization of the 
relevant categories, the exception being the 1991 survey, which contains so few issue-
related questions that none of the dimensions can be measured. The following 
analyses will therefore focus on the elections of 1975, 1995, and 1999. With respect 
to European integration, the information provided by the surveys is actually better 
than what we have from the media analysis. Due to limitations in the information 
available for the supply side, a direct comparison of the positions of the parties and 
their electorates is only possible for the 1995 election. However, it proves quite 
illuminating to position voters along the EU-dimension in 1975, way before 
integration became a political issue, as we shall see. Having operationalized the issue 




                                                
2  In 1999, the category emerges as polarizing as well, but this is mainly due to the SVP’s strong 
appraisal of the army, while most parties do not address the issue at all. For this reason and because 
army is no longer intimately related to immigration, I do not use positions regarding the army for the 
construction of the cultural divide in 1999.  
3  For theoretical reasons, I expect that a single factor will result from these analyses, because the 
corresponding issue categories should be part of the same underlying dimension. In general, this 
expectation is corroborated. There is one exception, occurring when integrating the three categories 
used for the cultural dimension in 1975. Already in constructing the underlying cultural liberalism 
category, two factors emerged, of which one is closer to cultural liberalism, while the other 
measures traditional values (see Appendix C). In the subsequent factor analysis used to measure the 
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Table 7.1: Relevant issue-categories per election and those operationalized on the 
demand side 
 Economic dimension Cultural dimension  European integration dimension 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Security    Europe 
1975  X X 2 dim. X   X 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Immigr  Army  Europe  
1991 – – – – –  – 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Immigr  Army  Europe 
1995 X – X X X  X 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Immigr    Europe 
1999 X X X X   X 
 
Note: X denotes that one dimension emerges from the factor analysis. In one case, the solution is two-
dimensional (“2 dim.”), and both underlying variables are used for the construction of the axis. See 




Parties and Voters on the Cultural Divide 
 
Position, match, and polarization 
 
Beginning with the cultural divide, I now track the positions of the parties and their 
electorates and verify how well political supply and demand match along this 
changing antagonism. The results of the analysis are presented in Figure 7.3 in spatial 
form, together with the measures for polarization and match. Starting the discussion in 
1975, it is quite striking that while the parties take rather divergent positions regarding 
the libertarian-traditionalism divide, the positions of their voters hardly differ from 
one another. On the party side, we can see that the Social Democrats are located at the 
libertarian-universalistic pole of the divide, but the CVP is not very far off. The 
opposing pole is constituted by the parties of the extreme left and the extreme right. 
The SVP, on the other hand, has a centrist position close to that of the Liberals, and 
                                                                                                                                       
cultural dimension, traditional values prove to be related to security-concerns, while cultural 
liberalism forms a second factor. However, because the Eigenvalue of the second factor is only 
1.00003, it seems reasonable to perform a factor analysis in which a one-dimensional solution is 
enforced.  




1975: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (6 parties): 0.19 






1991: only parties 






1995: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (6 parties): 0.96 






1999: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (4 parties): 0.98 
polarization parties: 0.60 | without SVP: 0.58 
 
Figure 7.3: Parties and voters on the cultural divide in Switzerland, 1975-1999. 
position, match, and polarization 
Legend: see Figure 7.2 
216 Chapter 7 
the same holds true for its voters. Traditionally, the SVP had been a conservative 
party, but the results shown here mirror the assessment found in the literature that the 
party pursued a centrist strategy in the 1970s. Overall, the cultural conflict articulated 
by the party system does not correspond to equally strong differences in orientations 
in the electorate. The strong mismatch between parties and their voters – and reflected 
in a low correlation – also derives from differences in the ordering of parties and their 
voters, of which the extreme left is the most obvious case.  
The reconfiguration of party oppositions along the cultural dimension comes in 
two steps. In 1991, after the immigration issue has become salient, this dimension no 
longer reflects a libertarian-authoritarian divide, but is more intimately related to 
differing conceptions of community. The overall polarization of the party system has 
risen, and the SVP has taken a step into more traditionalist-communitarian terrain. 
However, the SVP is not the right-most party, but lies between the Liberals and the 
extreme right. In a second major change taking place between 1991 and 1995, the 
SVP moves to the extreme of the dimension, outdistancing the smaller extreme right 
parties. The latter’s position is put in brackets, indicating (as always in these figures) 
that we have captured less than ten statements from them concerning this dimension, 
which mirrors the fact that they have received far less media attention. The 1999 
election confirms the pattern established four years earlier, and also sees polarization 
rise once more. This is also due to the Social Democrats’ moving closer to the 
libertarian-universalistic pole which results in a rising divide between the parties of 
the left and the centre-right. 
As far as the voters are concerned, their relative positions closely correspond to the 
stances taken by their parties, resulting in extraordinarily high measures of the match 
in positions. Voters’ positions are much more polarized along the cultural dimension 
than they used to be in 1975, and we find similar ideological blocks on the supply and 
on the demand side. The first is a left-libertarian block, constituted by the SP, the 
Ecologists and the extreme left, all of which take a decidedly libertarian-universalistic 
position. At the other extreme lie the voters of the SVP, which are located close to 
those of the smaller extreme right parties in 1995 and actually outflank them by far 
four years later. In between lies a centre-block formed by the Liberal and Christian 
Democrats. These two parties have moved together between 1991 and 1995, and the 
same holds true for their voters. In 1995, there is still some overlap between the 
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programmatic statements of these parties and the left-libertarian block. This is 
indicated by the bars showing the spread of programmatic statements (in the case of 
parties) and individual orientations (in the case of voters). However, on the voter side, 
the divide between the left-libertarian and the centre-right block clearly runs deepest, 
and in 1999, the parties have moved apart as well. On the other hand, an opposing 
development is discernible regarding the divide between the centre-right and the 
extreme right block. In 1995, the centre block’s statements hardly overlap with those 
of the SVP. In 1999, however, as the distance between the left and the centre-parties 
widens, the latter and the SVP have moved together.  
On the voter side, there was already more affinity in 1995 between those who 
voted for the SVP and those who chose the Liberals than their respective parties’ 
positions would lead us to expect. The move to the right performed by the centre-right 
therefore seems to reflect their fear of losing parts of their own electorate to the 
populist right. This danger could be real: Between 1995 and 1999, SVP voters’ 
cultural orientations have become more heterogeneous, which may reflect the inflow 
of less extreme voters into the SVP’s electoral pool. The analysis of the stability of 
alignments will further investigate this hypothesis. 
All in all, these results show that both the SVP, as well as its voters clearly lie at 
the extreme of the cultural dimension running from libertarian-universalistic to 
traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community. In this sense, the results 
closely parallel those concerning the Front National in France. In other words, the 
potentials underlying the SVP’s successful mobilization are by no means solely 
related to opposition against the country joining the European Union. Both the 
average position of the SVP’s electorate along the cultural line of opposition, as well 
as the relative homogeneity of these voters’ orientations – albeit more pronounced in 
1995 than in 1999 – shows that the party rallies a group of citizens who stand out for 
their exclusionist conception of community and their opposition to universalistic 
values. Nonetheless, it is plausible to suppose that the European issue has catalysed 
the rise of this new cultural antagonism, a hypothesis that will be addressed later on.  
Before turning to the loyalties that the three ideological blocks along the cultural 
divide entail, an intriguing question remains: Is the increasing polarization along this 
divide solely a product of the mobilization efforts of political parties – first the 
smaller extreme right parties and then the SVP – or did the corresponding potential in 
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some way already exist on the voter side? Luckily, the items contained in the 1975 
post-election survey allow an operationalization not only of the libertarian-
authoritarian divide that we have found to structure party oppositions in the 1970s, but 
also of the new cultural division of the 1990s. I start out by probing into the 
relationship between these old and new antagonisms. Table 7.2 presents the results of 
a factor analysis using the issues related to the old and new cultural divides (for a 
listing of the items used, see Appendix C). The results are quite striking in that they 
show orientations regarding the two dimensions to be clearly separated: The first 
factor emerging almost exclusively captures the new antagonism, centring around 
gender roles and solidarity with the third world (cultural liberalism) and the rights of 
immigrants (immigration). The second factor encompasses traditional moral values 
and patriotism (attitudes towards taking drugs and respect for the national flag), law 
and order stances, as well as support for the army. These results also underline the 
theoretically postulated connection between cultural liberalism and anti-immigration 
preferences. Although none of the established parties mobilized upon the immigration 
issue, the corresponding orientations are correlated with cultural liberalism at the 
individual level (r=0.37). 
 
Table 7.2:  Results of a rotated factor analysis of old and new cultural issues  
 in the Swiss 1975 survey 
 New cultural dimension Old cultural dimension 
Cultural liberalism 0.80 -0.01 
Immigration -0.79 0.15 
 
Army -0.23 0.79 
Traditional values -0.05 0.81 
Security (law and order) 0.32 0.59 
 
Eigenvalue 1.73 1.34 
Variance explained 34% 26% 
N  1062 
 
To determine how strongly the old and new cultural divides are related to party 
loyalties, the location of party electorates can be plotted in a two-dimensional political 
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space constituted by the two divides. Figure 7.4 reveals that the electorates of the left 
and centre-right parties diverge mainly along the horizontal dimension, which 
corresponds to the old cultural antagonism. Contrary to the prior analysis, this 
dimension also includes voters’ orientations regarding the army, and we can see that 
this results in their positions being somewhat more polarized. While the voters of the 
extreme right and the SVP lie at the extreme of this dimension, they hardly differ 
from the supporters of the Liberals. Much rather, the electorates of the SVP and the 
extreme right stand out for their position along the new cultural dimension, where 
their position is remarkably similar. These results illustrate two interesting points. 
First of all, as we have already seen, a traditionalist-communitarian political potential 
that was not really mobilized by the established parties existed already in the 1970s. 
Secondly, the SVP faced no trade-off in attempting to gain voters with such attitudes, 
since its traditional electorate already shared them to a large degree. The extra-
ordinary success of the SVP after its transformation then seems to result from its 
ability to hold on to its old clientele while gaining additional votes as a result of the 
rising prominence of the new cultural divide, and to absorbing the electorates of the 




Figure 7.4: Party electorates along the old and new cultural divides, 1975 
Legend: see Figure 7.2 
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disadvantages, being internally divided, lacking organizational capacity and 
resources, as well as the SVP’s charismatic leadership 
 
The stability of alignments along the cultural divide and resulting  
patterns of oppositions 
 
Having determined the content of oppositions and the positions of parties and voters 
along the cultural divide, the next task is now to investigate in how far the new 
cultural antagonism has led to durable alignments, making possible the application of 
the analytical schema developed in Chapter 4. From a theoretical point of view, two 
ideological blocks may be expected both on the left and on the right of the political 
spectrum along the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist communitarian divide, 
as discussed in Chapter 5. Three of these can actually be discerned in Switzerland, 
namely the New Left block, the traditional right and a New Right block. The division 
lacking is the one between Old Left and New Left. The Social Democrats, the 
Ecologists and the voters of the smaller extreme left parties can be considered part of 
the same left-libertarian block, given their unambiguous position at the libertarian-
universalistic pole of the divide.4 The centre-right block is formed by the Christian 
Democrat parties and the Liberals, which corresponds both to these parties’ stances, 
as well as to the position of their voters. Finally, an extreme right block is formed by 
the SVP and the smaller parties of the extreme right, of which the Swiss Democrats, 
the Automobilist/Freedom Party and the Lega dei Ticinesi have been the most 
important electorally.  
Figure 7.5 presents voters’ loyalties to the three ideological blocks along the 
cultural divide, using recall-questions from the surveys. Because the three blocks have 
not yet materialized, and because the 1975 survey does not feature a recall-question, 
the analysis starts in 1991. As the figure reveals, the extreme populist right block in 
general exhibits the highest levels of loyalties. Between 75 and 79% of those who 
declare having voted for one of the parties in this block four years before have done 
so again. At the beginning of the period under study, loyalties to the centre-right block 
                                                
4  Admittedly, in the 1975 campaign, the extreme left appears at the authoritarian pole of the 
libertarian-authoritarian antagonism, close to the extreme right. However, extreme left voters in that 
and later elections are consistently located at the libertarian-universalistic pole of this divide.  
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were still somewhat higher than those to the left-libertarian party block, but they 
exhibit opposing trends. While allegiances to the Liberals and Christian Democrats 
have declined, the voters of the left-libertarian parties have become more loyal to their 
parties, reaching levels similar to those of the extreme right. Overall, loyalties are 
strong, and the differences between the blocks are rather modest, and compared to the 
results of the French case in the preceding chapter, the fidelity of the centre-right 
voters has suffered less.  
 
 
Figure 7.5: Stability of alignments to the left-libertarian, centre-right and extreme 
right ideological blocks in Switzerland, 1991-1999 (in percent) 
 
We are now in a position to characterize the cultural divide more accurately 
employing the schema presented in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4.2). The more extensive 
analysis of the situation in 1975 allows a comprehensive assessment of this first 
election. Concerning the old cultural divide, which is the one structuring party 
positions in the campaign, the party system can be characterized as unresponsive, 
corresponding to the second cell from the right at the bottom of the schema. Given the 
renown stability of the party system up to the 1970s, alignments have probably been 
rather stable. On the other hand, we have seen that a new cultural division was present 
on the voter side, and this antagonism did not correspond to the one reflected by the 
party system. Hence, this was a new dimension of conflict along which the party 
system was unresponsive. Again, it is likely that party loyalties checked the 
emergence of the new conflict, and the success of the new parties of the extreme right 
was still very limited.  
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In the course of the 1990s, after the new cultural antagonism had gained centre 
stage among political conflicts under the mobilization efforts of the SVP, the 
libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian divide has evolved into a 
segmented cleavage. While the libertarian-universalistic pole has remained occupied 
by the Social Democrats and the Ecologists throughout the elections studied, the party 
system as a whole has gained responsiveness due to the SVP’s extreme position. 
There is an almost perfect match in the positions of parties and voters. Loyalties are 
high, especially those to the extreme right and the left-libertarian blocks, indicating a 
high degree of social closure of the groups divided by the divide. Accordingly, and as 
discussed theoretically in Chapter 4, this conflict can labelled a cleavage, because it 
corresponds to a durable pattern of alignments of social groups.  
My conception of the stability of alignments, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, is 
sensible to differences in turnout among the adherents of different ideological blocks. 
From a theoretical point of view, strong collective identities that are reinforced by 
political conflict can be expected to make voters turn out regularly to vote for their 
ideological block. In the case of Switzerland, where turnout is notoriously low, this 
affects my measure of loyalties more than in other contexts. A more in-depth analysis 
shows that the rising stability of alignments to the left is partly due to these parties’ 
rising capacity of bringing their people to the ballot box, which in turn indicates that 
left-libertarian political identities have generated higher levels of social closure in the 
1990s. On the political right, the recovery in the stability of alignments to the centre 
block in the 1999 election was also a product of higher turnout. At the same time, 
more voters defected the centre-block and voted for the populist right in 1999 than in 
1995. Relying on respondents’ recall of their 1995 vote, it appears that a good tenth of 
those who declare having voted for the centre-right block in 1995 have switched to 
the populist right in the following election (results not shown here). 
However, despite the considerable overlap in the ideological orientations of centre-
right and right-wing populist voters, the borderline between these two ideological 
blocks is not as permeable as it may appear. With regard to the ideologically more 
extreme SVP, the stability of alignments it engenders is perhaps less surprising, also 
in the light of the French findings presented in the preceding chapter, where the Front 
National also commands the strongest loyalties. But with respect the centre-right 
block in Switzerland, we may ask what exactly accounts for the relatively high degree 
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of loyalty. Is it a consequence of long-standing sympathies for these parties that are 
slow to erode, or of a dislike of the populist right’s anti-consensual style? Or are these 
alignments reinforced by other dimensions of conflict? The latter hypothesis is at the 
heart of the following analysis of the European integration dimension of oppositions. 
 
 
European Integration – a Reinforcing Issue-Dimension? 
 
Notwithstanding the central importance often attributed to the issue of European 
integration in Swiss politics, the analysis so far has provided little evidence that the 
SVP’s political stances and its voters’ orientation diverge strongly from those of other 
right-wing populist parties. However, orientations regarding the EU may nonetheless 
play a role in structuring alignments to the centre-right and right-wing populist party 
blocks, reinforcing the three-block division found along the libertarian-universalistic 
vs. traditionalist-communitarian dimension of conflict. Figure 7.6 now presents the 
positions of parties and voters along the EU-dimension for those years where we have 
sufficient data. A direct comparison of parties and voters along the lines of analysis 
pursued for the cultural dimension is only possible in 1995. In 1975 and 1999, on the 
other hand, the issue was not sufficiently present in the election campaign to position 
parties.  
Although the EU was not a political issue in 1975, we can measure voters’ 
positions using a survey question asking respondents whether Switzerland should join 
the Community, which is similar to the items employed in the later surveys. Again, 
we find the SVP to be the party whose voters most strongly oppose joining the EC, 
together with the supporters of the extreme left and right. This parallels the findings 
concerning the new cultural divide and once more underlines, first, that the SVP faced 
no trade-off in holding on to its core supporters and expanding its electoral reach, and 
second, that the attitudinal profile of the SVP’s traditional electorate was remarkably 
similar to that of extreme right voters. 
In 1991, when Europe has become a salient issue, the SVP again lies close to the 
parties of the extreme right and vividly opposes Switzerland’s taking part in the 




1975: only voters 






1991: only parties 






1995: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (4 parties): 0.995 






1999: only voters 
polarization electorates: 0.69 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Parties and voters on the European integration dimension in Switzerland, 
1975-1999. Position, match, and polarization 
Legend: see Figure 7.2 
 
process of unification. The three other parties – the SP, the CVP and the Liberals – 
differ somewhat in their position, but they are all closer to the integration pole of this 
divide. We also find some evidence here that the Ecologists’ opposition to the EU was 
responsible for the unusual configuration of political space in the MDS analysis 
presented earlier on (looking at their voters’ position in 1995 and 1999 suggests that 
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the party may have been out of touch with its electorate concerning this question). In 
1995, the EU-issue played a less important role, but the positions of those parties that 
we can place is fairly similar to those four years earlier (the SP and the extreme right 
appear in brackets because we have captured less than ten statements from them in the 
media analysis). There is a divide between the Europe-friendly Social Democrats and 
Liberals on the one hand, and the deeply sceptical SVP and extreme right on the 
other. This divide closely mirrors the position of these parties’ electorates, resulting in 
an almost perfect figure for match. Not only the party system is highly polarized, 
voters as well diverge much more in their orientations regarding the EU than was the 
case in 1975. Looking at the spread in positions reveals that the electorates of the SVP 
and extreme right and those of the other parties do not overlap. 
The 1999 election confirms this basic pattern: Even if the Liberal and Christian 
Democrat voters are somewhat less enthusiastic concerning closer ties to the EU than 
the left, the major rift is between the populist right and the other parties. Because the 
differences between the moderate and the populist right regarding the issue of 
European integration are much larger than those concerning the libertarian-
universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian divide, the EU-issue does appear as a 
factor structuring alignments between these two ideological blocks. In particular, the 
EU-divide seems to contribute to the high degree of fidelity that the voters of the 
populist right exhibit. It is therefore possible to label the cultural divide in Switzerland 
as one running between “integration” and “demarcation”, but at the same time, this 
divide is nothing more than a specific variant of a more general value divide we find 
in Western European countries. First of all, a similar divide concerning European 
integration between the established right and the populist right can be found in 
France, although in weaker form (see Chapter 6). Secondly, the integration dimension 
alone cannot account for the deep divide – engendering strong partisan loyalties and 
political subcultures – between the left-libertarian and the centre-right blocks in 
Switzerland. These parties, as well as their voters, differ much more with respect to 
the opposition between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian 
conceptions of community than they do regarding the question of the country’s 
relationship to Europe.  
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Parties and Voters on the Economic Divide 
 
In determining the relevant dimensions of opposition between parties, we have seen 
that the traditional state-market cleavage remains highly salient for parties in 
Switzerland. The central question in this section therefore is to which degree this is 
also the case for voters and whether economic alignments cross-cut or reinforce the 
alignments structured by the new cultural dimension of conflict. Figure 7.7 shows the 
respective positions of parties and voters on the economic axis. In the earliest 
election, the party political spectrum is clearly skewed to the left and weakly 
polarized. The position of the major parties more or less conforms to expectations, 
except that we would have expected the Liberals to be the most market-liberal party. 
But in fact, it is the (old) SVP that takes the right-most position, even if the large 
standard deviation indicates that the thrust of its programmatic statements is far from 
homogeneous. The parties of the extreme right, on the other hand, take on a rather 
welfarist position, a profile considered typical of the “old” extreme right. Because the 
positions of voters are standardized, we only know what their relative positions are, 
and thus cannot judge if their orientations are similarly skewed to the positions of the 
parties. However, we can see that the SVP’s voters actually lie to the left of those who 
voted for the Liberals. Together with the misrepresentation of extreme left and 
extreme right voters, this accounts for the low match between political offer and 
demand. 
In the 1990s, market liberalism has clearly gained support, and the party spectrum 
becomes more balanced, while the basic positions remain unchanged. At the same 
time, the SVP’s shift from the most market-liberal position in 1991 to the left in 1995 
and back to the right in 1999 testifies its somewhat ambiguous stance towards free 
markets discussed earlier on. Before entrenching itself firmly on the right of the 
spectrum in 1999, the SVP also continues to display high levels of heterogeneity in its 
programmatic statements. Contrary to the situation in the 1975 election, the match 
between the positions of parties and voters is high in the 1990s. In fact, the relative 
position of the SVP’s electorate turns out to be rather market-liberal in the aggregate, 
even if it lies to the left of the voters of the Liberals. Furthermore, while the SVP’s 
electorate is internally heterogeneous, it is no more divided than those of the other




1975: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (6 parties): 0.59 
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1995: parties (above) and voters (below) 
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1999: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (4 parties): 0.88 
polarization parties: 0.65 | without SVP: 0.55 
 
 
Figure 7.7: Parties and voters on the economic divide in Switzerland, 1975-1999. 
Position, match, and polarization 
Legend: see Figure 7.2 
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parties. In the Swiss case, in other words, we find some support for Kitschelt’s (1995) 
winning formula that posits that voters of the extreme right are characterized by a 
mixture of authoritarian and market-liberal orientations. However, it remains to be 
seen if the SVP mobilizes a heterogeneous coalition of voters, some of which support 
the party because of its exclusionist and Euro-sceptical stances, while others are 
attracted by its neo-liberal anti-state appeal. 
To test the stability of alignments engendered by the economic divide, it is again 
necessary to form ideological party groups and measure how loyally voters turn out to 
vote for their ideological block. For most parties, the classification into a left and right 
block regarding their positions along the traditional class cleavage is unambiguous. 
Although the voters of the smaller extreme right parties are generally quite 
economically right-wing, as we have seen, some extreme right parties such as the 
Swiss Democrats have a rather welfarist programme, and I therefore exclude extreme 
right voters from the calculations. The SVP, on the other hand, clearly belongs to the 
right-wing block. Another problem concerns the Christian Democrats. Applying the 
“genetic” criterion in the Swiss case is not as straightforward as it may seem. As 
already discussed, in those cantonal party systems that have historically lacked a party 
of the left, the Christian Democrats compete with the Liberals and take on parts of the 
left’s economic programme. And in fact, in our media data, the CVP appears as quite 
left-wing, with the exception of the 1995 campaign. Over the world, Christian 
Democrat parties have supported the establishment of generous welfare states (Huber, 
Stephens 2001). Finally, in ideological terms, Christian democracy’s politics of 
mediation is distinct both from left-wing and right-wing ideologies regarding the 
economic order (Frey 2006). I therefore treat Christian Democrat parties as a separate 
ideological block alongside the left and right. While Christian Democrat voters 
usually lean more to the right than to the left, they take a genuinely middle of the road 
position in 2002, which also underscores the usefulness of this classification. 
Figure 7.8 shows the stability of alignments to these three ideological blocks. 
Starting out at similar levels, the loyalties of the voters of the left and right blocks 
show an upward trend and reach about 80% in 1999. The fidelity of Christian 
Democrat voters, on the other hand, is the weakest. Considering party system 
polarization, match, and loyalties jointly, we can now draw some conclusions 
regarding the state-market cleavage. Between 1975 and 1999, we see a steady 
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increase in polarization of the party system. Up to 1995, however, polarization was 
still low or at medium-high levels. Regarding the stability of alignments, we can again 
assume high loyalties to the ideological blocks in 1975 and also throughout the 1990s, 
given the figures we have for 1995 and 1999. Because there is a mismatch between 
parties and voters in 1975, the party system was unresponsive in that election, with 
party loyalties at the same time checking realignments. By 1995, the party system has 
regained responsiveness, as indicated by a high match in the positions of parties and 
voters, meaning that the class divide represents an identitarian cleavage. However, 
polarization was already on the rise in 1995, and four years later, in 1999, it has risen 
well above 0.5, resulting in a segmented cleavage along the state-market divide.  
 
 
Figure 7.8: Stability of preferences for the left, right, and Christian Democrat  
party blocks in Switzerland, 1991-1999 (in percent) 
 
As the analysis reveals, alignments structured by the state-market and the cultural 
divide are not cross-cutting, but rather reinforcing. Both divides engender high levels 
of loyalty, the weakest element in this system of alignments being the Christian 
Democrats block. As we have already seen in the analysis of the dimensions of 
opposition using the campaign data, there is a tendency for the economic and cultural 
lines of opposition to be integrated in Switzerland, especially in 1991 and 1999. 
Indeed, the correlation between the positions of party electorates along the two 
dimensions shows that the two dimensions are even more strongly related on the voter 
side. The simple correlation coefficients are 0.76 for 1975, 0.95 for 1995 and 0.91 for 
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1999.5 Political space on the voter side therefore appears one-dimensional, and 
encompasses the state-market cleavage, the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-
communitarian cleavage, and the European integration dimensions. 
Of the three blocks formed by the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-
communitarian conflict, the centre-block is potentially vulnerable, while the left-
libertarian and the extreme right blocks command strong loyalties. At least some of its 
voters share orientations similar to those of the populist right’s electorate. The 
combination of the findings concerning the economic and the cultural divides clearly 
shows that the comparatively low levels of loyalty displayed by voters of the centre-
right block result from recompositions within the right. In other words, these weak 
loyalties correspond to flows from the centre-right to the SVP. At the same time, the 
division between these blocks reflects fundamentally differing orientations regarding 
European integration, counteracting further realignments. The European integration 
dimension thus reinforces and stabilizes the separation of the centre-right and populist 
right blocks along the cultural dimension. 
 
 
Political Divides as Determinants of Voting Choices 
 
Having determined the patterns of oppositions in the Swiss party system, the aim is 
now to investigate how well voters’ positions along the three dimensions can explain 
their voting decisions. Linking voters’ preferences and party choices according to a 
more strictly causal logic, this will shed additional light on parties’ different 
mobilization logics. More specifically, the analysis will allow a verification of the 
claim that the SVP mobilizes both on the cultural and the EU dimension, while 
economic preferences play a minor role. Table 7.3 shows the results of the logistic 
regression analyses for 1975, 1995, and 1999.6 
                                                
5  The corresponding figures for the parties’ positions are r=0.33 in 1975, r=0.99 in 1991, r=0.46 in 
1995 and r=0.68 in 1999. 
6  In all further analyses, I take advantage of the additional cantonal samples included in the 1995 post-
election surveys, which raises the number of observations considerably (while applying weights to 
correct for the different sample sizes). I have not used the additional samples in the preceding 
analyses because the weighting procedure cannot be employed in factor analysis.  
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Table 7.3: Political dimensions as determinants of voting choices in Switzerland, 
1975-1999: Results from logistic regressions run separately for each party 
 
 Parties 
Dimensions  ECOLO EXL SP CVP LIB SVP EXR 
 
1975 
Economic   odds – 0.6 0.6*** 1.1 1.7*** 1.3 1.2 
  z _ -1.1 -4.7 1.4 4.5 1.6 0.7 
Cultural  odds _ 0.8 0.8* 1.1 1.3* 1.0 1.5 
  z _ -0.8 -2.5 0.7 2.1 -0.1 1.1 
New cultural odds – 0.8 0.8# 0.9 1.1 1.3# 1.5 
  z – -0.6 -1.9 -1.2 0.8 1.7 1.4 
Europe  odds – 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.8* 1.5* 1.2 
  z – 0.5 -0.1 0.3 -2.2 2.4 0.6 
R2   – 3.1% 4.7% 0.4% 4.7% 4.4% 3.9% 
 
1995 
Economic  odds 0.9 0.5*** 0.6*** 1.1# 1.6*** 1.2** 1.2 
  z -1.0 -3.5 -9.6 1.7 10.1 3.1 1.4 
Cultural  odds 0.4*** 0.4** 0.6*** 1.4*** 1.7*** 2.0*** 1.4** 
  z -7.8 -2.9 -9.7 5.1 9.1 8.5 2.6 
Europe  odds 1.2 0.9 0.7*** 0.9 0.6*** 2.3*** 2.9*** 
  z 1.4 -0.3 -5.7 -1.0 -9.0 11.6 7.3 
R2   9.4% 13.1% 12.5% 1.3% 8.4% 17.2% 12.8% 
 
1999 
Economic  odds 0.5*** 0.5** 0.6*** 0.9 2.0*** 1.5*** 1.3 
  z -3.4 -2.7 -6.5 -0.8 0.2 5.2 1.4 
Cultural  odds 0.6** 0.6 0.5*** 1.3** 1.1 1.7*** 0.5** 
  z -2.7 -1.9 -7.6 2.8 1.5 5.4 -2.6 
Europe  odds 0.9 0.7 0.5*** 0.8* 0.6*** 2.4*** 5.2*** 
  z -0.6 -1.2 -6.6 -2.3 -5.4 9.7 5.0 
R2   10% 10.8% 20% 0.9% 8.1% 21.8% 16.4% 
 
Significance levels: # p=0.10 * p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001 
Number of observations: 1008 (1975), 6913 (1995), 1690 (1999) 
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I start the discussion by looking at the 1990s and then go back to the 1975 election 
to see in how far similar patterns can already be found in the earliest election. Because 
the driving forces of party mobilization are similar in 1995 and 1999, they can be 
discussed jointly. In general terms, the vote for the Social Democrats and the SVP can 
clearly be best predicted using voters’ location on the three dimensions of opposition, 
and these parties also lie at opposing poles of the cultural axis as well as the EU-
dimension. Libertarian-universalistic values and positive attitudes are a good predictor 
of the vote for the Social Democrats, while the opposing set of preferences – 
traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community and refusal to join the EU – 
best explain the vote for the SVP. Looking at the determinants of the vote for the 
smaller parties of the extreme right must clear any doubt that the SVP rightfully 
belongs to this party family. The supporters of the small parties of the extreme right 
are fervently opposed to European integration, but they are actually not more, but less 
traditionalist-communitarian than the voters of the SVP.7 
The economic dimension also plays an important role in structuring voting 
decisions, but here, the patterns of opposition differ from those found along the 
cultural axis. Polar positions in this domain are occupied by the Social Democrats and 
the extreme left on the one hand, and the Liberals on the other hand. Taken together, 
the cultural, economic and European integration dimensions result in a triangular 
pattern of conflict, where the left opposes the Liberals along the economic dimension 
and the populist right along the cultural dimension, while all the mainstream parties 
oppose the populist right in the domain of European integration.  
However, there are two qualifications to this general picture that touch upon 
crucial points of my argument. The first concerns the role of the cultural antagonism 
in the Liberals’ mobilization. Even more so than the Christian Democrats, Liberal 
voters in 1995 have quite traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community, 
and in this respect differ only in degree from those supporting the SVP. In 1995 it 
then appears that the main difference between the Liberals and the populist right lies 
in their voters’ starkly opposing attitudes to European integration. The situation in 
1999 is entirely different, however, and the cultural dimension no longer plays any 
role in the Liberals’ mobilization. This evolution may reflect realignments that have 
                                                
7  In 1999, the results suggest that a combination of relatively universalistic and Euro-sceptic attitudes 
makes more probable a vote for the extreme right. Note, however, that the position of extreme right 
voters along the cultural dimension is less universalistic than it may appear (see Figure 7.3). 
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taken place between the Liberals and their right-wing populist challenger between the 
two elections. The second qualification regards the role of economic liberalism in the 
SVP’s mobilization. Contrary to my hypothesis that right-wing populist parties 
mobilize exclusively on the cultural dimension, the SVP’s voters also appear to be 
distinctly market liberal in their orientations regarding the state-market cleavage. At 
the same time, while market-liberal attitudes make an SVP-vote more likely, the 
probability of supporting the Liberals rises even more steeply as economic attitudes 
become more free-market. My hunch is that market liberal orientations among the 
adherents of the populist right are part of a broader anti-leftist and anti-statist 
syndrome that takes different forms in various countries depending on their tradition 
of state involvement in the economy. An analysis of the different orientations within 
the SVP’s electorate, presented in the next section, will pursue this hypothesis further.  
Only brief commentaries are required concerning the other parties. First of all, 
within the left, no fundamental differences emerge between Ecologist and Social 
Democrat voters with regard to the cultural axis of conflict. Both electorates share 
strongly universalistic outlooks. The findings in Switzerland therefore support my 
claim that the Ecologists represent the counter-pole of the populist New Right along 
the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian axis. The differences 
between Social Democrat and Ecologist voters, on the other hand, are related to the 
other dimensions of conflict, attitudes towards the EU and economic preferences not 
consistently playing a role in the mobilization of the Ecologists. This stands in 
contrast to the general contention, and also the findings in France, according to which 
Ecologist voters are among the most supportive of European integration. However, a 
“normalization” is observable in Switzerland between 1995 and 1999, in that 
Ecologist voters have a tendency to be more supportive of European integration, even 
if the effects are insignificant in both elections. Secondly, concerning the Christian 
Democrats, it must be said that they are not really part of the general structure of 
oppositions: These voters do not stand out for their economic profile, and while they 
have rather traditionalist-communitarian values, the contribution of the ideological 
variables that structure interactions between the other parties is almost nil, as the 
amount of variance explained shows. This supports Frey’s (2006) contention that this 
party family employs a non-ideological mobilization logic. 
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To which degree do the patterns of opposition found in the 1990s correspond to 
those in the 1970s? In 1975, we can estimate the role played both by the “old” cultural 
dimension, centring on the libertarian-authoritarian divide, as well as the emerging 
oppositions centring on cultural liberalism, immigration, and European integration.8 
In very broad terms, the main antagonists in 1975 were the Social Democrats and the 
Liberals. In economic terms, this division is unsurprising. In cultural terms, we can 
see that progressive positions both on the old and the new divides foster support for 
the Social Democrats, while only the old antagonism, shaped by traditional values and 
law and order stances, is relevant for the Liberals. Already here, the supporters of the 
SVP and of the extreme right parties constitute the counter-pole to the New Left. At 
the same time, it must be kept in mind that it took the parties at the traditionalist-
communitarian pole of the new divide more than two decades to reach levels of 
support roughly similar to the combined strength of the Social Democrats and the 
Ecologists.  
The sovereignist potential was also already there to grab in 1975: Although not yet 
a prominent issue, since joining the European Community was not on the political 
agenda, SVP supporters were already strongly Euro-sceptic. Only the Liberals’ 
electorate was characterized by Europhile sentiments, whereas internationalism did 
not yet play a role for the left. Overall, we can see that party competition in the 1970s 
was not strongly driven by ideology – compared to the later elections, what the lines 
of conflict explain in voting behaviour is modest. As a tentative conclusion, then, 
because we do not have precise information concerning voter loyalties, the evidence 
nonetheless suggests that alignments were more strongly structured by established 
political identities than by ideology in 1975.  
 
 
                                                
8  Although cultural liberalism is both part of the new and the old cultural conflict, positions on the 
two dimensions are only weakly correlated at the individual level (r=0.14). The old cultural dimen-
sion is much more strongly related to traditional values and law and order than to cultural liberalism, 
while the new dimension is strongly shaped by cultural liberalism. 
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The Impact of Social Class and Education on Support for the SVP 
 
The social structural support base of the populist right in Switzerland 
 
Are the distinct traditionalist-communitarian preferences of the SVP’s electorate a 
product of similar positions in the employment structure? And do the social classes 
making up the support base of the party differ in ideological outlook? Together with 
the role of education in the SVP’s mobilization, these are the questions addressed in 
this and the following section. Previous analyses have shown that individual-level 
orientations regarding the cultural dimension in Switzerland are related to different 
social-structural attributes, most prominently education and social class (Lachat 
2007). My main concern here is to establish whether support for the SVP – which 
takes a clear-cut position in this domain – is stronger among those affected by the 
processes of economic modernization, or if the SVP’s potential is confined to those 
opposing cultural modernization. As pointed out earlier, the Swiss economic model 
would not lead us to expect that certain occupational categories as a whole have lost 
out in the modernization thrust of the past decades. Rather, losers are most likely to be 
find within certain categories, such as those working in sectors that have not been 
traditionally exposed to international competition. Unfortunately, most class schemas 
are not particularly well-suited to detect these more subtle within-class differences, 
and the analysis presented here is therefore necessarily rather cursory. Nonetheless, it 
is possible to test the thesis put forward by Kitschelt (1995) that the New Radical 
Right gains votes from workers by virtue of its cultural stances, while other segments 
such as the self-employed support these parties because of their free-market appeal.  
Table 7.4 presents the results of a logistic regression model that explains voting for 
the SVP using dummy variables for education and social class as independent 
variables (see Chapter 5). I include class and education in the same step because the 
results pertaining to class are not affected by the inclusion of education. Because the 
1991 survey only allows the operationalization of a more simple class schema, I do 
not report the results for that election, because they are not directly comparable with 
those for the other years. From the earliest election on, farmers constitute the only 
class whose over-representation in the SVP’s electorate is statistically significant. As 
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we may have expected, the self-employed also tend to vote for the SVP, but this effect 
is insignificant in all elections and becomes weaker over time. In the 1999 election, 
there is a similar tendency for unskilled workers to support the populist right, which is 
consistent with the economic modernization hypothesis. Again, however, this result is 
not significant. The only other reoccurring finding is a strong and statistically 
significant under-representation of social-cultural specialists – indeed the group most 
 
Table 7.4:  The social structural basis of support for the SVP  
 (logistic regression results) 
 
Occupational classes 1975 1995 1999 
 
Farmers odds 6.6*** 4.0*** 3.8*** 
 z 4.1 5.0 4.3 
Self-employed odds 1.5 1.3 1.2 
 z 0.7 1.0 0.7 
Unskilled workers odds 0.7 1.1 1.4 
 z -0.6 0.3 1.5 
Skilled workers odds 0.4 0.9 0.8 
 z -1.5 -0.6 -0.9 
Routine non-man. workers odds 0.7 0.7 0.7 
 z -0.6 -1.6 -1.1 
Technical specialists odds 0.3 0.9 0.6* 
 z -1.4 -0.7 -2.3 
Social-cultural specialist odds 0.7 0.3*** 0.3*** 
 z -0.5 -4.2 -4.1 
Non-labor-force part. odds 1.0 1.6* 1.0 
 z 0 2.1 -0.2 
 
Higher education odds 0.8 0.6** 1.2 
 z -0.7 -2.5 0.8 
Low education odds 1.3 0.8 0.7# 
 z 0.4 -1.2 -1.7 
 
Variance explained  10.5% 3.7% 3.6% 
N  1219 7167 2033 
Reference category: Managers/medium-level education 
Significance levels: # p=0.1 * p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001 
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likely to vote for the New Left parties situated at the opposing poles of the cultural 
divide (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998, Müller 1999). In 1999, technical specialists are 
also unlikely to vote for the SVP. However, with the exception of certain segments of 
the middle classes, where the party is underrepresented, the results testify a cross-
class appeal of the SVP, except for the party’s strong roots in the rural milieu. Given 
the party’s origins, this finding is no surprise. However, the results confirm that the 
SVP has managed to hold on to this constituency despite its transformation and a 
significant broadening of its electoral reach. There have been studies to show, using a 
sophisticated class schema, that parts of the working-class have a special propensity 
of voting for the populist right (Oesch 2006b), or that the party’s most recent gains 
have been concentrated in the working class (Selb, Lachat 2004). Overall, a consistent 
over-representation of economic modernization losers can not yet be asserted in my 
analysis, however.  
There is more evidence to suggest that the SVP rallies the losers of the cultural 
modernization processes of the past decades. In 1995, where the sample is sufficiently 
large, we see that voters with higher education are conspicuously underrepresented in 
the electorate of the populist right in Switzerland. No differences are observable 
between voters with medium and those with low levels of education. However, the 
finding concerning higher education does suggest that the divide between libertarian-
universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values has a structural basis, as does 
the under-representation of social-cultural specialists, that persists even when 
education is controlled for. In the other years, no educational pattern emerges. When 
the class variables are omitted from the model (results not shown here), the 
differences that are observable (yet not statistically significant) in 1975 and 1999, 
wash out. In 1995, the negative effect of higher education actually becomes even 
stronger and significant at p=0.000. 
All this suggests that the populist right’s appeal is predominantly cultural in 
Switzerland. To rule out the possibility, suggested by Kitschelt (1995), that some 
social groups vote for the SVP because of its neo-liberal appeal, I have tested 
interactions between social class position and locations on the economic and cultural 
dimensions of conflict. In general, few effects are significant, and I therefore only 
report the results from the 1995 survey, where the extraordinarily large number of 
respondents makes the results more robust. Table 7.5 displays the findings, which 
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Table 7.5:  Interaction effects between social classes and ideological positions as 
predictors of the SVP-vote, 1995 (logistic regression results) 
 Odds Ratio z-value  
Ideological positions 
Economic dimension 1.2 1.1 
Cultural dimension 2.3*** 2.2 
 
Social class 
Farmers  3.4*** 3.7 
Self-employed 1.2 0.6 
Unskilled workers 0.9 -0.6 
Skilled workers 0.8 -0.8 
Routine non-manual workers 0.5# -1.9 
Technical specialists 0.8 -0.8 
Socio-cultural specialists 0.3*** -3.7 
Non labour force 1.3 0.8 
 
Interaction effects 
Farmers*economic 1.0 0.0 
Self-employed*economic 1.0 -0.1 
Unskilled workers*economic 0.9 -0.4 
Skilled workers*economic 1.1 0.5 
Routine non-manual*economic 0.9 -0.3 
Technical specialists*economic 1.2 0.9 
Socio-cultural spec.*economic 1.2 0.5 
Non labour force*economic 1.1 0.3 
 
Farmers*cultural 0.8 -0.7 
Self-employed*cultural 1.0 0 
Unskilled workers*cultural 1.2 0.6 
Skilled workers*cultural 1.1 0.4 
Routine non-manual*cultural 1.6 1.4 
Technical specialists*cultural 1.3 1.1 
Socio-cultural spec.*cultural 2.1** 2.7 
Non labour force*cultural 1.1 0.5 
 
R-square  13% 
N  6961 
Reference category: Managers 
Significance levels: # 0.10 level * 0.05 level ** 0.01 level *** 0.001 level 
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disconfirm the hypothesis of different economic and cultural logics of the SVP 
depending on social class. Despite including almost 400 SVP-voters, none of the 
interaction effects between social class and economic preferences is significant. There 
are also few classes whose members stand out for supporting the SVP for cultural 
reasons, the exception being socio-cultural specialists. However, this result has to be 
seen in conjuncture with their generally low propensity to vote for the SVP. In other 
words, only socio-cultural specialists with markedly traditionalist-communitarian 
ideological worldviews support the SVP. The direct effects of social class remain 
unchanged when compared to the previous model in Table 7.4, even when we control 
for ideological positions, but economically right-wing preferences are no longer a 
significant predictor of voting for the SVP. 
All in all, then, the results of the analyses suggest that, except for its strongholds 
among farmers, the SVP has a cross-class profile. The under-representation of the 
socio-cultural specialists is the notable exception to this pattern, and parallels the 
findings in the French case. No more does the logic of the SVP’s mobilization differ 
between social classes, suggesting that individuals from different class locations all 
support the SVP by virtue of their traditionalist-communitarian worldview. However, 
albeit the effect is weaker, we have seen that market-liberal attitudes also foster 
support for the SVP. What is more, this effect does not seem to vary as a function of 
social class. Does class therefore no longer play a role for preference formation 
among the voters of the populist right in Switzerland? 
 
 
Social Class and Economic and Cultural Preference Formation 
 
The divergence of economic preferences within right-wing populist parties’ support 
coalition may have important consequences for their future electoral prospects. To the 
degree that orientations towards the state-market cleavage still vary as a function of 
social class, the parties’ continued success will depend crucially upon the superior 
salience of cultural, as opposed to economic group identifications among its voters. If, 
on the other hand, all these voters share homogeneous preferences, then the party will 
be less vulnerable to shifts in the relative salience of the two dimensions. The analysis 
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is confined to the 1995 and 1999 elections because the 1975 survey features too few 
SVP-voters to permit a reliable location of sub-groups of its electorate. The results are 
shown in Figure 7.9, which shows the preferences of the SVP’s electorate in the two-
dimensional space constituted by the economic and cultural dimensions, broken down 
by social class. As expected, populist right voters share a deeply traditionalist-
communitarian worldview, regardless of occupational class. What is more surprising, 
however, is that their economic preferences are relatively similar as well. All 
segments within the SVP’s electorate are situated in the market-liberal spectrum. The 
remaining differences conform to expectations, for example concerning the distance 
between unskilled workers and the self-employed. But disagreement over economic 
policy is rather modest, as compared with the different groups within the Front 
National’s electorate in France, where the working classes have more left-wing 
economic preferences (see Chapter 6). 
There are two explanations for this somewhat unexpected phenomenon. At a 
general level, different patterns of orientations (political cultures) exist regarding 
individuals’ relationship to the state. Historically, Switzerland is marked by an early 
hegemony of liberalism and by a weak labour movement (Luebbert 1991, Bartolini 
2000). Historical specificities, as well as differences in world-market integration, then 
lead to differences in the way orientations regarding state involvement in the economy 
are patterned by social class. The working class as a whole does not display markedly 
left-wing economic preferences in Switzerland (see Lachat 2007). In this respect, 
Switzerland differs from France, Germany and Britain, but not from the Netherlands 
and Austria (Kriesi et al. 2007). Secondly, in the case of SVP voters, mistrust against 
public spending is presumably part of a broader anti-state orientation. At least the 
SVP itself deplores state interference in the economy and in societal matters alike. In 
the party’s discourse, opposition against the alleged domination of state structures by 
the New Left has an anti-universalistic, as well as an anti-interventionalist component. 
But, as argued earlier on, this does not make the SVP or it supporters genuinely 
market-liberal. Interestingly, the Front National’s discourse is quite different in this 
respect, as we have seen, and the appeals issued by the populist right therefore seem 
to be shaped by the country’s tradition of state intervention. 
The homogeneity of both economic and cultural orientations within the SVP’s 
electorate suggests that culturally defined group identifications do not have to 






Figure 7.9: Economic and cultural positions within the SVP’s electorate, broken 
down by class, 1995 and 1999 
Note: the figures in brackets report the respective share of members of social classes  
in the SVP’s electorate 
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compete with, and ultimately triumph over class identifications to ensure the populist 
right’s continuing success. Consequently, the party’s vulnerability to a rising salience 
of economic, as opposed to cultural conflicts in the party system, is minimal. This 
appears to have been a key to the SVP’s success in the 1990s, where the cultural 





Although a traditionalist-communitarian political potential was present early on in 
Switzerland, it has taken the parties mobilizing against the libertarian-universalistic 
values of the New Left more than two decades to match the latter’s electoral strength. 
Differently from France, it has not been a new party of the extreme right to mobilize 
this potential, but an established party that underwent a transformation into a party of 
the populist right. It is the prolonged struggle of the SVP’s Zurich wing for hegemony 
in the national party organization – under the leadership of Christoph Blocher – that 
explains the late manifestation of a strong and united right-wing populist party in 
Switzerland. In the meanwhile, a number of smaller extreme right parties thrived in 
the political space later occupied by the SVP. Between the late 1980s and the mid-
1990s, the SVP gradually adopted these parties’ programme. Aided by the explosive-
ness of the question of Switzerland’s relationship to the European Union, it built a 
broad counter-movement to the libertarian left that rapidly absorbed its smaller 
extreme right competitors. 
The analysis presented in this chapter does not leave much doubt that the SVP 
qualifies for membership in the right-wing populist party family by virtue of its 
position at the extreme of the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communi-
tarian dimension of conflict, and of its aggressive anti-establishment style of mobili-
zation. It can also be shown that the party’s transformation involved the adoption of a 
hierarchical internal structure that has left a small group of politicians around 
Christoph Blocher a lot of leeway in defining the party’s programmatic stance. In 
programmatic terms, the SVP and the smaller extreme right parties can be shown to 
have a similar appeal, which is mirrored both in the parties’ positions, as well as in 
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their voters’ orientations. Despite the similarity of the SVP with other extreme 
populist right parties in Switzerland and elsewhere, resistance to European integration 
has played a much more important role in the party’s rise than elsewhere. Being the 
only major party opposing closer ties to the EU, the SVP could capitalize on an anti-
establishment discourse that has been important in moulding a sovereignist-
exclusionist collective identity and that has allowed the party to clearly demarcate 
itself from the established right.  
Nonetheless, while the question of European integration has been more prominent 
in Switzerland than elsewhere, the SVP’s voters are by no means solely held together 
by their opposition to Switzerland’s joining the EU, but also share a traditionalist-
communitarian worldview to a similar degree as for example the voters of the French 
Front National do. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the diffuseness of the traditionalist-
communitarian potential requires political entrepreneurs to link a counter-movement 
against the diffusion of universalistic values to specific political conflicts. In this 
sense, both the issues of European integration and immigration have helped the 
populist right to dominate the political agenda in the 1990s. And while a focus on the 
parties of the political right alone may suggest a paramount importance of the issue of 
European integration, such an interpretation fails to account for the structure of 
interactions in the party system as a whole. Attitudes towards the EU can by no means 
account for the deep rift that runs between left-libertarian and centre-right voters, all 
of which share a positive attitude towards the European Union. And finally, Euro-
scepticism on the part of the populist right is no Swiss idiosyncrasy, but is intimately 
related to the traditionalist-communitarian ideology that these parties advocate.  
The SVP’s extraordinary success as compared to other right-wing populist parties 
can be explained, as already suggested by McGann and Kitschelt (2005), by its ability 
to gain new voters while holding on to its traditional clientele. Going back to the 1975 
election, before the SVP entered the transformation to a right-wing populist party, the 
analysis presented here has revealed that the SVP did not face a trade-off between 
holding on to its traditional electorate while winning additional votes from those 
opposed to cultural liberalism and the EU, and who favoured a traditionalist-
communitarian conception of community. In fact, although the party itself did not yet 
advocate these programmatic positions, the corresponding orientations not only 
existed early on in the populace, but were already most widespread among the SVP’s 
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traditional voters. As early as in the 1970s, hardly a difference is observable between 
the cultural orientations of the voters of the extreme right and the SVP. 
The populist right’s success in Switzerland is further aided by the fact that, 
differently from France, its constituency is not only homogeneous as far as its cultural 
and EU-related preferences are concerned. The voters of the SVP also share a 
scepticism against state intervention in the economy, and as a consequence, the 
populist right in Switzerland has less divergent appeals to bridge than for example the 
Front National. Because the SVP has always been represented in parliament, its voters 
know all to well that anti-statism and economic protectionism are not mutually 
exclusive. Hence, the SVP has often opposed measures of economic liberalization and 
defends the interests of those sectors of the Swiss economy that have hitherto been 
sheltered from international competition, as other research has shown (Häusermann 
2003, Bernhard 2004).  
Furthermore, in the Swiss context, the country not yet being a member of the EU, 
it is not quite clear to which degree opposition to European integration actually 
reflects cultural or economic fears. Because participation in the European project 
would increase competition in the sheltered sectors, opposition to joining the EU may 
well reflect economic protectionism as well as perceptions that supranational 
integration endangers the “organic” national community. Unfortunately, we cannot 
differentiate between economic and identity-related aspects of European integration 
using the Swiss survey data. In any event, even if joining the EU does not appear as a 
viable option at the moment, parties and voters diverge just as much concerning the 
question how close ties the country should establish with the EU by means of bilateral 
agreements, and the European question is therefore likely to remain a salient one. 
If the hypothesis that the SVP rallies behind itself the potential losers of an 
opening up of the country to international economic competition is a plausible one, 
the empirical substantiation of this claim is more difficult. Most established class 
schemas are not particularly well suited to detect such fine-grained differences 
between social groups. The analysis in this chapter suggests that the SVP’s support 
base is not very clear-cut in class terms, apart from a consistent over-representation of 
farmers in its electorate. However, other analyses, using more sophisticated class 
schemas, have shown that the party receives (increasing) support from segments of 
the working class (Selb, Lachat 2004, Mazzoleni et al. 2005, Oesch 2006b). In part, 
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the fuzziness and heterogeneity of the SVP’s support base is due to its ability to 
merge its old support base with new voters. Indeed, the party has a more clear-cut 
social-structural profile in those cantons where it has not traditionally been present, 
such as Lucerne and Ticino, where not only farmers and the petty bourgeoisie, but 
also unskilled workers are over-represented in its support base (Diener et al. 2005, de 
Ambrogi et al. 2005). 
Looking at the Swiss party system as a whole, a triangular pattern of conflict has 
emerged, where the Social Democrats oppose the Liberals along the state-market 
cleavage and the SVP along the cultural divide. While the state-market cleavage has 
become more polarized in the 1990s as well, the transformation of the cultural divide 
and its rising salience above all represents a problem for the Liberals and the Christian 
Democrats. While the left-libertarian and the extreme right-wing populist blocks are 
supported by strong collective identities that have engendered stable alignments, voter 
loyalties to the centre-block are the weakest, partly due to defections that have 
benefited the SVP in recent elections. At the same time, the European integration 
dimension reinforces the division between the centre parties and the populist right. 
The deepest dividing line along the European dimension runs between these two 
blocks, thereby cross-cutting the cultural dimension, and contributing to the 
segmentation of loyalties along the cultural divide. The overall stability of alignments 
structured by the three-block pattern of oppositions suggests that the libertarian-
universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian divide is consolidating into a cleavage.  
One may of course speculate about the consequences of the SVP’s figurehead 
gaining a seat in the Executive Council of the federal government after the victorious 
2003 elections. Although there is an apparent lack of a charismatic party leader after 
Christoph Blocher’s entry into the governing coalition, the consensual political 
system allows him to portray himself as a sincere defender of the interests and values 
of his voters, while occasionally also playing opposition from within the government. 
And rather than revealing the hollowness of anti-establishment populism, government 
participation has allowed the populist right in Switzerland to actually fulfil some of its 
promises, for example by pushing through measures such as a restrictive immigration 
policy. In the economic domain, the fact that SVP voters share a dislike for expansive 
social welfare programmes also makes it easier for the party to govern without 
upsetting certain segments of its electorate. In Austria, the tension between the FPÖ’s 
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support of the rather neo-liberal government programme and the rather leftist 
economic preferences of some of its voters seems to have led working class voters to 
desert the party after its entry into government (see Heinisch 2003).  
Although that is still too early to judge, the SVP does not appear weakened by its 
government participation so far. Certainly, as is the case for all right-wing populist 
parties, the SVP’s mobilization has been greatly aided by the charismatic personality 
of its leader, and the question remains what the party’s fortunes will be after his 
departure. At the same time, given the stability of the new three-block pattern of 
opposition, it is unlikely that the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-
communitarian line of conflict will vanish soon. If the approach developed in this 
book is correct, then new structures of opposition will tend to become internalized as 
cognitive schemas by voters. And as long as the corresponding conflicts are kept alive 
by parties, these schemas will reproduce cleavages irrespective of specific 
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Despite the attention regularly devoted to the extreme right in Germany both in the 
media and in scholarly research, its electoral support has always remained rather 
limited in the post-war era, and its successes confined to singular events. In the 1980s, 
this situation change somewhat, when support for the Republikaner party appeared to 
mirror the rise of right-wing populist parties in other countries (Kitschelt 1995). 
However, the Republikaner have proven incapable of consolidating their successes in 
the 1990s. This failure is often attributed to the competition within the extreme right 
in Germany. However, even the combined support for the three most important 
parties, the Republikaner, the NPD and the DVU, reached no more than 3.3% in 1998, 
which marked the height of their success in a national parliamentary election in the 
1990s. Despite sporadic gains at the level of the Länder and in European elections, the 
extreme right has proven incapable of entrenching itself even at those levels.  
The absence of a right-wing populist party is to some extent striking in light of the 
fact that the German political space closely resembles that of other countries where 
these parties have been successful, as we have seen in Chapter 2. While the traditional 
state-market cleavage continues to manifest itself in election campaigns, the second 
dimension structuring party oppositions in the 1990s and early 2000s opposes 
libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. And while the rise 
of the issues brought up by the libertarian New Social Movements provoked a first 
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redefinition of cultural conflicts, and have resulted in the emergence of a powerful 
Ecologist party, a corresponding development has not occurred on the political right. 
Although the subsequent transformation of political space resulting from the 
politicization of the immigration question resembles the development found in the 
other countries, Germany represents one of the rather rare cases where the established 
right has remained largely unchallenged. Among the six countries that have been 
studied in Chapter 2, only Britain shares this characteristic. In both cases, it could be 
argued that singular explanations account for this fact, such as the majoritarian 
electoral formula in Britain, or the memory of National Socialism in Germany. Both 
accounts are plausible, but also problematic, since they deflect attention from more 
general features of party competition in these countries that limit the appeal of the 
extreme right. 
The analysis presented in this chapter demonstrates that the working of the party 
system has important consequences for the success or failure of the populist right. 
Using the analytical model from Chapter 4, I show that generalizable insights can be 
drawn from the German case. It is the prevalence of strong historical political 
identities together with the nature of the opposition between the Social Democrat and 
Christian Democrat parties that explain account for a restricted political space that 
hinders the establishment of challenging parties. Interaction patterns in the system are 
shaped by the predominance of these two large parties, which more than elsewhere 
retain the control of the political agenda and the scope of political conflict. It therefore 
appears that similar features could be at work both in Germany and Britain.  
In what follows, I first review the most important explanations put forward for the 
failure of the extreme right in Germany, pertaining to the heritage of National 
Socialism, to institutional factors, and to characteristics of the existing extreme right 
parties themselves. A number of explanations appears necessary to explain the 
electoral weakness of the extreme right, but I will argue that it is not pertinent to put 
too much emphasis on Germany’s electoral system, which Givens (2005) identifies as 
the single most important factor for the containment of such parties. A focus on 
institutional factors cannot explain the extreme right’s failure to institutionalize itself 
in those Länder where it has succeeded in passing the threshold. Instead, the lack of 
success of the extreme right in Germany can best be explained by these parties’ 
inability to develop a “modern” differentialist-nativist discourse on the one hand, and 
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the prevailing patterns of competition in the party system on the other. As far as the 
extreme right’s appeal is concerned, it is useful to distinguish, following Ignazi (1992, 
2002, 2003), between “old” and “new” extreme right parties. Of the three most 
important extreme right parties in Germany, the NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands) and DVU (Deutsche Volksunion) are exponents of the “old” group, 
which carries a fascist imprint, while only the Republikaner, a secession of the 
Bavarian CSU, is usually considered a “modern”, post-materialist extreme right party 
(Ignazi 2002: 28). This distinction is crucial because the success of the old type 
cannot be explained as a traditionalist-communitarian counter-movement to the 
libertarian-universalistic left. For all parties but the Republikaner, in other words, the 
chances of establishing a wide appeal have been limited from the start, and even the 
Republikaner’s programmatic discourse is rather vague and unsophisticated (Mudde 
2000), making its inclusion in the extreme right-wing populist party family, as defined 
in Chapter 2, ambiguous at best. Given Germany’s national socialist past, such 
ambiguity is hardly a recipe for electoral success.  
By the same token, I do not devote very much attention to the recent and 
sometimes spectacular successes of extreme right parties in elections at the level of 
the eastern Länder (states). If the “old” extreme right has been successful in Eastern 
Germany, then this cannot plausibly be attributed to the dynamic of party system 
transformations since the late 1960s that have resulted in the emergence of new right-
wing populist parties in countries such as France, Switzerland, or Austria. A different 
explanation is necessary for the support for these parties in the East, and my hunch is 
that it would have more in common with accounts of the extreme right parties in 
Eastern Europe than with those explaining the emergence of a new type of party in the 
long-established party systems of Western Europe. Nonetheless, the empirical part of 
this chapter focuses on the party system of unified Germany as a whole. Obviously, 
the different distribution of preferences in the eastern part of the country impinges on 
the German-wide strategies of parties. Consequently, they are relevant for the patterns 
of opposition that define the space available for the extreme right. These 
methodological choices are consequent on the specific focus of my model, and I 
therefore avoid entering into the ongoing debate about the extent to which distinct 
party systems exist in Western and Eastern Germany (see Pappi 1994, Weßels 2004, 
Dolezal 2007). Hence, with the exception of the 1976 election, the empirical analyses 
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in this chapter focus on the national contests of 1994, 1998 and 2002 in unified 
Germany.  
This chapter is organized as follows. I start with a broad sketch of the historical 
cleavages underlying the German Party system as well as its development in the past 
decades. In the second section, explanations for the weakness of the extreme right are 
discussed. I start by arguing that the electoral system, while being important in 
stabilizing a bipolar pattern of oppositions, cannot by itself account for the weakness 
of the extreme right. This leaves four plausible hypotheses for the failure of a party to 
emerge at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural divide. The first 
stresses the discourse and characteristics of the existing extreme right parties and their 
resulting inability to mobilize along the lines of modern right-wing populist parties 
such as the French Front National. The second hypothesis concerns the legacy of 
National Socialism, and argues that this has implications both at the elite and mass 
levels, as well as on the ability of extreme right actors to gain media access. There is 
evidence from surveys that demonstrates that the appeal of the extreme right’s agenda 
is rather narrow in the German electorate. Furthermore, comparing the media 
coverage of extreme right parties positions across countries reveals that successful 
exponents of this party family were given much more ample room to present their 
positions in the media than has been the case in Germany.  
The third hypothesis focuses on the role and strategy of the established parties, in 
particular in handling the question of immigration. A number of studies has argued 
that there is no space to the right of the Christian Democrat sister parties in cultural 
matters and concerning immigration policies. However, I intend to show that the role 
of the established parties both of the right and the left, and, consequently, the dynamic 
of competition in the party system have been crucial in inhibiting the articulation of 
existing traditionalist-communitarian political potentials. The latter hypothesis is 
pursued further in the third section, where the analytical framework from Chapter 4 is 
applied. Because it is sometimes argued that the Baviarian CSU contributes to 
rallying more extreme voters behind the established right by virtue of its pronounced 
authoritarian or traditionalist stances, I will treat the two Christian Democrat sister 
parties separately. The heart of the empirical sections is devoted to the hypothesis that 
the weakness of the extreme right can be attributed to the ability of the large parties of 
the left and right to absorb as well as crowd out the political potentials stemming from 
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The Post-war Party System and Historical Cleavages 
 
As most of its European counterparts, the German party system carries the imprint of 
the class and religious cleavages. Contrary to the fractionalized and polarized party 
system of the Weimar period, however, the post-war system of parties witnessed a 
process of consolidation and concentration after the War. The Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian-Social Union (CSU) 
succeeded in integrating a large part of the bourgeois electoral potential by absorbing 
various smaller conservative parties (Niedermayer 2006). Whereas the religious 
cleavage had historically embodied an antagonism between Protestants and Catholics, 
the Union parties were founded as inter-confessional Christian parties after the war, 
marking the emergence of a religious-secular cleavage. Concerning the state-market 
cleavage, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) remained the only legal party on the left 
after the outlawing of the Communist Party (KPD). In 1959, the SPD moderated its 
program, resulting in a widening of its appeal. Up to the 1980s, only one relevant 
additional party existed, the Free Democrats (FDP). Traditionally, the FDP took sides 
with the Union parties along the economic cleavage and with the SPD regarding the 
socio-cultural dimension of conflict (Niedermayer 2006: 115). 
Contrary to other countries such as France, the two main cleavages in Germany 
have not coincided, but have cross-cut one another rather strongly after World War II, 
a constellation generally thought to foster ideological moderation. Up to recent 
elections, for instance, Catholic workers have predominantly supported the Christian 
Democrats (Dolezal 2007). Together with the two main parties’ integrative capacity 
and near-hegemonic status, this has resulted in centripetal political competition 
(Smith 1976, Grande 2003). At the same time, the reformist strategy of the social-
liberal coalition under Chancellor Willy Brandt put new issues on the political agenda 
and made it increasingly difficult for the SPD to accommodate the diverging 
tendencies within its electorate, resulting from its increasing appeal among 
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intellectuals and the 1968 generation (Niedermayer 2006: 115-6). The rise of the 
libertarian-authoritarian value divide in the 1970s and 1980s led to internal tensions 
and the SPD found it difficult to define its programmatic line (Kitschelt 1994: 39), 
and ultimately could not avert the foundling of the Ecologist party. The latter’s 
emergence in the early 1980s is generally considered to mark the rise of a new phase 
of pluralization of the party system (Klingemann 1999, Niedermayer 2006).  
Apart from the 1949 election, and up to the founding of the  NPD (National-
demokratische Partei Deutschlands) as a merger of various extreme right splinter 
groups in 1964, extreme right parties had been without major successes in Germany. 
In the 1965 and 1969 federal elections, the NPD received 2.2 and 4.1 percent of the 
vote, respectively. These elections proved to be singular events, however. Despite the 
emergence of the neo-fascist DVU (Deutsche Volksunion) as a second extreme right 
party in 1971, the extreme right consistently received less than 1% of the vote 
thereafter, and remained a marginal phenomenon until the late 1980s (Stöss 2005: 76). 
The Republikaner, which became the most successful post-war extreme right party at 
the national level, were founded in 1983 as a breakaway from the Bavarian Christian 
Democrats (CSU). They reached the height of their success in the elections for the 
European parliament in 1989, where they captured 8.8% of the vote. At the same 
time, the party was unable to win more than marginal vote shares in federal elections. 
The European elections were therefore an exceptional event, and it can thus be argued 
that the extreme right has hardly affected the German party system. 
German reunification has resulted in the entry of a new party, the post-communist 
PDS (Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus). Beyond this, however, unification has 
had a rather limited impact on the German party system, due to the established 
parties’ ability to penetrate the new electoral landscape. Moreover, differences in 
voting behaviour between the eastern and the western part of the country are in 
decline, and party competition has become even more similar with the formation of 
the “Left Party-PDS”  (Dolezal 2007). This party was founded in 2005 as a merger of 
the PDS and the West German WASG (Wahlalternative soziale Gerechtigkeit), a 
party founded by dissatisfied (former) SPD members and union officials. Thus, two 
new parties, the Ecologists and the PDS/Left Party, have gained representation in 
parliament in the “period of differentiation” within the party system beginning in 
1983. At the same time, the number of relevant parties remains lower than in other 
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countries with proportional representation (Klingemann 2004). At least at the surface, 
then, the pattern of moderate pluralism has been preserved, while the process of 
pluralization has had more far-reaching consequences for the logics of coalition-
formation and the mechanics of the party system, especially at the state level (Grande 
2003). 
As far as the social structural determinants of voting choices are concerned, there 
is evidence to show that the party system has remained rather firmly rooted in 
cleavages, as we shall see. In light of the alleged centripetal pattern of competition 
between the major parties, and of the transformation of political space as a result of 
new cultural conflicts since the 1970s, this is rather surprising. And indeed, the 
apparent stability hides a transformation of both historical cleavages. Looking at 
parties’ core constituencies along the traditional class and religious cleavages, the 
propensity of unionized workers to prefer the SPD and of Catholics to support the 
Union parties has remained relatively strong (Klingemann 1999, Weßels 2000). 
However, it is important to note that these persisting differences in party preference 
are not mirrored in strongly diverging ideological orientations of the core groups 
divided by the traditional cleavages, at least not in terms of the conventional left-right 
scale (Weßels 2000). Furthermore, the loyalty of blue-collar workers to the SPD is in 
decline in the medium-term due to generational replacement (Pappi, Mnich 1992, 
Pappi 2002). And overall, the traditional cleavages are in decline as a result of to the 
shrinking of the core groups underlying them, namely, the industrial working class 
and catholic churchgoers (Klingemann 1999: 121). Thus, the impact of the manual-
non-manual divide on overall voting behaviour has weakened (Nieuwbeerta 1995). 
The evidence regarding the religious cleavage is more contradictory. Using 
religiosity as a measure, the religious cleavage appears to have somewhat waned in 
strength between the 1970s and the early 1980s, and has either remained stable 
thereafter (Lachat 2004: 97), or declined further (Knutsen 2004: 229). At the same 
time, however, the predicative strength of religious denomination has not receded 
since the 1970s (Knutsen 2004: 229). As far as the class cleavage is concerned, more 
differentiated class schemas, similar to the one employed in this book, point to a 
transformation, rather than a weakening of the state-market cleavage. Lachat (2004: 
97) can show that the decrease in class voting is quite modest, while it is non-existent 
in Knutsen’s (2004: 229) analysis. In other words, a renewed state-market cleavage 
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remains fairly vibrant in Germany, mainly as a result of the SPD’s adaptation to the 
changing class structure (Müller 1999: 140-1). And contrary to other countries, social 
classes continue to have strongly diverging economic preferences in Germany, while 
such differences in other countries are much stronger in cultural terms (see Lachat, 
Dolezal 2007: 27). The persistence of stronger class differences in economic pref-
erences than in other countries may be partly accounted for by the greater salience of 
the economic divide, which is also a result of the difficulties associated with the 
process of unification, a point I will return to later on. 
Summing up, there is a high degree of persistence of the ties between the two 
major parties and their respective core constituencies. On the other hand, these 
constituencies have shrunken quite dramatically, and it is the parties’ capacity to 
adapt to social structural changes that explains the stability of the German party 
system (Klingemann 1999). As a result of the continual adaptation of the established 
parties, and due to the emergence of the Ecologist party, new links between social 
groups and parties have formed, as studies using more refined class schemas are able 
to show (Müller 1999, Lachat 2004). Levels of volatility have remained 
comparatively low and do not show the sporadic eruptions characteristic of other 
Western European countries, even since the 1980s (Klingemann 2004: 49).  
Overall, the rootedness of the German party system in the electorate does not 
appear to offer very propitious circumstances for the emergence of a party situated at 
the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the new cultural divide. Furthermore, cross-
national differences in the voting behaviour of this party family’s core support groups 
are instructive. As noted in Chapter 1, the working class has become one of the most 
important clientele of right-wing populist parties in the 1990s. Quite contrary to the 
situation in Switzerland and France, however, the industrial workforce remains the 
stronghold of the Social Democrats in Germany (Oesch 2005: 10). Despite the decline 
of the traditional class cleavage, the SPD remains more firmly anchored in the 
working class than other left-wing parties, while Dolezal (2007) shows that catholic 
workers continue to support the Christian Democrats. Persisting alignments within 
this group thus limit the potential for realignments that could benefit the extreme 
right. 
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Explaining the Weakness of the Extreme Right in Germany 
 
Restraining, but not insurmountable: The electoral threshold 
 
Although the German electoral system is basically proportional, combined with the 
vote for a specific candidate, the 5% national threshold for gaining representation in 
the federal parliament discourages the formation of new parties. Givens (2005) argues 
that while the structural potentials for the extreme right exist throughout Western 
Europe, the electoral threshold accounts for the lack of success of the extreme right in 
Germany, because it induces citizens to strategically vote for a viable right-wing 
coalition rather than sincerely voting for the extreme right. Even if we accept the 
finding that strategic voting exists, however, it is somewhat doubtful that this should 
go all the way to explaining the extreme right’s meagre success, as Givens (2005) 
claims in her analysis covering Germany, France, and Austria.  
Apart from a general scepticism towards an exclusively institutional explanation, 
several further points shed doubt on this perspective. First of all, it is debatable 
whether voting for the extreme right is really like voting for any other party, and if it 
plausible to assume that the potential extreme right voter engages in the same kind of 
strategic reasoning as someone who faces the choice between two mainstream parties 
(see Norris 2005: 112-3 for a similar argument in spatial terms). Voters of the extreme 
right are generally disenchanted with the established parties, who fail to represent 
their decidedly traditionalist-communitarian outlooks, and therefore cultivate what 
may be called a “rational protest vote”. To the degree that a traditionalist-communi-
tarian potential similar to that found in other countries exists in Germany, as we may 
assume, and if this segment of the electorate nonetheless supports a mainstream party, 
then this is more likely to have to do with the moderate right’s programmatic offer 
than with strategic considerations. A third point worth remembering is that the 
emergence of the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian line of 
conflict in the German political space, put in evidence in Chapter 2, has resulted in the 
emergence of a strong Ecologist party, which obviously found it possible to overcome 
the threshold. Fourthly, in a cross-national perspective, there is no clear evidence for a 
negative effect of a high effective threshold on support for the extreme right. While 
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earlier analyses have found such an effect (Jackman, Volpert 1996), Carter (2005) has 
recently demonstrated that characteristics of the electoral system no longer have a 
significant effect if the ideological and organizational features of right-wing extremist 
parties themselves are taken into account. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, attributing a decisive role to the electoral 
threshold neglects the experience of the extreme right at the state (Länder) level. At 
various occasions, one of the extreme right parties has succeeded in passing the 5% 
threshold that applies equally for parliamentary elections in the Länder. In most cases, 
however, the extreme right has been unable to consolidate these successes. If the vote 
for these parties were really guided by strategic considerations, their potential voters 
should no longer strategically desert them once they are represented in parliament, 
since they then have a signal that their vote is likely not to be lost. However, in 
Baden-Württemberg the Republicans scored 10.9% of the vote in 1992 and 9.1% in 
1996, and despite being represented in parliament with 15 and 14 seats, respectively, 
they failed to pass the hurdle in the 2001 election. Similarly, they entered Berlin’s 
legislature in 1989 after gaining 7.5% of the vote, yet lost parliamentary represen-
tation in elections held a year later after the fall of the Berlin wall, when they gained 
only 3.7% in the Western part of the city. The only (partial) exception to this pattern 
is Bremen, where parliamentary representation is easier due to a lower threshold, and 
where the DVU has repeatedly entered the parliament. Even there, however, it has not 
been able to hold its vote share, and dropped out of parliament after its all time high 
of 6.2% in 1991 (all election results are from Stöss 2005: 124-133). Whether the same 
applies to the Eastern Länder, where the NPD or the DVU have passed the threshold 
in Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Brandenburg in the most recent contests, is not yet 
clear. In any event, the parties that have benefited from the recent dynamic of success 
in the eastern Länder, the NPD and the DVU, belong to the neo-fascist type of 
extreme right party, whose success cannot be accounted for by the gradual 
transformation of Western European party systems since the 1970s.  
Overall, then, the failure of the extreme right to institutionalize and to consolidate 
its successes even at the state level suggests that the electoral system, while 
representing a hurdle for new parties, can only be attributed an explanatory role in 
conjuncture with other factors. It is not further institutional factors, however, which 
are likely to prove important in this respect. The rules for the state funding of parties, 
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for example, guarantee reimbursement of campaign costs even for parties that fail to 
pass the threshold of 5% of the vote. And according to Norris’ (2005: 95-102) 
compilation of information on various institutional provisions such as party financial 
regulation and entitlement to free media access, the chances for the extreme right in 
Germany do not seem less propitious than elsewhere. We should therefore look at 
features of the party system and of extreme right parties themselves to account for the 
limited appeal of this party family in Germany.  
 
Discourse and organizational capacity of the German extreme right 
 
One of the keys to the success of the extreme populist right throughout Europe, and a 
defining feature of this sub-group of the extreme right party family, has been its 
adoption of a “differentialist nativist” or “ethnopluralist” discourse, as discussed in 
Chapter 1. The populist right must devote considerable energies to demarcating itself 
from overtly racist stances and to portray itself as part of the “politically ignored 
mainstream of society”. Asserting that ethnic communities are “unequal, but 
equivalent” has been a convincing way of issuing traditionalist-communitarian 
credentials in broadly acceptable terms. The most elementary distinction here is the 
one drawn by Ignazi (1992, 2002, 2003) between the “old” extreme right, which is in 
continuity with early 20th century fascism, and the post-industrial parties of the “new” 
extreme right that emerged in the 1980s. Right-wing populist parties are of the latter 
type. As Carter’s (2005) comprehensive analysis shows, neo-fascist parties receive 
only marginal voter shares across Europe. Additionally, Goulder (2003) demonstrates 
that different factors account for the success of “old” and “new” extreme right parties. 
Given the historical experience of National Socialism in Germany, extreme right 
parties will have to moderate their discourse and distance themselves from fascism 
even more explicitly than elsewhere in order to attract more than a handful of protest 
voters. Against this background, it is immediately clear that neither the NPD, nor the 
DVU are likely to make large electoral inroads. There is a consensus that these two 
parties belong to the “old” extreme right group (Ignazi 2002: 28, Goulder 2003) and 
adhere to classical racism (Carter 2005: 36). Furthermore, the DVU is linked rather 
directly to neo-fascist organizations (Kitschelt 1995: 218). Concerning an ethno-
258 Chapter 8 
pluralist discourse, Mudde (2000) finds some vague indications of the concept in the 
DVU’s party literature, but in conclusion states that the party’s ideology is “too 
nebulous to include such elaborated world views as ethnopluralism” (2000: 171-2). 
Both the NPD and the DVU have a programmatic profile quite specific to Germany. 
They retain traces of anti-Semitism, express nostalgia for Germany’s military glories, 
and claim the rehabilitation of the Nazi past. Furthermore, they put heavy emphasis 
on demanding the reunification of Germany prior to 1989 (Ignazi 2003: 66-74). And 
while the NPD in the 1960s did denounce the decline of traditional moral values, the 
Americanization of life styles and the ’68 generation’s libertarian values (ibid, p. 67), 
both parties’ program appears historically charged to a degree that makes it unlikely 
that they should mobilize a broad counter-movement that opposes the diffusion of 
universalistic values.  
In terms of their organizational characteristics, the NPD has a stronger organiza-
tion than the DVU, which was founded in the early 1970s by Gerhard Frey, an 
extreme right businessman and publisher of various nationalist weeklies, but at least 
initially it “more closely resembled a fan club of the popular-nostalgic publications of 
its founder, Gerhard Frey, than a real party” (Ignazi 2003: 69, see also Backes, Mudde 
2000). Both parties are weakly organized and poorly led, however, and the NPD is 
also ridden by internal divisions (Carter 2005: Ch. 3). At the same time, the NPD and 
DVU have at times overcome their rivalries and formed alliances in state elections, 
both in the late 1980s and since the late 1990s, when they became more successful in 
various electoral contests in the eastern Länder. This allowed them to overcome the 
problem that the DVU has a lot of money, but no cadres, while the NPD has the 
opposite problem (Backes, Mudde 2000: 461). However, since the NPD has a 
stronger neo-fascist stance, the alliance makes it more difficult for the extreme right to 
mobilize beyond its core clientele (Stöss 2005: 146). 
Following the “old” vs. “new” extreme right distinction, the auspices for success 
were clearly more favourable for the Republikaner party, which is generally 
considered to be a representative of the “new” type (Ignazi 2002: 28, Goulder 2003, 
Cole 2005). Founded by two MPs of the Bavarian CSU, Franz Handlos and Ekkehard 
Voigt, the Republikaner initially took over large parts of the latter’s program and 
attempted to differentiate itself from the extreme right milieu (Backes, Mudde 2000: 
458-9). However, the party’s national-conservative ideology became more extreme 
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when Franz Schönhuber ascended to the party leadership in 1985, supported by the 
inflow of militants from neo-Nazi organizations into the party after its first electoral 
gains (Kitschelt 1995: 217). Schönhuber was an ex-journalist and former member of 
the Waffen-SS, who had been dismissed by the Bavarian television for his compliance 
with Nazism, and who explicitly tried to turn the Republikaner into a right-wing 
populist party inspired by the Front National in France (Backes, Mudde 2000: 459, 
Ignazi 2003: 71-2).  
However, the Republikaner lacked broader appeal by failing to cushion the 
immigration theme in acceptable terms. According to Mudde (2000: 171-2), the party 
does not have an elaborate ideology and the concept of ethnopluralism is even less 
present in the Republikaner’s programs than in those issued by the DVU. Having been 
accused regularly of anti-Semitism and racism, even if these themes are more implicit 
than explicitly mentioned in the party’s literature (Mudde 2000: 45), the party’s 
programmatic stance has faced difficulties in finding acclaim in a country in which 
where the rejection of ideas connected to National Socialism is part of the democratic 
consensus. That said, the Republikaner, who have always been explicitly pro-
democratic, have repeatedly attempted to moderate their overall profile, but without 
much success. Contradictions remained even in phases of ideological moderation, 
such as the demand to restore the pre-World War II borders of the German Reich 
(Ignazi 2003: 73). Since 1992, the party is under surveillance by the Federal Office 
for the Protection of the Constitution. As a consequence, the new chairman, Rolf 
Schlierer, tried to move the party away from extremism, but without much success. In 
1998, Schlierer agreed with the NPD and DVU that the three parties should not 
engage in competition in future elections, further blurring the boundaries between old 
and new extreme right in Germany. 
The erratic movement from extreme positions to more moderate stances and back 
results from continuous power struggles inside the party. In terms of party organiza-
tion and leadership, the Republikaner benefited from generous public funding after 
their early successes and was able to count on growing numbers of party activists, 
which should have allowed them to reinforce the party apparatus. Nonetheless, the 
confrontations between the clearly extreme faction and the more moderate 
protagonists such as Schlierer could not be accommodated within the party’s 
structures (Decker 2000: 162-3). Carter (2005: 66-72) classifies the Republikaner as a 
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weakly organized, poorly led and divided right-wing extremist party, pointing out that 
Schönhuber, although generally considered the most charismatic right-wing extremist 
leader in Germany (Decker 2003: 58, Stöss 2005: 85), proved too weak to withstand 
the dissent within the party leadership. This clearly contrasts with leaders such as Le 
Pen in France, who has been able either to accommodate the radical extreme right 
groups and more moderate proponents of the party, or to survive the breakaway of 
dissenting competitors, as we have seen in Chapter 6. 
In conclusion, the parties of the extreme right in Germany differ from the 
successful exponents of this party family. Among the three most successful extreme 
right parties in Germany, the Republikaner stand out for fulfilling at least one of the 
criteria I have set out as defining for the right-wing populist party family, namely, a 
broad anti-establishment discourse (on this point, see Mudde 2000: 53-55, 77-8). 
None of the parties has developed an elaborate traditionalist-communitarian discourse 
and all are plagued by internal rifts and lack undisputed leaders. Together with the 
patterns of competition in the party system, which will be discussed shortly, I take 
these factors to be a more pertinent explanation of the Republikaner’s ultimate failure 
than accounts stressing their economic profile. In Kitschelt’s (1995: Ch. 6) account, 
the Republikaner have limited their electoral appeal by not endorsing market 
capitalism and the call for a small state, and have thereby failed to establish them-
selves as an alternative to the established right. As a consequence, and differing from 
successful new radical right parties, according to Kitschelt, only blue-collar workers 
are over-represented in the Republikaner’s electorate, while the party lacks appeal 
among small businesspeople and farmers. 
In fact, the Republikaner party initially advocated a mixture of liberal economics 
and social protection much in the same way as its mother party, the Bavarian CSU, 
but in the 1990s started to issue welfare chauvinist stances in order to appeal to the 
lower classes (Mudde 2000: 48-50). More than anything else, in other words, the 
Republikaner have simply skipped the neo-liberal phase that certain right-wing 
populist parties such as the Front National and the FPÖ went through in the early 
1980s. As the analysis in Chapter 2 has shown, the latter two parties no longer clearly 
endorse market liberalism, while the analysis of the Front National’s voters has shown 
that they do not stand out for their market liberal credentials. Moreover, the initial 
over-representation of small businessmen among Front National voters has washed 
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out, as shown in Chapter 6. As a consequence, the social composition of successful 
right-wing populist parties has come to resemble the pattern that Kitschelt deemed 
exceptional in the case of the Republikaner (see Betz 2001, 2004 and the survey of the 
literature in Chapter 1). In other words, the Republikaner’s welfare chauvinist stances 
appear far from irrational, and the lacking repercussion of the party’s message is more 
likely to lie in its inability to develop a convincing traditionalist-communitarian 
discourse. 
 
Historical legacies and the stigmatisation of the extreme right in Germany 
 
The adherence of contemporary extreme right parties to historically burdened 
concepts of ethnic nationalism is likely to inhibit their success even more strongly in 
Germany than elsewhere due to the memory of National Socialism. At the same time, 
this specific historical experience may account for the continuity in extreme right 
thought. As discussed in Chapter 3, political activists always draw on historical 
blueprints, discussions in intellectual circles, or ongoing debates in political 
philosophy in adopting political ideologies. Regarding Germany, Kitschelt (1995: 
203-4) diagnoses a legacy of fascism both in terms of “old fighters” from the Nazi 
period having been around, as well as in terms of intellectual thought, since the 
traditional extreme right has been able to transmit its interpretation of politics to 
successor generations of activists. In France, on the other hand, the Front National 
drew on contemporary philosophical currents of the New Right and the writings of 
Alain de Benoist, who had popularized ethnopluralist concepts.  
One of the reasons why nothing of the sort happened in Germany may lie in the 
discursive opportunity structures resulting from different models of citizenship 
(Koopmans, Kriesi 1997). Amending the authors’ model slightly, the republican 
model of citizenship in France provides opportunities for a culturalist, ethnopluralist 
discourse, and actors can either demand the cultural assimilation of foreigners, or 
claim that they cannot be integrated, and demand the limitation of their number. An 
ethnic conception of citizenship, on the other hand, together with the long-standing 
denial of the political class that Germany is a country of immigration, provides much 
less fertile ground for the politicization of the question of integration and cultural 
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identity, and arguments hinging on biological racism have therefore survived. At the 
same time, the legacy of National Socialism has made racism a taboo and has 
restricted the political space to the right of the Christian Democrat parties along the 
cultural dimension. Hence, while discursive opportunities for the extreme right 
resulting from their respective model of citizenship are strong both in Germany and in 
France, these factors explain why extreme right mobilization has followed the path of 
radicalization in Germany, but has institutionalized in the party system in France, 
according to Koopmans et al. (2005). The fascist legacy, the nature of the extreme 
right’s discourse, as well as its political marginalization push it further towards 
radicalization. At the same time, the stigmatisation of extreme right activism is 
especially strong in Germany, as comparative studies have shown (Klandermans et al. 
2005), and it extends to (new) extreme right or right-wing populist parties as well.  
One of the consequences of the stigmatization of extreme right thought is that none 
of the established parties would ever enter an alliance with the extreme right in 
Germany. Equally relevant, however, is the extreme right’s limited access to the news 
media. If right-wing populist parties want to convince the public of the difference 
between overt racism and ethnopluralism in order to mobilize mainstream voters with 
particularistic orientations, the media must give them an opportunity to present their 
political ideas. In Germany, even the initially more moderate Republikaner were by 
and large denied access to television, in part also because politicians from the 
established parties were unwilling to enter into discussion with them (Bergdorf 1998).  
The media data used throughout this book allow a comparison of the degree to 
which newspapers in different countries function as a platform for the diffusion of 
extreme right parties’ programmatic stances. Table 8.1 shows the number of actor-
issue sentences issued by extreme right parties and politicians that have been captured 
in the coding of newspaper articles. These are the sentences that give voters 
information on the policy positions of political parties and that I use for the graphical 
representation of political spaces. Table 8.1 shows that the amount of coverage that 
newspapers provide of extreme right parties’ programmatic statements differs 
strongly by country. Furthermore, it reveals that all successful right-wing populist 
parties such as the Front National and the FPÖ could count on extensive media 
coverage. Germany and Britain stand out for not giving any space whatsoever to 
extreme right parties’ program. These parties may be discussed in the media (mostly 
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in terms of the danger they represent for democracy), and other political actors may 
refer to them (also mostly in negative terms), but not a single sentence gives readers a 
hint of these parties’ policy stances.  
 
Table 8.1:  Newspaper coverage of extreme right-wing (populist) parties’ 
programmatic stances in six countries (number and share of actor-issue-
sentences in election campaigns, late 1980s to early 2000s) 
 Austria Switzerland France Netherlands Germany  Britain 
Election (FPÖ) (SVP)  (EXR) (FN) (EXR) (EXR) (EXR) 
1st  71 (8.8%) 162 (14.8%) 87 (8%) 190 (9.3%) 21 (2.9%) 0 (–) 0 (–) 
2nd  177 (16.1%) 81 (15.6%) 34 (6.5%) 114 (6.3%) 0 (0%) 0 (–) 0 (–) 
3rd  168 (17%) 87 (26.9%) 2 (0.6%) 138 (12.3%) 12 (0.9%) 0 (–) 0 (–) 
Note: The election years analysed are 1994, 1999 and 2002 in Austria, 1991, 1995 and 1999 in 
Switzerland, 1988, 1995 and 2002 in France, 1994, 1998 and 2002 in the Netherlands, 1994, 
1998 and 2002 in Germany, 1992, 1997 and 2001 in Great Britain.  
Source: Media content analysis, see Chapter 5. 
 
Obviously, media access is much easier for established parties that have underwent a 
transformation to a right-wing populist party, as the cases of the FPÖ and the SVP 
show. However, we can see in the Swiss case that the smaller extreme right parties 
also received fairly extensive coverage prior to their decline in the mid-1990s. 
Furthermore, French newspapers give considerable attention to the Front National’s 
programmatic statements, including full-page interviews with Le Pen. On the other 
hand, Dutch newspapers hardly write about the programs of parties such as the 
Centrumsdemokraten. This corresponds to the strong stigmatisation of extreme right 
activism, where the Netherlands displays similarities with Germany (Klandermans et 
al. 2005). Because I do not consider the LPF a right-wing populist party, as argued in 
Chapter 2, I have not included Pim Fortuyn’s statements in the figure for the 
Netherlands. Pim Fortuyn was in fact able to play an important role in the 2002 media 
campaign, and to present his ideas in great detail. 341 or over 25% of all actor-issue 
sentences referred to his political program.  
Of course, cause and effect are to some degree unclear in this comparison, since it 
may also be right-wing populist parties’ ideological moderation and more nuanced 
ideology that gives them better media access, which then contributes to their success. 
Nonetheless, the comparison does suggest that even modern right-wing populist 
parties will be likely to face considerable difficulties in diffusing their message in 
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Germany and Britain. We can conclude, then, that countries not only differ in the 
degree to which the established parties lay a “cordon sanitaire” around right-wing 
populist parties and preclude alliances with them, but also regarding the barriers 
extreme right parties face in gaining media access.  
As a consequence of its neo-fascist discourse in conjuncture with the stigmatiza-
tion of its positions, the extreme right’s electoral potential is more limited in Germany 
than in other countries. Table 8.2 shows the share of all respondents in the 1998 post-
election survey that believe that the Republikaner and the DVU, respectively, 
represent their interests. The overall results show that the Republikaner have a 
somewhat broader appeal, with 6.1% of the respondents agreeing that the party has 
the right objectives, while the corresponding figure for the DVU is lower. As we 
know from the country analyses so far, parts of the electorate of the established right 
has cultural preferences that put them into reach of right-wing populist parties’ 
mobilization efforts. To test whether this also holds true for the extreme right in 
Germany, the responses in Table 8.2 are broken down by party choice in the 1998 
election. The results reveal that support for the Republikaner’s political program does 
not differ among the supporters of the major parties, and that the same hold true for 
the DVU. Leaving aside those who actually voted for the extreme right, the 
perception that these parties represent their interests is slightly stronger, but still 
modest among non-voters, and strongest among respondents who refused to declare 
their party choice. Here, the potential is higher, in part because this group is likely to 
comprise a number of respondents who did not admit actually having voted for the 
extreme right.1  
To sum up, the results presented in Table 8.2 show that even for the more moderate 
Republikaner party, the overall electoral potential is limited, and does not appear to be 
a function of partisanship. By comparison, in France, 22.3% of all respondents in 
2002 declared they either strongly or more or less agreed with the ideas defended by 
Jean-Marie Le Pen, and this share is much higher among the voters of the established 
right than among the established left.2 The results for Germany, on the other hand, are 
compatible with the finding reported by Falter (1994) and Arzheimer et al. (2001) that 
                                                
1  Concerning the outright rejection of the extreme right’s program, electorates vary somewhat more, 
and so does the share of those who think the extreme right neither represents, nor opposes their 
interests. Because the latter category is somewhat difficult to interpret, however, and I focus on 
those who think the extreme right would potentially represent their interests.  
2  Calculated from the 2002 post-election survey used in Chapter 6. 
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even the majority of voters with strongly right-wing extremist world-views are 
integrated by the Social Democrat and Christian Democrat parties. Apart from the 
differences between extreme right parties themselves, this begs the question whether 
the extreme right’s limited potential is due to the strategies of the established parties, 
to which I now turn. 
 
Table 8.2:  Perception of voters that extreme right parties represent their interests,  
 by electorate, 1998 (in percent) 
 Party Electorate 
 Ecolo PDS SPD FDP CDU CSU EXR Non- Refuse Total 
        Voters answer 
 
Do the Republikaner… 
represent your interests 3 4.7 4.5 0.4 4.7 4.8 81.6 5 9 6.1 
oppose your interests 92.2 83.7 86.4 84.2 84.8 75.4 11.4 68.8 74.6 82.1 
neither nor 4.9 11.6 9.1 15.4 10.6 19.9 7 26.2 16.5 11.8 
 
Does the DVU… 
represent your interests 2.6 4.8 3.4 0.5 2.7 2.3 39 3.9 10.4 4.3 
oppose your interests 93.1 84 88.3 78.7 88.9 85.2 27.8 74.8 73.8 85 
neither nor 4.4 11.2 8.3 20.9 8.4 12.5 33.2 21.3 15.9 10.8 
Note: Results calculated using regional sampling weights. 
Source: 1998 Post-election survey, see Appendix B.  
Legend: Ecolo: Green party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen); PDS: Party of Democratic Socialism; SPD: 
Social Democratic Party; FDP: Liberal Democrats; CDU: Christian Democratic Union; CSU: 
Christian-Social Union (only in Bavaria), EXR: extreme right voters, including NPD, DVU, 
and Republikaner.  
 
 
The role and strategy of the established parties: Still a restricted ideological space? 
 
Since World War II, the two Christian Democrat sister parties have proven a 
remarkable capacity of integrating the entire right-wing spectrum. Smith (1976), in 
discussing Germany’s “restricted ideological space”, points out that “The early ability 
of the CDU to spread itself across the previously rigid lines of German society led to 
the assimilation of a large proportion of the electorate within a single umbrella-party” 
(1977: 402). In the 1950s, the Union first formed alliances with and then integrated 
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the “Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten” (BHE), a party representing 
expellees from the east. Using a strong rhetoric of German national unity, it prevented 
the emergence of an independent extreme right voter bloc (Kitschelt 1995: 208). The 
Union’s strategy of refusing to accept a competitor to its right has been a deliberate 
one. The dominance of the Union parties in the right-wing spectrum gives them 
considerable leeway to shift their positions when new issues emerge and to take 
pronounced stances without risking to lose to a more centre-right competitor. Until 
today, it is widely held that the extreme right’s marginality is due to the ability of the 
established right to take up the latter’s issues, to occupy its positions in a more 
moderate and acceptable way, and to thereby integrate potential supporters of extreme 
right-wing parties (Niedermayer 2006: 119, Minkenberg 1997: 155, Jaschke 1999: 
141-2, Dolezal 2007). 
Comparative research shows that the political space other parties leave to the 
extreme right impacts strongly on the latter’s success. In an analysis covering 41 
extreme right parties, Carter (2005: 114-125, 205-212) shows that these parties 
perform worse when their mainstream right-wing competitors are more right-wing. 
Regarding Germany, it appears as if the established right was able to absorb the right-
wing extremist potential until the early 1980s, and then again in the 1990s to present. 
The following brief sketch seeks to substantiate this claim. I wish to show that the 
established right first failed to respond adequately to the challenge resulting from the 
rise of the New Left, resulting in the emergence of the Republikaner party in 1983, 
followed by a number of electoral surges. However, German unification and the 
immigration issue provided the Christian Democrats with an opportunity to regain 
credibility among traditionalist-communitarian voters, thereby again restricting the 
political space available for the extreme right. 
Germany witnessed a “renaissance of conservatism” in the 1970s as a reaction to 
the 1968 student movement and to the formation of a social-liberal government after 
the 1972 election, which performed a policy shift regarding the communist countries 
in the east (the so-called “Ostpolitik”). Confronted with the decline of religiosity and 
a programmatic vacuum, the Union parties endorsed the Zeitgeist by stressing the 
importance of the family for moral guidance, and by propagating a new historical and 
national consciousness (Grande 1988). The new conservative-liberal coalition that 
took office in 1982 had announced a moral and intellectual renewal (“geistig-
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moralische Wende”), which can be interpreted as a neo-conservative counterpart to 
the New Left political agenda. When the Union parties returned to power, however, 
they failed to perform the promised “turn” in terms of concrete policies (Ignazi 2003: 
74-5). Symbolically, however, patriotism made come-back under Kohl’s chancellor-
ship (Grande 1988: 69). It was a large loan of the Federal government to the German 
Democratic Republic, arranged by CSU-leader Franz Josef Strauß, which provoked 
the breakaway of the Republikaner from their Bavarian Christian Democrat mother 
party. The founding of the Republikaner party is widely held to have resulted from the 
space created by the Union parties’ failure to fulfil their promises, which in turn was 
due to tensions between competing factions within the party (Minkenberg 1992: 70-2, 
Grande 1988: 70-1, Ignazi 2003: 75).  
In other words, the Union parties, as a party with a pluralist and democratic 
internal structure, showed difficulties in absorbing the traditionalist political potential 
that resulted from the mobilization of the New Left. The odds for such a strategy 
improved, however, with the rise of two new issues on the political agenda. For one 
thing, the Union orchestrated the re-unification of the country under Helmut Kohl’s 
leadership and thereby deprived the extreme right of one of its central themes of the 
post-war decades (Stöss 2005: 38-40, 86). Even the new Republikaner party, which 
reached the apex of its success in the wake of the fall of the Berlin wall, had made this 
one of their central claims (Betz 1991: 121). However, the Union had always been 
sensitive to the national question in order to accommodate one of the extreme right’s 
central themes, such as never explicitly recognizing the post-war eastern border with 
Poland. Finally, with the fall of the wall, the Christian Democrats became the party of 
re-unification. For another, the CSU and parts of the CDU took up the immigration 
issue already in the early 1980s. A few weeks before the fall of the social-liberal 
coalition, CDU leader Helmut Kohl demanded the reduction of the number of 
foreigners in Germany, and the CSU continued to campaign against refugees 
(Thränhardt 1995, Schmidke 2004).  
The Social Democrats responded differently to the explosive immigration issue 
than did the Socialists in France, however. The latter had pursued an “adversarial 
strategy” regarding the issue, making multiculturalism a central claim (Meguid 2005; 
see Chapter 6). Instead, the SPD employed a “dismissive strategy” by systematically 
downplayed the immigration question. In retrospect, Helmut Schmidt explained that 
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the SPD in 1980 had decided not to ask for local voting rights for foreigners because 
this went “against the instincts of our core electorate”, namely, their blue-collar 
constituency (Thränhardt 1995: 327, Schmidtke 2004: 166-7). In the early 1990s, the 
SPD again avoided a stretching of the ideological space. When Germany was 
confronted with large number of migrants and refugees from Eastern Europe and 
former Yugoslavia, spurring a wave of extreme right activism and violence, the Union 
parties, then in government, reacted promptly. They modified the constitution to allow 
for a far more restrictive immigration policy. The Union parties argued that the 
“threshold of tolerance” and of the capacity to assimilate foreigners had been reached, 
and succeeded in forcing the SPD into the so-called “asylum compromise” (Schmidke 
2004: 169). The resolute reaction of the Union and the giving in of the SPD ousted the 
issue from the political agenda. According to Ignazi (2003: 77-8), continued extreme 
right violence after the amendment of the constitution and the consecutive drop in 
new refugees was confronted with a strong counter-mobilization by anti-racist 
organizations and trade unions, and resulted in a re-stigmatization of extreme right 
positions. 
The integration of foreigners became a more polarizing issue in 1999 when the red-
green coalition announced to reform Germany’s nationality law and attempted to 
allow the dual nationality for long-standing foreign residents and their children. In 
response, the Union parties launched a large debate on national identity, the CDU’s 
parliamentary leader Friedrich Merz demanding that immigrants must conform to 
Germany’s “guiding culture” (“Leitkultur”). As a consequence, the new nationality 
law was drafted in close collaboration with the opposition, because the government 
wanted to keep the issue out of partisan politics. In the event, the proposition was 
watered down considerably. Nevertheless, the Union parties voted against the law in 
parliament, and it only passed the upper house of parliament under constitutionally 
dubious circumstances (Schmidke 2004: 171). 
Again, comparative research underlines the accommodative strategy of the parties 
of the established right concerning the extreme right-wing agenda. Luebbers et al. 
(2002) show that the space for an extreme right-wing party is limited in Germany as 
compared to other countries as a result of the CSU’s position concerning immigration, 
which has the most restrictive stance of all established right-wing parties included in 
the analysis. Koopmans et al. (2005) come to the same conclusion, and interestingly, 
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it is again in Germany and Great Britain that the established right leaves little room to 
the extreme right and is able to pre-empt the latter’s success. As Falter (1994: 159-
163) and Decker (2000: 164-5) observe, the success of the extreme right in Germany 
has generally followed the political attention cycles regarding the immigration and 
integration issues. However, the Union parties’ ensuing capacity to absorb the issue, 
in conjuncture with the consensus-oriented approach of the SPD, seems to have kept 
the issue from staying on the political agenda for protracted periods of time. As a 
consequence, the extreme right potential has declined in Germany. Based on 
calculations by van der Brug et al. (2005: 547) using European Election Studies, the 
share of respondents finding the Republikaner attractive dropped from 16.1% in 1989 
to 11.3% in 1994, and further to 5% in 1999. 
One of the central aims of the empirical analysis in the remaining sections of this 
chapter is to evaluate the claim that the extreme populist right has found its 
mobilization space restricted due to the dynamics of competition in the party system. 
First of all, I will extend the analysis in Chapter 2, which showed that the basic 
dimensions underlying competition in the German party system resemble those found 
in the other countries, by analysing these dimensions separately for each election. If 
the structure of competition in Germany is similar to that found elsewhere in Western 
Europe, then the (extreme) traditionalist-communitarian potential may be prevented 
from manifesting itself in broadly two ways. First, as suggested above, the Union 
parties may crowd the extreme right out by virtue of their pronounced stance 
concerning the question of community and other issues associated with the new 
cultural divide. If this hypothesis is correct, the Union parties should exhibit a fairly 
extreme position along this divide. On the other hand, there may be segments of the 
electorate that hold more extreme positions on the cultural divide than those 
represented by the Union parties, but these voters may nonetheless refrain from 
supporting a more extreme party. In this case, the political potential that these voters 
represent remains latent either due to the established parties’ efforts of not making 
traditionalist-exclusionist issues a mayor issue, or to the lack of legitimacy of the 
existing extreme right parties. Applying the analytical model from Chapter 4, these 
hypotheses will now be tested empirically. 
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The Configuration of the Party-Political Space: The Traditionalist-
Communitarian Transformation of the 1990s 
 
The analysis starts by determining the dimensions underlying oppositions in the 
election campaigns studied and follows the methodological procedures laid out in 
Chapter 5. Because of the frequent claim that the Union parties are able to cover the 
entire right-of-the-middle political spectrum by virtue of the Bavarian CSU taking a 
more rightist and anti-immigrant position than the CSU, the Bavarian Christian 
Democratic party is positioned separately. All sentences in the newspapers referring 
to common positions of the two Union parties are coded as CDU statements. Figure 
8.1 shows the representation of political space resulting from the MDS-analysis. In all 
but one case, the solutions are clearly two-dimensional. The exception is the 2002 
election, where it is debatable whether a two- or a three-dimensional solution is more 
appropriate. However, the goodness-of-fit of the solution improves far more when 
moving from one to two dimensions than when moving from two to three, and for 
ease of representation and interpretation, I have therefore chosen the two-dimensional 
solution.3  
In all four elections, an economic and a cultural line of opposition emerge. Both in 
the 1970s and in the 1990s/2000s, the economic conflict is characterized by the 
antagonism between support for the welfare state on the one hand, and advocacy of 
economic liberalism on the other, representing the traditional state-market divide. 
From the distances between the two poles of the economic divide, we can see that 
divisions regarding economic policy run deeper in the 1998 and 2002 elections than in 
the two earlier contests. Regarding the cultural divide, a transformation occurs 
between the 1970s and the 1990s. In 1976, this dimension is structured by diverging 
positions regarding cultural liberalism, while both budgetary rigor and support for the 
army lie at the opposing end of the dimension in the traditionalist political space. 
From a theoretical point of view, both issues can plausibly be interpreted as the 
counter-pole to cultural liberalism, and I have therefore drawn the axis between them. 
In 1994, however, when the immigration issue appears on the political agenda, a
                                                
3  The values for the Stress-I statistic are 0.16 in 1976, 0.34 in 1994, 0.32 in 1998, and 0.25 in 2002. 





























































Figure 8.1: Political space in Germany, 1976-2002. Positions of parties and issue categories 
Legend: see Table 8.2
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traditionalist-communitarian counter-pole to cultural liberalism has emerged.
4
 The 
universalistic values embodied in cultural liberalism, on the other hand, prove less 
polarizing in this election, as the centrist location of the category shows. This is an 
exception, however, since the cultural divide clearly cuts across the economic divide 
in the 1998 and 2002 campaigns, and both poles structure party oppositions.  
In other words, a cultural divide opposing a libertarian-universalistic position on 
the one hand, and a traditionalist-communitarian defence of community on the other 
hand has clearly taken shape in Germany in the 1990s, and in a similar way to France 
and Switzerland. In principle, this should provide a favourable opportunity structure 
for right-wing populist parties. This transformed cultural divide resembles the 
“parochialism vs. cosmopolitism” dimension that Kitschelt (1995: 226) found only 
the Republikaner’s electorate to take an extreme position on in 1990, while this 
dimension did not structure the attitudes of the entire electorate. As Dolezal (2007, 
Table 2) shows, there is an economic and a cultural factor underlying voters’ 
attitudes, and both cultural liberalism, as well as immigration are part of the cultural 
dimension in the 1998 and 2002 elections. A line of conflict initially only relevant for 
extreme right voters has thereby arrived at the very centre of party competition in 
Germany. 
While the positions of the parties in the political space will be analysed in more 
detail and separately for each dimension in the following section, some broad 
evolutions deserve notice here. The configurations in Figure 8.1 show that the Union 
parties have taken a clear position along the cultural dimension already in the 1970s, 
and the CDU is also located nearest to the traditionalist-communitarian pole from 
1994 on. The position of the CSU does not appear more extreme than that of the 
CDU, but this may also be due to the more limited information we have concerning its 
stances. The SPD’s location is less clear-cut than that of the CDU. In 1976, when it 
formed a coalition with the liberals, it constitutes a left-libertarian pole, while the FDP 
takes a economically rightist and culturally libertarian position. In the later 
campaigns, however, the SPD has adopted more centrist stances and abandoned its 
distinctive position, which is now occupied by the Ecologists. Similarly to the SPD, 
                                                
4  In the 1994 campaign, 2.7% of the sentences fell into the immigration category, slightly below the 
share of 3% usually employed as a minimum for the inclusion into the MDS-solution (see Chapter 
5). I have lowered the minimal share of sentences for this election to allow the representation of 
immigration. In 1998 and 2002, 6.3% and 4.1% of the sentences concerned immigration, 
respectively (see Appendix A). 
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the FDP has also taken its distance from cultural liberalism, especially in the 2002 
election. At the same time, however, it takes more clearly market-liberal positions. 
Finally, the post-communist PDS appears quite left-libertarian in 1994 and 1998, but 
can no longer be represented in the 2002 solution due to insufficient media coverage 
of its policy stances. 
A final point that deserves mention concerns the issue of European integration. 
Contrary to Switzerland and France, disputes over supranational integration do not 
emerge as a salient dimension of party competition. In fact, European integration only 
played a role in the 1994 election, and there, favourable stances regarding the 
integration project lie close to the traditionalist-communitarian area of political space, 
reflecting the CDU’s traditional promotion of the integration process. In Germany, 
support for the EU is therefore not associated with libertarian-universalistic positions, 
as expected theoretically in Chapter 1, and as shown in the French and Swiss analysis. 
This reflects a pro-European consensus in Germany, where no relevant political actor 
has mobilized against European integration. Furthermore, mass attitudes regarding the 
EU have traditionally been quite favourable in Germany, and the fear of losing 
sovereignty is not widespread, despite less euphoric support for the EU since the 
1980s (Diez-Medrano 2003, Dolezal 2007). As the surveys employed in this chapter 
show, partisanship is not structured by attitudes regarding the EU to a significant 
degree. The average attitudes of the supporters of the two large parties, the CDU and 
the SPD, hardly differ, while the voters of the Ecologists and the FDP stand out for 
their rather pronounced pro-European attitudes (data not shown here). For this reason, 
and because we lack reliable information on the positions of parties, the EU-
dimension is not examined in this chapter. 
For the subsequent analyses of the positions of the parties and of their voters, the 
dimension are defined as follows. For the economic divide, welfare and economic 
liberalism emerge as polarizing issues in all four contests, and the case is therefore 
straightforward. As Table 8.3 shows, at least attitudes regarding economic liberalism 
can be measured on the demand side in all four elections using survey data. As far as 
the cultural divide is concerned, I use positions regarding cultural liberalism, 
budgetary rigor and the army in the 1976 election. Both neo-conservative calls for 
cutting back the state, as well as insistence on a strong army theoretically make sense 
as traditionalist counter-poles to libertarian positions. While all three categories can 
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Table 8.3: Relevant issue-categories and available data on the demand side 
 Economic dimension Cultural dimension 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Budget Army  
1976 X X X – – 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Immigration 
1994 X X X X 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Immigration 
1998 – X X X 
 Welfare  Ecolib  Cultlib  Immigration 
2002 – X X X 
 
Note:  X denotes that the category can be operationalized and that a single dimension results from the 
factor analysis. See Chapter 5 for an explanation of this procedure and Appendix C for a list of 
the items used for each category. 
 
be measured on the supply side, survey data only allows an operationalization of 
cultural liberalism on the demand side. In the three more recent contests, I uniformly 
use cultural liberalism and immigration to locate parties and voters, and items 
pertaining to these categories are available in the three surveys. For all subsequent 
analyses, the second vote (“Zweitstimme”) is used to identify respondents’ party 
preference. The first vote is cast in single-member districts, and in most of them, the 
SPD and Union parties alone have realistic chances of winning a seat, resulting in 
widespread strategic voting. By contrast, the second vote, which is cast in fairly large 
multi-member districts, allows respondents to cast a more sincere vote. 
 
 
Parties and Voters on the Cultural Divide 
 
Position, match, and polarization 
 
Applying my analytical model that distinguishes different types of opposition between 
parties and electorates, we now turn to the question how well the German party 
system reflects voter orientations. The analysis begins with the cultural divide. The 
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positions of parties and voters are presented in Figure 8.2, together with the values for 
polarization and the match between parties and voters (for all methodological matters, 
please refer to Chapter 5). In the 1976 election, the positions of the parties represent 
an opposition between the social-liberal government and the Christian Democratic 
opposition along the libertarian-traditionalist divide, and positions are highly 
polarized. As indicated by the match between political supply and demand, the party 
system reflects voter preferences almost perfectly. A two-block structure is clearly 
discernible at both levels.
5
 
There is a break between the situation in the mid-1970s and the three more recent 
contests, where the old contrast is no longer present. The most striking feature of the 
new pattern is that the two major parties no longer take strongly opposing positions, 
and that the same holds true for their electorates. In the 1994 contest, a year after the 
new immigration law took effect, the SPD and CDU lie very close to one another, a 
finding confirmed in the later elections. Together, the major parties lie closer to the 
libertarian-universalistic pole in 1994, move to the centre of the spectrum in 1998, 
and then move back to the left in 2002. In the 1994 election, newspapers very much 
focused on the three traditional German parties, and we cannot place the smaller 
actors, which tend to take much more extreme positions in the later contests. This is 
particularly true of the Ecologists, while the FDP hovers between the mainstream 
positions of the two major parties and a more decidedly libertarian-universalistic 
stance. Finally, as discussed earlier on, at no point does the media give any cues of the 
political program of the parties of the extreme right. 
A new pattern of opposition has thus emerged, which is characterized by similar 
political stances of the SPD and Union parties, while the smaller parties occupy the 
universalistic space to the left of the SPD, which the latter has abandoned since the 
mid-1970s. This pattern mirrors the distribution of preferences on the voter side. 
Except for 1998, where the figure for match barely reaches the level indicating 
congruent representation, the correlation between the positions of parties and those of 
their voters is very high, indicating that the party system is responsive to voter 
preferences. While large parts of the electorate are thus bound into an alliance
                                                
5  Non-voters are included in this graph because they stand out for their rather traditionalist positions, 
possibly indicating an electoral potential to the right of the Union parties. This contrasts with the 
centrist average location of non-voters in the later years, where they are not shown for this reason. 




1976: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (4 parties): 0.96 






1994: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (3 parties): 0.94 






1998: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (6 parties): 0.8 






2002: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (6 parties): 0.95 
polarization parties: 0.25 
 
Figure 8.2: Parties and voters on the cultural divide in Germany, 1976-2002.  
Position, match, and polarization 
Legend: see Table 8.2 
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with two major centrist parties, the forefront of the New Left is mobilized by the 
Ecologists, whose voters consistently lie at the universalistic pole of the divide. There 
is an imbalance in the party system along the cultural divide, since there is no counter-
pole to the Ecologists mobilizing voters at the traditionalist-communitarian extreme of 
the preference distribution. A potential for differentiation would exist on the right, 
however. Using factor scores to locate parties, the centre of the axis halves the 
distribution of respondents, and we can clearly see that there are many voters to the 
right of the average Union voter. 
However, apart from the small group of extreme right followers, these voters do 
not seem inclined to support new or anti-establishment political parties. In fact, it is 
interesting to note that those who voted for the Republikaner in 1994 do not appear 
more extreme than Christian Democrat voters at all. This could indicate that a 
considerable share of them were protest voters, as Westle and Niedermayer (1992) 
have suspected, while Falter (1994) has found evidence that these voters in fact hold 
extremist world-views. With the data used here, however, reliable conclusions are 
precluded by the extremely limited number of Republikaner voters in the sample 
(N=9). In the two more recent elections, where there are more respondents, the 
situation is different. Here, the voters of the Republikaner, the NPD, and the DVU are 
subsumed under the extreme right label, and this electorate is clearly situated at the 
extreme of the cultural dimension. As we would expect, they express fierce opposition 
both against immigration and cultural liberalism. At the same time, the parties of the 
extreme right appear unable to mobilize voters beyond their core constituency of 
hard-line authoritarians. In this respect, the other parties’ handling of the immigration 
issue, which extreme right parties can credibly claim to own, appears most relevant, 
apart from the characteristics of the extreme right parties themselves, and the 
stigmatization that is associated with supporting them. By and large, the established 
parties have kept the immigration issue off the political agenda after the reform of the 
immigration law, containing its saliency. While the Union parties do issue highly 
restrictive stances regarding immigration, which differ considerably from those of the 
SPD (see the tables in Appendix A), the relative marginality of the immigration issue 
means that positions on the cultural dimension are dominated by the far more salient 
278 Chapter 8 
questions centring on cultural liberalism.
6
 At the highest, in the 1998 election 
campaign, 6.3% of all sentences concerned immigration (see Appendix A). 
To a large degree, then, voters with traditionalist-communitarian world-views vote 
for the Union parties. However, the hypothesis that the Union’s integrative strategy is 
aided by the CSU being more extreme than the CDU is not confirmed in this analysis. 
The CSU is located only slightly to the right of the CDU, and the same holds true for 
its electorate. Thus, it does not seem that the Union parties permanently mobilize the 
traditionalist-communitarian potential by virtue of their extreme position, but rather 
that this potential most of the time remains latent and does not manifest itself 
politically. This, in turn, is only possible because of the collusive strategy the major 
parties of the left and right generally pursue, combined with the Union’s moving to 
the right whenever the immigration issue actually surfaces in the public debate. As the 
bars indicating the standard deviation of voter preferences shows, the electorates of 
the SPD and Union parties are characterized by similar degrees of heterogeneity and 
overlap to some degree. Only the Ecologists consistently mobilize an markedly 
universalistic-minded electorate and thus escape the centripetal dynamic. To a more 
limited degree, the same holds true for the post-socialist PDS, but in the elections 
under study here, this remains a phenomenon confined to Eastern Germany, and as we 
will see, supporters of the PDS stand out even more for their strongly welfare statist 
preferences. Finally, the FDP only at times differs markedly from the two major 
parties in its political stance, and its voters are also located in the centre of the 
distribution. 
The centripetal nature of competition between the major parties of the left and right 
along the cultural divide helps to explain the limited success of parties attempting to 
mobilize a similar clientele as right-wing populist parties do in other countries. By 
leaving the libertarian-universalistic spectrum to the Ecologists, the Social Democrat 
party has abandoned the New Left conviction it displayed in the 1970s and has moved 
to a more orthodox “Old Left” position. As mentioned earlier on, blue-collar workers, 
which together with those who have low levels of formal education represent the core 
clientele of right-wing populist parties in other countries, have remained faithful to 
the Social Democratic left in Germany. And this is the case despite the fact that 
                                                
6  As explained in Chapter 5, positions regarding the two issue categories constituting a dimension are 
weighted by salience, and the location of parties thus reflects their positions relative to the overall 
public debate. 
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skilled and unskilled workers as well as citizens with little formal education have 
developed relatively anti-universalistic and anti-immigrant orientations since the 
1970s to a similar degree in Germany as in other Western European countries (see 
Kriesi et al. 2007, in particular Dolezal’s chapter on Germany). It is quite plausible 
that the SPD has prevented the alienation of this electorate as a consequence of its 
centrist stances regarding the conflict between libertarian-universalistic and 
traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community. 
 
Ideological blocks, voter loyalties, and resulting patterns of oppositions 
 
In all but the 1976 election, the very nature of the patterns of cultural opposition in 
Germany impedes a clear-cut identification of ideological blocks, which is necessary 
to implement the analytical model set out in Figure 4.2. Because of the break in the 
patterns of opposition between the 1970s and the 1990s, the 1976 election will be 
treated separately. In that election, which is marked by an opposition between a 
libertarian and an authoritarian block (SPD and FDP as opposed to the Union parties), 
loyalties prove to be very strong, with 85.3% and 90.2% of the voters, respectively, 
having voted for the same block in the preceding election. The party system being 
quite polarized and reflecting the positions of voters closely, the cultural divide thus 
represents a segmented cleavage in 1976.  
In the 1990s, both the SPD and the FDP have abandoned their decidedly libertarian 
position. In theory, four ideological blocks can be distinguished along the new 
cultural divide, namely Old Left, New Left, Old Right and New Right (see Chapter 5). 
Of these, the New Right block is insignificant in Germany. Within the remaining 
three blocks, only the division between Old Left (SPD) and New Left (Ecologists) is 
reflected in segmented ideological positions. Compared to this divide, the distance 
between the SPD and the Union parties is smaller both at the voter and at the party 
level. Nonetheless, it is sensible to distinguish between these two blocks in analysing 
the stability of alignments because of the “genetic” criterion discussed in Chapter 5. 
The opposition between SPD and the Union parties has traditionally been and to some 
degree remains not only the political expression of the class divide, but also of the 
religious cleavage. The associated moral questions evolve around the defence of, or 
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opposition to, cultural liberalism, which later on has been enriched with new issues 
that are more intimately linked to universalistic and communitarian conceptions of 
community. Figure 8.3 shows the stability of alignments to the left-libertarian, the 
centre-left and the centre-right blocks since 1994, when the new pattern of opposition 
has emerged. I have subsumed only Ecologist voters under the left-libertarian label, 
since the supporters of the PDS are less consistently libertarian-universalistic and lie 
between Ecologist and SPD voters. SPD and PDS thus form the centre-left block, 
while supporters of the Union parties and of the FDP form the centre-right block. 
Extreme right voters are too few in number and do not fit in any of these blocks due to 




Figure 8.3: Stability of alignments to the left-libertarian, centre-left and centre-
right ideological blocks in Germany, 1994-2002 (in percent) 
 
Figure 8.3 reveals that loyalties to the two centre blocks started out from comparably 
high levels in 1994, but have developed differently thereafter. While the stability of 
alignments to the centre-left has declined between 1998 and 2002, the centre-right has 
gained ground and exhibits the highest loyalties of all ideological blocks in 2002. The 
loyalty of left-libertarian voters to the Ecologist party shows a slow, but steady 
increase, which points to a growing institutionalization of the divide within the left. 
Applying the model from Figure 4.2, the four elections can now be classified as 
follows. In 1994, the party system is feebly polarized, but nonetheless responsive to 
the electorate. In conjuncture with the relatively high stability of alignments both of 
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centre-left and centre-right voters, the cultural divide therefore represents an 
identitarian cleavage, where alignments are stabilized by strong political identities 
and historical cleavages, in this case by the remains of the religious-secular divide. 
However, this does not hold for voters with strongly libertarian-universalistic 
convictions, who have lost their spiritual home in the SPD and are only in the process 
of developing strong loyalties to the Ecologists.  
By 1998, party positions have become much more polarized, and the system has by 
and large retained responsiveness. Loyalties remain stable or deepen, as in the case of 
the left-libertarian block, and the cultural divide therefore constitutes a segmented 
cleavage, as in 1976. The pattern changes again in 2002, when the polarization of the 
party system drops considerably, while the match between parties and voters rises. 
With loyalties to the two major blocks moving in opposite directions, this case is 
somewhat ambiguous to classify. Due to the eroding loyalties of SPD voters, which in 
part reflects defections to the Union parties, but also a considerable share that 
switched to the Ecologists, the situation has become more competitive. Overall, 
however, 78.6% of those who had cast a valid vote in 1998 chose a party belonging to 
the same ideological block four years later (data not shown here). With more than 
three quarters of the electorate remaining loyal, we can safely classify the cultural 
divide as an identitarian cleavage in 2002, acknowledging that this is less clear within 
the left than between left and right.  
 
Summary: Patterns of cultural conflict and the extreme right potential 
 
Since the 1970s, oppositions along the cultural divide have oscillated between a 
segmented and an identitarian cleavage. In conjuncture with the qualitative analysis 
presented earlier on, we can conclude that this has facilitated the containment of the 
extreme right potential. In two of the four elections studied, in 1994 and in 2002, the 
major parties and their voters have not been deeply divided, and only the Ecologist 
party and its voters escape the centripetal dynamic. At the same time, loyalties remain 
high, limiting the potential for new political actors to mobilize those sections of the 
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electorate that support right-wing populist parties in France and Switzerland.
7
 
Contrary to the latter two countries, there is a divide within the left, and the left-
libertarian block is not hegemonic, limiting the potential for a traditionalist-
communitarian mobilization.  
That said, identitarian cleavages are less likely to contain the emergence of new 
political parties than segmented cleavages, where political conflicts constantly 
reinforce and reactivate the underlying collective identities. However, in the German 
case, loyalties are not only historically formed along the segmented cleavage that we 
could still observe in 1976, but are also sporadically reinforced by more polarized 
electoral campaigns, as the example of 1998 shows. On the other hand, the dividing 
line between the left-libertarian and the centre-left block is more in flux, since the 
Ecologists have only begun to build a loyal following in the 1990s. The decline of 
loyalties to the centre-left is therefore largely due to the process of reconfiguration 
within the left, rather than to a more general opening up of the cultural cleavage. The 
next section will provide evidence in support of this hypothesis, and also focuses on 
another mechanism that reinforces the divide between the two left-wing blocks and 
the centre-right block, namely, conflicts along the state-market cleavage.  
 
 
Parties and Voters on the Economic Divide 
 
Position, match, and polarization 
 
Because the opposition between the major actors in the German party system reflects 
both a cultural and the state-market cleavage, the patterns of opposition in the 
economic domain have important consequences for the stability of the party system as 
a whole. Compared to other countries, the economic divide has been relatively salient 
in Germany throughout the 1990s, due to the economic challenges resulting from the 
reunification of the country. According to Mielke (2001: 90), the problems of 
                                                
7  This conclusion is corroborated by the findings presented by Schmitt-Beck et al. (2006), who show 
that the road to switching partisanship in Germany almost invariably involves a prior move from 
partisanship into independence. 
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unemployment and the question of the viability of the system of social protection 
have resulted in a “renaissance of the social question” in structuring the party system. 
And in fact, party positions have been more polarized along the economic dimension 
in the 1990s and early 2000s than in the 1976 election, as Figure 8.4 shows. In 1976, 
parties differ less regarding economic policy than they did concerning the cultural 
divide, and we can also see that the social-liberal coalition was much more united in 
cultural matters than in economic policy making. The largest gap in ideological 
profile is between the Social Democrats and the CDU. While these two parties are 
responsive to the preferences of their voters, the FDP’s electorate turns out to be more 
centrist than the party itself. As a whole, however, the party system proves to be 
responsive.  
In the later elections, the left and right blocks first diverge in the 1994 election, 
while the 1998 and 2002 campaigns bring a convergence of the major parties as a 
consequence of the SPD’s move towards the centre. From 1998 on, party positions no 
longer exhibit a clear division into two ideological blocks. This centripetal pattern of 
competition between the SPD and the Union parties mirrors a similar proximity of 
their electorates, which can already be observed in 1994. Looking at the match 
between the positions of parties and voters reveals an adaptation of the parties to their 
respective electorates. In the 1994 election, the party system as a whole does not 
represent voters well. The most obvious case of misrepresentation is that of the SPD, 
whose voters are much more centrist than their party, and the same holds for the 
Ecologists. Four years later, the SPD has moved towards the centre, and in 2002, the 
Ecologists follow suit. With these reorientations, the party system has regained 
responsiveness, as exhibited by the high match in positions of parties and voters. As a 
consequence, only the PDS and the FDP escape the centripetal dynamic of 
competition.  
Two further points deserve mention. The first concerns the extreme right. We can 
see that the supporters of the NPD, DVU and Republikaner are actually extreme on 
both the cultural and the economic dimension in the two latest contests, combining 
xenophobic authoritarianism with strongly welfare statist stances. This profile is quite 
extraordinary and contrasts with that of supporters of modern right-wing populist 
parties, who do not share homogeneous preferences regarding economic policy. On 
the other hand, those who voted for the Republikaner in 1994 once again stand out for 
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1976: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (4 parties): 0.81 






1994: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (5 parties): 0.76 






1998: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (6 parties): 0.83 






2002: parties (above) and voters (below) 
match (6 parties): 0.91 
polarization parties: 0.43 
 
Figure 8.4: Parties and voters on the economic divide in Germany, 1976-2002.  
Position, match, and polarization 
Legend: see Table 8.2 
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having preferences similar to those of Christian Democrats, and obviously did not 
constitute a distinct electorate in ideological terms. Secondly, a significant group of 
non-voters with more leftist preferences than those of the average SPD supporter 
develops in 1998 and 2002, indicating a left-wing potential not absorbed by the 
established parties, and that is likely to have fuelled the emergence of the new “Left 
Party” (Linkspartei). 
 
The stability of alignments along the state-market cleavage and implications for the 
German party system 
 
Looking at the stability of alignments along the economic divide will shed light on the 
latter’s role in the overall structure of alignments. For the definition of ideological 
blocks, the “genetic” historical criterion referred to in Chapter 5 is sufficient in most 
cases. The SPD emerged from the labour movement of the late 19
th
 century, while the 
Union parties and the FDP form the opposing, market-friendly camp regarding the 
class cleavage. The case is also simple for the post-communist PDS, as well as for the 
Ecologists, because the latter at least up to 1998 clearly have a leftist profile. Extreme 
right voters are assigned to neither of the two blocks. Figure 8.5 reveals highly stable 
alignments over the entire period from 1976 to 2002. We observe that the weakness of 
the centre-left block observed in the prior analysis of the cultural divide is to a large 
degree due to reconfigurations between the left-libertarian and the centre-left blocks, 
while loyalties to the left as a whole remain high. Even in 2002, they reach levels 
comparable to those sixteen years earlier. Loyalties to the right, which have declined 
since the earliest election, have regained stability in the latest contest. In the light of 
the relatively similar positions of the major parties and their voters, this result is 
remarkable. 
Again following the analytical model set out in Figure 4.2, confrontations in the 
1976 election evolved around an identitarian cleavage, where alignments are not 
stabilized by virulent conflicts, but by strong political identities that have resulted 
from earlier conflicts. In 1994, the party system is unresponsive, and while the overall 
polarization is just below 0.5, at least the SPD, which takes more radical stances than 
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Figure 8.5: Stability of alignments to the left and right ideological blocks  
in Germany, 1976-2002 (in percent) 
 
its voters, exhibits organizational cartellization. At the same time, long-standing voter 
loyalties check realignments in favour of the established right. In the remaining two 
elections, where the party system has regained responsiveness, the identitarian 
character of the state-market cleavage plays an important role in 2002, when 
polarization is relatively modest. In 1998, by contrast the cleavage is more 
segmented, and more polarized party positions reinforce the political identities 
underlying the divide.  
Overall, we find that the economic cleavage is similar in nature to the cultural 
divide, characterized by rather low levels of polarization, but with occasional 
instances of segmentation. To a large degree, then, ideological alignments are based 
on acquired political identities, and less on contemporary conflicts. At the same time, 
parties never leap-frog their positions, and voters therefore know what they stand for. 
It is therefore unlikely that the centripetal nature of competition in Germany will be 
disrupted by a challenger breaking into the system in the near future. At the same 
time, the performance of governments will be decisive in stabilizing alignments in the 
longer run. After all, both dimensions that structure competition in the German party 
system would be classified as competitive political dimensions, according to my 
model, if it were not for the remarkably strong political identities that have developed 
out of long-established patterns of conflict. In a last step, the question will be 
addressed how firmly the collective identities underlying the stability of the party 
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system are rooted in differing ideological orientations by looking at individual-level 
voting determinants.  
 
 
Political Divides as Determinants of Voting Choices 
 
Given the centripetal pattern of oppositions of the major parties and their electorates 
along both dimensions of party interaction in Germany, we cannot yet be sure to 
which degree these conflicts, rather than pure party identification, for example, 
structure partisan alignments. However, building on theoretical considerations set out 
in Chapter 4, my interpretation is the following: The stability of alignments revealed 
in the analysis so far indicates the rootedness of the party system in the cognitive 
schemas of voters, which are shaped by a cultural and an economic cleavages. The 
cultural cleavage has its origin in the religious cleavage, but now centres more on the 
antagonism between universalistic values and cultural relativism than on traditional 
ethics and the relationship between the church and the state. The economic cleavage is 
still alive, but no longer (exclusively) pits workers against employers and the middle 
classes, but has evolved into a more general divide over state intervention and social 
security that involves different social groups today. In this case, voters’ positions 
regarding the two dimensions of conflict should may be more relevant in structuring 
party choices than the closeness of electorates’ mean position would suggest. 
The rival interpretation concerning the exact nature of the linkages between parties 
and voters would be that the dimensions we have found to structure election 
campaigns are relevant only for the supporters of the smaller and more ideologically 
extreme parties. Party identifications with the major parties, on the other hand, may 
simply be a product of past conflicts, which are not of much relevance today, as the 
large overlap between the orientations of SPD and Union voters could suggest. The 
personal traits of candidates or other, more “soft” dimensions that voters use to 
differentiate between parties and candidates may be decisive.  
Table 8.4 shows the effects of voters’ positions along the two dimensions of 
conflict on party choice, based on separate binary logistic regressions for each party. 
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Table 8.4:  Political dimensions as determinants of voting choices in Germany, 
 1976-2002: Results from logistic regressions run separately for each party 
 
 Parties 
Dimensions  ECOLO PDS SPD FDP CDU CSU EXR 
 
1976 
Economic  odds – – 0.6*** 1.1 1.6*** 1.4** – 
  z – – -6.5 0.8 5.4 3.1 – 
Cultural  odds – – 0.4*** 0.8* 1.8*** 1.6*** – 
  z – – -9.4 -2.3 6.8 4.1 – 
R
2 
  – – 14.7% 1% 10.1% 5.3% – 
 
1994         (REP) 
Economic  odds 0.8 0.5*** 1.0 1.8*** 1.2*** 1.0 1.2 
  z -1.5 -5.6 -0.1 3.8 3.5 -0.1 0.6 
Cultural  odds 0.3*** 0.6*** 0.9# 1.2 1.6*** 1.4# 1.7 
  z -7.7 -6.1 -1.7 1.5 7.7 1.8 1.0 
R
2 
  16.3% 9.4% 0.2% 4% 4% 1% 2.2% 
 
1998         (EXR) 
Economic  odds 1.0 0.4*** 0.9 2.4*** 1.5*** 1.2 0.6 
  z 0.2 -4.1 -1.6 3.9 5.1 0.8 -1.6 
Cultural  odds 0.2*** 0.6*** 0.8*** 0.9 1.7*** 1.2 10.1*** 
  z -7.4 -3.9 -3.2 -0.7 6.4 1.1 6.6 
R
2 
  20.5% 8.8% 0.9% 8.3% 5.9% 0.5% 30.9% 
 
2002         (EXR) 
Economic  odds 1.0 0.3*** 0.8* 1.2 1.5*** 1.4* 0.4*** 
  z 0.3 -7.8 -2.1 0.7 4.1 2.4 -3.8 
Cultural  odds 0.4*** 0.6* 0.8** 1.1 1.5*** 1.7*** 7.9*** 
  z -6.4 -2.3 -2.5 0.9 4.9 4.2 4.7 
R
2 
  8.7% 20.1% 1.2% 0.4% 4.4% 4.4% 34.2% 
 
Significance levels: # p=0.10 * p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001 
Number of observations: 1054 (1976), 1921 (1994), 1421 (1998), 1307 (2002) 
 
The analysis reveals that the vote for the SPD and the CDU can be much better 
explained with voters’ ideological positions in 1976 than in the later elections. This is 
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particularly true for the SPD, which loses its ideological profile completely in 1994. 
This is the case both for the cultural dimension, as well as for the economic divide. In 
the 1998 and 2002 elections, the SPD regains a somewhat sharper profile on both 
dimensions, but what we can explain in terms of voting for the SPD with ideological 
variables alone is quite limited. Two competitors within the left have sharper profiles 
than the SPD. For one thing, the Eastern German PDS remains the only party 
mobilizing economically leftist voters, which helps to explain the success of its 
alliance with the Western German WASG in the 2005 elections. Somewhat 
unexpectedly, the PDS also rallies voters adhering to libertarian-universalistic values. 
Here, one has to keep in mind that in the elections studied here, this is an effect 
confined to the Eastern states. In Germany as a whole, it is the Ecologists that most 
strongly mobilize a highly ideological electorate that strongly endorses libertarian-
universalistic values. As in France and Switzerland, however, Ecologist voters do not 
stand out for their economic preferences, and it is therefore misleading to simply 
depict them as standing to the left of the SPD. Much rather, they are the mirror image 
of the populist right, which in other countries mobilizes a segment of the electorate 
who shares the opposing, traditionalist-communitarian set of convictions. To sum up 
the results for the left of the political spectrum, we find that the new cultural 
dimension plays a role in structuring alignments. Contrary to the findings in France 
and Switzerland, however, this potential is mobilized more or less exclusively by the 
Ecologists, and by the PDS in the Eastern part of the country. These results thus 
confirm Stöss’ (2002: 419) finding that the SPD is the real “people’s party”, which 
mobilizes voters near to the overall mean of citizen preferences on both dimensions.  
Turning to the right of the political spectrum, it is interesting to note, and highly 
relevant for the mobilization space of the extreme right, that the Christian Democrat 
CDU is not a mirror image of the SPD. Corresponding to its position regarding the 
two traditional cleavages that have created the party system, the CDU mobilizes an 
electorate that is distinct both in terms of economic preferences, as well as regarding 
cultural orientations. Although the amount variance explained by the voters’ positions 
on the two dimensions is lower in recent years than it was in 1976, the CDU continues 
to attract voters that are more traditionalist-communitarian as well as more market-
liberal in economic terms. It is actually the Bavarian CSU that constitutes something 
like the mirror image of the SPD. With its near-hegemonic position in Bavaria, it 
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often mobilizes a quite diverse following, but the 2002 election also confirms that it is 
able to attract voters with traditionalist-communitarian world-views. Overall, the 
Christian Democrats are solidly rooted in the traditionalist-communitarian milieu, a 
pattern that holds irrespective of the degree of polarization of the particular campaign. 
While polarization along the cultural divide only reached high levels in the 1998 
election (see Figures 8.2 and 8.4), the CDU consistently rallies the counter-pole to the 
Ecologists. Finally, the FDP oscillates between a centrist pattern of mobilization in 
1976 and 2002, and a more ideological appeal based on market-liberal convictions in 
1994 and 1998, but has ceased to mobilize a culturally distinct electorate since the 
1970s.  
Finally, the results presented in Table 8.4 provide some relevant information on the 
electorate of the right-wing extremist parties. First of all, it is confirmed that the 
Republikaner did not mobilize a particularly extreme electorate in 1994. This changes 
in the later elections, however, where the extreme right group consists of voters of the 
NPD, the DVU, as well as the Republikaner. Here, we see that having an extremely 
traditionalist-communitarian outlook makes the odds of voting for a party of the 
extreme right considerably. For no other party are voting choices so dependent on 
ideological variables, as the amount of variance explained indicates. At the same time, 
this also shows the limits of the mobilization capacity of the extreme right, which is 
unable to reach beyond a hard core of voters that are extreme in their anti-
universalistic and exclusionist stances. As Falter (1994) and Arzheimer et al. (2001) 
have shown, it is the interaction of a number of factors that raises the probability of a 
vote for the extreme right. Only the conjuncture of an extreme right world-view, 
political discontent, and feelings of social or economic deprivation account for the 
extreme right vote, while the Union parties continue to integrate voters with far-right 
orientations lacking these supplementary features. Furthermore, the analysis presented 
here, which positions voters separately on the two dimensions of conflict, shows that 
those who do support the extreme right exhibit an unusual combination of extreme 
attitudes regarding both economic policy and cultural issues. 
To summarize, the results confirm the reinvigorated-cleavage-hypothesis. The 
highly stable alignments put in evidence in the previous analyses are firmly rooted in 
ideological differences pertaining to state involvement in the economy as well as in 
diverging normative conceptions of community and justice. The CDU, and to some 
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degree the CSU as well, attract an electorate that is distinct both by virtue of its 
traditionalist-communitarian, as well as its economically more liberal outlook. The 
Union is therefore more firmly anchored in the two cleavages than the SPD, whose 
voters are more centrist on both dimensions, and therefore less distinct in ideological 
terms. As a consequence, the SPD more vulnerable to the changing moods of public 
opinion than the Union. The relative homogeneity of the Union’s electorate suggests 
that the established right should be more successful in preventing the emergence of a 





Several explanations for the failure of the existing right-wing extremist parties to gain 
a substantive following in Germany, as well as the inability of new right-wing 
populist parties to establish themselves, were put forward at the beginning of this 
chapter. Having dismissed the electoral system as a sufficient explanation, I have 
focused on five hypotheses that focus on political factors, on the nature and strategy 
of the existing extreme right parties themselves, and on the patterns of interaction in 
the party system. The value of these explanations in the light of the evidence 
presented in this chapter can be subsumed under three broad headings. The first, and 
probably also the most important explanation regards the strategies of the established 
parties of the left and right. Secondly, and in part as a result from these strategies, the 
potential for a traditionalist-communitarian mobilization beyond the mainstream is 
very limited. Here, the enduring legacy of National Socialism on mass and elite 
political behaviour should not be neglected. The third conclusion concerns the 
propensity of the existing extreme right parties to mobilize the potentials that exist. I 
start with this point because it can be summarized more briefly.  
In principle, the presence of markedly traditionalist-communitarian attitudes at the 
voter level does offer opportunities for political entrepreneurs to craft a political 
identity based on the rejection of other cultures. However, these opportunities are 
unlikely to be seized. The creation of such a collective identity along the lines 
followed by right-wing populist parties in other countries requires political talent and 
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skill. As a consequence, the chances that the existing extreme right parties in 
Germany may benefit from societal dynamics common to all advanced industrial 
countries are virtually nil. Even the Republikaner, arguably closest to the model of the 
“new”, post-modern extreme right party within the exponents of the extreme right 
party family in Germany, are weakly organized and plagued by internal disputes 
between modernizing and neo-fascist factions. At the same time, however, the 
formation of anti-establishment parties outside the extreme right milieu have been no 
more successful. The Schill-Party, for example, which campaigned with categorical 
law and order stances, failed to attract voters on a national scale after its breakthrough 
in the Land elections in Hamburg in 2001. Sporadic successes of parties such as the 
Schill’s, as well as those of the extreme right in state elections rarely extend to the 
national parliamentary elections, where more is at stake, and where voters are less 
likely to cast a protest vote (Niedermayer 2004). This should also be kept in mind 
when looking at the sometimes spectacular results of extreme right parties in Eastern 
Germany. In national elections, on the other hand, the established parties have not 
been confronted with serious challengers. This can be explained with the predominant 
patters of opposition that help to maintain established political identities and cognitive 
representations of politics at the voter level.  
In gauging the impact of the strategies of the established parties on the success of 
right-wing populist challengers, the analysis presented in this chapter underlines the 
crucial importance of not only looking at the populist right’s closest competitors, but 
also at the parties situated at the libertarian-universalistic counter-pole of the cultural 
divide. In thereby validates both the usefulness of the model developed in Chapter 4, 
as well as a similar theoretical argument made by Meguid (2005). Secondary evidence 
suggests that the behaviour of the Union parties in the early 1980s did not differ 
substantially from that of the established right in France. While in opposition and in 
order to maximise its chances in state-level elections, the Union pursued a polarizing 
strategy by bringing up the immigration issue, similarly to many conservative parties 
in the 1980s, as Ignazi (2003) has stressed. However, the German trajectory differs 
from that of other countries in two respects. First and foremost, the left has not 
attempted to exploit the salience of the issue of community by advocating 
universalistic or multicultural counter-conceptions to the ethnic-communitarian model 
of citizenship defended by the Union. Contrary to Socialist and Social Democratic 
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parties in countries such as France and Switzerland, which fuelled the polarization of 
cultural conflicts, the SPD abandoned the decidedly left-libertarian position it had 
occupied in the 1970s, and moved towards the centre of the cultural divide. Both of 
these possible strategies involve gains and losses. The conduct of the SPD entailed the 
loss of the its libertarian-universalistic electorate to what became one of the most 
important Ecologist parties in the developed world. On the other hand, its strategy has 
prevented a more fundamental reconfiguration of the party system driven by conflicts 
over community. 
Partly as a consequence, the Union has retained the ownership of the immigration 
question and of the more general defence of traditionalism. Its hegemonic position in 
the traditionalist-communitarian political space has given it sufficient leeway to 
pursue an accommodative strategy whenever it faced a challenger from the extreme 
right. It not only repeatedly co-opted the latter’s stances concerning traditional moral 
values, but also orchestrated the reunification of the country, introduced a restrictive 
immigration policy, and demanded foreigners to adapt to the country’s dominant 
culture under the catchword “Leitkultur”. Except for such occasional strategic jumps 
into traditionalist-communitarian terrain, however, the Union parties cultivate a rather 
moderate centre-right political discourse, as their programmatic statements in the 
campaigns under study show. Because the two Christian Democratic sister parties do 
not differ markedly in their position, the analysis also disconfirms the hypothesis that 
the Union parties’ integrative capacity is aided by the Bavarian CSU being more 
extreme than the CDU. Rather than the more simple argument that the Union parties’ 
own extreme position limits the success of the extreme right, the analysis presented in 
this chapter suggests a more nuanced account. It is the conjuncture of the strategies of 
the established parties of the left and right that allows them to integrate vast parts of 
the electorate, and in particular those groups – working-class voters and citizens with 
low levels of formal education – that have turned to anti-establishment parties or have 
at least become politically disaffected in other countries.  
The legacy of National Socialism, and the will to prevent a recurrence of the past 
should not be neglected as determinants of the established parties’ strategies. By the 
same token, the past seems to influence Germany’s mass political culture. The 
analysis has shown that a considerable segment of the electorate has markedly more 
traditionalist and anti-immigrant sentiments than the average Union voter and than the 
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Union itself. Nonetheless, these citizens overwhelmingly refuse to vote for extreme 
right parties. In the 1998 election survey, little over 6% of the respondents agreed 
with the statement that the Republikaner party represented their interests – as opposed 
to more than 22% of the French who declared that Le Pen has the right ideas in 2002, 
or even 32% in 1991 (Mayer 2002: 379). Surely, the extreme right’s programmatic 
profile and its inability to develop more nuanced and communitarian-sounding 
conceptions of cultural identity explain part of this difference. However, the effect of 
political culture should not be neglected either. New far-right parties are immediately 
associated with the fascist past, leading to the refusal of the established parties to 
enter alliances with them, of the media to provide coverage of their program, and of 
voters to support them.  
The integrative capacity of the established parties is greatly aided by the 
persistence of political identities that carry the imprint of the historical class and 
religious cleavages. The transformation of the historical cleavages has been gradual. 
The class cleavage has evolved into a state-market cleavage that is anchored in new 
socio-economic divisions, while the religious-secular cleavage lives on in the 
opposition between libertarian universalism and traditionalist values, whereas 
questions of community have remained less prominent than elsewhere. The important 
role old conflicts play in determining citizens’ cognitive representations of politics is 
partly a consequence of the stability in the lines of conflict structuring the party 
system. On the other hand, the dominant pattern of interaction is rather centripetal 
both along the cultural, as well as along the economic dimension, and political 
identities are only sporadically reinforced by contemporary conflicts. Most of the 
time, the patterns of conflict take on the character of identitarian cleavages. In the 
long run, according to my model, this could make competition depend more and more 
on the performance of governments, and alignments should become more volatile. 
Apart from their performance in government, the established parties’ continued 
dominance would also depend on their ability to rapidly absorb new issues. However, 
two features of the German party system make a evolution of the two identitarian 
cleavages into competitive political dimensions appear unlikely. For one thing, the 
established parties’ positions occasionally become more polarized along both 
dimensions. Rather than being a permanent feature, centripetal competition therefore 
alternates with segmented oppositions, thereby reinforcing the underlying political 
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identities. For another, even if the positions of the SPD and the Union often no longer 
diverge strongly, they never “leapfrog” their competitors’ positions, and therefore 
remain true to what they “stand for” in voters’ cognitive representations of political 
space.  
There is more change regarding the smaller parties and the situation is less clear on 
the political left. As a consequence of the SPD’s centrist strategy, new parties have 
emerged that mobilize voters lying closer to the poles of the economic and cultural 
dimensions. On the one hand, the German-wide appeal of the Left Party may alter the 
patterns of economic conflict in the party system, and it is yet too early to judge what 
the consequences of such a development may be. On the other hand, the emergence of 
the Ecologist party, representing the outcome of an earlier strategic move on the part 
of the SPD, more than anything else has helped to maintain older political identities in 
spite of the emergence of new cultural conflicts that result from the diffusion of 
universalistic values since the late 1960s.  
It may appear that the success of the Ecologist party in conjuncture with the 
absence of serious right-wing populist challengers would disconfirm my assertion that 
the latter ride the tide of a broad societal counter-movement to the libertarian left. In 
reality, however, the strength of the Ecologist party in Germany is the flip side of the 
overall weakness of the libertarian-universalistic pole in electoral terms. In France and 
Switzerland, all parties of the left have undergone a New Left transformation and now 
combine economic leftism with the defence of libertarian-universalistic values. In 
these cases, the established right was unable to impede the institutionalization of a 
party at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural divide. This is a logical 
outcome of parties’ strategic behaviour, since both the libertarian-universalistic, as 
well as the traditionalist-communitarian poles stand to gain from a polarization along 
the cultural dimension, while the centre-right can only lose. This scenario has not 
materialized in Germany for two reasons, first, because of the split between the Old 
Left and the libertarian-universalistic pole, and second, because the Union more or 
less alone represents the right-wing spectrum. The dividing line between left and right 
runs deep in voters’ minds, and since the Union does not face competition from 
another established centre-right party, it has a lot of flexibility in strategically 
adapting its position without the risk of incurring electoral losses. While the New Left 
has thus driven a transformation of the cultural divide, which has come to resemble 
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that found in the other countries, the established parties have succeeded in keeping 
polarization along cultural conflicts low. The corresponding issues have not 
fundamentally transformed the core of the party system, where voters’ traditional 
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The New Cultural Conflict and its Political Manifestation 
 
In the 1990s, a new party family has come to play an important role in Western 
European politics. By virtue of their distinct traditionalist-communitarian position, 
their anti-establishment discourse, and a centralized, hierarchical party structure, 
right-wing populist parties have been the driving force in pushing a polarization of the 
cultural dimension of conflict in Western European party systems. As a consequence 
of the historical formation of the class and religious cleavages, the space of political 
alternatives represented in these party systems has always been characterized by an 
economic and a cultural or value-based divide. Due to the mobilization processes of 
the New Left and the populist right, cultural oppositions have been revived and filled 
with new content, while the importance of economic conflicts has declined at least for 
certain segments of the electorate. 
The expansion of higher education as a result of the critical juncture of the 
educational revolution of the 1960s has resulted in a wide acclaim of the universalistic 
norms advocated by the libertarian New Social Movements. Social Democratic parties 
have reacted to the resulting electoral potential by putting stronger emphasis of cul-
tural, as opposed to economic issues, thereby undergoing a New Left transformation. 
While a libertarian-universalistic pole has already emerged in the political space of 
the 1970s, a significant counter-pole postulating the opposing normative ideal has 
only manifested itself with considerable delay. Increasingly, however, right-wing 
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populist parties have adopted a cultural differentialist mobilization frame that is 
conductive to the bonding of the more diffuse traditionalist potential. Insisting on the 
primacy of established cultural practices over the universalistic norms promoted by 
the New Left, and relating this claim to an opposition to immigration, the populist 
right has contributed to moulding a collective consciousness on the part of those who 
feel alienated by the societal developments of the past decades. The discursive 
innovation of right-wing populist parties made possible the mobilization of a segment 
of the electorate characterized by homogeneous value orientations, and that is situated 
at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the new cultural divide.  
Orientations of this kind are not new as such, and their political relevance therefore 
depends on whether or not they are rendered salient. I have proposed two central 
mechanism that account for the individual-level salience of group attachments. One 
consists of the social networks societal groups are imbedded in, which affect the 
salience of role identities, and the other is political conflict, which reinforces group 
attachments and political identities. The mobilization of the new cultural divide is 
thus the result of the weakening of older role identities – related to class and religion – 
and the corresponding political attachments on the one hand, and the increased 
salience of new social divisions on the other. These older political identities have been 
weakened by the processes of economic and societal modernization, and by the 
processes of globalization and European integration. The lowering of economic 
boundaries between nation states and the decline of the Keynesian model of economic 
regulation have engendered further social divisions, but even more importantly, they 
have led to a weakening of older, economically defined divisions, and have made 
possible the rising prominence of the new cultural dimension of conflict. Right-wing 
populist parties have therefore benefited both from the potential of cultural, as well as 
economic “losers” of modernization, but, somewhat paradoxically, they have articu-
lated these grievances in cultural, and not in economic terms.  
With the partial exception of Britain, where the immigration issue has not played 
an important role until recently, the basic structure of the party political space is 
remarkably similar in the countries studied in this book. An economic state-market 
divide and an opposition between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-
communitarian values have come to structure party interactions in France, 
Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands and Germany in the 1990s. Britain’s political 
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space, on the other hand, shows similarities with that of the other countries in the 
1970s, before the question of community came to dominate the cultural divide. But 
even if the country has not seen the emergence of a party situated at the traditionalist-
communitarian pole of this divide, party oppositions in Britain are nonetheless 
structured by disagreement over libertarian-universalistic values. In Germany, on the 
other hand, the established right played with the fire in the early 1980s, and 
immigration as well as traditionalism have repeatedly played a role in the election 
campaigns of the 1990s. Nonetheless, contrary to the countries where the populist 
right was able to assert itself, the cultural divide does not polarize parties and their 
electorates to the same degree in Germany. In the light of the prevalence of similar 
orientations in the German electorate as those right-wing populist parties thrive upon 
in other countries, an explanation is needed both for the magnitude, as well as the 
timing of the success of new political parties seeking to mobilize the structural 
potentials underlying the new cultural conflict.  
 
The Transformation of Party Systems in France, Switzerland,  
and Germany 
 
Building on the two mechanisms of social identity formation mentioned above, the 
analytical approach developed in this book has focused on the interaction of the lines 
of conflict structuring party systems and the political identities that these ideological 
divisions entail at the voter level. Whether new political identities can emerge and 
gain room then depends, first, on how firmly voters are anchored in the old structure 
of conflict, second, on the relative salience of the economic and cultural dimensions at 
the individual level, and third, on how the established actors in the party system react 
to the new structural potentials. By looking separately at each dimension of conflict 
manifesting itself in electoral campaigns, and in combining supply side and demand 
side data, the respective roles of the economic and cultural dimensions can be 
discerned in this process. By focusing on the degree of polarization along a political 
divide, on the responsiveness of parties to voter orientations, and on the degree of 
closure that a division entails, it is possible to distinguish several types of divide that 
have varying consequences for the mobilization of new conflicts. While some divides 
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are not at the centre of political disagreement and retain their role primarily as a 
consequence of strong political identities and organizational loyalties, others are 
constantly refreshed by political conflict, which reinforces the underlying social and 
political identities. Furthermore, if the established parties are unresponsive to the 
preferences of their voters, this opens the way for realignments to occur that can 
either profit another established party, or a new political actor.  
This model has been applied to three cases that represents alternative paths for the 
manifestation of the traditionalist-communitarian potential. In France, the weakly 
institutionalized nature of the parties of the established right has opened the way to 
the early emergence and subsequent entrenchment of a newly founded right-wing 
populist party already in the 1980s. In Switzerland, an established conservative party 
underwent a transformation to a party of the populist right. In this process, the Swiss 
People’s Party has adopted a cultural differentialist discourse, forged a hierarchical 
internal party structure, and has meshing the revolt against universalistic values in a 
broad anti-establishment strategy of mobilization and collective identity formation. 
According to these shared characteristics, both Swiss People’s Party and the French 
Front National are exponents of an extreme right-wing populist party family that has 
taken shape in the 1990s. Germany, on the other hand, has constituted an important 
case in that it has not seen the breakthrough of a party of this type. 
Figure 9.1 shows the nature of economic conflicts in the three countries studied in 
one election in the mid-1970s and three more recent elections. For ease of 
representation, only the first two elements of the model are shown, namely, the 
polarization of the party system and the match between the positions of parties and 
their electorates, which indicates the responsiveness of the party system to voter 
preferences. The resulting four quadrants correspond to four basic types of divide, 
each of which is further differentiated in the full model according to the stability of 
alignments that the line of conflict entails (see Figure 4.2). While there are elections 
in which the match in the positions of parties and their voters is somewhat lower, the 
state-market cleavage represents an identitarian divide in most cases by virtue of 
medium to low levels of polarization and rather responsive party systems. While voter 
loyalties to the ideological party blocks defined by the state-market cleavage continue 
to be strong, economic conflicts have therefore not been very strongly reinforced by 
political conflict already in the 1970s, and the situation is similar one or two decades 
 Conclusion 303 
 
later. Switzerland is an exception to this general picture, in that the party system was 
first unresponsive in the 1970s and then became more strongly polarized along this 
dimension than in the other countries at the end of the 1990s. This reflects the impact 
of the Swiss People’s Party’s specific programmatic mix, combining an extreme 




Figure 9.1: Patterns of opposition along the state-market cleavage  
in France, Switzerland, and Germany 
 
The state-market cleavage is thus kept alive by the relatively strong political identities 
associated with it, rather than by segmented patterns of opposition. For those parts of 
the electorate that do not have strong allegiances to the left and right economic 
blocks, however, the economic divide is likely to have evolved into a competitive 
political dimension, where the performance of governments is decisive for voting 
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decisions. In the long run, as established political identities fade, this is what we 
would expect for the entire electorate. In France, an overall decline in the stability of 
alignments to these blocks has already been witnessed since the 1970s, while they 
have remained rather stable in the other countries. Loyalties related to the state-
market cleavage have thus delayed, but not organized out completely the rising 
prominence of political identities related to the new cultural divide. 
As Figure 9.2 reveals, patterns of opposition have become more segmented along 
the new cultural line of conflict than along the economic divide in Switzerland and 
France. In both countries, alignments were still structured by the religious and class 
cleavages in the 1970s, and the manifestation of the left-libertarian agenda in party 
competition first led to a loss of responsiveness of their party systems, and then to 
reconfigurations of partisan alignments and parties’ political offer. By the 1990s, 
under the impact of the mobilization of the populist right, a three-block structure has 
emerged in which the poles are constituted by the left-libertarian and the 
traditionalist-communitarian blocks, with the centre right squeezed in the middle. At 
the end of this process of party system transformation, parties closely mirror the 
positions of the electorate. Right-wing populist parties are an integral part of a 
segmented pattern of oppositions in Switzerland and France, and clearly have an 
electorate of their own in ideological terms.  
The comparison between those two countries where the populist right has been 
successful with the case of Germany reveals interesting differences in the patterns of 
competition. In contrast to France and Switzerland, party oppositions in the 1970s  
were segmented along a libertarian-traditionalist line of conflict in Germany. While 
retaining responsiveness in the later elections, the party system has become less 
polarized in two of the three more recent elections, however. With the exception of 
the 1998 campaign, the pattern of oppositions has been rather centripetal in Germany. 
In the absence of a strong right-wing populist challenger, the two major parties of the 
left and right have succeeded in keeping polarization low along the cultural divide of 
the 1990s, while strong political identities related to the left and right ideological 
blocks stabilize alignments. Because the Union parties have retained the ownership of 
the issues related to traditionalism and immigration, and have the continuing ability to 
rally voters holding traditionalist-communitarian preferences, the structural potentials 
related to the new cultural conflict manifest themselves in tempered form in Germany. 
 Conclusion 305 
 
However, even in this country, it is not the state-market cleavage that hinders a 
polarization and subsequent segmentation along the new cultural divide, but rather the 
strategies of the established parties of the left and right. 
 
 
Figure 9.2: Patterns of opposition along the cultural divide (points connected by 
lines) and the EU-dimension in France, Switzerland, and Germany 
 
Two characteristics of the German party system have allowed to keep polarization 
low along the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian line of 
conflict. First of all, and contrary to France and Switzerland, there is a clear 
separation between the New Left and the Old Left in Germany. Similarly to the other 
countries, the critical juncture of the educational revolution has resulted in the 
emergence of an Ecologist party that mobilizes voters with decidedly universalistic 
outlooks. As elsewhere, this party and its electorate are situated at the libertarian-
universalistic pole of the new divide. However, while the SPD still held a similar 
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position in the political space of the 1970s, it has moved to the centre in the later 
elections. As a consequence, the libertarian-universalistic pole is politically weaker in 
Germany than in the other countries, where the entire left has undergone a New Left 
transformation. In conjuncture with the Union parties’ generally rather centrist stance, 
large parts of the electorate are thus bound into a cultural antagonism that is far less 
polarized, and more pragmatically handled than in France and Switzerland. 
The second characteristic of the German party system is that the Union parties 
alone dominate the entire right-wing spectrum. This has given the Union considerable 
flexibility in adapting its position to the moods of the populace. Whenever the 
extreme right has managed to push immigration and the national question onto the 
political stage, the Union has been able to absorb these issues by virtue of a clear 
traditionalist-communitarian stance, while moving back to the centre thereafter. This 
is visible in Figure 9.2 in the contrast between the segmented structure of oppositions 
in the 1998 election and the more identitarian pattern before and after. The crucial 
feature that distinguishes Germany from France and Switzerland in this respect is that 
there has always been competition for voters within the right in the latter two 
countries. In France, the Gaullist RPR succeeded in displacing the UDF as the 
dominant force in the right-wing spectrum by launching a first attempt at right-wing 
identity politics. While the UDF had rallied voters that were both more religious and 
more market-liberal than those of the left, the RPR early on defended French national 
sovereignty and communitarian conceptions of community. When the RPR moderated 
its position, it was overhauled by a political force that defended a much ore coherent 
traditionalist-communitarian world-view. At the same time, Jacques Chirac’s new 
Gaullist party was an early forerunner of the populist right. The same logic applies to 
the Swiss People’s Party, which also increased its voter share at the expense of the 
other established parties of the right by shifting emphasis from economic issues to 
identity politics. 
Contrary to the SPD in Germany, the left in Switzerland and France took a clearly 
adversarial position to that of the populist right, and thereby pushed the polarization 
along the new cultural divide. In this sense, the analysis confirms the argument put 
forward by Meguid (2005) that the strategies of both the mainstream left and right 
determine the chances of new polarizing parties to emerge. However, once a right-
wing populist party has emerged, it is rational for the left to pursue a polarizing 
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strategy. Both the New Left and the populist right stand to gain from the polarization 
of cultural conflicts, while the established right can only lose – either to the left-
libertarian block or to a more extreme right-wing competitor. Those parts of the 
electoral coalition rallied by the established right by virtue of its economic stance risk 
breaking apart when cultural conflicts gain centre stage, and when political conflict 
leads to a polarization at the voter level.  
As I have argued in the German case, the electoral system plays a minor role in 
inhibiting the entry of an extreme right party. As Carter (2005) has shown, the effect 
of the electoral threshold on the success of the extreme right found in other research is 
spurious, while the fate of these parties is really defined by attributes of these parties 
themselves and the strategies of the established right. The parties of the extreme right 
in Germany do not practice a culturalist differentialist discourse of the kind necessary 
for a broader traditionalist-communitarian mobilization beyond the hard core of 
exclusionist-authoritarian voters. At the same time, the patterns of opposition along 
the cultural line of conflict just discussed nonetheless point to an indirect role of the 
German electoral system on the articulation of the new cultural conflict. While the 
comparatively high electoral threshold cannot by itself explain the absence of a 
successful right-wing populist party, it has prevented an earlier fragmentation within 
the right-wing political camp, thereby giving the Union parties a lot of flexibility in 
ousting the extreme right. 
A further difference between those countries where right-wing populist parties 
have made an electoral breakthrough and Germany concerns the role orientations 
regarding European integration play in structuring partisan alignments. While the 
debates evolving round this issue have not been prominent in Germany, European 
integration has played an important role in France and especially Switzerland. Figure 
9.2 shows that the European integration project engenders the most segmented 
oppositions in the 1995 electoral contests in these countries. Where it is present, the 
populist right has been the driving force in pushing the saliency and the polarization 
of the European integration dimension. Theoretically, traditionalist-communitarian 
and anti-European sentiments are closely related, and both in Switzerland and in 
France, the populist right is also the most fervent opponent to European integration, at 
least concerning its cultural ramifications.  
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In Switzerland, opposition to the country’s rapprochement to Europe has 
constituted a second, highly important mobilization frame for the populist right. At 
the same time, the analysis has shown that this issue has only catalyzed the collective 
identity underlying the traditionalist-communitarian potential, which overlaps to a 
large degree with that engendered by Euro-scepticism. While the European 
integration dimension coincides to a considerable degree with the new cultural divide, 
it plays an important role in reinforcing the distinctiveness of the two ideological 
blocks constituted by the established and the populist right. There is some overlap in 
the orientations of voters of the established right and the populist right, and it is the 
European integration dimension that reinforces the divide between these two 
ideological blocks. Those voting for the established right are much more favourable to 
the European project. On the other hand, the rift between the left-libertarian and the 
centre-right blocks runs much deeper with respect to the libertarian-universalistic vs. 
traditionalist-communitarian divide than regarding European integration.  
 
 
The Institutionalization of a New Cultural Cleavage and Prospects  
for the Future Success of the Populist Right 
 
Where the populist right has made an electoral breakthrough, it rallies an electorate 
that is ideologically distinct by virtue of its extreme position on the cultural dimension 
of conflict. What is more, the new cultural conflict is not merely a temporary populist 
backlash against the New Left and the political establishment in general, but is rather 
firmly anchored in social structure. Higher education, which fosters the adoption of 
libertarian-universalistic values, depresses the propensity to vote for right-wing 
populist parties both in France and in Switzerland, although the effect is clearer in 
France. In that country, furthermore, those with low levels of education are especially 
likely to vote for the Front National, and the populist right therefore receives 
considerable support from the losers of the economic and cultural processes of 
modernization of the past decades.  
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At the same time, the economic preferences of the electorates of the Front National 
and the Swiss People’s Party vary. In France, the posture of the supporters of the 
populist right regarding the state-market cleavage continues to differ as a function of 
social class. Its core constituency consists of skilled workers, which have left-of-the-
centre economic preferences. The Front National’s Swiss counterpart is different in a 
number of respects. First of all, while both parties share the feature of an under-
representation of social-cultural specialists, indeed the core constituency of the New 
Left, working class voters are not over-represented in the SVP’s electorate. In this 
respect, the party is clearly an exception among right-wing populist parties, as the 
most recent evidence confirms (Minkenberg, Perrineau 2007). As a consequence of its 
ability to hold on to its traditional electorate, the SVP mobilizes a broader electoral 
coalition in class terms. Furthermore, all its voters lean to the market side of the 
economic cleavage, independently of the social class they belong to. At the same 
time, one should not mistake the SVP voters’ anti-state orientations as proof of the 
importance of market liberalism in right-wing populist parties’ mobilization, as 
Kitschelt (1995) has misleadingly concluded. In many respects, the SVP and its voters 
are less market-liberal than it appears, and it should be kept in mind that opposition to 
closer bonds with the European Union has both an element of cultural, as well as 
economic protectionism. In France, the Front National mobilizes only those who feel 
culturally and politically threatened by European integration, leaving economic fears 
related to market integration to the Communists. In Switzerland, the SVP is capable 
of mobilizing the entire EU-sceptical electorate, and in conjuncture with the 
prominence of the issue, this may explain the broader appeal and larger electoral 
success of the populist right in Switzerland, as compared to other countries.  
These differences may be taken to imply that right-wing populist parties depend to 
varying degrees on the salience of the cultural divide, where its voters are united 
across countries by virtue of their extreme position. However, the segmented pattern 
of oppositions along the cultural line of opposition in France and Switzerland suggests 
that the phase of realignment has come to an end. Right-wing populist parties in these 
two countries command the highest loyalties of all ideological blocks along the 
cultural dimension, and it is unlikely that their voters should abandon them all too 
soon. For those who have been socialized into the new structure of conflicts, cognitive 
representations of politics centre on cultural, and not economic antagonisms. 
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Considerable parts of the Front National’s electorate acclaim Jean-Marie Le Pen’s 
statement that the terms of left and right have become meaningless and that the real 
antagonism has to do with identity. What is more, given the strength the populist right 
has reached, it is rather unlikely that disputes over the proper definition of binding 
norms, over what constitutes the basis of the national community, and over the 
challenge posed to national sovereignty by European unification should recede all too 
soon. Political conflict will therefore reinforce the collective political identities 
underlying the antagonism between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-
communitarian values. 
Right-wing populist parties are sometimes ridden by the negative side-effects of 
their hierarchical internal structure, which results in occasional scissions when 
rivalling factions cannot be reconciled. The cases of the Front National and the 
Austrian Freedom Party suggest, however, that the right-wing populist potential has to 
a certain degree become independent of its organizational carrier. Freed from the 
disadvantageous consequences of its participation in government, the FPÖ has not 
fared badly in the recent elections in Austria, while Jörg Haider’s new party, 
“Bündnis Zukunft Österreich” (BZÖ), has survived as well. The leaving of Bruno 
Mégret’s faction of the Front National has not harmed Le Pen’s success in the 2002 
presidential election either. Charismatic personalities are important for any new party, 
and the supporters of the populist right do not vote for a figurehead more than the 
sympathizers of other parties, and no more do they simply express their distrust vis-à-
vis the established parties. Rather, they take political decisions by relating them to 
their own position in their two-dimensional representation of politics. While 
personalities and party structures are central for the initial mobilization of a new line 
of opposition in phases of realignment, they become less relevant in times of “normal 
politics”, when voters’ rely on their ideological schemas.  
As a result of the mobilization of the conflict between libertarian-universalistic and 
traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of justice and community, Western 
European party systems have been altered. The new cultural conflict has evolved into 
a cleavage that has displaced the religious opposition and has settled as the second 
cleavage dimension in various Western Europe party systems. Further research should 
investigate which more specific group attachments underlie and nourish the broader 
libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian political identities. While 
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the empirical parts of this book has focused on these political identities, I have offered 
conceptual tools to study the anchorage of party systems in social and role identities 
in the theoretical chapters. To be able to apply these instruments, the gathering of 
survey data that allows an analysis of voters’ embedding in social networks is a 
desideratum. Using the cruder measures of social class, there is some evidence that 
the populist right is entrenching itself in the working class milieu in countries such as 
France and Austria. As Mayer (2002) has shown, the propensity to vote for the Front 
National increases the more ties respondents have to the working class milieu. The 
populist right, similarly to Austria, for example, is thereby on its way to becoming a 
post-modern workers’ party.  
Where right-wing populist parties have failed to break into the party system so far, 
it is rather unlikely that they will be able to establish themselves in the future. In 
Germany, the established parties have collectively averted the emergence of a party 
situated at the traditionalist-communitarian extreme of the cultural dimension. As a 
consequence, the new cultural cleavage overlaps to a large degree with the economic 
divide, and proves less polarizing than in other countries. Rather than provoking a 
division within the right, cultural conflicts have resulted in the division into an New 
Left and an Old Left in Germany. Furthermore, in that country as well as more 
recently in the Netherlands, economic conflicts seem to be gaining room again, and 
new parties have emerged to the left of the Social Democrats on the state-market 
divide. The ensuing polarization of this dimension enhances its salience, and, by 
reinforcing economically defined group divisions, puts limits on the mobilization of 
new conflicts. While the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian 
cleavage has thus more or less replaced the religious cleavage everywhere in Western 
Europe, the intensity of conflict it engenders and the configurations of parties 
mobilizing around it differ. The transformation of social structure does not determine 
the shape political antagonisms will take on, because the configurations of party 
systems and the strategies of political actors impinge on the processing and political 
manifestation of changing social structures.  
In this book, I have sought to underline the importance of studying the interaction 
between structural potentials, collective beliefs, and political agency. Social structure 
does not transpose itself in politics as a matter of course, and the way social polarities 
manifest themselves politically is heavily shaped by path dependency. The historical 
312 Chapter 9 
method employed by the founding fathers of the cleavage approach made them 
sensitive to the contingency of political development and to the pitfalls of a crude 
structuralism. In quantitative empirical analysis, the lack of an understanding of how 
past and present interact is much more widespread. Adopting a “culturalist 
structuralism”, as I would call it, represents a promising way to integrate structure, the 
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Extreme left             
1988 1.00 -1.00 -0.85 1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  
2002 1.00 0.25 -1.00    -1.00  -0.33  0.33  
PCF             
1978 0.94 -0.44 -0.94 0.46  0.82   1.00 -1.00 0.82  
1988 0.91 -0.75 -1.00 1.00 -1.00 1.00 -0.80  0.20  0.92  
1995 0.75 -1.00 -0.94 0.83 -0.50 1.00 -0.50 -1.00 1.00  0.57  
2002 1.00 0.33 -0.87 0.60  0.60 -1.00  1.00  -1.00  
PSF             
1978 0.71 -0.35 -0.86 0.76  0.46   0.80 1.00 0.58  
1988 0.72 0.21 -0.48 0.98 1.00 1.00 -0.46  0.29  0.49  
1995 0.78 -0.10 -0.86 0.75 0.95 0.94 -0.44 -0.58 0.71  0.46  
2002 0.63 0.34 -0.67 0.46  1.00 -1.00  0.92  0.65  
Ecologists             
2002 0.88 -0.25 -1.00 0.43  1.00 -1.00  -0.14  -0.27  
MRG             
1978 0.77 0.17 -0.58 0.20  0.50   1.00 0.67 0.94  
1995 0.56 0.00 -1.00 1.00 1.00  -1.00 1.00   1.00  
UDF             
1978 0.23 0.84 -0.37 0.07  1.00   0.92 0.61 0.64  
1988 0.16 0.87 0.30 0.82 1.00 0.94 0.78  0.76  0.84  
1995 -0.33 1.00 -0.71 1.00 0.56  1.00  1.00  0.75  
2002 -0.22 0.64 -0.28 0.40  1.00 -1.00  1.00  0.71  
RPR             
1978 -0.05 0.85 -0.04 -0.72  1.00   1.00 0.33 0.04  
1988 0.20 1.00 0.32 0.12 0.91 0.85 0.56  0.72  0.09  
1995 0.24 0.60 -0.47 0.26 0.59 0.90 0.76 0.55 1.00  0.45  
2002 0.05 0.94 0.21 0.43  1.00 -0.85  0.96  0.00  
FRONT             
1988 -0.05 0.88 -0.71 -0.79 1.00 -0.14 1.00  1.00  0.73  
1995 0.29 0.75 0.00 -0.69 -1.00 -1.00 0.68 0.79 1.00  0.64  
2002 -0.13 1.00 0.41 -0.71  0.71 0.83  0.77  0.80  
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Table A.2: Issue salience for French parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during 
each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election). 
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Extreme left               
1988 52.1 2.1 27.1 6.3 0.0 4.2 2.1  2.1  4.2  48 2.4 
2002 36.1 13.1 34.4 0.0  0.0 1.6  4.9  9.8  61 5.9 
PCF               
1978 27.7 11.1 28.5 17.4  4.7   0.9 0.4 9.4  235 16.6 
1988 38.2 4.8 17.0 9.1 4.2 7.9 12.1  3.0  3.6  165 8.3 
1995 22.2 1.9 28.7 11.1 3.7 7.4 3.7 5.6 2.8  13.0  108 6.0 
2002 43.2 8.1 20.3 6.8  6.8 8.1  4.1  2.7  74 7.2 
PSF               
1978 34.5 10.2 24.8 10.6  4.3   3.1 0.9 11.5  322 22.7 
1988 23.4 4.2 19.2 12.5 8.7 15.4 6.3  3.8  6.6  745 37.7 
1995 27.7 3.3 22.3 6.6 6.1 5.2 5.0 3.0 5.3  15.5  638 35.5 
2002 31.1 13.2 12.6 10.8  7.8 4.5  15.0  5.1  334 32.3 
Ecologists               
2002 20.2 7.1 16.7 8.3  9.5 3.6  21.4  13.1  84 8.1 
MRG               
1978 26.3 4.7 34.2 7.9  6.3   1.1 3.2 16.3  190 13.4 
1995 23.1 10.3 20.5 15.4 7.7 0.0 15.4 2.6 0.0  5.1  39 2.2 
UDF               
1978 20.0 5.5 23.0 17.3  5.5   5.7 10.1 12.9  456 32.2 
1988 19.1 9.4 18.8 6.1 8.0 18.5 2.5  9.9  7.7  362 18.3 
1995 8.6 8.6 20.0 11.4 22.9 0.0 2.9 0.0 2.9  22.9  35 1.9 
2002 20.7 12.6 18.4 11.5  4.6 8.0  16.1  8.0  87 8.4 
RPR               
1978 29.3 9.3 21.4 17.2  4.7   6.0 1.4 10.7  215 15.2 
1988 21.1 3.4 19.4 11.2 4.6 8.2 13.3  11.8  7.2  475 24.0 
1995 20.8 10.9 20.1 7.0 9.8 6.3 2.1 3.9 4.4  14.7  816 45.4 
2002 20.1 11.7 18.2 7.7  4.0 4.7  17.9  15.7  274 26.5 
FRONT               
1988 10.4 7.1 3.8 11.5 2.7 3.8 33.9  14.8  12.0  183 9.3 
1995 12.3 7.0 11.4 15.8 8.8 1.8 21.9 6.1 5.3  9.6  114 6.3 
2002 13.4 4.2 14.3 11.8  5.9 20.2  21.8  8.4  119 11.5 
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Ecologists             
1994 0.00 0.60 -1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.11  1.00  -0.14  
1998 0.23 1.00 -0.25 0.47  1.00 -0.60 0.00 -0.60 0.92 1.00  
2002 0.53 0.00 -0.13 0.53 0.56 0.42 -1.00 -0.81  1.00 0.00 -0.20 
SPÖ             
1975 0.59 -0.40 -0.30 0.91  0.69   0.81 0.00 0.29 0.90 
1994 0.86 0.46 -0.15 0.65 0.80 0.75 0.66 -0.32 0.87  0.29 1.00 
1998 0.57 0.89 0.26 0.44 1.00 0.71 -0.25 -0.74 0.50 0.76 0.74  
2002 0.69 0.67 -0.58 0.48 0.29 0.64 -1.00 -0.93  0.89 0.74 0.82 
LIF             
1994 1.00  0.86 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.00 -1.00 1.00  -0.45  
1998 0.09 1.00 0.83 0.60 1.00 0.83  0.57 -1.00 1.00 0.40  
ÖVP             
1975 0.89 0.50 -0.37 0.50  0.14   1.00 1.00 0.37 0.80 
1994 -0.34 0.88 0.43 0.21 0.94 0.26 -0.14 -0.14 0.65  0.34 1.00 
1998 0.15 1.00 -0.04 -0.51 0.61 0.73  -0.28 1.00 0.47 0.70  
2002 0.14 0.83 0.14 0.34 0.50 0.68 0.38 0.30  0.73 0.18 0.00 
FPÖ             
1975 -0.71 0.73 -0.17 -1.00  -1.00   1.00 1.00 0.82 1.00 
1994 -0.20 0.50 -0.13 0.25 0.00 0.50 0.67 0.00 1.00  0.54  
1998 -0.23 0.56 -0.05 -0.55 -0.13 1.00 0.60 0.38 1.00 1.00 0.70  
2002 0.38 1.00 -0.50 -0.83 0.20 -1.00 1.00 0.29  1.00 0.35 0.54 
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Table A.4: Issue salience for Austrian parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category 
during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election). 
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Ecologists               
1994 4.9 12.2 2.4 4.9 2.4 17.1 22.0 0.0 17.1  17.1 0.0 41 5.2 
1998 15.9 2.4 14.6 23.2 0.0 7.3 6.1 7.3 6.1 14.6 2.4  82 7.6 
2002 11.0 1.3 2.6 11.0 5.8 8.4 4.5 11.6  27.1 10.3 6.5 155 15.8 
SPÖ               
1975 12.8 8.7 12.5 6.4  15.2   6.1 4.1 9.9 24.2 343 53.6 
1994 10.5 7.8 12.3 17.7 6.0 7.2 5.7 4.2 15.9  5.7 6.9 333 42.0 
1998 14.7 5.0 17.2 11.4 1.1 6.6 1.1 10.0 8.9 9.4 14.7  361 33.6 
2002 25.9 8.9 7.0 8.5 2.6 10.4 1.5 10.0  14.1 7.0 4.1 270 27.6 
LIF               
1994 2.2 0.0 31.1 26.7 4.4 2.2 4.4 2.2 2.2  24.4 0.0 45 5.7 
1998 24.0 9.4 24.0 5.2 3.1 12.5 0.0 7.3 1.0 3.1 10.4  96 8.9 
ÖVP               
1975 17.5 11.4 22.4 4.4  20.2   1.8 0.4 15.4 6.6 228 35.6 
1994 17.4 5.6 17.7 12.5 5.6 6.2 2.3 6.9 12.1  11.5 2.3 305 38.5 
1998 21.8 5.8 6.9 19.6 5.0 11.0 0.0 16.0 2.8 4.1 6.9  362 33.7 
2002 20.7 10.6 8.5 7.5 10.9 7.2 10.9 7.2  11.6 4.4 0.5 387 39.5 
FPÖ               
1975 10.1 21.7 17.4 1.4  7.2   7.2 13.0 15.9 5.8 69 10.8 
1994 14.5 5.8 11.6 2.9 1.4 2.9 8.7 2.9 10.1  39.1 0.0 69 8.7 
1998 17.4 5.2 12.2 11.6 2.3 5.8 12.2 9.3 6.4 1.7 15.7  172 16.0 
2002 23.4 3.6 8.4 7.2 13.8 0.6 4.2 12.6  12.6 6.0 7.8 167 17.1 
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Ecologists             
1991 0.83 -1.00 -0.33 0.63 -0.81  -1.00 -0.73 -0.50 0.85 0.50 -0.84 
1995                       -0.33 0.00 -0.50  -1.00 -1.00  0.65 -0.75 -1.00 
SP             
1975 0.77 1.00 -0.71 0.71  1.00  0.50 -1.00 0.83 0.32  
1991 0.74 -0.09 -0.20 0.69 0.76  -0.41 -0.75 -1.00 0.81 0.11 -0.20 
1995 0.89 0.20 0.14 0.52 0.56  0.00 -0.15  0.95 -0.55 0.08 
1999 0.83  -0.25 1.00 1.00 0.73 -0.78   0.58 -0.33 0.83 
CVP             
1975 0.88 1.00 -0.22 0.78  1.00  0.25 0.25 1.00 0.41  
1991 0.67 0.14 0.20 0.11 0.55  -0.14 -0.40 1.00 0.62 0.58 0.67 
1995 0.33 1.00 0.53 -0.25 0.33  -0.33 0.50  0.70 0.46 0.24 
1999 1.00 0.56 -0.22 0.84 1.00 0.94 0.64 -1.00 0.60 0.57 -1.00 1.00 
Liberals             
1975 0.26 0.78 0.00 0.47  0.64  0.50 0.88 -0.11 0.22  
1991 0.47 0.55 0.87 0.37 0.43  0.67 0.76 0.92 0.74 0.59 0.60 
1995 -0.56 0.93 0.93 0.09 0.44  0.14 0.75  0.50 0.21 1.00 
1999 0.25 0.96 0.85 0.80 1.00 0.39 0.56 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.60 0.91 
SVP             
1975 -0.25 1.00 -0.40 0.41  1.00  1.00 1.00 0.63 0.09  
1991 -0.32 0.71 0.23 -0.18 -0.82  0.71 0.75 1.00 -0.10 0.20 -0.10 
1995 0.19 0.94 0.71 -0.87 -0.86  0.83 0.88  0.92 0.46 -0.60 
1999 -0.80 1.00 0.79 -0.26 -0.91 -0.60 0.69 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.83 1.00 
Extreme right             
1975 0.27 1.00 -1.00 -0.03  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  
1991 -0.50 0.75 1.00 -0.58 -1.00  0.93 0.56 1.00 -0.18 1.00 0.33 
1995 -1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.25 -1.00  0.91 1.00  -1.00 0.60 -0.67 
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Table A.6: Issue salience for Swiss parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during 
each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election). 




lib. Europe Culture 
Anti-









Ecologists               
1991 3.4 1.1 1.7 9.1 30.7  2.8 6.3 1.1 18.8 3.4 21.6 176 12.9 
1995 0.0 0.0 7.7 20.5 10.3  2.6 2.6  43.6 5.1 7.7 39 4.0 
SP               
1975 19.1 7.8 12.2 25.2  3.5  9.6 2.6 5.2 14.8  115 18.9 
1991 13.5 13.1 8.2 18.4 9.4  7.0 9.0 0.4 13.1 3.7 4.1 244 17.8 
1995 20.2 2.7 15.3 18.0 4.9  1.1 7.1  12.0 12.0 6.6 183 18.8 
1999 13.6 0.0 9.1 10.6 3.0 22.7 13.6 0.0 0.0 9.1 9.1 9.1 66 8.7 
CVP               
1975 14.4 9.0 8.1 28.8  5.4  3.6 7.2 3.6 19.8  111 18.3 
1991 10.6 2.7 3.9 19.6 15.3  8.2 3.9 2.7 23.1 5.1 4.7 255 18.7 
1995 9.7 18.2 12.3 10.4 1.9  3.9 1.3  21.4 8.4 12.3 154 15.8 
1999 7.6 11.0 12.4 17.2 2.8 17.9 4.8 2.8 3.4 10.3 2.1 7.6 145 19.0 
Liberals               
1975 18.6 8.0 25.2 8.4  4.9  7.1 7.5 4.0 16.4  226 37.2 
1991 10.4 8.8 12.0 13.1 10.9  6.1 4.5 6.7 14.1 10.7 2.7 375 27.4 
1995 7.8 9.1 26.0 13.9 11.7  6.1 3.5  1.7 12.6 7.8 231 23.7 
1999 6.5 18.6 20.6 4.0 2.4 16.6 12.6 0.8 3.6 3.2 2.0 8.9 247 32.4 
SVP               
1975 8.9 8.9 11.1 24.4  4.4  8.9 12.2 8.9 12.2  90 14.8 
1991 12.6 3.5 11.1 17.1 11.1  20.6 5.0 1.5 12.6 2.5 2.5 199 14.6 
1995 6.2 12.5 2.4 10.7 46.0  4.2 5.9  2.1 8.3 1.7 289 29.6 
1999 3.3 22.0 6.3 6.3 7.2 7.9 28.0 7.2 3.6 2.0 3.0 3.3 304 39.9 
Extreme right               
1975 16.7 1.5 4.5 48.5  6.1  7.6 3.0 3.0 9.1  66 10.9 
1991 1.7 6.8 4.2 16.1 9.3  22.9 6.8 3.4 18.6 5.1 5.1 118 8.6 
1995 6.3 10.1 5.1 10.1 10.1  27.8 6.3  3.8 12.7 7.6 79 8.1 
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GroenLinks             
1972 0.61 0.00 -1.00 1.00  1.00  -1.00 -1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1994 0.56            -0.50 0.25            0.00 -1.00  1.00 1.00  -1.00 
2002 1.00   -0.50  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 0.56 
2003 0.43 -0.14 0.50 1.00   -1.00  0.50 1.00 -0.33 -0.26 
PvdA             
1972 0.79 -0.15 -1.00 0.81  1.00  -0.59 -0.45 1.00 1.00 -0.33 
1994 0.33 0.10 0.14 0.33 0.78 0.39 -0.16  0.04 0.75  -0.33 
1998 0.74 -0.38 -0.50 0.43 -0.23 0.89 -0.50 -0.50 0.53 1.00  0.80 
2002 0.23  -0.41 -0.31  0.14 -0.19 -0.36 0.60 0.24 0.00 0.74 
2003 0.30 -0.33 -0.60 -0.33   0.10  0.19 -0.42 0.05  
D66             
1972 0.69 -1.00 -1.00 0.63  1.00  -1.00 -1.00 0.20 1.00 0.00 
1994 0.32 -1.00 1.00 0.00  1.00 0.00  0.25 1.00  -0.25 
1998 0.63 1.00 1.00 0.68 1.00 0.66 -0.96 -1.00 -0.04 0.75  1.00 
2002 0.23   -0.32  0.11 0.00 -0.93 1.00 1.00 0.50  
CDA             
1972 0.59 -0.07 -0.52 0.50  0.59  0.00 0.80 0.98 0.57 0.65 
1994 -0.10 0.75 0.55 0.58 -0.17 0.67 0.62  0.36 0.81  0.25 
1998 -0.67  0.33 0.19 -0.20 1.00 -1.00 1.00 0.78 1.00  1.00 
2002 0.00  -1.00 0.00  0.63 -1.00 0.21 1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.00 
2003 0.24 0.04 -0.40 -0.17   0.04  0.41 -0.10 0.10 0.40 
VVD             
1972 -0.39 0.64 0.43 0.40  0.17  0.06 0.90 1.00 0.58 1.00 
1994 -0.43 0.43 1.00 -0.56 -0.50 -0.38 0.50  0.64 -0.08  -1.00 
1998 -0.33 0.66 0.12 -0.30 -0.06 1.00 0.57 0.90 -0.05 -0.72  0.07 
2002 -0.33  0.35 0.24  1.00 1.00 0.14 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.60 
2003 -0.17 0.13 0.27 -0.31   0.17  0.17 0.50 0.38 0.33 
LPF             
2002 -0.33  0.33 -0.40  0.17 -0.28 0.08 -0.13 -1.00 0.47            
2003 0.00 0.57            -0.22   -0.17  0.06 -0.60 0.38 -0.65 
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Table A.8: Issue salience for Dutch parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during 
each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election). 
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GroenLinks               
1972 31.8 4.5 2.3 2.3  18.2  18.2 4.5 6.8 6.8 4.5 44 5.6 
1994 20.5 0.0 10.3 10.3 0.0 5.1 10.3  5.1 28.2  10.3 39 5.9 
2002 26.7  0.0 13.3  10.0 3.3 3.3 0.0 3.3 13.3 26.7 30 4.0 
2003 14.6 14.6 2.1 2.1   10.4  8.3 2.1 6.3 39.6 48 6.1 
PvdA               
1972 25.5 12.7 2.9 7.8  12.7  15.7 10.8 2.9 5.9 2.9 102 13.1 
1994 20.0 4.7 3.3 7.0 4.2 20.9 11.6  16.7 10.2  1.4 215 32.3 
1998 13.6 11.4 8.6 10.0 7.9 10.0 5.7 5.7 14.3 5.7  7.1 140 29.3 
2002 7.3  5.8 8.8  2.6 7.7 44.2 5.5 7.7 2.2 8.4 274 36.5 
2003 27.8 10.0 5.6 3.3   5.6  8.9 6.7 32.2 0.0 90 11.4 
D66               
1972 36.7 4.1 2.0 8.2  12.2  10.2 2.0 10.2 10.2 4.1 49 6.3 
1994 26.8 2.4 2.4 9.8 0.0 4.9 9.8  19.5 9.8  14.6 41 6.2 
1998 17.0 0.7 5.0 25.5 2.8 11.3 9.2 2.1 19.9 5.7  0.7 141 29.5 
2002 18.3  0.0 23.2  11.0 2.4 26.8 2.4 1.2 14.6 0.0 82 10.9 
CDA               
1972 26.9 7.2 8.8 12.0  10.4  4.5 6.6 6.6 11.7 5.3 376 48.1 
1994 29.3 7.8 7.8 10.6 7.4 2.1 6.0  18.7 7.4  2.8 283 42.5 
1998 16.2 0.0 8.1 21.6 13.5 2.7 2.7 5.4 24.3 2.7  2.7 37 7.7 
2002 16.2  2.7 24.3  10.8 2.7 18.9 10.8 2.7 8.1 2.7 37 4.9 
2003 22.9 9.9 4.0 16.2   4.7  22.9 11.5 4.0 4.0 253 32.1 
VVD               
1972 25.2 11.9 6.7 11.4  5.7  15.2 9.5 2.9 9.0 2.4 210 26.9 
1994 8.0 8.0 5.7 10.2 9.1 4.5 34.1  12.5 6.8  1.1 88 13.2 
1998 13.1 10.0 10.6 6.3 21.3 1.3 8.8 3.1 6.3 5.6  13.8 160 33.5 
2002 10.6  9.2 13.4  2.8 4.2 14.8 33.1 5.6 2.8 3.5 142 18.9 
2003 21.2 8.8 6.9 12.4   5.5  18.9 5.5 18.0 2.8 217 27.5 
LPF               
2002 22.7  4.9 22.7  3.2 10.8 7.0 17.3 1.1 10.3 0.0 185 24.7 
2003 2.2 7.8 0.0 10.0   6.7  18.3 5.6 9.4 40.0 180 22.8 
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Labour             
1974 0.92 0.23 -0.28 1.00 -1.00 1.00   -0.67 -1.00 1.00 0.82 
1992 0.48 -0.53 -0.88 -0.35  0.56   -0.33 1.00 -0.07  
1997 0.41 0.29 -0.10 0.10 -0.50 0.68   0.86 0.81 0.21 0.70 
2001 0.60 -0.03 -0.01 0.67 0.37 0.55 0.09  0.86 0.48 0.70  
Libdem             
1974 1.00 -1.00 -0.27            -1.00                         -1.00 1.00 1.00 
1992 1.00 -0.80 0.60 1.00  0.80              1.00 0.79  
1997 0.03 -1.00 -0.73 0.80 0.89 1.00   0.33 1.00 0.54 0.78 
2001 1.00            0.60 -1.00            1.00             1.00 0.00 1.00  
Conservatives             
1974 0.90 0.33 0.09 -0.16 -0.50 -0.05   0.38 -0.77 0.60 0.86 
1992 0.60 0.48 0.35 -0.22  0.61   1.00 0.47 -0.75  
1997 0.11 0.25 0.48 -0.21 -0.79 0.43   0.93 1.00 0.24 0.42 
2001 0.30 0.46 0.23 0.23 -0.79 0.00 0.64  1.00 -0.71 -0.20  
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Table A.10: Issue salience for British parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during 
each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election). 
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Labour               
1974 15.0 7.5 38.7 2.9 11.6 3.5   3.5 2.3 8.7 6.4 173 32.3 
1992 29.4 7.2 22.2 7.7  18.6   1.4 1.4 12.2  221 38.2 
1997 10.5 5.7 18.8 11.1 12.0 10.3   15.7 4.8 7.4 3.7 542 44.4 
2001 13.3 3.5 20.8 4.9 13.8 7.2 2.6  13.6 7.2 13.1  428 66.7 
Libdem               
1974 24.3 13.5 29.7 0.0 2.7 0.0   0.0 2.7 24.3 2.7 37 6.9 
1992 8.2 20.4 10.2 12.2  10.2   0.0 4.1 34.7  49 8.5 
1997 12.2 3.0 9.1 16.5 5.5 6.1   9.1 20.7 7.9 9.8 164 13.4 
2001 30.0 0.0 25.0 5.0 0.0 25.0 0.0  5.0 5.0 5.0  20 3.1 
Conservatives               
1974 8.0 2.8 33.4 11.7 3.7 5.8   8.9 9.2 3.1 13.5 326 60.8 
1992 14.9 15.6 16.9 12.0  14.9   10.4 4.9 10.4  308 53.3 
1997 15.5 2.3 11.2 11.0 18.4 7.8   15.9 5.2 5.6 7.0 516 42.2 
2001 11.9 7.2 6.7 6.7 25.8 10.3 11.3  8.8 3.6 7.7  194 30.2 
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PDS             
1994                                                                              -1.00 -0.79 1.00 1.00            
1998 0.85            0.06 0.80  1.00            -0.67 -0.33 0.83 0.00 0.50 
2002 1.00 0.00 -0.96 1.00                          1.00 1.00            
Ecologists             
1994 0.86 -1.00 -0.70 0.71  1.00 -1.00 -1.00  1.00 0.75 0.50 
1998 0.58 1.00 -0.56 0.67  0.29 -1.00 0.04 -0.63 0.82  -0.13 
2002 0.33 0.60 0.11 0.72   -1.00  0.00 0.98 1.00 0.00 
SPD             
1976 0.27 -0.63 -0.29 0.66  0.80  -0.90 0.21 1.00  0.63 
1994 0.34 0.87 -0.93 0.45 0.21 0.50 -1.00 -0.33 0.64 0.50 1.00 0.76 
1998 0.32 0.40 0.00 0.42  0.83 1.00 0.17 0.83 0.86 0.27 0.79 
2002 0.59 -0.29 0.22 0.40   -0.44  0.63 0.65 0.43 0.78 
FDP             
1976 0.07 -0.78 0.46 0.79  0.56  -0.63 0.00 0.16  -0.71 
1994 0.06 0.33 0.68 0.36 -0.09 0.00 -0.75 0.60 0.00 0.60 0.43  
1998 -0.52 0.92 0.96 0.87  0.60 -0.56 0.07 0.69 0.00 0.71 0.71 
2002 -0.13 1.00 0.57 0.54   0.33  -0.50 -1.00 0.88 0.67 
Union*             
1976 0.30 0.40 0.56 -0.24  0.33  0.45 0.87   -0.56 
1994 0.20 0.73 0.54 0.17 0.63 0.60 0.85 0.88 0.64 0.76 0.72 0.58 
1998 0.09 0.59 0.61 -0.08  1.00 0.94 1.00 0.97 -0.05 0.40 0.29 
2002 0.43 0.58 0.22 0.15   0.64  0.91 -0.03 0.85 0.25 
CDU** 
1976 0.48 0.59 0.55 -0.16  0.00  0.33 0.89  0.20 
 
-0.56 
1994 -0.02 0.57 0.32 0.49 0.86 0.43 0.85 0.86 0.57 0.77 0.60 0.58 
1998 0.13 0.28 0.43 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.91 1.00 0.97 0.02 1.00 0.29 
2002 0.30 0.56 0.20 0.44 1.00 1.00 0.56 1.00 0.75 -0.18 1.00 -0.20 
CSU** 
1976 -0.10 0.00 0.67 -0.38  0.50  1.00 0.83    
1994 0.64 0.81 0.80 0.14 0.13 1.00  1.00 1.00 0.70 1.00  
1998 -0.07 0.96 1.00 -0.06  1.00 1.00  1.00 -1.00 0.36  
2002 0.63 0.63 0.38 0.23 1.00 0.33 0.67 1.00 0.97 0.23 0.83 1.00 
* Used for the MDS-Analysis in Chapter 2    ** Used in Chapter 8 
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Table A.12: Issue salience for German parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category 
during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election). 
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PDS               
1994 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 66.7 4.8 23.8 0.0 21 2.2 
1998 19.7 0.0 27.3 15.2  3.0 0.0 9.1 4.5 9.1 6.1 6.1 66 5.8 
2002 5.3 10.5 63.2 5.3   0.0  0.0 5.3 10.5 0.0 19 1.7 
Ecologists               
1994 13.5 3.8 9.6 13.5 0.0 1.9 3.8 7.7 0.0 23.1 15.4 7.7 52 5.4 
1998 18.9 1.8 4.9 18.3  4.3 7.9 7.3 9.8 17.1 0.0 9.8 164 14.5 
2002 11.2 4.7 8.4 16.8   0.9  6.5 43.0 6.5 1.9 107 9.7 
SPD               
1976 17.5 3.4 13.2 30.3  4.3  4.3 10.3 0.4  16.2 234 38.4 
1994 18.3 6.7 10.3 17.9 6.3 5.4 1.3 6.7 6.3 9.4 4.0 7.6 224 23.1 
1998 30.6 3.5 9.7 13.5  4.2 1.4 2.1 16.0 11.1 3.8 4.2 288 25.5 
2002 18.0 8.9 18.8 29.3   1.8  9.1 6.7 2.8 4.6 505 45.9 
FDP               
1976 15.7 5.1 27.0 15.7  9.6  2.2 6.2 10.7  7.9 178 29.2 
1994 13.1 8.8 18.2 20.4 8.0 7.3 5.8 3.6 5.8 3.6 5.1 0.0 137 14.1 
1998 18.2 6.8 14.2 25.6  2.8 10.2 4.0 7.4 2.8 4.0 4.0 176 15.6 
2002 15.2 34.3 20.0 12.4   2.9  3.8 1.0 7.6 2.9 105 9.5 
Union*               
1976 16.7 12.6 19.7 31.8  1.5  5.6 7.6 0.0  4.5 198 32.5 
1994 16.1 7.5 12.5 14.2 9.5 1.9 2.4 4.5 10.7 10.5 5.4 4.9 535 55.2 
1998 17.9 11.5 5.1 21.6  3.9 8.3 1.8 15.4 6.7 3.4 4.4 435 38.5 
2002 22.3 11.5 13.5 15.1   9.9  12.4 9.6 3.6 2.2 364 33.1 
CDU** 
1976 14.7 10.9 21.2 32.1  0.6  5.8 5.8  3.2 5.8 156 24.3 
1994 14.7 3.5 9.4 17.5 8.9 1.8 3.3 5.6 12.2 11.7 5.1 6.6 395 40.8 
1998 18.6 8.0 4.4 22.8 0.9 4.7 6.8 2.4 17.4 8.0 0.3 5.6 338 29.8 
2002 24.2 12.6 19.8 12.1 5.3 1.0 4.4 1.5 5.8 10.6 0.5 2.4 207 17.4 
CSU** 
1976 21.3 17.0 12.8 27.7  4.3  4.3 12.8    47 7.3 
1994 20.0 18.6 21.4 5.0 11.4 2.1  1.4 6.4 7.1 6.4  140 14.5 
1998 15.0 23.0 7.0 17.0  1.0 13.0  8.0 2.0 14.0  100 8.8 
2002 17.2 8.9 4.4 16.7 1.1 1.7 15.0 1.1 18.3 7.2 6.7 1.7 180 15.2 












1978: Enquête post-électorale française, 1978 (q0062) 
1988: Enquête post-électorale française, 1988 (q0601) 
1995: Enquête post-électorale française, 1995 (q0891) 





1975: Attitudes politiques 1975 (20)  
[part of “Political Action – An Eight Nation Study”] 
1991: VOX-Analyse der Nationalratswahlen 1991(Longchamp/Hardmeier) 
1995: Swiss electoral study 1995 (1815) 





1976: Wahlstudie 1976 (ZA0823) 
1994: Nachwahlstudie 1994 (ZA 2601) 
1998: Politische Einstellungen, politische Partizipation und Wählerverhalten im 
vereinigten Deutschland 1998 (ZA 3066) 





Indicators Used for the Operationalization of  









var description category 
t26 supprimer avantages pour réduire inégalités sociales welfare 
t27 élargir le secteur nationalisé ecolib 
t29 limiter augmentation du niveau de vie pour lutter contre 
l’inflation 
ecolib 
t30 interdire les licenciements ecolib 
t71 supprimer le droit de grève ? ecolib 
t64 fier d’être français ? cultlib 
t73 pouvoir prendre la pilule avant la majorité ? cultlib 
t77 rôle de l’école : discipline ou esprit critique ? cultlib 





var description category 
q1a6 Salaires égaux: n’encouragent pas à travailler ecolib 
q4 Difficultés économiques: Etat doit-il contrôler entreprises ? ecolib 
q31a2 Etat : devrait garantir revenu minimum welfare 
q31a9 Rétablir impôt sur grandes fortunes welfare 
q2a1 Couple non marié : condamnable ? trad. values 
q2a2 Avortement : condamnable ? trad. values 
q2a3 Infidélité : condamnable ? trad. values 
q2a4 Homosexualité : condamnable ? trad. values 
q31a6 Femme : faite pour élever les enfants ? trad. values 
q31a7 Société : il faut une hiérarchie cultlib 
q10 Rôle de l’école : discipline ou esprit critique ? cultlib 
q1a4 Fier d’être français cultlib 
q31a5 Juifs ont trop de pouvoir en France cultlib 
q31a8 Normal que les musulmans en France aient des mosquées cultlib 
q1a9 Trop d’immigrés en France immigration 






var description category 
q36 priorité: compétitivité ou situation des salaries ecolib 
q20a2 l’Etat intervient-il trop ou pas assez dans la vie économique ecolib 
q7a1 trop d’immigrés en France immigration 
q7a6 on ne se sent plus chez soi comme avant immigration 
q7a3 homosexualité est acceptable cultlib 
q7a5 normal que les musulmans en France aient des mosquées cultlib 
q7a7 normal qu’une femme puisse avorter cultlib 
q22a1 rôle de l’école : discipline ou esprit critique cultlib 
q20a1 rôle de la femme (à la maison ou même rôle que hommes) cultlib 
Positive/negative feelings 
var description category 
q21a4 compétition ecolib 
q21a5 profit ecolib 
q21a6 syndicat ecolib 
q21a7 nationalisation ecolib 
q21a12 privatisation ecolib 
q21a2 féminisme cultlib 
q21a8 autorité cultlib 
q21a13 islam immigration 
 
 
2002, Wave 2 
 
var description category 
xq237 interdire les licenciements ecolib 
xq239 Difficultés économiques: Etat doit-il contrôler 
entreprises ? 
ecolib 
xq255 recherches sur le génôme humain cultlib 
xq58 rôle de l’école : discipline ou esprit critique cultlib 
xq39p2_4 les juifs ont trop de pouvoir en France cultlib 
xq39p2_1 trop d’immigrés en France immigration 







var description category 
v38 scale state vs. free market ecolib 
v53 issue importance: looking after old people welfare 
v65 issue importance: providing good medical care welfare 
v68 issue importance: providing adequate housing welfare 
v80 issue importance: trying to even out differences in wealth 
between people 
welfare 
v56 issue importance: guaranteeing equal rights for men and 
women 
cultlib 
v83 issue importance: giving more aid to Third World cultlib 
v156 approves of people taking drugs? trad. values 
v157 approves of people lacking respect for the national flag? trad. values 
v158 approves of people living in a hippie community? trad. values 
v74 issue importance: guaranteeing neighbourhoods safe from 
crime 
law and order 
333 
v155 approves of people refusing to go the army? army 
v201 Should Switzerland join the EC? EU 





var description category 
val2 Verringerung oder Erhöhung der Sozialausgaben? welfare 
val8 Erhöhung oder Verminderung der Steuern auf hohe Einkommen? welfare 
val1 Für starke Armee oder Schweiz ohne Armee? army 
val3 Für EU-Beitritt oder Alleingang der Schweiz? EU 
val4 Für gleiche Chancen für Ausländer oder für bessere Chancen für 
Schweizer? 
immigration 





var description category 
rp15495a Soll der Staat in die Wirtschaft eingreifen oder sich auf den 
Markt verlassen? 
ecolib 
rp15420a Verringerung oder Erhöhung der Sozialausgaben? welfare 
rp15480a Erhöhung oder Verminderung der Steuern auf hohe 
Einkommen? 
welfare 
rp15410a Für starke Armee oder Schweiz ohne Armee? army 
rp15430a Für EU-Beitritt oder Alleingang der Schweiz? EU 
rp15440a Für gleiche Chancen für Ausländer oder für bessere Chancen 
für Schweizer? 
immigration 
rp15450a Traditionen verteidigen oder in Frage stellen? cultlib 











var description category 
v503 Staatliche Kontrollen vs. wirtschaftliche Entscheidungen ecolib 
v505 Wohlfahrtsstaat: Staat vs. Eigenverantwortung welfare 
v504 Öffentliche Ordnung vs. persönliche Freiheit cultlib 
v518 Einstellung Scheidungsrecht cultlib 
v519 Einstellung Abtreibungsrecht cultlib 





var description category 
v39 Skala zur staatlichen Wirtschaftsbelebung ecolib 
v42 Skala zu staatlichem Wohnungsangebot ecolib 
v104 Zustimmung, dass Gehorsam und Disziplin wichtig cultlib 
v100 Mehr oder weniger Geld für Renten/Pensionen welfare 
v27 Wichtigkeit, dass Staat für mehr Wohnungen sorgt welfare 
v30 Wichtigkeit Zuzug von Ausländern zu regeln immig 
334 
v41 Skala: Ausländerzuzug erleichtern/erschweren immig 
v44 Müssen sich Ausländer anpassen? immig 
v45 Ausländer zurückschicken? immig 
v46 Politische Rechte für Ausländer immig 





var description category 
v177a Verantwortung Staat Arbeitsplatz für jeden ecolib 
v350b Einstellung Nationalisierung wichtiger Unternehmen ecolib 
v176c Wichtigkeit Gleichstellung cultlib 
v350a Stolz Deutscher zu sein cultlib 
v350c Wieder Mut zu einem starken Nationalgefühl cultlib 
v174b Skala Immigration immig 
v350l Überfremdung durch Ausländer immig 
v350n Zustimmung Ausländer sollten Landsleute heiraten immig 





var description category 
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